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Abstract 
The events surrounding the collapse of the second Labour government in the summer 
of 1931 represented a watershed in twentieth century British politics. They brought to 
a close the ‘uneasy equilibrium’ which had characterised the country’s political life 
since 1918, ensconcing a Conservative-dominated National government in power for 
the remainder of a decade marked by continuing economic uncertainty and the 
mounting threat of war. They also precipitated a crisis of political identity within the 
Labour party. Deprived of the founding generation of its leadership and with its 
parliamentary strength decimated, the ‘gradualist’ approach which had long 
characterised its politics was seemingly left in tatters. Yet Labour returned to office in 
1940 as a key partner in the wartime coalition; in 1945, it secured a sweeping electoral 
landslide of its own, allowing it to implement much of its traditional programme. It is 
the contention of this thesis that the party’s recovery during the 1930s was made 
possible by the crucial contribution of the trade unions. With Labour’s political 
leadership substantially weakened after 1931, the unions assumed a pivotal role in 
shaping the party’s direction, to the extent that by 1940, its political culture, 
organisation and policy had been decisively remade. The identity which developed in 
these years continued to characterise Labour’s politics for a generation, through the 
‘high tide’ of the 1945 Attlee government, into the 1950s and beyond. This was a 
hugely significant and underappreciated achievement in the context of the destruction 
of labour movements that attended the retreat of political democracy across much of 
Europe during the 1930s. This thesis seeks to investigate and understand the crucial 
contribution of the trade unions to this redevelopment of Labour’s political culture 
through an exploration of key aspects of the party’s organisation in the period 1931-
1940.  
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A note on money 
 
 
 
 
Reference is made throughout this thesis to sums of money, for example, trade union 
political levies and general election expenses. All sums referred to are those of the 
time; when the British system of money was based on pounds (£), shillings (s.) and 
pence (d.). 12d. was equal to 1s. and 20s. to £1. 
Several indices can be used to give a sense of the comparable worth today of these 
sums: see https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ for full details. The simplest 
way to do this is to multiply the historic sum by the percentage increase in the Retail 
Price Index; £100 in 1935 is therefore roughly equal to £6,371 in 2016 prices. 
The average weekly earnings in 1935 for men in manual work of 21 years and over 
were 64s. 6d. (£3 4s. 6d.), including 53s. 4d. in mining; 67s. 7d. in metals and 
engineering; 83s. 8d. in printing; 61s. 2d. in building, 57s. 10d. in public utilities; and 
69s. 1d. in transport. For women in manual work of 18 years and over, average weekly 
earnings were 31s. 3d. (£1 11s. 3d.), including 30s. 3d. in textiles; and 30s. 1d. in other 
manufacturing. See Table 38, Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics, 
Historical Abstract, 1886-1968 (London, 1971), p. 96. 
The cost of living indices (July 1914=100) for all items were as follows: January 
1929=167; January 1930=166; January 1931=153; January 1932=147; February 
1933=141; January 1934=142; January 1935=143; January 1936=147; January 
1937=151; January 1938=159; January 1939=155; January 1940=174; and January 
1941=196. See Table 38, Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics, 
Historical Abstract, 1886-1968 (London, 1971), pp. 166-171. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The events surrounding the collapse of the second Labour government in the summer 
of 1931 represented a watershed in twentieth century British politics. They brought to 
a close the ‘unstable equilibrium’1 which had characterised the country’s political life 
since 1918, ensconcing a Conservative-dominated National government in power for 
the remainder of a decade marked by continuing economic uncertainty and the 
mounting threat of war. They also precipitated a crisis of political identity within the 
Labour party. Deprived of the founding generation of its leadership and with its 
parliamentary strength decimated, the gradualist approach to socialism which had long 
characterised its politics was seemingly left in tatters. Yet Labour returned to office in 
1940 as a key partner in the wartime coalition; in 1945, it secured a sweeping electoral 
landslide of its own, allowing it to implement much of its traditional programme. It is 
the contention of this thesis that the party’s recovery during the 1930s was made 
possible by the crucial contribution of the trade unions. With Labour’s political 
leadership substantially weakened after 1931, the unions assumed a pivotal role in 
shaping the party’s direction, to the extent that by 1940, its political culture, 
organisation and policy had been decisively remade. The identity which developed in 
these years continued to characterise Labour’s politics for a generation, through the 
high tide of the 1945 Attlee government, into the 1950s and beyond. This was a hugely 
significant and underappreciated achievement in the context of the destruction of 
labour movements that attended the retreat of political democracy across much of 
Europe during the 1930s. This thesis seeks to investigate and understand the crucial 
contribution of the trade unions to this redevelopment of Labour’s political culture 
through an exploration of key aspects of the party’s organisation in the period 1931-
1940.  
                                                          
1 The phrase is Ross McKibbin’s; see his Parties and People. England 1914-1951 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 
33-68. 
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The relationship between the Labour party and the trade unions was one of the most 
significant and distinctive aspects of twentieth century British politics. In no other major 
industrialised nation did such a close association between a trade union movement 
and a political party develop. The relationship had its origins in the decision of the 1899 
Trades Union Congress to pursue parliamentary representation independent of the 
Liberal and Conservative parties; the following year the Labour Representation 
Committee was established. Rechristened the Labour party in 1906, by the First World 
War the new organisation was able to count on the allegiance of a broad section of 
the trade union movement. A constitutional overhaul in 1918 gave the party a formal, 
if ambiguous, commitment to socialist politics, whilst fostering the establishment of 
local Labour parties, grounded in individual membership, as the basis for the party’s 
work in the constituencies. Yet the original federal structure of the party, through which 
trade unions affiliated to Labour and were integrated closely into its national 
organisation was retained. In the years that followed, the party’s support grew; by 1924 
it held office as a minority government under Ramsay MacDonald. This experience 
was short-lived but exposed tensions in the party’s relationship with the unions which 
were also apparent during the General Strike of 1926. Labour returned to office, again 
as a minority administration headed by MacDonald, in 1929. This too proved a largely 
unhappy experience in the context of economic slump and rapidly rising mass 
unemployment, which the government seemed powerless to arrest. The Labour 
Cabinet resigned in August 1931, unable, in the face of a mounting financial crisis, to 
agree on spending cuts to which the TUC General Council was fervently opposed. 
While the bulk of the party went into opposition, MacDonald formed a ‘National 
government’ including the Conservative and Liberal parties, alongside a handful of 
Labour ex-ministers. A general election followed in October resulting in a National 
landslide, with Labour castigated as having ‘run away’ from the crisis under the 
pressure of trade union ‘dictation’. 
In this context there was a reassertion of trade union priorities within the party, 
including a consolidation of organisational links such as the revitalisation of the 
National Joint Council to coordinate policy. With a depleted parliamentary leadership, 
the balance of power within the party moved towards the trade unions to the extent 
that Labour appeared to become, in one famous phrase, ‘the General Council’s 
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Party’.2 There were signs of recovery in the economy, and correspondingly in the 
unions’ industrial strength, from late 1933, but these remained difficult years for the 
party. Although conflicts over its direction and domestic policies had largely been 
resolved by 1935, the National government secured a second comprehensive victory 
at the polls that November. Rearmament and the threat of war dominated the politics 
of the later 1930s; during this period the TUC, under the leadership of Walter Citrine, 
was increasingly concerned with establishing a corporatist partnership with 
government and employers. Labour remained far from national office, and would likely 
have suffered a further electoral defeat had war not intervened in September 1939. 
However, the military crisis of May 1940 discredited the National – by now 
overwhelmingly Conservative – administration of Neville Chamberlain, and propelled 
Labour into a coalition government led by Winston Churchill, with one of the 
outstanding personalities of the trade union movement, Ernest Bevin, joining the 
Cabinet as Minister of Labour. The requirements of the wartime economy, and the 
period of majority Labour government which followed in 1945, helped entrench a 
system of tripartite corporatism between unions, employers and the state which 
endured through both Labour and Conservative administrations until the election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979. The trade unions’ organisational links to the Labour party, 
although in some respects much modified, have continued until the present day.  
Labour’s time in opposition from 1931 to 1940 was frustrating, leaving the party 
effectively powerless to affect ‘practical problems and immediate events’.3 However, 
a number of developments took place within Labour politics during this period which 
were of significance not just to the party itself, but also to British political culture more 
broadly. Firstly, there were changes in Labour’s organisation and policy which were to 
shape the party’s identity into the time of its first majority government in 1945-51, and 
beyond. The sense of crisis engendered by the events of 1931 seemed to validate a 
more radical conception of socialism than the party had been prepared to entertain 
during the MacDonald era, and emboldened the Labour left to seek sweeping changes 
to the party’s policy. By the mid-thirties, however, it was the party’s moderates who 
were triumphant; it would be they, not the left, who would have the greatest influence 
on Labour’s future direction. Secondly, the strategy of pursuing a united front with 
                                                          
2 Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, tenth edition (Basingstoke, 1993), pp. 71-87.  
3 Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1977), p. 1. 
18 
 
other parties in opposition to the National administration was decisively rejected. In 
the latter half of the decade, communists and others sought common action with 
Labour to challenge the government, particularly over its attitude to continental fascist 
aggression; their advances were spurned and their supporters within the Labour party 
defeated. Finally, despite the Labour opposition’s political weakness, liberal 
democratic politics were maintained in Britain, and extremists of both left and right 
successfully side-lined; noteworthy in the context of the destruction of democratic 
political systems in, for example, Germany and Spain during the period.  
Britain’s trade unions had an important role to play in these developments. Not only 
did they have a critical share in the remaking of Labour’s organisation and policy, but 
they also made a significant contribution to shaping the party’s strategy to marginalise 
the political extremes. Perhaps most importantly, they helped ensure the viability of 
political democracy in Britain. One aspect of this was in their growing status as 
‘governing institutions’ within a system of ‘corporate bias’, which aimed at maintaining 
the existing parliamentary system of government by the avoidance of crises through 
‘institutional collaboration’.4 This process had yet to be completed by the late 1930s; 
in their relationship with Labour, however, the trade unions made a major contribution 
to shoring up support for parliamentary democracy: they provided the material and 
moral resources for the party to function effectively. This was not only a question of 
funding, although that was far from irrelevant; they also developed structures to 
provide the party with candidates and MPs drawn directly from the working class. They 
provided solidity in times of crisis; their culture of collective solidarity and democratic 
respect for majority decisions had a critical influence on Labour’s political culture. 
Neither British political culture in the interwar period, nor Labour’s role within it, have 
wanted for historians; this was the period of the expansion of the democratic franchise 
and Labour’s ‘emergence in its modern form as the main institutional focus of the 
British left’.5 The field has expanded in recent years.6 Prominent works include those 
                                                          
4 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society. The experience of the British system since 1911 
(London, 1979), pp. 20-21. 
5 Kevin Morgan, Bolshevism and the British Left. Part Three. Bolshevism, Syndicalism and the General 
Strike. The Lost Internationalist World of A. A. Purcell (London, 2013), p. 349. 
6 On the broader political culture of the period, see two collections of essays, Laura Beers and Geraint 
Thomas, (eds.), Brave New World. Imperial and Democratic Nation-Building in Britain between the 
Wars (London, 2011), and Julie V. Gottlieb and Richard Toye, (eds.), The Aftermath of Suffrage: 
Women, Gender, and Politics in Britain, 1918-1945 (Basingstoke, 2013). 
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by Ross McKibbin, who argues that the Second World War threw the politics of the 
interwar years ‘off course’, interrupting the Conservative hegemony of the 1930s and 
replacing the individualist democracy of that period with a social-democratic version; 
he emphasises the importance of class relationships and the extent to which Labour 
benefitted from their changing nature.7 Andrew Thorpe has analysed the experience 
of Britain’s main political parties during the Second World War, providing much insight 
into their organisational development; he has also contributed a detailed study of the 
1931 general election.8  
A number of studies have illustrated the diverse influences on Labour’s political culture 
in the period. David Howell’s MacDonald’s Party. Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-
1931 analyses the party’s culture and organisational development in the 1920s, 
emphasising the complexity of Labour’s relationship with trade unions, women, the 
Independent Labour Party, and those of other ‘progressive varieties’, although the-
post MacDonald period is largely beyond its scope 9 
Laura Beers’ work analyses the development of Labour’s relationship with the media 
from the party’s early days to the end of the Second World War. She argues 
convincingly that the party developed an increasingly sophisticated media strategy 
during the 1920s and 1930s, making use of ‘the popular press, radio, cinema, and 
political advertising to project itself as a truly national party representing all the 
productive elements of British society’; this allowed it to compete with the 
Conservatives and served to ‘normalise’ Labour politics, playing a crucial role in the 
party’s political recovery in the years after 1931.10 Kevin Morgan’s Bolshevism and the 
British Left trilogy considers the labour movement’s reception of Russian Bolshevik 
influences between the wars, emphasising several important aspects of political 
organisation and challenging to notion of an inevitable ‘forward march’ of Labour: the 
significance of money in politics and the often porous boundaries of the party in a time 
                                                          
7 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1998); Parties and People. 
England 1914-1951 (Oxford, 2010); The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 
(Oxford, 1991). 
8 Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, 1991); (ed.), The Failure of Political 
Extremism in Inter-war Britain (Exeter, 1989); Parties at War. Political Organization in Second World 
War Britain (Oxford, 2009). 
9 David Howell, MacDonald’s Party. Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-1931 (Oxford, 2002). 
10 Laura Beers, Your Britain. Media and the Making of the Labour Party (Cambridge, MA and London, 
2010), pp. 6-7, 202. 
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of organisational flux are key insights of Morgan’s work.11 Nicole Robertson has 
analysed the role of the Co-operative movement.12 Peter Catterall has examined the 
relationship between the Labour party and the Free Churches and the influence of 
Nonconformity on Labour’s political style.13 Clare Griffiths has explored the challenges 
to Labour’s success in rural Britain and the nature of the party’s relationship with the 
countryside.14 Stefan Berger examines organisational developments in the light of 
continental experience.15 Matthew Worley’s work integrates an analysis of Labour’s 
activity at the local level into a discussion of the party’s interwar development; two 
collections edited by Worley emphasise the variety of local and other influences, whilst 
there have been a number of studies focused on particularly towns or regions.16 Trade 
unions have often had a less central role in recent labour histories: this is due in part 
to a necessary rebalancing to recognise of gender and culture in the history of a 
movement which has often appeared overwhelmingly male; it is also reflective of the 
more marginal role played in British society in recent years by trade unions, in contrast 
to much of the earlier post-war period.17 
Rather fewer works have dealt with Labour’s experience of the 1930s specifically: as 
the preceding discussion suggests, often their scope has included the whole interwar 
                                                          
11 Kevin Morgan, Bolshevism and the British Left. Part One. Labour Legends and Russian Gold 
(London, 2006); Bolshevism and the British Left. Part Two. The Webbs and Soviet Communism 
(London, 2006); Bolshevism and the British Left. Part Three. Bolshevism, Syndicalism and the 
General Strike. The Lost Internationalist World of A. A. Purcell (London, 2013). 
12 Nicole Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960. Minding their 
Own Business (Abingdon, 2010). 
13 Peter Catterall, Labour and the Free Churches, 1918-39. Radicalism, Righteousness and Religion 
(London, 2016). 
14 Clare V. J. Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside. The Politics of Rural Britain, 1918-1939 (Oxford, 
2007). 
15 Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900-1931 (Oxford, 
1994). 
16 Matthew Worley, (ed.), The Foundations of the British Labour Party. Identities, Cultures and 
Perspectives, 1900-39 (Abingdon, 2009); Labour Inside the Gate. A History of the British Labour Party 
between the Wars (London and New York, 2008); (ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots. Essays on the 
Activities of Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45 (Aldershot, 2005). Book length studies 
include Michael Savage, The Dynamics of Working-Class Politics. The Labour Movement in Preston 
1880-1940 (Cambridge, 1987); Jack Reynolds and Keith Laybourn, Labour Heartland. The history of 
the Labour Party in West Yorkshire during the inter-war years 1918-1939 (Bradford, 1987); Peter 
Wyncoll, The Nottingham Labour Movement 1880-1939 (London, 1985); R. J. Waller, The Dukeries 
Transformed. The Social and Political Development of a Twentieth-Century Coalfield (Oxford, 1983); 
John Marriot, The Culture of Labourism. The East End Between the Wars (Edinburgh, 1991); Chris 
Williams, Democratic Rhondda. Politics and Society, 1885-1951 (Cardiff, 1996); Sam Davies, 
Liverpool Labour. Social and Political influences on the development of the Labour Party in Liverpool, 
1900-1939 (Keele, 1996); Declan McHugh, Labour in the City. The Development of the Labour party 
in Manchester, 1918-31 (Manchester, 2006). 
17 See for instance Selina Todd, The People. The Rise and Fall of the Working Class 1910-2010 
(London, 2014). 
21 
 
period, or focused more closely on the 1920s. General histories of the party discuss 
the 1931-40 period, although naturally their treatment is often fairly slight. Early 
‘official’ histories were slighter than most: Francis Williams’ two volumes, for instance, 
both dedicate less than twenty pages – in each case out of close to four hundred – to 
the thirties; here, the period is viewed as the unfortunate result of MacDonald’s 
‘betrayal’ representing merely a prelude to Labour’s ascent to majority government.18 
Henry Pelling adds more detail on Labour’s ‘convalescence’ after 1931, although 
brevity limits his analysis of the extent to which Labour became the ‘General Council’s 
Party’ in those years.19 Historians sympathetic to the Marxist left criticised Labour’s 
supposed timidity in the period: for Ralph Miliband, Labour’s parliamentarism had 
frustrated the possibility of achieving socialism; the party’s approach to the problems 
of the 1930s represented nothing more than ‘MacDonaldism with MacDonald’.20  
The classic study of Labour in the period remains that by Ben Pimlott, published in 
1977. Labour and the Left in the 1930s directly addressed the stance of Miliband and 
others, arguing that it was in fact the divisions in the party caused by the left which 
prohibited Labour from exerting influence on the political direction of Britain in the 
period. Pimlott’s view of Labour as a mere ‘electoral machine’, however, is rather 
narrow, and arguably precludes a more sensitive understanding of the politics of the 
labour movement in general, and the unions – who are mainly to be found in Pimlott’s 
work mustering their block votes at party conference to defeat Stafford Cripps and his 
allies – in particular.21 Richard Shackleton’s chapter in an edited volume on ‘Trade 
unions and the slump’ is arguably the most sustained attempt to analyse the unions’ 
influence on Labour politics in the 1930s. Shackleton considers the unions’ role in the 
party’s recovery after 1931, and their influence on issue including unemployment and 
the approach of war; he also provides a useful schema of the chronology of this 
influence, observing a sometimes inconsistent tightening of links during 1932-34, 
followed a period of conflict in 1935-36, and an ‘apogee’ of union power in the years 
prior to the outbreak of war. However, the piece is brief, and closer attention is required 
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to several of its themes.22 Tom Buchanan’s account of the party’s response to the 
Spanish Civil War is nuanced, taking account of the broader movement, but remains 
largely a study of Labour’s experience of that conflict.23 John Swift’s monograph is the 
most recent full-length analysis of the party in the period, yet it is largely dedicated to 
a rehabilitation of Clement Attlee’s leadership in these years and gives little 
consideration to trade unions.24 
Trade unions do have a separate historiography of their own, although it has not 
always focused closely on their relations with Labour. Amongst contemporaries, one 
writer to take early notice of these relations was the German social-democratic 
journalist Egon Wertheimer. His Portrait of the Labour Party, published in English in 
1929, observed that the ‘influence of the trade unions has not only had [a] tremendous 
effect on the organisation but also on the psychology’ of the party.25 Another 
contemporary, the American academic Dean E. McHenry, in The Labour Party in 
Transition, 1931-1938 was, although by no means unsympathetic, sceptical in 
suggesting there had been a reassertion of the unions’ ‘dominant power’ in the party 
after 1931; he argued for reform of the party’s federal structure on a constituency 
basis, interpreting the existing arrangement as permitting a ‘lopsided ‘parliament of 
industry’ within the party structure’.26 The Labour intellectual G. D. H. Cole recruited a 
number of trade union figures to contribute to his survey of British Trade Unionism To-
Day.27 For Cole, with his long interest in industrial organisation and guild socialism, 
the unions were not only an inevitable feature of the party, despite the growth of 
individual membership; they also provided ‘a valuable guarantee of stability and an 
assurance against doctrinal splits actually rending the party organisation asunder’.28 
With the confirmation of the unions as partners in tripartite corporatism in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, a number of studies addressed aspects of their role in society and 
politics, alongside a burgeoning field of institutional histories. V. L. Allen’s volume on 
Trade Unions and the Government considered how the unions’ behaviour varied – or 
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did not – in periods of Labour administration.29 The work of Hugh Clegg and others 
highlighted the unions’ commitment to a pluralist model of industrial relations.30 Party-
union relations were the focus of a 1960 volume by Martin Harrison, which whilst astute 
and insightful, dealt primarily with the post-war years.31 Whilst criticism of the unions’ 
role in protecting the party leadership from the intrusion of Bevanism was common on 
parts of the left in the 1950s, with the passing from the trade union scene of right-
wingers such as Arthur Deakin, Tom Williamson, and Will Lawther, and their 
replacement with more left-inclined leaders like Frank Cousins, critical accounts 
tended to be fewer.32 In the context of the fragmenting of the corporatist compromise 
in the later 1960s, stronger criticism came from the left in works such as those by 
Miliband, whilst the often controversial role played by unions in the public life of the 
1970s prompted critiques from the social democratic right, in, for example, the work of 
David Marquand. The work of Keith Middlemas analysed the unions’ role in the more 
corporatist relationship between government and industry that emerged from the 
Second World War; his Politics and Industrial Society argues for the existence of 
‘corporate bias’ in the interwar years.33  
Perhaps the major contribution to the study of party-union relations has been the work 
of Lewis Minkin. His The Contentious Alliance offers a detailed and wide-ranging 
analysis of the relationship, positing the existence of a system of informal ‘rules’ which 
governed a relationship based on the principles of trade union restraint, the autonomy 
of the industrial and political spheres, democracy, unity and solidarity, as represented, 
by, for instance, an adherence to majority decisions. Minkin’s work is lar largely 
focused on the post-war period, although many of its insights also be traced prior to 
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1945.34 There have been a number of studies addressing the politics both of trade 
unions more broadly, and those of particular organisations.35  
This thesis seeks to integrate insights from these varied historiographies to provide an 
original account of the part played by trade unions in Labour’s political culture in the 
1930s: it places a distinctive focus on organisational developments and their 
implications for party culture, seeking to add considerable detail and complexity to an 
understanding of Labour’s politics in the 1930s. Much recent work on British interwar 
politics as outlined above prioritises policy development or electoral culture; this study 
suggests that party organisation is also worthy of careful consideration. Moreover, 
some recent work tends to overlook or underplay the contribution of the trade unions 
to the Labour party’s development: this account seeks to put them back in the picture 
during a critical period in the party’s history. 
The relationship was always much more than a series of practical, organisational 
functions; the unions also imbued the party with much of its characteristic political 
culture. Henry Drucker has described Labour as being built around an ethos – a 
dimension of party ideology separate from mere adherence to doctrinal principles – 
arising out of working class experience. This ethos ‘is not open to recruitment by 
agreement’ but ‘gives rise to distinctive practices and institutions’, quite separate from 
those which were products of the middle class ethos of the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, having its origin ‘overwhelmingly in the trade unions’. Ideology-as-doctrine 
might be easier to locate, for example in policy statements, manifestos and party 
conference resolutions, yet ethos was not ‘less real or less important’. He identifies 
several practices which reveal Labour’s ethos, including reluctance to sack leaders, 
personal style, financial practices and adherence to formal rules.36 Drucker’s is a 
compelling argument, offering a nuanced approach to understanding Labour’s politics; 
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the trade union movement seems the logical starting point for an investigation of this 
aspect of the party’s culture.  
The very notion of ‘the unions’ is problematic; it is important to establish that the trade 
unions did not represent a homogenous bloc: 
British Trade Unionism was not created as a scientifically organised 
movement inspired from a single centre; it was not even remoulded at 
any time in accordance with a common plan. It grew and developed of 
itself, as a direct response to needs immediately felt by one body of 
workers after another; and each group, when it could not find an existing 
Union to meet its needs, created a new Union of its own and only 
subsequently, if at all, linked itself up with the rest of the movement. The 
consequence is that, from the standpoint of the formalist, British Trade 
Unionism is a chaos.37 
As this comment by the socialist thinker G. D. H. Cole implies, the trade union 
movement was diverse, and in many respects an organic response by particular 
groups of workers to their own circumstances at work. Attempting to get a full 
impression of the movement could be akin to ‘visiting an ancient city full of architecture 
of different periods and styles’ each reflecting ‘the social needs, the materials available 
and the ways of bringing them together that were proper to their several periods’.38 
Unions of different kinds could bring a variety of experiences to Labour party culture. 
Unions could be organised on a national, regional or even local basis, drawing on a 
variety of skill levels and gender bases. Alastair J. Reid’s analysis provides a useful 
interpretative schema for understanding the complexities of the trade union world, 
identifying ‘three main types of occupational experience, each producing its own 
outlook and form of organisation’.39 The first group, assembly workers such as 
engineers, were concerned with assembling products from a range of materials and as 
such were skilled, educated, and well-paid. The form of trade unionism they developed 
is usually referred to as craft unionism: this emphasised a firmly ‘voluntarist’ approach 
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to industrial relations, based on well-resourced organisations in single industries 
dealing independently with employers, and sharing a strong craft identity. They often 
maintained welfare funds and offered members a range of benefits. Initially based on 
local organisation, by the mid-nineteenth century, the craft unions had begun to 
centralise their organisation and funds nationally: the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, established in 1851, provides a well-known example of such a trade union. 
Such organisations prioritised local democracy, even once established nationally, and 
retained a hostility to outside interference in their affairs.  
The second occupational group, process workers, were involved in the processing of 
a single raw material, such as coal or cotton. Skills were gained through learning on 
the job, meaning such workers were relatively easy to replace. Combined with low pay, 
their organisations, which Reid characterises as seniority unions, found it difficult to 
maintain the funds available to the craft unions, with the consequence that they were 
less able to engage in successful collective bargaining, and far more amenable to state 
intervention in order to achieve their aims. Miners’ unions, for example, pursued 
statutory safety protections from the mid-nineteenth century, although they often 
struggled to gain recognition by employers. This type of trade union, then, was more 
inclined towards taking political action: miners unions sponsored candidates for 
Parliament as early as the 1870s. The third occupational group, general manual 
labourers, were in the most precarious position, being the least skilled and worst paid. 
Trade union organisation was difficult to maintain amongst such workers, and the form 
it increasingly took from the 1890s was that of federal or general unionism – large 
national organisations representing workers across a variety of trades, and seeking 
state support for general minimum standards. This three-fold system provides a 
valuable overview of the variety inherent in the trade union movement, but it was the 
voluntarist approach, most characteristic of the craft unions but common to other types 
of union, Reid contends, that was to provide the ‘basic underpinning of wider labour 
politics’ in Britain.40 Taking the heterogeneous nature of the movement, and the varying 
traditions which shaped its development, into account is crucial to a full understanding 
of Labour’s political culture; this project attempts to do so. 
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Given the practicalities of the project, it has been necessary to make a selection of 
trade unions on which to focus. Seven key unions have been chosen, although various 
others are referred to throughout. Although there has been an element of self-selection 
in some cases – particularly that of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain [MFGB], the 
union with the largest membership affiliated to Labour in the period, as well as the most 
significant sponsor of candidates and Members of Parliament – a number of factors 
have been taken into consideration. Achieving a representative cross-section of the 
movement was one such factor; this had several aspects. Firstly, to incorporate 
examples from each of the three occupational groups identified by Reid. The 
Amalgamated Engineering Union [AEU] gives a good example of craft organisation, 
although it has further significance as a union experiencing rapid growth later in the 
decade, with which political membership failed to keep pace. The MFGB provides a 
strong example of seniority unionism, whilst the two main general unions, the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union [TGWU], and the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers [NUGMW], represent the third category. Variety in union structure was also a 
factor: the two general unions exhibited a kind of dual structure, being organised both 
geographically by region, as well as by trade group. The National Union of Railwaymen 
[NUR] operated on the lines of geographical branches which dealt directly with the 
union’s central office; in other organisations such as the AEU, relations between the 
branches and the national leadership were mediated by regional organisation. The 
MFGB is perhaps the best example of a federated union, based on area unions in the 
various coalfields. The United Textile Factory Workers’ Association [UTFWA], the 
federal body for cotton workers, is another example, but the MFGB has been preferred 
here on the basis that the UTFWA’s complex multiplicity of local affiliates, each 
representing different parts of the craft, would have involved more convoluted analysis 
of themes which are more apparent in a study of the MFGB; crucially given that the 
thesis aims to deal with the unions’ work in Parliament, the UTFWA had no sponsored 
representatives in the House of Commons throughout the period under consideration 
until a by-election in 1939. It is therefore not one of the main unions considered, 
although it is discussed in relation to specific issues such as candidate selection. 
Industrial factors were also relevant: whilst the MFGB represented workers in a 
struggling export industry, others such as the National Union of Distributive and Allied 
Workers [NUDAW] organised in the growing distribution trade whilst the NUR 
represented an industry ‘sheltered’ from international competition. The smaller railway 
28 
 
union, the Railway Clerks’ Association [RCA] has also been used; union size was 
important but not paramount. The RCA gives an excellent example of a smaller ‘white-
collar’ union organising clerical workers; it also had a notably high proportion of political 
levy-paying members, as well as a string commitment to securing parliamentary 
representation which marked it out even in contrast with larger organisations. The 
NUDAW also achieved a high rate of political membership, whereas the AEU provides 
a fascinating contrast with its low level of political levy-payers. 
The analysis takes place largely at the national level, although local developments are 
examined more closely in the discussion of constituencies in Chapter 3. This national 
focus is deliberate; the political activities of trade unions in general were mediated 
through their national organisation. Future research might carry these themes through 
at the local party and union level; unfortunately, a detailed attempt to do so here has 
been beyond the scope of this project.  
The thesis draws heavily on extensive and detailed archival research, primarily the 
records of trade unions including minutes of union executive and other committees, 
reports of annual or biennial conferences, annual and other financial reports, union 
journals and correspondence. Many of the records used are held at the Modern 
Records Centre at the University of Warwick, and the Working Class Movement 
Library in Salford. Whilst these are relatively conventional sources, they are often 
underused in studies of Labour politics. It is a contention of the work that thorough, 
empirical examination of sources of this kind can yield new and important insights into 
the history of Labour politics in the period. The records of the TUC, including general 
council minutes, annual congress reports and correspondence; the minutes and 
reports of the National Joint Council/National Council of Labour; the records of the 
Labour party, including National Executive papers, annual conference reports and 
other publications, head office files and correspondence; and the minutes of meetings 
Parliamentary Labour Party [PLP] and its executive have also been used. The Labour 
History Archive and Study Centre at the People’s History Museum in Manchester has 
been invaluable in this regard. These archival sources have been supplemented by a 
large body of contemporary books and other works, as well as the memoirs and diaries 
of key individuals. The record of parliamentary proceedings, Hansard, has also been 
used, along with a range of other official sources and national and local periodicals 
and newspapers. One challenge in researching trade unions in the period is the often 
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rather short paper trail left behind by key individuals. Personal papers tend not to have 
survived, certainly not to the extent they have done for Labour politicians of the era, 
although there are exceptions such as Bevin and Citrine, as well as some individuals’ 
papers which have made their way into union archives. The institutional sources 
referred to above have therefore been crucial; often they can be used to reconstruct a 
good deal of the lives, careers and politics of individual trade unionists. Whilst only a 
handful of the trade union figures discussed have been the subjects of full-scale 
biographies, the multi-volume Dictionary of Labour Biography has been of great 
benefit in providing biographical information for many of the personalities referred to. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first, ‘Britain and her trade unions in the 
1930s’, briefly establishes the political, economic and social context in which the 
developments discussed in the later chapters took place, including an overview of the 
experience of the Labour party in the period. It discusses the trade union movement 
itself, examining its structure and organisation, the position of the unions in industry 
and their role in collective bargaining, the role of the TUC, and aspects of the distinctive 
culture of the movement.  
The second chapter, ‘Membership and money’, examines the political funds of trade 
unions and assesses their contribution to party finance. The party’s financial problems 
during the period are considered in detail; the focus then turns to the unions’ role in 
electoral finance, before examining the development of a system of regulation of 
constituency finance, known as the Hastings Agreement. The appendix relates largely 
to the contents of this chapter: it provides full membership and financial details of the 
seven unions referred to. 
The third chapter, ‘Candidates and constituencies’, analyses trade unions’ sponsored 
parliamentary candidates. It identifies the major patterns in sponsorship across the 
period, and examines the procedures employed by unions for the selection of their 
candidates, notably the parliamentary panel system. The participation of union officials 
as candidates is considered; the discussion then turns to the role of electoral 
geography in placing the candidates, including a number of selection disputes. 
The fourth chapter, ‘Parliamentary politics’, considers the role played by trade union 
Members of Parliament. It assesses their position within the PLP and offers case 
studies of the parliamentary groups of two of the unions. Attention is given to the nature 
30 
 
and development of liaison between the unions and their MPs, noting the 
establishment of an increasingly professionalised service to this end within the TGWU. 
Finally, the position of trade union MPs within the wider Labour movement is 
considered, including their role at union and party conferences, and in union 
publications. 
In the final chapter, ‘Party strategy’, two case studies focus on the part played by the 
unions in shaping Labour strategy. Particular attention is given to the marginalisation 
of domestic extremist politics, whether of the right, in the form of the British Union of 
Fascists; or the left, discussing the marginalisation of the left within the party and the 
images recruited to assist in this. 
A conclusion then brings together the main arguments of the thesis, discussing some 
of the longer term implications of the developments considered in the earlier chapters. 
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Chapter 1 
Britain and her trade unions in the 1930s 
 
 
 
Few decades in recent British history have suffered such a poor reputation as the 
1930s. Indeed, it is almost commonplace to preface any discussion of the period with 
the obligatory reference to W. H. Auden’s ‘low, dishonest decade’ of mass 
unemployment, hunger marches, the means test, and appeasement. Sharp divisions 
of opinion, both among contemporaries at the time and historians since, have 
sometimes obscured a more complex picture.  
The military disaster of May 1940 shattered the prestige of the National government 
politicians who had presided over most of the preceding ten years. The experience of 
full employment and improved social welfare during the Second World War, and under 
the Labour government which followed it in 1945, appeared to confirm the cruelty, 
incompetence, and paucity of imagination of Britain’s 1930s leaders, who by this stage 
had few defenders on the political scene. Historians writing during the more 
prosperous 1950s and 1960s echoed this view of the period. The post-war success of 
Keynesian demand management policies appeared to vindicate their earlier 
advocates, who had been ignored by the less dynamic figures in office in the 1930s.41 
Revisionist approaches emerged in the 1970s following the crisis of Keynesianism 
which accompanied economic stagnation; whilst not dismissing the criticisms of earlier 
interpretations, they did start to move towards a something of rehabilitation of the 
‘Devil’s Decade’ in pointing to Britain’s relative stability when contrasted with many 
European neighbours, and the ‘dawn of affluence’ that began to break for many; these 
insights have influenced much historical work since.42 Recent works continue to tend 
towards a more optimistic interpretation of 1930s Britain.43 What follows establishes 
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the political, economic, and social climate in which Labour’s political culture developed 
through the 1930s, before turning to a closer analysis of the trade union context.   
 
Politics 
 
The 1930s saw a significant restructuring of British politics. Since the First World War, 
the Labour party had emerged as a serious challenger to the older Conservative and 
Liberal parties; competition between all three parties shaped the electoral politics of 
the 1920s, although the Conservatives were the dominant party of government.44 A 
minority Labour government was returned to office in 1929, following arguably the last 
genuinely three-party contest at a general election. Beset by economic problems, the 
government resigned following a Cabinet split over cuts to unemployment benefit in 
the face of a financial crisis in August 1931. The Labour prime minister, Ramsay 
MacDonald, then formed a National government with the support of the Conservatives 
and Liberals, alongside a handful of Labour colleagues. A landslide victory at the 
general election held in October 1931 entrenched the National government in power 
for much of the next decade; a second comprehensive electoral victory followed in 
November 1935. 
The National governments dominated British politics in the 1930s.45 Although rumours 
of some kind of multi-party combination had circulated during the last year of the 
Labour government; it was not until the financial crisis prompted the resignation of the 
Labour administration in August 1931 that such an arrangement became a serious 
proposition. After consultation with the King and the opposition leaders, MacDonald 
formed a National government on 24 August. He continued as prime minister; three 
Labour colleagues – Philip Snowden, J. H. Thomas, and Lord Sankey – joined him in 
a new Cabinet of ten which also included four Conservatives and two Liberals.46 
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Initially conceived of as a temporary arrangement to weather the crisis, with the 
purpose of balancing the budget by pushing through the cuts in public expenditure that 
Labour had baulked at, halting the run on the pound and preserving the gold standard 
exchange rate. Within weeks, however, the continuing crisis had forced the 
abandonment of the gold standard, and a general election was called for 27 October, 
with the National government seeking a ‘doctor’s mandate’, a deliberate ambiguity 
which allowed the Conservatives to argue for their traditional policy of protective tariffs, 
whilst the Liberals under Sir Herbert Samuel could continue to advocate free trade. 
Another Liberal faction, the ‘Liberal Nationals’ led by Sir John Simon, supported the 
Conservatives in pushing for the introduction of tariffs.47  
The result was a landslide, with the National government winning some 554 seats in 
the House of Commons, 470 of them held by Conservatives. A further 33 seats were 
held by Samuelite Liberals, and 35 by Simonite Liberal Nationals.48 This had the effect 
of isolating MacDonald, who remained Prime Minister at the head of a group of just 
thirteen ‘National Labour’ MPs, whilst allowing Conservative priorities to predominate. 
Neville Chamberlain, now Chancellor of the Exchequer in a reformed National Cabinet, 
pushed through the Import Duties Act in February 1932, introducing protective tariffs 
on imports. Collective Cabinet responsibility on trade policy was suspended for a time 
under an ‘agreement to differ’ to keep the Samuelite Liberals in the fold, but this rather 
embarrassing arrangement was brought to an end by the departure of the Samuelites 
from their government posts in September 1932 following the adoption of a system of 
imperial preference at the Ottawa Dominions conference; Samuel and his followers 
moved into opposition in late 1933, by which time the Conservatives held fifteen of 
twenty Cabinet posts.  This ended Samuel’s hopes of re-uniting his party; Simon and 
another Liberal National, Walter Runciman, now held important posts in a National 
administration that could claim some success, despite few radical departures in policy, 
with unemployment starting to fall from 1933, and the 1931 cuts being restored in 
1934. A potential crisis over the institution of new scales of unemployment relief under 
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a national Unemployment Assistance Board introduced by Chamberlain was 
navigated effectively early in 1935. In many cases it was found that the new rates of 
benefit would be lower than those currently paid by local Public Assistance 
Committees; this sparked an outcry not just from Labour and the left, but also by 
Conservative MPs representing constituencies with high levels of unemployment, with 
the result that the government backed down, allowing whichever was the higher rate 
to be paid.49 The ailing MacDonald swapped places with Baldwin that May; the 
government’s record, as well as its declared support for collective security through the 
League of Nations in the context of an Italian invasion of Abyssinia, helped it to another 
comprehensive general election victory in November 1935. Conservatives now held 
387 of the government’s 429 seats, along with 33 Liberal Nationals and eight National 
Labour MPs. The opposition Liberals could muster just 21 seats, whilst Labour had 
climbed to 154.50 
Foreign affairs became more prominent in the National government’s second term. Its 
support for the League of Nations was shown to be without substance by the revelation 
of the Hoare-Laval Pact in late 1935, under which the British and French foreign 
ministers agreed to cede Abyssinian territory to Italy. Rearmament had begun in 1935; 
with collective security now effectively dead, the government pursued a policy of trying 
to secure peace through placating aggressors, whilst rearming in preparation for the 
conflict that might come. No action was taken when Nazi Germany re-occupied the 
Rhineland in 1936, whilst the government stuck to a policy of non-intervention in the 
Spanish Civil War, despite obvious breaches of an international agreement to this 
effect by Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union.  Baldwin, his prestige enhanced by his 
management of the crisis accompanying Edward VIII’s abdication in December 1936, 
gave way to Chamberlain in June 1937. National Labour, by this point, was largely an 
irrelevance. The new premier’s policy of appeasement caused dissent amongst 
several Conservatives who favoured a more resolute approach, including Winston 
Churchill, a vocal, long-time opponent of the administration’s attitude in relation to 
Germany, and Anthony Eden, who resigned as Foreign Secretary in February 1938, 
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although these critics were never in a strong enough position to seriously challenge 
the government’s authority. Chamberlain’s negotiation of the Munich Agreement in 
September 1938, ceding the Czech Sudetenland to Germany, appeared to have 
secured peace; within a year Britain was at war following the German invasion of 
Poland. The failure of the Norway campaign in spring 1940 shook confidence in 
Chamberlain’s conduct of the war and made necessary a broadening of the 
government; Conservative dissenters now combined with the Labour opposition, with 
the refusal of the latter to serve under Chamberlain prompting the prime minister’s 
resignation and replacement with Churchill, and bringing Labour into the 
government.51 
This was a world away from where Labour had found itself in the autumn of 1931. 
Much of the party’s leadership had been wiped out. Arthur Henderson, J. R. Clynes, 
Herbert Morrison, A. V. Alexander, Arthur Greenwood, Wedgwood Benn, Margaret 
Bondfield and Hugh Dalton, amongst many others, lost their seats. The leadership of 
the party in Parliament was taken by the elderly George Lansbury; Henderson 
remained as nominal leader until 1932. The crisis caused a sharp debate over the 
party’s future direction; the gradualist socialism it had espoused had failed to arrest 
unemployment whilst in office, whilst the more radical manifesto on which it stood in 
1931 had been decisively rejected. The experience of government had opened 
tensions between the party and the trade unions; the unions now began to reassert 
themselves, pushing for the reestablishment of the National Joint Council [NJC; later 
National Council of Labour, NCL] to co-ordinate policy.52 The Independent Labour 
Party [ILP], which had moved further to the left in the late 1920s, chose to disaffiliate 
from Labour in 1932; yet there was still a swing to the left in the party, to the frustration 
of Henderson, who had continued to try to steer a more moderate course.53 1932 saw 
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the foundation of a group on the party’s left, the Socialist League, centred around the 
barrister and newly-prominent frontbencher Sir Stafford Cripps; whilst the League had 
some successes at the party’s 1933 conference, however, the major developments in 
policy were being undertaken by the National Executive Committee’s [NEC] policy 
subcommittee, which included Dalton and Morrison; its schemes for planning and 
public ownership would influence the post-war Attlee government.54 Although several 
Labour leaders such as Henderson and Greenwood were returned at by-elections, the 
locus of power in the party remained outside the House. Advances were made in local 
government, with control of the London County Council being captured for the first 
time in 1934.  
Lansbury’s pacifism was not compatible with support for sanctions against Italy 
following its invasion of Abyssinia; he resigned to be replaced, initially temporarily and 
then permanently, by Clement Attlee, who led the party into the 1935 general election. 
Whilst defence issues continued to divide the party, its domestic programme was 
being honed, and was given concise form in Labour’s Immediate Programme, 
published in 1937. In the context of the rise of continental fascism there was pressure 
from the left, including the ILP and the Communist Party of Great Britain [CPGB], which 
had previously denounced Labour as ’social fascist’ during the Communist 
International’s ‘Third Period’, for a united front against the National Government; 
Communist affiliation to Labour, however was resisted: the Socialist League was 
forced to disband over its support for such a front.  
The Communists remained a small but frustrating thorn in Labour’s left side, although 
they were only successful in securing one seat at the 1935 general election. A small 
fascist organisation, the British Union of Fascists, also aroused hostility on the left, but 
again, their influence was limited.55 
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The economy  
 
 
 
The broad outline of British economic development in the period 1931-1940 was one 
of slow progress from depression to recovery, yet without closer analysis such an 
assessment can obscure considerable divergences between industries and regions. 
The 1930s have a rather gloomy reputation in economic terms, and indeed, mass 
unemployment remained a persistent problem until the onset of war. However, when 
a combination of cyclical and structural factors are taken into account, a more complex 
picture emerges of the economy in this period, and the role played by government 
policy in shaping it. 
Britain emerged from the First World War into an economic boom. For the previous 
four years, much of industry had been focused on war production; this left a ‘large 
backlog of investment to be made good’ following wartime neglect. As well as the 
replacement of machinery, wartime shortages led to an increased demand for 
consumer goods, whilst with the cessation of most housebuilding activity during the 
conflict, there was a major shortage of housing.56 Whilst the boom, which ran from 
roughly March 1919 to April 1920, encouraged by government expenditure, did 
produce a substantial increase in exports, which had also collapsed during the war, 
demand continued to exceed productive capacity, leading to an increase in prices, its 
‘outstanding feature’ was a ‘financial orgy’ of speculative buying.57 This led to 
overcapitalisation in several industries, massively increasing their debts, and was 
followed by a swathe of cuts to public expenditure, the ‘Geddes Axe’. Production fell, 
unemployment rose, and by June 1921 the economy was in a state of severe 
depression. Unemployment stood at some 17 per cent of the insured workforce, with 
2.2 million workers in total unemployed.58  Although there was a steady recovery up 
to 1925, with substantial increases in overall production and exports, unemployment 
persisted significant, with well over a million insured persons still out of work at the 
height of the recovery in 1924.59 This ‘intractable million’ was to endure until the 
Second World War. 
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That a return to the Gold Standard exchange rate, suspended during the war, would 
aid British economic prosperity was axiomatic across political divides as well as in the 
Treasury and the City of London; Britain was taken back onto gold at its pre-war parity 
by the Conservative Chancellor, Churchill, in April 1925. Although controversial at the 
time, it is now generally accepted that this had the effect of overvaluing sterling and 
thus overpricing British exports: this had the greatest impact on the staple industries 
such as coal, cotton and shipbuilding which relied heavily on the export trade; although 
also significant here was the growth on international competition, particularly from 
countries with undervalued currencies such as France and Belgium. Another, weaker 
boom, certainly by international standards, followed in the later 1920s, although by 
1929, exports were again declining; this was compounded by the Wall Street Crash in 
the United States in October 1929, which ‘greatly aggravated and accelerated the 
deflationary tendencies in Britain’.60 Another depression followed, although again, 
comparisons with other countries, particularly Germany and the United States, 
suffered more severe economic consequences. Total unemployment passed two 
million in July 1930, and 2.5 million in December, eventually peaking at 2.86 million in 
August 1932.61 The staple industries were most effect: the average unemployment for 
1932 was 62.0 per cent of the shipbuilding workforce, 47.9 per cent in iron and steel, 
30.6 per cent in cotton, and 34.5 per cent in coalmining.62  
By the end of 1932, the force of the depression had been arrested; a tentative recovery 
began to felt from 1933, with ‘sustained growth’ across all sectors of the economy from 
1934. Initially this took place in often newer, non-export trades including vehicle 
manufacture and building; although an export recovery from 1934 began to help the 
older staple industries too.63 The recovery continued apace until 1937, by which point 
industrial output had almost doubled over five years and real income by nineteen per 
cent; this constituted the ‘largest and most sustained period of growth in the whole of 
the inter-war period’.64 A relatively mild recession followed in 1937-38, again most 
pronounced in the export industries, although this decline had been reversed by 1939; 
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production continued to rise, encouraged by rearmament, and later the conditions of 
war. 
Cyclical factors alone cannot account for the changes in the British economy in the 
period; structural factors were also influential. Whilst the staple industries were in a 
long-term decline, a number of new electrical and light manufacturing industries were 
growing; the uneven development of these, however, accounted for the substantial 
regional variations in unemployment: the North East and South Wales, where 
shipbuilding and mining were the dominant industries, were particularly badly affected; 
yet the south east of England saw low unemployment and relative prosperity.  
 
Trade unionism 
 
The experience of the First World War had wrought major changes in the landscape 
of British industrial relations. With millions of men enlisting into the armed forces, 
manpower requirements strengthened the position of labour in general, and skilled 
labour in particular. The need to maximise the efficiency of war production and prevent 
shortages increasingly drew the state to intervene in industry to secure co-operation 
between employers and workers; this heightened the status of unions and employers’ 
organisations and encouraged the expansion of collective bargaining. Under the 
Treasury Agreement of 1915, given legislative force by the Munitions of War Act the 
same year, unions agreed to the compulsory arbitration of disputes and the relaxation 
of restrictions on output, including allowing the dilution by semi-skilled – often female 
– labour of certain work previously reserved for skilled men, in exchange for the 
limitation of employers’ profits, for the duration of the war. Government control of 
munitions, coal-mining and railways led to national wage agreements in those 
industries; the changes in engineering drastically increased the importance of shop 
stewards in workshop negotiations, whilst union leaderships were drawn into the 
organisation of war production. Membership rose from 4,145,000 in 1914 to 8,348,000 
by 1920, whilst collective bargaining was enhanced through the establishment of 
Whitley councils and the Industrial Court. With the growth of trade unionism, direct 
action tactics became popular as a means of forcing concessions. A national railway 
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strike in 1919 was settled in the railwaymen’s favour, but the miners were less 
successful in 1921.65  
A General Strike was called by the TUC to support a further coalmining lockout in 
1926; its failure critically damaged the direct action approach. In the aftermath of the 
General Strike’s failure, there were new departures, pushed by the TUC and its 
general secretary, Walter Citrine, towards industrial co-operation with employers, 
symbolised by the Mond-Turner discussions on 1928-30. Whilst the slump halted 
union growth and resulted in a period of industrial retrenchment, the movement began 
to recover from the mid-1930s.66 
The strength of trade union organisation varied broadly across different sectors of the 
economy. The traditional staple industries continued to exhibit high levels of 
organisation through the 1930s; the coal, cotton and shipbuilding unions were 
‘remarkably successful’ in this regard despite ‘prolonged depression and a steady 
shrinkage in the total numbers employed’.67 The membership of unions in the mining 
and quarrying trade group stayed above half a million during every year in the period. 
Union density – the proportion of the potential membership of a union who were in fact 
members, and therefore a useful metric by which to assess union strength – in 
coalmining had been as high as 76.7 per cent in 1921; although this slumped to 51.8 
per cent in the wake of the 1926 lockout, and further to 51.3 per cent during the 
depression, it had climbed to 81.1 per cent by 1939. Although total union membership 
in mining was lower in 1939 than it had been in 1926, the reduction in the workforce 
was even greater, meaning a higher proportion of unionised miners.68 Most miners 
were organised in district unions within their respective coalfield; these unions in turn 
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were constituent members of the national federal body, the Miners’ Federation of 
Great Britain.69 The largest memberships were in Durham, South Wales, and 
Yorkshire, with the coalfields of Scotland and Lancashire and providing sizeable 
memberships; smaller coalfields such as Kent, North Wales and the Forest of Dean 
were also represented. MFGB remained Britain’s largest union until 1937, when its 
membership was exceeded by that of the TGWU.70 The decline in both trade union 
membership and the total numbers employed in another staple, the cotton industry, 
was more marked, with the former falling by some 38 per cent from 1931-1940.71 By 
contrast, union density remained stable: 54.6 per cent in 1930, and 54.4 per cent in 
1939, despite a small dip in the years 1931-35.72 While this might have weakened the 
cotton operatives in terms of their weight in the labour movement, it did not necessarily 
do so within the industry itself. Cotton workers were organised in a number of 
federations based on craft, usually referred to by the operatives themselves as 
‘amalgamations’, in turn consisting of a large number of local unions, a ‘cumbrously 
decentralised’ arrangement.73 The three most important were the Amalgamated 
Weavers’ Association, with a 1931 membership of 158,660; the Amalgamated 
Association of Operative Cotton Spinners and Twiners, 1931 membership 44,168; and 
the Amalgamated Association of Card, Blowing, and Ring Room Operatives, with 
53,473 members in 1931.74 Each amalgamation was part of a still larger federation, 
the United Textile Factory Workers’ Association [UTFWA], which dealt with political 
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and general policy matters. Efforts at closer integration were often ‘broken on the rock 
of local vested interests’, and whilst the overwhelming majority of members of the 
Weavers’ and Cardroom amalgamations were women, male officials predominated 
throughout; in several respects the cotton unions ‘hardly kept pace with the times’.75 
The railways were another area of trade union strength, with an annual average union 
density of 59.7 per cent from 1929-38, rising as high as 67.6 per cent in 1937.76 Union 
membership was divided between three organisations, the largest of which was the 
National Union of Railwaymen, an industrial union open to all employees of the railway 
companies. Although the NUR included a minority of footplate staff, that is, engine 
drivers and firemen, the bulk of these better-paid workers were organised on a craft 
basis in the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen [ASLEF]. The 
Railway Clerks’ Association [RCA] catered for clerical staff; a minority of its members 
were women. Union membership in non-railway transport almost doubled from its 
1931 total by 1940.77 The majority of unionised workers in road transport were 
members of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, a general union operating 
across many industries including a significant presence amongst dock workers. 
Employment in road transport, which included trams and buses as well as commercial 
haulage, rose steadily across the decade. Union density rose from 46.5 per cent in 
1932 to 72.2 per cent in 1938, helping the TGWU to become Britain’s largest and most 
powerful trade union in the process.78 The other large general union was the National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers [NUGMW], which included a large number 
of gas workers and municipal employees, amongst others. Like the TGWU, it had 
considerable success in organising unskilled workers, particularly in the later 1930s. 
Although figures for union density are not available, by 1940 its membership had 
increased by 67.7 per cent over its 1931 total. Both general unions recruited amongst 
both sexes, although the vast majority of members in both were men. Engineering was 
a field of increasing importance in the trade union movement across the 1930s. The 
main union in this industry was the Amalgamated Engineering Union [AEU], organised  
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Figure 1.1 TUC membership by trade group, 1931-1940 
 
Trade group 1931 1934 1937 1940 
Mining and quarrying 
      
631,507  
      
527,331  
      
544,705  
      
608,054  
Railways 
      
427,098  
      
376,676  
      
448,779  
      
466,931  
Other transport 
      
473,298  
      
450,912  
      
605,893  
      
740,337  
Shipbuilding 
         
72,085  
         
55,540  
         
77,541  
         
92,192  
Engineering, founding, vehicle-building 
      
335,891  
      
293,833  
      
449,212  
      
639,896  
Iron, steel, minor metal trades 
      
113,635  
         
92,207  
      
119,178  
      
151,113  
Building, woodworking, finishing 
      
334,579  
      
290,352  
      
326,619  
      
388,762  
Printing and paper 
      
150,898  
      
152,636  
      
168,793  
      
199,529  
Cotton 
      
282,009  
      
216,721  
      
185,385  
      
174,725  
Other textiles 
      
138,690  
      
106,531  
      
104,771  
      
114,088  
Clothing 
         
71,569  
         
71,463  
         
91,792  
      
138,283  
Leather, boot and shoe 
         
93,899  
         
91,478  
      
101,995  
      
110,767  
Glass, pottery, chemicals, food, etc. 
      
218,798  
      
230,462  
      
275,472  
      
343,616  
Agriculture 
         
30,000  
         
30,000  
         
32,000  
         
45,000  
Public employees 
         
28,888  
         
28,193  
         
60,429  
      
102,085  
Non-manual workers 
         
56,544  
         
48,574  
         
74,310  
      
116,703  
General workers 
      
259,233  
      
231,644  
      
341,773  
      
434,630  
TOTAL 
   
3,719,401  
   
3,294,581  
   
4,008,647  
   
4,866,711  
 
 
Source: Trades Union Congress, Annual Reports, 1931-1940. 
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Figure 1.2 Overall trade union density, 1918-1946 
 
Source: Bain and Price, Profiles of Union Growth, table 2.2, pp. 39-40. 
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on a craft basis and recruiting only men, until wartime dilution led to a chance in this 
policy in 1943.79 Whilst women were employed in many of the newer industries, 
although often union organisation could difficult.80 The largest unions organised in the 
private sector, although the MFGB and NUR favoured nationalisation of their 
industries; a substantial proportion of the NUGMW’s membership were in municipal 
employment. Although there was union growth in parts of the public sector, unions 
which catered for such workers were often at something of a distance from the rest of 
the labour movement; in the cast of postal workers and civil servants, this had been 
enforced as part of the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act passed following 
the General Strike.81 Co-operative employees were organised in the National Union of 
Distributive and Allied Workers [NUDAW].  Whilst in many areas such as agriculture, 
trade unionism remained weak, the overall density figures in figure 1.2 support Clegg’s 
assertion that the unions were in ‘fair shape’ in 1933, despite the slump.  
There were no major departures in structure and few amalgamations during the 1930s. 
The early 1920s had seen significant organisational reform: the TGWU, NUGMW, 
AEU and NUDAW were all products of amalgamations in that period, whilst most 
recently, the TGWU had absorbed the Workers’ Union [WU] in 1929. Limited 
resources and the difficulties of organising during the slump precluded further 
departures; in many ways, this was a period which saw the consolidation of earlier 
changes. Most unions were organised on a geographical basis, based on branches; 
relations with the national organisation might be mediated through regional structures. 
In the general unions, organisation was a dual basis, with structures for area and trade 
group representation. Such unions, with their executives drawn largely from lay 
membership, concentrated much power in the hands of their officials; the key 
personality in this regard was Ernest Bevin of the TGWU, with Citrine one of the two 
leading figures within the trade union world in the period. The different coalfield 
cultures of the area mining unions shaped the organisation of the MFGB; they retained 
considerable autonomy although there were pressures towards a more unified national 
union; this would eventually be achieved in the formation of the National Union of 
                                                          
79 A rather dry official history of the AEU is James B. Jeffreys, The Story of the Engineers. 1800-1945 
(London, 1945). 
80 Miriam Glucksmann, Women Assemble. Women Workers and the New Industries in Inter-war Britain 
(London and New York, 1990). 
81 See, for instance, Alan Clinton, Post Office Workers. A Trade Union and Social History (London, 
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Mineworkers [NUM] in 1944. The Federation had endured a chaotic period in the 
1920s during the general secretaryship of Arthur Cook; a more disciplined leadership 
group now came to the fore, with Ebby Edwards of Northumberland one of the key 
figures. 
Factionalism along political lines was present in many unions; most typically between 
a moderate, Labour-supporting majority and a Communist or Communist-leaning 
minority. The CPGB had been active within many unions during the 1920s through 
Minority Movements. The major unions where Communists maintained some 
influence in the 1930s were the AEU and the MFGB: Arthur Horner, President of the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation [SWMF] from 1936, was arguably the most influential 
Communist on the industrial side of the Labour movement.82  
The years from 1934-39, Hugh Clegg noted, represented ‘one of the most successful 
periods in the history of British industrial relations’, based on both the spread of 
collective bargaining, and the low level of disputes that resulted in strike action.83 
Machinery for collective bargaining had been established in some industries since 
before 1914, but now increasingly took place at the national level. An exception 
remained coalmining: area agreements had been reinstituted after 1926. As the 
figures in figure 1.3 demonstrate, disputes were significantly less disruptive than in the 
1920s or 1940s; whilst there were major textiles disputes in 1932, apart from two 
strikes by London busmen of the TGWU in 1932 and 1937, the only other major 
disruption came through strikes against the non-political unions in the coalfields of 
South Wales, and most significantly at Harworth colliery in Nottinghamshire. These 
organisations had been established in several coalfields after 1926, the most 
prominent being that led by George Spencer in Nottinghamshire, although by the end 
of the decade, their influence had been reduced to negligible proportions.84 
  
                                                          
82 Nina Fishman, The British Communist Party and the Trade Unions 1933-45 (Aldershot, 1995); for the 
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83 H. A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889. Volume III: 1933-1951 (Oxford, 1994), p. 
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84 A. R. Griffin and C. P. Griffin, ‘ The Non-Political Trade Union Movement’ in A. Briggs and J. Saville 
(eds.), Essays in Labour History. Volume 3, 1918-1939 (London, 1977), pp. 133-162. For an example 
from a smaller coalfield, see Keith Gildart ‘Militancy, moderation and the struggle against company 
unionism in the North Wales coalfield, 1926-1944’, Welsh History Review 20:3 (2001), 532-564. 
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Figure 1.3 Work stoppages due to industrial disputes, 1918-1945 (in-year) 
 
Year 
Number of 
stoppages 
Number of 
workers 
involved 
Aggregate 
work days lost 
Days lost 
(coalmining 
only) 
1918             1,165     1,116,000          5,875,000          1,165,000  
1919             1,352     2,591,000       34,969,000          7,441,000  
1920             1,607     1,932,000       26,568,000       17,424,000  
1921                763     1,801,000       85,872,000       72,693,000  
1922                576         552,000       19,850,000          1,246,000  
1923                628         405,000       10,672,000          1,183,000  
1924                710         613,000          8,424,000          1,563,000  
1925                603         441,000          7,952,000          3,453,000  
1926                323     2,734,000     162,233,000     146,434,000  
1927                308         108,000          1,174,000             688,000  
1928                302         124,000          1,388,000             452,000  
1929                431         533,000          8,287,000             576,000  
1930                422         307,000          4,399,000             663,000  
1931                420         490,000          6,983,000          2,848,000  
1932                389         379,000          6,488,000             287,000  
1933                357         136,000          1,072,000             446,000  
1934                471         134,000             959,000             365,000  
1935                553         271,000          1,955,000          1,368,000  
1936                818         316,000          1,829,000             852,000  
1937             1,129         597,000          3,413,000          1,496,000  
1938                875         274,000          1,334,000             697,000  
1939                940         337,000          1,356,000             565,000  
1940                922         299,000             940,000             505,000  
1941             1,251         360,000          1,079,000             335,000  
1942             1,303         456,000          1,527,000             840,000  
1943             1,785         557,000          1,808,000             890,000  
1944             2,194         821,000          3,714,000          2,480,000  
1945             2,293         531,000          2,835,000             641,000  
Source: Department of Employment, British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract, 1886-1968 (London, 
1971), table 197, p. 396. Figures relate to Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
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Chapter 2 
Membership and money 
 
A serious investigation of the relationship between the Labour party and the trade 
unions in the 1930s – as, indeed, in any other period – must necessarily consider the 
question of money. Raising and spending money are amongst the most basic 
functions of all political parties. Both the effective operation of party organisation and 
Labour’s chances of electoral success in the constituencies hinged to varying degrees 
on financial considerations. The role of the unions in these activities merits close 
attention for several reasons. Firstly, finance had a part in the engagement with, and 
representation of, individual unions within the party’s federal structure. The annual 
affiliation fee provided the basis for unions’ collective membership of the party, which 
in turn determined a union’s voting strength at party conference, and thus – formally, 
at least – its weight in the party’s deliberations and internal democratic structure. 
Secondly, the importance of the trade union contribution to the party’s finances both 
at national and local level. In the absence of mass individual membership of the 
constituency parties, trade unions provided the bulk of Labour headquarters’ regular 
income throughout this period, and thus the foundation for political action at the 
national level. Union contributions at local level were also significant. Trade union 
commitment to political action, as Martin Harrison noted half a century ago, would 
represent ‘little more than an oratorical gesture without the backing of substantial 
finance’85 and as will be seen, the contribution of the unions in the period under study 
here was considerable. Thirdly, party finance and the unions’ role in it were central to 
Labour claims about the party’s own democratic credentials, as the following comment 
from the former Labour MP Mary Hamilton in a 1939 volume for the party’s Labour 
Book Service demonstrates: 
By comparison with the older parties in the State, Labour is poor. It is not 
financed by the wealthy. There are no great capital interests behind it. It has 
no secret funds. Its accounts are open to the inspection of members as to 
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that of all the world […] The resources open to the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties are not, and never have been, open to Labour […] Much that in other 
parties is done for pay is here done through voluntary unpaid effort […] What 
is given […] costs the giver more in personal sacrifice than do the ample 
donations made to Party funds by well-to-do Conservatives and Liberals. 
The kernel of Labour Party finance is the small subscription of the many.86 
That Labour party organisation was not only distinctive but both more transparent and 
more ‘democratic’ than that of its political rivals was characteristic of how the party 
sought to present itself, as well as reflecting an assumption shared by many of its 
members. Kevin Morgan has argued that such claims of ‘democratic self-sufficiency’, 
whereby ‘Labour’s electoral challenge was sprung solely from the loins of the working 
class movement’, were prompted by the high frequency of general elections between 
1918 and 1929 which emphasised the importance of electoral funding. This, he 
suggests, represents a defining party myth ‘routinely expounded’ ever since in both 
party and academic literature.87 Morgan illustrates the resilience of a more traditional 
source of electoral finance in Labour politics, the wealthy individual, concentrating on 
the constituency activity of well-to-do candidates in the 1920s.88 But to focus on the 
continuing importance of union money to the party does not entail having to swallow 
the myth whole: the complexities of interpretations such as Hamilton’s need careful 
unpicking. Small subscriptions in the shape of political levy contributions may have 
been the ‘kernel’ of Labour finance, but they were subscriptions mediated through 
trade union machinery, and, concurring with Morgan that Labour’s party finance needs 
looking at anew, this chapter seeks to illuminate the process of such mediation. 
Such an approach can help shed light on the party’s political culture. Its ‘peculiar 
attitude to money’ is one of the four features of Labour’s ethos identified by Henry 
Drucker, who notes that ‘nowhere does the Labour Party more clearly reveal its origins 
                                                          
86 Mary Agnes Hamilton, The Labour Party To-day (London, n.d. [1939]), pp. 56-7. For a similar 
viewpoint from a prominent trade unionist, see John Bromley MP, general secretary of ASLEF, HC 
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in the trade unions […] than in its attitudes to its own money’.89 Drucker highlights 
several distinctive financial practices of the party and unions, considered in more detail 
below, which are representative of this ethos. Money also has a role in another of the 
features identified by Drucker, namely that of personal style, in terms of an emphasis 
on the virtue of sacrifice and a corresponding contempt for ostentatious displays of 
personal wealth.90 Both are evident in the ‘official’ party interpretation expressed by 
Hamilton; and demonstrate the ‘stress on moral ends, the tendency to see the Labour 
party as a vehicle of righteousness and the biblically-flavoured sense of moral outrage 
that coloured the party’s ideology, self-image and rhetoric’, which Peter Catterall 
suggests exemplifies Labour’s nonconformist inheritance.91 An examination of union 
finance can develop this analysis further. 
Party finance in Britain has been, if not exactly neglected, then not afforded the 
attention it deserves by political historians, although it continues to excite the interest 
of political scientists.92 The major contribution to the field remains Michael Pinto-
Duschinsky’s survey of British Political Finance covering the century from 1880, 
although there have been a number of other serious works since.93 Inattention may be 
partly due to a sense of the world of balance sheets, auditors and administrative costs 
as being at the more mundane end of political activity, or in part due to the past 
disinclination of parties other than Labour to make public any details of their finances, 
particularly at national level, leaving earlier researchers such as James Kerr Pollock 
struggling uncertainly through ‘the fog which obscures the party war chests’ of the 
Liberals and Conservatives, although Stuart Ball’s recent work has revealed in some 
detail the interwar finances of the latter.94 Labour has fared better than most here. As 
                                                          
89 H. M. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party (London, 1979), p. 15. 
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well as the relevant chapters by Pinto-Duschinsky, William B. Gwyn has considered 
Labour’s financial difficulties before the First World War; Ross McKibbin the party’s 
finances in the period to 1924; Andrew Thorpe the Second World War years; Martin 
Harrison the period from 1945-60; and Lewis Minkin developments in the 1980s, as 
well as the study by Morgan already referred to.95 Generally such work on party 
finance has been part of broader studies of the party – or parties – and as such 
relatively little attention has been given to the detailed analysis of the political levy and 
union political funds. Harrison makes the most sustained attempt at this, but his 
insights apply predominantly to the period after the re-introduction of the ‘contracting-
out’ system in 1946; unions in the 1930s were operating in very different economic 
and legislative contexts. The system of ‘contracting-in’ imposed by the 1927 Trade 
Disputes and Trade Union Act was in force for the duration of the period under 
consideration here, which alongside economic difficulties had the effect of depleting 
trade union political income, and correspondingly, funds available to Labour. Despite 
this, Pinto-Duschinsky argues that there ‘was no real shortage of money for the Labour 
party from the trade unions’ and refers to the availability of ‘easy union money’ in the 
period, whilst there is a sense in much of the existing literature that such money would 
be quickly forthcoming in times of crisis.96 Certainly union money accounted for the 
vast majority of the party’s income in the period, and times of acute need did bring 
greater generosity on the unions’ part, but the notion of easy money, along with the 
often powerful image of union leaders as the party’s ‘sugar daddies’ – a concern 
acknowledged by those very leaders both at the time and more recently – can be 
deeply misleading. This chapter seeks to examine more closely Labour party finance 
during the 1930s, considering in detail the raising and spending of political funds by 
the major affiliated unions. It then discusses the union part in Labour finance at the 
national and constituency levels, including the development of a system of regulation 
for the latter, usually referred to as the Hastings Agreement. It argues that unions’ 
financial support for the party was far from unconditional: instead it was the product of 
often complex processes of negotiation within their own internal democratic structures, 
which were in turn refracted through the party’s ethos. Analysis of such processes can 
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inform a better understanding of the unions’ role within Labour’s political culture in the 
period, as well as the broader role of trade unions as civil society organisations in 
British politics. 
 
The political levy 
 
In making use of the financial resources of trade unions, as Pinto-Duschinsky notes, 
Labour was establishing a previously unseen pattern of political finance in Britain, 
replacing individual with institutional contributions as the foundation of its finance.97   
As suggested by the previous chapter, trade unions were often responsible for 
managing considerable funds, and whilst political funds typically represented only a 
small proportion of the total, broader attitudes towards the management and meaning 
of money could have a significant impact on union political finance. Given the fact of 
‘having vast sums of money lent out in various ways; having many thousands of 
pounds passing through their accounts monthly, and at times, in the case of 
unemployment and strikes, making huge disbursements’, sound financial practice was 
increasingly prized and encouraged, not least through a small literature of manuals 
and textbooks compiled by union officials.98 According to the Chief Registrar for 
Friendly Societies, total trade union assets amounted to £11,966,000 in 1931, and 
£16,372,000 by 1936.99 Richard Rose suggested that the ‘most distinctive feature’ of 
Labour financial accounts was the amount of money hoarded, allowed to accumulate 
‘for its own sake’.100 This is certainly evident in union accounts in general, as figure 
2.1 demonstrates: each of the unions discussed here steadily increased its overall 
reserves across the decade, the sole exception being the AEU during the pit of the
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Figure 2.1 Total assets of selected trade unions, end of year (£) 
 
 
 
Source: calculated from unions’ own records. See appendix for full details.
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depression in 1932-33, when membership was at its lowest ebb and unemployment 
amongst AEU members at its highest, at 25 per cent until December 1932.101 The 
largest reserves were held by the unions which operated the greatest range of optional 
funds. The bulk of the Engineers’ reserves, for example, were held in its 
superannuation fund; the NUR ran funds to insure for accidents, disablement, death 
and provision for orphans, as well as sick and benevolent funds. Membership of each 
of these optional funds cost NUR members 1d weekly whilst AEU rates were 
considerably higher: regular payments, particularly if members did not need to draw 
on fund benefits, allowed steady but considerable accumulation.102 The general 
unions, which offered fewer optional benefits and charged lower subscription rates, 
were more reliant on increases in overall membership to build up their reserves. 
The practice of such accumulation was indicative of the movement’s working class 
foundations. Paul Johnson has argued that working-class household budgeting 
mitigated for the unpredictability of income and expenditure ‘by committing a set 
portion of income each week to financial planning’, most typically through mutual or 
club saving’: this was the economics of the rainy day, rather than the more typically 
middle-class practice of  investing for the future.103 Trade unions, in turn, saved more 
and invested less than other friendly societies. In sharp contrast to friendly societies 
as a whole, a much greater proportion of trade union money was maintained as liquid 
assets, either as cash in hand or in banks: some 36.4 per cent of union assets, as 
against 5.1 per cent of total friendly society assets, were held in this way in 1936.104 
By contrast, much less trade union money was invested in comparison to friendly 
societies as a whole, with 45.5 per cent of the 1936 total held in bonds or investments 
as against 67.9 per cent for all friendly societies.105  
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The existence of such large liquid assets, whether held cash in hand or in national and 
branch bank accounts, could provide a temptation to a dishonest official, particularly 
where accounting practices were obscure, and cases of corruption and embezzlement 
were not unknown.106 As the Chief Registrar noted, given the difficulty of ‘ensuring 
adequate supervision’ of a large number of minor officials throughout the country, ‘it is 
not surprising that defalcations frequently occur’.107 In a movement conscious of the 
practical and ethical significance of its foundation on the workers’ pennies, this was 
obviously problematic. As such, although often forced to write off large sums as 
irrecoverable, unions could be assiduous in pursuing defaulting officials, whether 
through expulsion or legal action.108 The highest-profile example during the period was 
that of Charles Sitch, general secretary of the Chain Makers and Strikers Association 
– a small union founded by Sitch’s father, the funds of which Sitch, a former Labour 
MP, ‘controlled virtually unsupervised’ – who was found in 1933 to have defrauded his 
union of some £4,800 over a four-year period, resulting in the end of Sitch’s public 
career and a nine month prison sentence.109  
The general pattern of union finance, then, tended towards accumulation of cash 
assets; J. R. Clynes’ comments in his presidential address to the NUGMW’s 1934 
Congress are illustrative of the attitude behind this approach:  
These reserves must be carefully guarded, for just as in times of depression 
we have to fight against reductions and encroachments, and must 
sometimes compromise or give way, we will find that when conditions 
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substantially improve, little can be obtained by merely asking for it. We are 
not seeking trouble, but we know from experience that trouble is in store for 
us, and we must be ready to face it with adequate Union support for our 
members.110 
We now turn to the political levy in particular. The trade unions which came together 
to found the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 did so in part owing to an 
environment of adverse, anti-union legal judgments, yet at this stage the only 
restriction on their political expenditure was that the Chief Registrar for Friendly 
Societies had to be satisfied that any such activity fell within a given union’s own rules. 
As such, those unions which contributed to the fledgling LRC could do so using their 
general funds, that is, those accrued through ordinary membership subscriptions. 
Several unions instituted levies on their memberships to this end. This was not 
uncontroversial: many trade unionists remained opposed to independent Labour 
politics.  A Liberal branch secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 
W. V. Osborne, was amongst the objectors, and succeeded in taking his case to the 
House of Lords; the result, the so-called ‘Osborne Judgment’ of 1909, effectively 
barred unions from collecting money for political purposes. The threat this posed to 
the Labour party was relieved firstly by the introduction of salaries for MPs in 1911, 
and secondly by the passage of the Trade Union Act, 1913.111  This legislation allowed 
for the collection of political levies, provided they were kept in a separate political fund. 
Setting up such a fund would require approval by a ballot vote of the membership; 
once a separate fund was established, those members who wanted to do so would be 
entitled to ‘contract-out’ of paying political levies. A flurry of ballots followed, with most 
unions voting in favour of setting up a political fund.112 These decisions supporting 
political action retained their symbolic power: thirty years later, the return of the result 
of the RCA’s ballot still hung framed above the general secretary’s desk.113 Several of 
the unions discussed in this chapter never held ballots: they were products of later 
amalgamations, and were able to rely on affirmative results in their predecessor 
unions.114 In practice relatively few members chose to ‘contract-out’: this system had 
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the effect of making membership apathy an ally of Labour politics. Despite continued 
Conservative hostility, ‘contracting-out’ remained in place until the Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act, 1927 was passed in the aftermath of the General Strike. This 
measure substituted in its place ‘contracting-in’, under which union members would 
have to give notice of their willingness to pay into the political fund before any 
contributions were taken: this would now have to be incorporated into union rules. This 
not only caused an immediate fall in the numbers paying the political levy, but placed 
substantial new administrative costs on unions which now had to organise and provide 
forms for ‘contracting-in’. The Act also barred civil service trade unions from political 
affiliations, affecting the Union of Post Office Workers and the Civil Service Clerical 
Association in particular, as well as limiting the legality of strike action. Unsurprisingly 
the trade union movement demanded the Act’s repeal, but the attempt of the second 
Labour government foundered on the rocks of Liberal opposition.115 Resolutions 
demanding repeal became a ‘hardy perennial’ of trade union and Labour conferences 
over the years that followed, before the Attlee government eventually re-established 
‘contracting-out’ by the Trade Union Act, 1946.116 
Political and affiliated membership 
An advantage of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927 – for the historian of 
political finance, at least – was the additional statistical data in relation to political funds 
it required unions to submit to the Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies. Figures for 
the numbers of members paying the political levy are available from 1928, and 
although even these need to be treated with some caution, they are not so ‘gravely 
inaccurate’ as those for the pre-1928 or post-1946 ‘contracting-out’ periods, when the 
total number of contributors was calculated by subtracting the figure for those 
‘contracting-out’ from the total membership, not counting the often substantial 
numbers of members not contributing to the political fund for other reasons.117 Political 
membership – that is, those paying the levy – diverged considerably from the overall 
                                                          
115 See Neil Riddell, Labour in Crisis. The second Labour government, 1929-31 (Manchester and New 
York, 1999), pp. 71-75 for an account of this attempt at repeal. 
116 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 22-28. ‘Contracting-in’ was retained in 
Northern Ireland. The Thatcher government’s Trade Union Act, 1984 forced unions to hold a political 
fund ballot every ten years, whilst the Trade Union Act, 2016 reintroduces a modified version of 
‘contracting-in’ in the guise of the ‘opt-in’ form. 
117 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 33-34. For example, certain categories 
of membership such as the apprenticed, unemployed or retired were routinely exempted. 
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industrial membership following the 1927 Act. It has been estimated that prior to 1928, 
some 75-80 per cent of trade union members paid in to the political fund; this declined 
in 1928 to less than three-fifths.118 Although this figure was maintained during the early 
1930s, in the context of union growth later in the decade, the number of levy-payers 
had slipped to under half of the total membership by 1939.119  
Not all unions kept accurate records of their political membership: indeed, this was 
often difficult to do effectively, and returns to the Chief Registrar might be calculated 
back from political fund income. This did not necessarily give the true figure: some 
unions operated different levy rates for different categories of members, whilst 
members who had ‘contracted-in’ not paying – through, for example, non-collection, 
part-payment, or those members in arrears – could also compromise the accuracy of 
these figures.120 Union administrative structure also had an effect on record-keeping: 
the NUR was generally able to maintain reasonably precise figures owing to the fact 
that its branches reported directly to head office. Where financial returns were 
mediated through other layers of union bureaucracy, especially in craft organisations 
such as the AEU and in the general unions which afforded considerable autonomy to 
district or trade group sections, national union offices often lacked reliable statistics for 
political membership. 
As figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, the political membership of each of the main 
unions considered here followed roughly the same pattern as industrial membership 
across the period.121 NUDAW’s record was particularly impressive here: its political 
membership grew every year, and at a faster rate than its industrial membership in 
                                                          
118 Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980, pp 75-77. Harrison, Trade Unions and the 
Labour Party since 1945, pp. 32-33; FS 32 Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies, Annual Reports of 
the Chief Registrar. 
119 See figure 2.5 below for further detail. For registration purposes, there were two categories of trade 
union, registered and unregistered. Unregistered trade unions were typically federal bodies including 
a number of constituent unions: for example, whilst the Durham Miners’ Association was a registered 
union, the MFGB – the largest unregistered union – was not. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions 
Act, 1927 allowed the Chief Registrar to collect figures from the unregistered unions for the first time, 
although this did result in some double-counting, although, as Harrison notes, the Annual Reports of 
the Chief Registrar did try to eliminate this as far as possible. Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour 
Party since 1945, p. 33. 
120 Even so, it has been necessary to calculate in this way in the instances of the NUGMW and AEU 
owing to the information available. Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 33-
34. Certain categories of membership such as the apprenticed, unemployed or retired were routinely 
exempted from paying the levy; the TGWU varied its political levy rate for junior and apprenticed 
members. 
121 Full membership details of the unions discussed can be found in the appendix. 
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Figure 2.2 Industrial membership, selected trade unions 
 
 
 
Source: unions’ own records – see appendix for full details.
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Figure 2.3 Political membership, selected trade unions 
 
 
 
Source: union records and my own calculations – see appendix for full details.
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every year except 1939-40. It also increased by a greater number than industrial 
membership in every year apart from 1931 and 1937-40, implying a high level of 
success, especially during 1932-36, in encouraging members both new and old to pay 
the political levy. From 1933 onwards at least eighty per cent of the industrial 
membership were also political members.122 The same pattern is evident in the RCA’s 
figures.123  
More typically, however, both political and industrial memberships reached their nadir 
in 1932-33 before rising later in the decade: the figures for the TGWU, NUGMW, and 
to a lesser extent, MFGB and NUR, had this in common.  
The notable exception here is the AEU. Its political membership remained static across 
the period, despite often massive increases in industrial membership – at least 11.5 
per cent annually, and sometimes twice that - from 1935 onwards. The union was 
singularly unsuccessful in getting new entrants to pay the levy, with the result that the 
proportion of members who did pay declined from 38 per cent of the industrial 
membership in 1931-32 to just 14.6 per cent by 1940.124  The union’s leadership 
viewed this ‘marked slackening’ with some concern: ‘the position of the AEU is not so 
bad as some; but it is none too good, having regard to the rapid and substantial 
additions to membership […] It is evident […] that a real effort must be made to 
reawaken amongst the members of this Union a lively interest in the question of its 
political responsibilities’.125 Subscription rates were one factor which could affect the 
proportions of membership paying the levy. The AEU charged 3d per quarter for 
political membership, amounting to a shilling annually. Whilst this was a typical political 
levy rate, as craft unionists AEU members paid some of the biggest average overall 
contributions of any trade union. In 1931, annual union contributions for workers in the 
metals sector averaged £2 12s 8d compared to a £1 17s 0d average for all unions; by 
1936, these figures had risen to £2 17s 7d and £1 18s 1d respectively.126 That they 
were already making substantial subscriptions towards a variety of other benefits may 
have been incentive enough for engineers’ non-payment of the political levy; this 
                                                          
122 See appendix, table j. 
123 See appendix, table m. 
124 See appendix, table a. 
125 AEU Monthly Journal, November 1938. 
126 FS 32.72 Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies, Report for the Year 1932, Part 4: Trade Unions, 
p.15; Report for the Year 1937, Part 4: Trade Unions, p. 9. Only trade unionists in the printing industry 
payed higher average annual contributions, £5 12s 8d, in 1936. 
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seems likely to have particularly applied to new entrants to the industry later in the 
decade. By contrast, trade unionists in, for example, mining (£1 5s 9d in 1936) and 
transport (£1 9s 3d in 1936) paid much lower average annual contributions, and these 
unions experienced much less difficulty in extracting political levy subscriptions from 
their members.127 The Engineers’ heritage of craft union independence likely 
contributed to the level of non-payment; another factor was the legacy of the collapse 
in shop-steward organisation in the 1920s and its effect on collectors.128 Labour’s 
shifting position on rearmament may have been a consideration for different members 
at different points: the party’s ambiguous position before 1937 may not have endeared 
Labour to engineers in the armaments industry, whereas the party’s stronger stance 
in favour of rearmament later in the decade did not necessarily sit easily with official 
AEU scepticism.129 The AEU’s response to its declining political membership was 
hardly imaginative; rather than a sustained push to advertise the benefits of political 
action to new joiners, the union counted on existing levy-payers to contribute more: 
the rate was doubled to 6d per quarter in 1940. By this time Labour had joined the 
coalition government, which may have made it easier to push the change through the 
union’s National Committee.130 With the party back in office, the proportion of AEU 
levy-payers did increase to 19.5 per cent by 1941, but in the context of rapid wartime 
membership expansion, this had fallen back to 14.2 per cent by late 1943; it would 
take until the repeal of the 1927 Act in 1946 to effect substantial change in levels of 
AEU political membership.131  
Several unions operated variable levy rates in order to better attract contractors-in; the 
TGWU is a prominent example of a union doing this with some success.132 Some of 
the discrepancy between industrial and political memberships can be explained by the 
                                                          
127 Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies, Report for the Year 1937, Part 4: Trade Unions, p. 9 
128 Richard Croucher, Engineers at War (London, 1982), pp. 23-26. 
129 See Tom Buchanan, ‘The politics of internationalism: the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the 
Spanish Civil War’, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History 53:3 (1988), 47-55, p. 49 for 
the AEU’s position on rearmament. 
130 Only one committee member opposed the change, with the resolution carried 34 to 1. 
TU/ENG/1/A/44, AEU, Bound Reports, 1940: AEU Report of Proceedings of 22nd National Committee 
and 5th Rules Revision Meeting, May-June 1940, p. 318. An amendment to increase the rate to 4d 
instead was by lost 32 to 3. 
131 Statistics from Labour Party, NEC Minutes 1941, minutes of meeting of Finance and General 
Purposes committee 16 January 1941; Labour Party, NEC Minutes 1943, minutes of Special 
Conference of Trade Union Officers, 24 November 1943.  
132 In this period the TGWU charged 1d per quarter for women and under-21s; 3d per quarter all other 
members.  
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ineligibility of certain union members, such as juveniles or apprentices, from paying at 
all; a memorandum prepared by the TUC Research Department on contracting-in in 
the wake of the 1927 Act’s introduction noted that ‘many unionists who have refused 
to sign contracting-in cards’, in this case presumably on the principle of opposition to 
the imposition of the Act itself, rather than Labour politics, were continuing to pay 
political contributions as a voluntary donation. Further evidence of this practice has 
proved hard to find, but it seems likely that it did occur.133  
The method used to collect levy payments could also have an impact on political 
membership. Later observers lamented the inefficiency of collection systems which 
relied on small amounts being collected in person on a regular basis.134 Some systems 
certainly were inefficient. The AEU again offers an instructive example: its members’ 
political contributions were to be collected quarterly, at a branch’s final meeting night 
of the quarter.135 Ensuring regular attendance at relatively infrequent meetings was 
one impediment to efficient collection; the commitment of collectors hunting down 
unpaid dues could be another. As Harrison notes, collectors would ‘usually prefer to 
clear up industrial arrears before insisting on payment of the levy’; this was surely even 
more pronounced during the slump.136 The NUR’s political membership figures imply 
that the Railwaymen’s system of collecting ½d every week was more fruitful amongst 
workers on weekly wages; that the political levy was collected separately from other 
dues may also have contributed to fostering political consciousness.137 A criticism of 
the compound system of collecting, more widespread in the post-war period, was that 
it did the opposite by merging the levy payment into the usual weekly contribution.138 
Such a system could, however, prevent a relatively high political levy rate from 
                                                          
133 MSS.292/43.2/1 TUC ‘Trade Union Political Fund. Contracting In’ file, 1927-1934: TUC Research 
Department, ‘Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act, 1927. Contracting-In’, memorandum, 26 
September 1928. 
134 Drucker refers to the monthly door-to-door collection of party dues, still prevalent in the 1970s, as 
an ‘absurd’ system of collecting money. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, p. 16; see 
also Rose, The Problem of Party Government, p. 233. 
135 TU/ENG/4/A/14 AEU, Rule Books, 1920-1957. 
136 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, p. 48. 
137 MSS.127/NU/4/3/5 NUR Rules, 1935. NUDAW changed its levy rate from 6d per quarter to ½d per 
week in 1935; although the union’s rulebook still suggested this should be collected quarterly, the 
alteration likely gave collectors more discretion to follow their own method. NUDAW, Rule Books, 
1930-1940. 
138 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 48-49. Under compounding, a week 
or two’s full contribution would be given directly to the political fund, representing the member’s levy 
payment for the whole year. A printing union’s general secretary described the practice to Harrison as 
‘a bloody swindle. They know their members wouldn’t pay the money if they knew what they were 
paying for’. 
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becoming an obstacle to payment, as in the case of the RCA, which charged ¾d per 
week.139  
The number of members a union chose to affiliate to the Labour party usually differed 
from its total political membership.140 The affiliation fee was the basis of a union’s 
engagement in Labour politics. This had been set at an annual rate of 1d per member 
in 1912, increasing to 2d in 1918 and then 3d in 1920 as the party’s ambitions – and 
expenditure – grew. In 1929, the fee was raised to 4d, and then 4½d in 1937. A special 
levy of an additional 2d per member was collected over the three years between the 
1929-32 party conferences.141 Figure 2.4 shows the affiliated membership of eight 
major unions.  NUDAW simply affiliated on the basis of the previous year’s political 
membership. Sometimes a rounded figure would be used, approximating the political 
membership figure; the RCA offers a good example of this practice. The use of a 
rounded figure could disguise substantial disparities, however: it might be higher or 
lower than its actual total of political levy-payers. Affiliating a political membership 
greater than its real size could increase prestige, deflect criticism that a union was not 
pulling its weight politically, and maintain the size of its block vote at party conference, 
although the desire to demonstrate stability and political loyalty should not be 
underestimated. The MFGB typically affiliated exactly 
                                                          
139 Although it could arouse suspicion. Herbert Elvin, general secretary of the National Union of Clerks 
and Administrative Workers, in making inquiries to the TUC in 1934 as to means of increasing his 
levy-paying membership, implied that the RCA was exploiting the compound system to the 
disadvantage of non-levy-payers. Elvin thought that compounding allowed the RCA to effectively 
collect greater dues from non-subscribers to the political levy, by retaining their two weeks’ 
contribution that would otherwise have gone to the political fund for industrial purposes. A degree of 
clerical union rivalry may have been a factor in his accusation, given the RCA’s high proportion of 
political membership. Walter Milne-Bailey, in reply, noted that the RCA’s rules on this point were 
‘strictly in accordance with the law’, but admitted the TUC had ‘no information’ as to whether such 
practices actually went on. See MSS.292/43.2/1 TUC ‘Trade Union Political Fund. Contracting In’ file, 
1927-1934: Elvin to Citrine, 14 August 1934; Milne-Bailey to Elvin, 16 August 1934; Elvin to Citrine, 
17 August 1934; Milne-Bailey to Elvin, 20 August 1934; Elvin to Milne-Bailey, 22 August 1934; Milne-
Bailey to Elvin, 23 August 1934; Elvin to Citrine, 24 August 1934. 
140 This was also true of industrial membership and TUC affiliations; several of the points made in this 
paragraph also apply in regards of TUC membership. 
141 The levy was proposed at the 1929 by Gordon MacDonald of the MFGB, backed by the TGWU’s 
Ernest Bevin. John Bromley of ASLEF, Charles Dukes of the NUGMW, and Arthur Henderson all took 
part – notably all were figures with strong profiles on both sides of the movement. LPACR 1929, p. 
244. A special double levy was charged in 1926 only; prior to 1912, a combination of affiliation fee at 
15s per thousand members, and a parliamentary levy of 2d per member to support Labour MPs was 
used. With the introduction of parliamentary salaries, there was no longer a need for the latter levy, 
and so a single levy of 1d per member was introduced. See Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 
1830-1980, pp. 61-67; Dean E. McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition 1931-1938 (London, 1938), 
pp. 45-46. 
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Figure 2.4 Affiliated membership, selected trade unions 
 
 
 
Source: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1929-1940.
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400,000 members, although the combined political membership of its districts regularly 
fell short of this total. The AEU figures for 1932-36 – 70,022; 70,004; 70006; 70,009 
and 70,021 – imply that the union was attempting to give the appearance of an 
accurately fluctuating figure whilst disguising an embarrassingly lower political 
membership. Calculations from political fund income confirm that the paying 
membership was closer to 65,000. The NUGMW usually affiliated to the party on a 
political membership of 242,000 through the 1930s. This figure had itself been lowered 
from 250,000 in 1933 in recognition of the impact of the slump on membership. Yet 
the actual political membership of the union was likely below 200,000 in 1933, only 
surpassing 242,000 in 1936. Thereafter the union maintained a 242,000 affiliation, 
despite a substantially larger political membership. The affiliated figure had 
represented 108 per cent of the political membership in 1935, but only 68 per cent of 
it in 1939. Using a lower figure could help conserve political fund resources, which was 
of particular importance to the NUGMW, as will be seen below. The TGWU also tended 
to affiliate to the party at a lower figure than its actual political membership. That a 
rounded figure was generally used implies that financial considerations were of 
significance; the much reduced affiliated figure for 1934 may reflect leadership 
frustration following the Clay Cross inquiry given that the actual political membership 
continued to rise.142 Sensitivity to the charge of union dictation, or the appearance of 
dominating conference proceedings through a large block vote, might also encourage 
restraint in affiliating on a lower figure.143    
Political funds 
The reports of the Chief Registrar shed light on the overall political income and 
expenditure of trade unions in the period, as figure 2.5 demonstrates. The most recent 
study of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 has suggested that the ‘impact 
on political funds was immediate and significant’; the fall of over 700,000 total 
contributors, and 1.2 million in Labour affiliations, from 1927-28 confirms this.144 One 
area in which the shift to contracting-in had an undeniable effect was in the cost of  
                                                          
142 The Clay Cross controversy is discussed in the next chapter. 
143 Rose, The Problem of Party Government, p. 237. 
144 Adrian Williamson, ‘The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 Reconsidered’, Historical 
Studies in Industrial Relations 37 (2016), 33-82, p. 65. 
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Figure 2.5 All trade unions: political funds and Labour party affiliations, 1927-1940 
 
 
Source: FS 32 Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies, Annual Reports of the Chief Registrar; TUC Annual Reports; Labour Party Annual Conference Reports; 
additional information from Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980, p. 75 and Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 32-
33. Contribution figures are not available for 1940. 
 *Total contributors: the Chief Registrar removed some double counting, so this total does not necessarily equal the sum of the figures in the columns for 
contributors in registered and unregistered unions. 
 **Figures represent income, rather than just contributions. Chief Registrar’s figures unavailable; Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980, p. 75. 
 ***Political funds of trade unions, e/y:  the Chief Registrar’s accounts include unions of employers, of which almost all of the funds belonged to the National 
Farmers’ Union; these figures are close estimates based on subtraction of the NFU’s funds. The Chief Registrar’s figures for total contributions and total 
expenditure already exclude the NFU. 
 
Year 
Trade union 
membership 
(TUC figure) 
Contributors 
in registered 
trade unions 
Contributors 
in 
unregistered 
trade unions 
Total  
contributors* 
% 
paying 
levy 
Total 
contributions 
(£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Political 
funds of trade 
unions, e/y 
(£)*** 
Labour 
party 
affiliation, 
trade unions 
1927 4,163,994 2,224,000 597,000 2,821,000 67.7       3,238,939 
1928 3,874,842 1,634,000 581,000 2,088,000 58.3 170,000 201,000 359,000 2,025,139 
1929 3,673,144 1,669,000 584,000 2,119,000 59.1 159,000 218,000 313,000 2,044,279 
1930 3,744,320 1,683,000 590,000 2,144,000 59.2 168,000 138,000 354,000 2,011,484 
1931 3,719,401 1,587,000 584,000 2,045,000 59.7 144,000 217,000 295,000 2,024,216 
1932 3,613,273 1,493,000 542,000 1,916,000 58.5 151,000 131,000 324,000 1,960,269 
1933 3,367,911 1,481,000 549,000 1,915,000 57.0 145,000 144,000 342,000 1,899,007 
1934 3,294,581 1,576,000 525,000 1,983,000 57.7 157,000 143,000 366,000 1,857,524 
1935 3,388,810 1,671,000 525,000 2,078,000 56.5 163,000 229,000 311,000 1,912,924 
1936 3,614,551 1,780,000 545,000 2,213,000 54.0 173,000 152,000 344,000 1,968,538 
1937 4,008,647 1,922,000 570,000 2,491,000 51.4 192,000** 172,000 365,000 2,037,071 
1938 4,460,617 1,975,000 575,000 2,550,000 50.2 199,000** 167,000 392,000 2,158,076 
1939 4,669,186 2,017,000 562,000 2,579,000 49.8 196,000** 172,000 416,000 2,214,070 
1940 4,866,711        2,226,575 
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political fund administration, both immediately following the Act itself, and on into the 
1930s. Substantial resources were required in the short term to encourage as many 
members as possible to sign contracting-in forms.145 Over the longer term, the 
administrative burden on union staff was increased considerably, as the NUGMW-
sponsored MP Arthur Hayday complained: 
I represent a union that has 300,000 members. […] When contracting-out 
was the order, from 2,000 to 3,000 – say 3,000 – contracted-out. […] We 
kept records of that small number. Now that we have filed away in index 
form, say, 280,000 cards and have increased the secretarial staff, the 
Morning Post or some national paper begins to trounce you for taking such 
a large percentage of 6d per week contribution for management, and then 
they say that it is to keep the agitator comfortably well off, instead of which 
it is imposed by the Government, which says to you, ‘Keep 280,000 cards; 
follow them up’. I should like somebody on that side of the House who was 
responsible for the Act of 1927 to say if they would like the Government to 
carry that out […] If they did, I wonder if the country realises that, in order to 
fix their spite upon trade unionists, they would have to employ two or three 
thousand civil servants. In our office we have 280,000 names indexed, and 
we are expected to keep going through them and taking out the names of 
those who have died and to trace those who may have left the union.146 
General funds could be used to meet the additional administrative costs, although 
typically a portion of political funds were also spent this way. The average expenditure 
per member on union working expenses had been 14s 2d in 1927; it rose sharply to 
15s 2d by 1932 – twice as fast as average contributions.147 Although no overall figure 
for political fund income is available for 1927, it seems that it was the slump rather 
than the Act which had a more significant effect on income, with totals markedly lower 
in the years 1931-33. Reserves also fell during these years, partly in order to meet the 
decline in income, compounded the cost of two general elections in just over two years. 
                                                          
145 The efforts of the TGWU are reflected in hefty files of correspondence between head office and the 
union’s various area organisations: see especially MSS.126/TG/783/C/1 TGWU, correspondence file, 
‘Political Provisions – Contracting In’. 
146 Arthur Hayday, HC Debs. 22 January 1931, vol. 247, cc. 446-447. 
147 Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies, Report for the Year 1937, Part 4: Trade Unions, p. 9 
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Ernest Bevin suggested in 1931 that the Act was ‘more of an insult than an injury’.148 
Pinto-Duschinsky’s account supports this view: he contends that not only were unions 
reasonably successful in mitigating the effect of the Act, in part through making use of 
previously hoarded income and vigorous efforts to get members to contract in, but the 
purchasing power of funds increased as the cost of living fell during the slump.149 
Arguably the real significance of the Act was symbolic; for many trade unionists, it was 
‘passed in a cold-blooded spirit of revenge’ after the General Strike, and represented 
the denial of fundamental rights and freedoms in the service of naked partisanship.150 
Although political fund income had recovered by the end of the decade, the total 
number of contributors had yet to do so; moreover, as the Chief Registrar’s statistics 
demonstrate, the proportion of levy-payers overall continued to decline.151 
The records of individual unions can be more revealing. The financial aspect of trade 
union political action has been under-researched, and yet, as Martin Harrison has 
suggested, without ‘the backing of substantial finance’ such action would be only a 
gesture.152 Harrison’s own work is perhaps the most systematic attempt to analyse the 
problems of trade union political finance, although, as he notes, it is often unions’ own 
accounts which present the ‘most serious obstacle’ to such an investigation. Despite 
being required by law to supply both their own membership and the Chief Registrar 
with annual statements, ‘nothing binds them to make it either comprehensive or 
comprehensible’.153 Arguably Harrison slightly exaggerates this difficulty, and although 
it is certainly possible to detect something of the fear of giving anything away to ‘the 
other side’ that he identifies in some unions’ pronouncements and publications 
concerning political finance in the 1930s, perhaps the main challenge lies in the lack 
of uniform accounting practices, which in some instances makes comparison between 
unions problematic, or at worst somewhat speculative. However, it remains possible 
                                                          
148 Williamson, ‘The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 Reconsidered’, p. 71. 
149 Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980, p. 77. 
150 Frank Stillwell, ‘The New Trade Union Bill’, TGWU Record, January 1931. Stillwell was secretary of 
the union’s legal department.   
151 The TUC was sufficiently concerned by reports that members who had contracted-in prior to the 
1931 general election had since refused to pay, to make enquiries of its constituent unions, although 
little evidence of this was found; the AUBTW reported that the reality was ‘Quite the other way. 
National Govt’s programme of economy has resulted in stopping of meaningful activities in building 
and many men thrown out of work. This has had effect of improving responses to appeals for levy’. 
The AEU also reported increases. MSS.292/43.2/1 TUC ‘Trade Union Political Fund. Contracting In’, 
handwritten note, undated but 1931-33.  
152 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, p. 55. 
153 Ibid., p. 59. 
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to make use of the financial accounts of trade unions to assess the character of the 
unions’ financial contribution to Labour party politics in the period.  
As suggested, accounting practices varied: most unions published an annual financial 
statement supplementary to their annual reports; the NUGMW, however, published 
such statements on a six-monthly basis. Unions’ financial years were not always 
consistent: the Miners’ Federation used a July-to-June basis for their statements, 
although during 1931 they changed to using a more conventional calendar year. 
Generally such statements would be discussed at the next annual conference of the 
union in question following their publication, although here again, the NUGMW 
provides an exception in that its congresses were held on a biennial basis. Although 
the union’s biennial reports did give a brief overview of expenditure on political 
activities in the intervening period, this probably rendered any congress criticism of 
such activity the more difficult. The major obstacle in terms of the statements 
themselves, however, is in the variety of systems for categorising political income and 
expenditure. The Railway Clerks did not itemise expenditure in their political fund 
statements, making it difficult to tell precisely what money was spent where. This does 
appear to reflect to some degree the ‘fear’ described by Harrison: at the union’s 1936 
conference, defending the decision not to publish itemised expenditure on 
candidatures, the RCA treasurer commented ‘We have not got those figures here […] 
If our friends want to know, we can tell them, although it is not usually given in the 
most public way’.154 The following year there was an attempt at the RCA conference 
to move back the political fund section of the annual report on the grounds of lack of 
information. A. W. Longbottom, an RCA parliamentary candidate, complained that it 
was ‘totally inadequate’ that a clerical association was unable to give greater detail on 
political expenditure. The treasurer’s reply was revealing: ‘It is one thing to inform our 
members, but it is another thing to put all our confidential political expenditure into a 
document that is going to be circulated far and wide […] what value would it be to any 
member here?’ He was supported by a delegate wary that such information might be 
used against the Association by the railway companies, and the challenge was 
defeated.155 The Railway Clerks seem to have been the exception here, however, 
although it is perhaps notable that the general secretary’s introductory remarks to the 
                                                          
154 MSS.55/1/CON/64a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1936, p. 78. 
155 MSS.55/1/CON/65a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1937, pp. 183-5. 
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NUGMW’s half-yearly reports usually neglected to mention political expenditure, 
despite it taking up several pages early on in the reports.156 Political funds were just 
one of many separate accounts. Most unions, the NUGMW included, did provide 
itemised detail on their political income and expenditure, and the difficulty, as 
mentioned, in comparing them derives from the fact that different unions categorised 
the same kind of expenditure under different headings, or changed the ways they did 
so. The Miners’ Federation, for example, up to 1935, included delegates’ fees and 
expenses for attending Labour party conferences under expenditure on the Labour 
party centrally, without indicating how much of the total represented affiliation fees, 
delegates’ fees and delegates’ expenses; from 1936, delegates’ expenses, but not 
their fees, were excluded and listed separately.157  
Figure 2.6 gives details of the central political funds of seven unions. In the cases of 
two unions, half of all political fund contributions were retained by the districts (MFGB) 
and branches (NUR). These sums did not pass through the unions’ central accounts 
and as such are excluded here; it should be noted that the overall political expenditure 
and reserves of these unions were therefore greater than the totals shown. The other 
unions allocated sums from central political funds to their regional and branch 
organisation; consequently these figures are included as part of their central 
expenditure. Income followed closely the pattern of political membership, either rising 
or remaining stable throughout the period.158 The heaviest expenditure came from the 
four unions with the largest political memberships – the MFGB, NUR, TGWU and 
NUGMW, although the NUDAW was catching up by the end of the decade; 
unsurprisingly the general election years of 1931 and 1935 saw the highest peaks in 
spending by all seven unions. In spite of its smaller size and political membership, the 
RCA outspent the AEU by two to one in general election years.   
                                                          
156 TU/GENERALB/1/A/5-16 NUGMW Reports and Minutes, Half-Yearly Financial Reports. 
157 D.845.14-15 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, Annual Reports, 1935 and 1936. In instances such 
as these an attempt has been made wherever possible to ensure figures for spending on the party 
centrally, constituency expenses etc. have been included under the correct headings, apart from 
where the failure to separate such expenditure within a statement has made an accurate calculation 
impossible. 
158 I have been unable to satisfactorily account for the substantial drop in AEU income during 1936; an 
accounting error, although possible, seems unlikely as the figure of £2,506 appears in several places 
in the union’s records for that year, although there is no evidence, for example in executive council 
minutes, that the union’s leadership were particularly concerned about the apparent drop.   
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Figure 2.6 Central political funds of selected trade unions (£) 
 
  AEU MFGB NUDAW 
  income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y 
1931 
       
3,782  
       
6,459         7,845  
     
10,985  
     
23,367  
     
31,557  
       
9,274  
       
9,782  
       
7,006  
1932 
       
3,490  
       
3,029         8,307  
     
18,736  
     
14,259  
     
34,988  
       
9,580  
       
6,322  10,265 
1933 
       
3,355  
       
4,260         7,403  
     
20,026  
     
12,550  
     
33,476  
     
10,040  
       
7,482  12,823 
1934 
       
3,368  
       
4,384         6,387  
     
20,062  
     
13,049  
     
40,489  
     
10,741  
       
8,771  14,791 
1935 
       
3,420  
       
6,219         3,588  
     
20,536  
     
26,931  
     
34,095  
     
12,168  
     
15,655  11,306 
1936 
       
2,506  
       
3,942         2,152  
     
21,776  
     
15,416  
     
40,454  
     
14,211  
       
9,777  15,740 
1937 
       
3,266  
       
4,317         1,101  
     
21,952  
     
16,562  
     
45,818  
     
15,690  
     
10,743  20,688 
1938 
       
3,260  
       
3,573  788 
     
22,823  
     
14,339  
     
54,172  
     
16,982  
     
11,481  26,189 
1939 
       
3,325  
       
3,149  964 
     
22,375  
     
21,681  
     
55,104  
     
17,493  
     
11,919  31,763 
1940 
       
3,336  
       
1,930         2,370  
     
22,518  
     
16,501  
     
61,071  
     
17,433  
     
10,653  38,543 
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Figure 2.6 Central political funds of selected trade unions (£), ctd. 
 
  NUGMW NUR RCA 
  income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y 
1931 
     
16,778  
     
25,726  
     
23,887  12,715 24,772 
     
69,777  
       
8,403  
     
12,091  
       
5,330  
1932 
     
14,763  
     
15,244  
     
24,876  11,875 9,681 
     
75,684  
       
7,940  
       
5,615  
       
7,654  
1933 
     
14,366  
     
15,745  
     
23,262  11,238 12,352 
     
78,173  
       
7,684  
       
6,465  
       
8,874  
1934 
     
14,502  
     
16,421  
     
21,343  11,273 10,608 
     
82,573  
       
7,760  
       
6,152  
     
10,481  
1935 
     
15,499  
     
26,424  
     
11,418  11,733 26,558 
     
71,892  
       
8,061  
     
14,660  
       
3,883  
1936 
     
17,205  
     
18,093  
     
10,530  11,641 10,550 
     
74,801  
       
8,670  
       
6,773  
       
5,779  
1937 
     
18,713  
     
19,781  
       
9,460  12,177 17,234 
     
71,614  
       
9,074  
       
7,773  
       
7,081  
1938 
     
19,105  
     
17,577  
     
10,987  12,570 12,624 
     
73,399  
       
9,648  
       
6,874  
       
9,855  
1939 
     
27,873  
     
18,874  
     
19,986  11,936 16,618 
     
70,506  
       
9,394  
       
5,339  
     
13,911  
1940 
     
20,552  
     
16,943  
     
22,595  11,421 10,736 
     
72,786  
       
9,136  
       
5,031  
     
18,015  
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Figure 2.6 Central political funds of selected trade unions (£), ctd. 
 
  TGWU 
  income expenditure 
balance, 
e/y 
1931 
     
12,872  
     
21,508  
       
9,006  
1932 
     
11,623  
       
9,432  
     
11,197  
1933 
     
11,473  
       
7,628  
     
15,042  
1934 
     
12,625  
     
11,895  
     
15,772  
1935 
     
13,846  
     
17,128  
     
12,489  
1936 
     
15,308  
     
11,031  
     
16,766  
1937 
     
17,871  
     
14,552  
     
20,086  
1938 
     
20,270  
     
14,588  
     
25,768  
1939 
     
19,381  
     
15,987  
     
29,179  
1940 
     
17,988  
     
14,981  
     
32,169  
 
Source: Calculated from unions’ political fund records in annual and other financial reports – see appendix for further details.
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One of the largest calls on political funds was the party affiliation fee: this ranged 
between a NUDAW annual average of 27.7 per cent of political fund expenditure, and 
a TGWU figure of 38.6 per cent over the decade.159 Another major item was the cost 
of maintenance and expenses to those constituencies where a union sponsored 
parliamentary candidates. These averaged 17 per cent of the annual expenditure of 
the NUGMW, NUR and AEU; the lower TGWU figure of 12.9 per cent is reflective of 
the lower grants payed by that union. The high NUDAW average of 21.6 per cent of 
expenditure would likely be exceeded by that of the RCA, which sponsored a high 
number of candidates despite its smaller size. 
Something of the tendency towards saving referred to earlier can be seen in the end-
of-year balance figures. Reserves steadily grew across the decade, with the exception 
of the AEU, where static income forced the union to draw more heavily on reserves to 
meet expenditure; saving of any substance was out of the equation until the 1940s. 
Reserves were generally equivalent to a year of two’s worth of political fund income, 
sufficient to meet any large unexpected expense.160 This reflected an attitude of 
caution, although the RCA, for one, often appeared to be pushing its political fund to 
the limit. The major exception is the NUR .In terms of overall reserves, its political fund 
was the most buoyant, with end-of-year balances regularly in excess of £70,000, 
sometimes as much as seven times its annual income. This reflected the relative 
stability of the NUR’s membership over the longer term, and allowed the union to easily 
absorb expenditure larger than income in 1937 and 1939.161 It should be noted, 
however, that all of the unions discussed here had relatively healthy political funds: for 
many smaller organisations, building up political fund reserves at all remained an 
ambition until the war years. 
The allocation of political fund income throughout a union could be affect the level of 
reserves available. Some central expenditure was earmarked for use by unions’ 
                                                          
159 Calculated from unions’ own records; this figure also includes other regular fees payed to the party 
such as the by-election deposit insurance fund levy. See Appendix I for full details. 
160 This was the case with the MFGB, NUDAW, RCA and TGWU. 
161 Not only had the NUR been longer-established in its present form than the other unions discussed 
here, but it had not been involved in the kind of prolonged national industrial action that had forced 
the MFGB to rely on political fund reserves to meet ordinary industrial expenditure in the 1920s. In the 
only major national dispute on the railways since the First World War, the NUR’s deep reserves had 
been advantageous: expenditure on publicity for the 1919 railway strike ‘dwarfed’ that of Labour’s 
1918 general election campaign. See Laura Beers, “Is this man an anarchist?’ Industrial action and 
the battle for public opinion in interwar Britain’, Journal of Modern History 82 (2010), 30-60, p. 41. 
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regional and local organisation. The NUDAW kept two separate political fund 
accounts; the first of these was used for all of the union’s major political activities, the 
second reserved for use by branches in order to pay their affiliation fees to Divisional 
Labour parties. Similarly, although apparently not using a separate account, the 
NUGMW returned a proportion of contributions received to its district organisations. 
Unfortunately district accounts do not give any detail on the expenditure of this 
returned part of the political fund beyond how much was spent, but it is clear that the 
issue was a contested one across the period. Figure 2.7 illustrates the position of the 
union’s political fund reserves. The proportion of central to district allocation of the fund 
had originally been set at 80:20 in head office’s favour at the amalgamation of the 
union in 1924, but over the following seventeen years these proportions were 
successfully altered on five occasions – a further attempt in 1938 met with failure – 
first increasing the districts’ allocation, and then moving back to a position where, in 
1941, there was a 70:30 split in which the union kept the larger part for use centrally. 
In every year until 1938 the union spent more than it received in income, whilst its 
political fund balance more than halved across the period. For a large union, its political 
fund seems to have been in fairly poor shape, and this may well have been a factor in 
its reluctance to give automatic membership of its political panel to a union candidate 
to replace Charles Dukes at Warrington (Lancashire), for instance. In a relatively high-
spending union, this was surely the result of its policy of returning a proportion of the 
funds to districts, and the fact that these proportions changed so regularly. The MFGB, 
always returning exactly half, was able to be more consistent and manage its political 
fund more effectively; its system does not seem to have provoked any great complaint 
during the period. The regular changes of rule prevented the NUGMW from doing 
likewise. Moreover, in several years it seems to have spent a considerable sum on 
political fund administration.162 As referred to above, it initially split its fund resources 
80:20, with the smaller share going back to the districts. In 1926 this was modified to 
70:30, and a 1930 attempt to alter this to 60:30:10, with the ten per cent going directly 
to branches, was defeated in favour of a 60:40 ratio, on the understanding that the 
union’s general council could request  
                                                          
162 TU/GENERALB/1/A/7-16 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes 1931-1940, NUGMW Half-Yearly Financial 
Reports. 
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 Figure 2.7 NUGMW Central Political Fund Reserves, 1924-1940 
 
 
Source: TU/GENERALB/1/A/1-16 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes 1924-40, NUGMW Half-Yearly Financial Reports.
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voluntary donations back from the districts if the central political fund ran short.163 At 
the 1932 biennial congress, the ratio was altered again to 50:50, by a narrow vote of 
53 to 43. Several delegates stressed the importance of local elections, and Clynes’ 
speech from the platform against the change, based on the argument that many 
districts were already receiving more than they spent, was ineffectual. This clearly 
presented a problem: by the end of 1934, with a general election probably not too far 
away, the union’s political fund balance had been reduced to around two-thirds of its 
level in 1931 even after the election. The leadership did not challenge this at the 1934 
congress, but two years later the 60:40 rate was reintroduced. This required a change 
of rule, and was slipped into a report on the remuneration of officials, possibly with the 
intention of avoiding a protracted discussion which might increase opposition to the 
proposal. This part of the report was voted on separately, and a 74 to 33 majority 
backed the leadership’s position.164 Even so, the amount of political fund reserve 
continued to fall, and an attempt to revert to a 70:30 ratio in 1938 failed by ninety votes 
to 64, despite Dukes making a lengthy speech in favour, as well as presenting the 
congress with a provisional balance sheet for the year which put the position across 
in stark terms.165 The 1941 congress, delayed from June 1940 due to the war 
emergency, did finally agree to this change.166 Unions with more substantial reserves 
did not have this problem: the TGWU was regularly able to return around a third of 
income to its district organisations.  
The records of the NUR provide an opportunity to analyse the local political funds of 
trade unions in more detail; its branches kept hold of half of all political fund income 
for their own purposes. The NUR’s politics were as well-resourced at local as at 
national level: during the period total branch reserves never dipped below £30,000. 
Around a quarter of its branches’ total political expenditure was on affiliations to local 
parties; local and municipal election expenses would have been another major item of 
                                                          
163 TU/GENERALB/1/A/6 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes 1930, NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress 
Report 1930, pp. 102-3. This was carried by 44 votes to 26, possibly – although this is not clear from 
the congress report – just after a break or on the final day of the meeting when fewer delegates were 
present. 
164 TU/GENERALB/1/A/12 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes 1936, NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress 
Report 1936, pp. 73-4 and 183. Clegg, General Union, pp. 98-100 incorrectly ascribes this decision 
to 1934. 
165 TU/GENERALB/1/A/14 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes 1938, NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress 
Report 1938, pp. 40 and 100-9. 
166 Clegg, General Union, pp. 98-100.  
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expenditure, although no breakdown of these figures is available.167 Deep reserves 
allowed substantial finance to be committed to general election campaigns at the local 
level: total branch political expenditure was effectively double the annual average in 
general election years.168 The MFGB’s districts also retained half of political fund 
income; the Durham area was best resourced, with comparable reserves to the total 
for NUR branches nationally.169 This allowed the DMA to provide, for instance, 
substantial financial support at general elections even in seats within the county where 
its own official miners’ candidates were not standing.170  
An inspection of political fund accounts suggests that there was not always easy union 
money available to the Labour party in the period. Some unions, most notably the 
NUR, had built up a substantial political fund reserve. Others, however, struggled with 
their political finances, and this very likely had an impact, particularly on the number 
of candidates they chose to support. Certainly the AEU would not have been able to 
afford to support any additional candidates, and the struggle of the NUGMW’s head 
office to win back control of a larger proportion of its political fund from the districts 
was hardly likely to make it amenable to increasing its expenditure in this, or any other, 
regard. Even NUDAW and the RCA, with high political memberships and well-
managed political funds, did not have very large balances left to fall back on in this 
period.  
A comment is required on one other aspect of the unions’ spending in the period. 
Helen McCarthy and Pat Thane have argued convincingly that consideration of the 
role of voluntary associations is essential to an account of Britain’s political stability, a 
corollary to the ‘corporate bias’ identified by Middlemas.171 Trade unions had a role to 
play in the funding of associational society. The amounts spent were not always large, 
                                                          
167 An annual average 71.5 per cent of branch expenditure from 1931-1940 was on ‘other’ expenses. 
168 Annual average 1931-1940 of £11,558. 1931 expenditure = £19,362; 1935 = £18,464. Calculated 
from branch figures in NUR Annual Financial Reports. 
169 W. R. Garside, The Durham Miners 1919-1960 (London, 1971), p. 350. The position of other coalfield 
unions differed significantly; average expenditure in South Wales, for instance, was much lower, whilst 
the problems in the coalfield in the early 1930s meant that the SWMF was unable to build up a 
substantial political fund balance even approximating an average year’s expenditure until the end of 
the decade. See D.845.70-77 SWMF, Minutes, 1930-38, SWMF Annual Balance Sheets. 
170 For example at Bishop Auckland, where Hugh Dalton was the candidate from 1929, and Seaham, 
where the Labour candidates in succession were Sidney Webb, Ramsay MacDonald, and Manny 
Shinwell. 
171 Helen McCarthy and Pat Thane, ‘The Politics of Association in Industrial Society’, Twentieth Century 
British History 22:2 (2011), 217-229; Helen McCarthy, ‘Parties, voluntary associations and democratic 
politics in interwar Britain’, Historical Journal 50:4 (2007), 891-912. 
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and not always drawn specifically from political funds, but they were often regular, 
demonstrating the commitment of the unions to civil society. The League of Nations 
Union [LNU] was one recipient of union largesse; the TGWU paid a regular 
subscription, supported by an occasional larger donation.172 The NUR paid regular 
annual subscriptions to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
[NSPCC] and the National Council for Civil Liberties [NCCL], as well as making regular 
donations to a number of hospitals, and more explicitly political bodies such as the 
Land Nationalisation Society.173 The funding of associational culture is an area which 
requires further research, but these examples give a flavour of the unions’ civil society 
role in this regard. 
 
Party finance: problems and possibilities 
 
Labour party national finances remained in a parlous state during the 1930s. The 
problem of underfunding dogged the party throughout the interwar years. Beyond the 
difficulties associated with trade union finance, Labour had been unable to 
successfully develop a mass individual membership through the 1920s.174 This not 
only restricted income from DLP affiliation fees, but had a knock-on effect on other 
sources of potential revenue: the party’s literature regularly made a loss, with only the 
Labour Woman proving consistently profitable across the 1930s.175  Income from trade 
union affiliation fees, therefore, were crucial to the Labour’s financial survival; as figure 
                                                          
172 See MSS.126/TG/1186/A/10 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance 
and Emergency Committee, 1932, GEC, meeting of 22 November 1932 for the subscription of £5 5s 
per annum; MSS.126/TG/1186/A/14 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1936, GEC meeting of 18 May 1936 for a larger donation 
of £500. 
173 See the minutes of quarterly executive committee meetings in MSS.127/NU/1/1/26 NUR, Annual 
Proceedings and Reports, 1938 for a typical year’s subscriptions. These included subscriptions of £10 
to the NSPCC; £25 to the NCCL; £3,000 in donations to the International Solidarity Fund; £250 to the 
Spanish Workers’ Fund; £500 to the International Transport Workers’ Federation’s fund for Distressed 
Victims of Fascism; and subscriptions of £100 each to the Mary Macarthur Holiday Home for Women 
Workers, the Association of Cine-technicians, and the Hospital Saturday Fund; £35 to the British 
Workers’ Sports Association; and £25 each to the Land Nationalisation Society, the Industrial Health 
Education Society, the Royal Free Hospital, the Western Ophthalmic Hospital, the Royal Westminster 
Ophthalmic Hospital, and the Royal Eye Hospital.  
174 Christopher Howard, ‘Expectations born to death: local Labour party expansion in the 1920s’ in Jay 
Winter (ed.), The Working Class in Modern British History. Essays in Honour of Henry Pelling 
(Cambridge, 1983), 65-81. 
175 The Labour Woman made a profit every year apart from 1938; Labour Magazine in 1931-2 only, and 
Labour in 1939 only. Labour Party, Annual Conference Reports. 
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2.8 demonstrates, union affiliations typically constituted well over half of the party’s 
annual income. General election years were the exception, yet even here, a 
substantial part of the additional income came from union sources.  
Figure 2.8 provides details of the party’s income and expenditure over the period. 
Labour’s finances were managed by the party treasurer; Arthur Henderson held the 
post from 1929 until his death in 1935.176 The Finance and General Purposes 
Committee, a sub-committee of the National Executive, was also significant. A 
statement presented to the 1931 annual conference at Scarborough noted the 
‘extremely serious’ financial position, anticipating a deficit of some £8,500 by the end 
of 1931, with a further deficit of £10,500 for 1932; the NEC requested an increase in 
the affiliation fee from 3d to 4d, or else a repetition of the 2d special levy over three 
years.177 The deficit figures may have helped stir the delegates into action; 
significantly, it was Arthur Hayday of the NUGMW, the serving TUC president, who 
moved the successful motion for the increase to 4d; he was seconded by Joseph 
Hallsworth, NUDAW’s general secretary.178 Moreover, the conference chairman was 
Stanley Hirst, financial secretary of the TGWU, who may have exercised an important 
influence in securing union support for the measure. The conference was sitting amidst 
widespread anticipation of a snap general election being called; in this context, it was 
the trade unions who came to the party’s aid in its hour of need, providing both material 
and moral support in being seen to push the change forward. By the end of the year, 
however, the party was anticipating a larger deficit of £14,000 for 1932, with several 
former MPs defeated in October 1931 now re-joining the staff at Transport House on 
a full-time basis. The affiliation fee increase offset this to a degree, but the outlook 
remained bleak; an NEC sub-committee of three was appointed to investigate the 
                                                          
176 He had previously served in the post from 1903-1911, when he was succeeded by Ramsay 
MacDonald. A change to the party’s constitution in 1929 allowed the leader to sit on the National 
Executive ex officio; MacDonald therefore resigned the Treasurership in June, to be replaced by 
Henderson, who was unopposed. Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1930, p. 4. 
177 ‘Statement on the financial position of the party’, Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1931, pp. 
77-80. See Labour Party NEC papers, FGPC meeting of 22 July 1931: nearly all of the money raised 
from the 2d special levy had already been spent, although some contributions remained outstanding. 
There was unease over the fact that some trade unions had been led to believe the special levy funds 
would provide sufficient income until October 1932; perhaps the political crisis of August 1931 was 
fortuitous in allowing potential conflict over this to be avoided. 
178 Ibid., p. 209. 
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Figure 2.8 Labour party central finances, 1929-1940 
 
  1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
 
Central party income (£)             
Affiliation fees, total 
   
28,956  
   
41,404  
   
35,695  
   
39,291  
   
38,438  
   
38,075  
   
39,580  
   
40,863  
   
46,220  
   
48,657  
   
52,501  
   
45,130  
from trade unions 
   
25,991  
   
35,073  
   
31,227  
   
33,285  
   
31,905  
   
30,938  
   
31,951  
   
32,797  
   
38,210  
   
39,497  
   
44,189  
   
38,518  
from divisional parties 
     
2,006  
     
5,623  
     
4,000  
     
5,393  
     
5,850  
     
6,436  
     
6,891  
     
7,274  
     
7,199  
     
8,384  
     
7,554  
     
5,840  
Literature sales etc 
   
33,002  
     
7,367  
   
13,710  
     
6,558  
     
5,689  
     
5,444  
   
14,518  
     
5,730  
     
9,770  
   
11,358  
     
9,114  
     
4,377  
Donations, grants, loans, funds etc 
   
13,900   
   
13,031  
     
5,548  
     
2,646  
     
7,042  
   
24,899  
     
2,042  
     
9,224  
     
9,116  
     
9,383  
       
450  
By-election insurance fund     
     
4,029  
     
4,967  
     
3,085  
     
5,169  
     
5,345  
     
5,404  
     
5,137  
     
4,964  
Staff superannuation fund         
     
4,544  
     
5,047  
     
5,444  
     
5,547  
 
Total income 
   
79,546  
   
45,205  
   
62,681  
   
52,247  
   
51,836  
   
57,631  
   
88,531  
   
57,237  
   
75,730  
   
66,484  
   
82,122  
   
65,808  
 
TU affil. fees as proportion of total income 32.7% 77.6% 49.8% 63.7% 61.5% 53.7% 36.1% 57.3% 50.5% 59.4% 53.8% 58.5% 
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Figure 2.8 Labour party central finances, 1929-1940, ctd. 
 
  1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
 
Central party expenditure (£)                         
Organisation 
   
15,379  
   
14,911  
   
15,668  
   
14,273  
   
12,950  
   
10,826  
   
10,952  
   
13,601  
   
13,662  
   
14,532  
   
15,569  
   
15,334  
By-elections     
     
4,626  
     
4,804  
     
2,633  
     
5,068  
     
7,018  
     
5,602  
     
4,484  
     
2,120  
Literature etc 
   
31,404  
     
6,629  
   
17,091  
     
8,085  
     
6,581  
     
5,431  
   
12,791  
     
6,001  
     
7,381  
     
8,024  
   
10,924  
     
4,789  
General office expenses 
   
20,450  
   
21,928  
   
22,678  
   
23,060  
   
23,524  
   
23,062  
   
22,623  
   
25,261  
   
26,323  
   
27,178  
   
27,264  
   
25,801  
Staff superannuation         
     
2,995  
     
3,074  
     
3,106  
     
3,031  
Special campaigns etc  
       
105    
         
20  
     
6,401  
   
30,254  
     
2,686  
   
11,531  
   
16,319    
 
 
Total expenditure 
   
78,530  
   
53,038  
   
61,913  
   
51,974  
   
52,199  
   
56,126  
   
84,703  
   
57,820  
   
73,945  
   
82,259  
   
72,730  
   
53,750  
 
Balance brought forward, end/year (£) 
     
2,614  
     
1,920  -2,613 -1,256 -394 
     
1,721  
     
6,676  
     
3,238  
       
379  
       
236  
     
3,948  
     
6,512  
 
 
Source: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1929-1940. 
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possibility of economies being made across Headquarters departments.179  Its 
membership included that year’s NEC chair George Lathan, who was to play an 
important role in Labour finance across the decade, first as the key figure on the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, and later, after Henderson’s death, as 
party treasurer. Lathan was chief assistant secretary of the RCA – effectively the 
union’s number two official – as well as acting as president of the National Federation 
of Professional Workers, making a ‘substantial’ contribution to the expansion of his 
union, itself the largest NFPW affiliate. A skilled and dedicated administrator, Lathan 
served as MP for Sheffield Park from 1929-31, and again from 1935-42. 180 
Henderson’s absence at the World Disarmament Conference seems to have allowed 
Lathan considerable scope on financial matters, and under his supervision Labour’s 
management of its financial resources was increasingly professionalised.  
The economies sub-committee managed to find substantial savings of some £8,000 
in 1932, and a further £6,000 in 1933, mostly in administrative costs and the 
streamlining of head office organisation, but this was not without an impact on the 
party’s wider activities: a scheme which provided grants towards constituency agents’ 
salaries was cut, with the agreement of the National Union of Labour Organisers and 
Election Agents.181 Its final report, issued in January 1933, noted that opportunities for 
increasing party income were limited due to the joint effects of the depression and the 
Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act, and suggested a push to increase contracting-
                                                          
179 Labour Party NEC papers, FGPC memorandum dated 10 December 1931, ‘Financial position 1932. 
General Account’. The re-employed staff included both Arthur and Will Henderson, Arthur Greenwood, 
and Dr. Marion Phillips. 
180 David E. Martin, ‘Lathan, George (1875-1942)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography IX, pp. 168-170. 
Lathan’s brother, Charles Latham – who changed his surname to avoid confusion – served as chair 
of the London County Council’s finance committee under Herbert Morrison from 1934, earning a 
reputation as London’s ‘iron chancellor’; he succeeded Morrison as council leader in 1940. Both 
brothers’ careers demonstrated ‘professionalism and efficiency rather than keen partisanship’; David 
Howell, ‘Latham, Charles, first Baron Latham (1888–1970)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004), online edition, May 2013 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.lib.exeter.ac.uk/view/article/34416, accessed 27 August 2017]. Lathan was 
joined on the economies sub-committee by Robert Dennison of BISAKTA and T. E. Williams of the 
Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society. When Dennison left the NEC following the 1932 party 
conference, he was replaced on the sub-committee by his BISAKTA successor, James Walker. 
181 Labour Party NEC papers, ‘Final Report of the Economy Committee’, presented to NEC meeting of 
18 January 1933. For the revised agents’ salary scheme, see Labour Party, Annual Conference 
Report 1933, pp. 32-33. These grants were cut from fifteen to ten per cent of an agent’s salary in 1932 
and 1933, then 7.5 per cent in 1934 and 1935. See also Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 
1934, p. 25. 
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in membership, something Lathan had already been pursuing.182 It also criticised the 
practice of drawing on the reserves held in special funds to meet ordinary expenditure; 
this was possibly a veiled criticism of Henderson, who had been in favour of using the 
general election fund to meet the 1931-32 deficit.183 It is possible to discern two 
conflicting approaches to party finance here. Aiming at putting the party on a sound 
financial basis for the longer term, Lathan sought to ensure the party lived within its 
means, even if this meant sacrificing certain activities in the interim. The approach 
taken by the FGPC under his influence was to tackle the problem of underfunding at 
the root by seeking to secure a higher proportion of political levy-payers, particularly 
in those unions which did not seem to be pulling their weight. Henderson’s method, by 
contrast, relied more heavily on his personal prestige within the movement to secure 
funds at short notice. At the NEC’s January 1933 meeting, for example, ‘referring to 
the pressing need for funds to carry the party over the next few months’, he made a 
personal appeal to those NEC members ‘representing the larger unions to use their 
influence’ to secure 1933 affiliation fees as soon as possible.184 This did not preclude 
dipping into special funds when deemed necessary. Arguably this was an approach 
borne of having to deal with frequent, acute financial crisis, and while it may have 
yielded results when the appeal came from a figure of Henderson’s stature in the 
labour movement, it was unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term. It also tended 
towards over-reliance on a few big unions to stump up the money. Whilst this may 
have been difficult to avoid, given the weakness of many political funds, Lathan’s 
approach, drawing on his work over many years in developing the RCA’s membership, 
sought to involve smaller unions in building up their political membership to provide a 
more secure basis for party finance. This latter approach was increasingly pursued by 
the party during the 1930s, although its success was limited until the war years. In the 
meantime, financial problems continued; Lathan and Hirst were forced to secure 
‘temporary financial accommodation’ from the manager of the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society bank in 1938 until the following year’s affiliation fees began to accrue.185 A 
further report on Labour’s financial position in March 1939 anticipated having to 
                                                          
182 Labour Party NEC papers, FGPC meeting of 17 March 1932 for decision to contact unions with low 
contracting-in rates. 
183 As reported by Glenvil Hall, Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of FGPC meeting of 10 December 
1931. 
184 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 18 January 1933. 
185 Labour Party NEC papers, note to minutes of NEC meeting of 16 December 1938. 
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arrange a further overdraft to keep paying the party’s staff during the last months of 
the year.186 This was avoided however: the outbreak of war produced a fresh wave of 
union donations of over £8,500, whilst the 1940 party conference agreed to a further 
affiliation fee increase to 5d.187 
Besides financial appeals for general election campaigns, several initiatives were 
instigated during the period in an attempt to increase income, often with specific 
campaigns in mind.188 A ‘Victory for Socialism’ scheme was launched with much 
fanfare at the 1933 party conference, with the ambitious goal of raising £50,000 before 
the next election to fund a literature and platform campaign as part of a ‘supreme effort 
to win Power’; large though the sum might be, ‘it is only a portion of what will be spent 
by our opponents in their determination to withstand Labour’s attack’.189 The scheme 
would only be pursued if an initial £5,000 could be found, but the response was 
disappointing: by the end of 1934, only £8,641 had been raised, with several larger 
unions including the MFGB declining to contribute owing to their strained political 
funds.190 Some of the total came from contributions from individuals, including J. S. 
Elias of Odhams’ Press, publisher of the Daily Herald, who gave £1,000 towards 
literature, and the NEC was able to report to the 1935 conference that, with the scheme 
now wrapped up, ‘an extensive and sustained campaign’ had been carried through, 
although on a more limited scale than initially envisaged.191 Some of the money was 
used to cover deficits elsewhere; in 1936 the party’s auditors criticised such special 
                                                          
186 Labour Party NEC papers, report on ‘Financial Position of the Party’, March 1939. 
187 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1940, pp.46 and 155. A total of £8,862 was donated to a 
general appeal in the autumn of 1939; all but £310 of this came from trade unions. The largest donors 
were the MFGB (£5,000), NUDAW (£1,000), the NUR (£1,000), NATSOPA (£500), and UTFWA 
(£250). 
188 General election finance is discussed below. 
189 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1933, pp 203-204; 290-291. Italics in original. It was 
anticipated that £30,000 of this total would be raised by ‘the national and general movement’, and the 
remainder through 35s/month contributions from each DLP towards party literature. 
190 A sum of £5,000 in ‘cash and promises’ was passed by the end of March 1934; the NEC had put the 
campaign on hold earlier that month when only £3,500 had been raised. Labour Party NEC papers, 
minutes of NEC meetings of 1 March 1934 and 27 March 1934. The largest trade union contributions 
came from the NUR (£500), NUDAW (£500), the AEU (£500), the RCA (£300), NATSOPA and the 
ASW (£250 each): memorandum on ‘Victory for Socialism’ campaign appended to NEC minutes for 
27 March 1934. The MFGB, BISAKTA, and TGWU all failed to contribute: in the latter case, the 
simultaneous dispute over the Clay Cross by-election was a factor. Labour Party, Annual Conference 
Report 1935, pp. 74-75. 
191 For Elias, Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 1 March 1934; Labour Party, Annual 
Conference Report 1935, p. 53. 
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appeals as ‘unsound finance’.192 However, the national campaign launched in 1937 to 
publicise Labour’s Immediate Programme enjoyed considerably more success in 
terms of both fundraising and impact. A special campaign committee, chaired by 
Herbert Morrison, organised a series of campaign weeks through 1937 and 1938, 
accompanied by innovative print propaganda, most notably the Your Britain series of 
pamphlets, which used colour photography to present Labour’s policies to the 
electorate, and helped break party records for literature sales.193 This print 
propaganda, ‘more strikingly modern in its presentation than that of its competitors’, 
demonstrated the party’s ‘willingness to experiment with and invest in new methods of 
presentation and packaging’.194  It also underlined what could be achieved through a 
carefully organised, purposeful, and well-resourced campaign. Although literature 
sales achieved significant income, particularly as the campaign progressed, the bulk 
of the donations which made the campaign possible came from the unions: the NUR 
gave £5,000, the Durham Miners’ Association £5,000, and the RCA over £1,000.195 
Not only were union political funds more buoyant than they had been in 1933-35, 
allowing for greater generosity, but the innovative, focused and professional nature of 
the campaign, spearheaded by Morrison’s committee, was a far more promising 
prospect than the vaguer ‘Victory for Socialism’, which likely made parting with union 
funds easier.196  
                                                          
192 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of FGPC meeting of 21 February 1935; Labour Party, Annual 
Conference Report 1935, pp. 55-56. 
193 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1937, pp. 21-24; Annual Conference Report 1939, pp. 65-
66. Laura Beers, Your Britain. Media and the Making of the Labour Party (Cambridge, MA and London, 
2010), pp. 158-164. The four Your Britain pamphlets sold a combined total of 1,764,000 copies. 
Annual Conference Report 1937, p. 85. 
194 Beers, Your Britain. Media and the Making of the Labour Party, p. 158. 
195 For a full list of contributors see Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1939, p. 66. The NUGMW 
gave £505, and the AEU and NUDAW £500 each. The TGWU, again, did not contribute. In 1937, 
£8,431 was raised through donations, with £6,927 of that total coming from trade unions; literature 
sales totalled £3,170. In 1938 the campaign fund received £9,065 in donations including £6,962 from 
trade union sources; literature sales amounted for £4,427 in income. Annual Conference Report 1939, 
pp. 123, 129. 
196 An associated agricultural campaign, organised by a committee chaired by Christopher Addison, 
was cut back significantly during 1939 as the party tried to save money. As Clare Griffiths notes, rural 
campaigns were ‘always an add-on to general party activity’, and as such easily sacrificed: some 
£1,750 of £3,050 made in savings came from the agricultural campaign fund. Clare V. J. Griffiths 
Labour and the Countryside. The Politics of Rural Britain, 1918-1939 (Oxford, 2007), p. 124, and 
Labour Party NEC papers, report on ‘Financial Position of the Party’, March 1939. Donations to the 
fund, including several from unions, continued: see Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1939, 
pp. 24 and 46. 
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By-elections provided another, less predictable call on party funds, and could cause 
difficulties when ordinary income was already stretched. This might result in a by-
election not being fought, or an under-resourced campaign. A voluntary levy on CLPs 
to meet by-election expenditure had been established following the 1924 election, but 
the large number of by-elections during 1930-31 prompted the NEC to recommend the 
extension of a by-election insurance fund on a compulsory basis to all affiliated 
organisations.197 A draft scheme was prepared for the 1931 Scarborough conference, 
but the pressures of time in the context of the imminent general election meant the 
issue was not discussed until the following year at Leicester, when the conference 
agreed to adopt the less generous of two proposals, which would raise £442 for each 
by-election from DLPs and affiliated unions, with levy rates varying depending upon 
membership size.198 Payment to the fund was made a ‘definite part of the basis of 
affiliation to the Party’ in 1934, and the following year’s conference decided to replace 
the inefficient system of collection at every by-election with a single annual payment 
as well as introducing more flexible levy rates.199 This allowed by-elections to be fought 
‘with more adequate funds and organisation than formerly’, and although the fund was 
generally in debit until 1939, continued collection through the war years, with 
expenditure reduced due the electoral truce, ensured it became a ‘notable source of 
profit’, with assets of over £25,000 by 1945.200  
                                                          
197 There were 23 by-elections between September 1930 and August 1931, thirteen of which took place 
in constituencies held by Labour. Labour candidates fought in twenty of these contests. By contrast 
there had been an average of twelve by-elections in each of the last six years (1924-25: 7; 1925-26: 
13; 1926-27: 12; 1927-28: 18; 1928-29: 14; 1929-30: 8). Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 
1931, p. 16. 
198 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1931, pp. 39-41; Annual Conference Report 1932, pp. 52-
54 and 202. The more generous and expensive scheme would have furnished £590 for each by-
election, assuming all DLPs and affiliated organisations contributed. Under this proposal, the NEC 
was prepared to accept responsibility for expenses up to £500; the figure was £375 in the scheme 
adopted. This lower figure provided a cushion against possible non-contributions whilst allowing a 
build-up of reserves, but may also imply the NEC had persistent deficits in other funds in mind. The 
proposal noted that several unions had ‘been very much embarrassed’ by having to meet the 
expenses of several by-elections in the same year, whilst the risk of unexpected expenditure could 
easily put others into serious difficulty; the scheme was therefore ‘a useful form of insurance and a 
good investment’. The scale adopted would see some £75 of the £442 total coming from the eight 
largest affiliated unions, whilst £206 would come from DLPs. Annual Conference Report 1932, p. 53. 
199 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1934, pp. 43, 191; Annual Conference Report 1935, pp. 
49-53, 219-220. The new levy scales would apply from January 1936; the maximum for each contest 
was reduced from £375 to £350. The largest organisations would now contribute £150 annually, and 
DLPs £5 each. 
200 McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition 1931-1938, p. 53; Thorpe, Parties at War. Political 
Organization in Second World War Britain, p. 259: Thorpe suggests that it ‘seems improbable that this 
was not a consideration in Labour managers' firm ongoing commitment to the truce’. 
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Another departure towards more regularised finance and professional party 
organisation was the establishment of a superannuation scheme for party staff. The 
necessity for such a scheme, as well as a retiring age for party staff, was agreed to at 
the 1933 Hastings conference; as one delegate argued, ‘when Labour is demanding 
that every man should have a pension when he has reached a retiring age, we must 
set the pace and ourselves adopt such a scheme’.201 The ‘extreme financial 
stringency’ of recent years had until now precluded such a development. After 
consultations with the National Union of Labour Organisers and Election Agents, a 
scheme limited to ‘direct and permanent members’ of staff was eventually presented 
to the 1936 Edinburgh conference: it excluded constituency agents on the grounds of 
administrative and financial difficulty, whilst conceding the principle that they too 
should be covered. The scheme would be financed by an increase of ½ d in the 
affiliation fee to 4 ½ d per member annually.202 Only Lathan, moving the proposed 
scheme, and Stafford Cripps spoke in favour, but staff superannuation met with little 
significant opposition, with only two trade union delegates speaking against. William 
Holmes of the National Union of Agricultural Workers complained of ‘the hardship upon 
his own and similar Trade Unions’ that an affiliation fee increase would involve, whilst 
an AEU delegate, A. E. Eyton, seconded the reference back of the scheme. The 
reference back was defeated on a card vote by 1,819,000 to 399,000; the voting 
figures implied that alongside the AEU and NUAW, possibly one other large union, 
most likely the NUGMW given its political fund difficulties, voted against.203 On the 
whole, unions were prepared to contribute in order to secure superannuation for party 
                                                          
201 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1933, p. 234. The speaker was Major J. Bellerby of 
Cambridge DLP; the motion was formally seconded and approved without debate. 
202 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1936, pp. 56-59. The NULOEA produced an initial proposal 
drafted by Arthur W. Petch, financial secretary of NUDAW and ‘a high authority on superannuation’. 
Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of meeting of the Adjustments Board, 1 August 1935 and attached 
‘Memorandum in Explanation of Proposed Superannuation Scheme Submitted by the Agents’ Union 
to the Adjustments Board on 1 August 1935 together with Tables relating to Financial Proposals and 
the Effect of various modifications to the Scheme’. For Petch, see John B. Smethurst, ‘Petch, Arthur 
William (1886-1935)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography IV, pp. 136-137.  
203 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1936, p. 216. Speakers from Edinburgh Central and 
Deptford DLPs also opposed the scheme: the membership of these organisations, in addition to the 
AEU and NUAW total 93,805, so another 305,000 votes against came from somewhere. The 242,000 
vote of NUGMW seems a likely candidate, in light of the discussions above, with the remainder coming 
from DLPs and smaller unions. The TUC already operated a superannuation scheme for its staff; the 
party scheme was partly based on this. Labour Party NEC papers, memorandum by W. G. Hall, ‘The 
Labour Party. Staff Superannuation’, dated April 1936. The NUAW was having difficulties with its 
political fund obligations: see Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of FGPC meeting, 21 February 1936, 
for a NUAW complaint about the hardship imposed by by-election insurance fund payments. 
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staff, and the professionalisation of party work that this implied. This was echoed in 
the decision to establish a similar scheme for party agents. A further increase in the 
affiliation fee to provide the initial funding for the scheme was narrowly defeated at the 
1939 conference: having been presented by Lathan and backed by Joseph Hallsworth 
of NUDAW, the reference back, moved by the MFGB’s Ebby Edwards was carried by 
395,000 votes.204 In the changed context of May 1940, however, the scheme and the 
increased affiliation fees needed to establish it were approved by a large majority. 
Hallsworth again contributed to discussion, very likely in favour. The voting figures of 
2,163,000 to 425,000 suggest that MFGB opposition had dissipated: there was no 
Mineworkers’ speaker in the debate, but two – Harold Clay of the TGWU and Charles 
Dukes of the NUGMW – from the general unions, suggesting that one of the two 
organisations cast its vote against.205  Trade union support ensured that this significant 
step in the professionalisation of Labour’s agents, bringing the party into line with 
earlier developments in the Conservative and Liberal parties, took place.206 
As Andrew Thorpe has demonstrated, the war had a transformative effect on Labour 
party finances. In sharp contrast to the ‘very gloomy’ outlook of 1939, by 1945 the 
party’s national finances had ‘never been healthier’. Improving party finances, 
bolstered by good party-union relations, helped fund major campaigns, overhaul 
staffing, and permit developments in regional organisation precluded by the party’s 
financial position before 1939.207 Despite the limitations of party finance in the 1930s, 
the developments outlined here did allow for effective campaigning and eye-catching 
initiatives like Your Britain, the ongoing professionalisation of Labour’s organisation, 
                                                          
204 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1939, p. 290. The NUR’s John Marchbank also took part 
in the debate, although it is unclear from the brief summary in the report as to his position, although 
usually NUR money was forthcoming. Certainly some larger unions must have been opposed: the 
reference back was carried by 1,453,000 to 1,058,000 on a card vote. For the proposals see pp. 99-
101.  
205 That this was the NUGMW seems a strong possibility, despite the recovery in its political finances 
being underway by this point. Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1939, pp. 47 and 154-155. 
The AEU may also have been in the minority. 
206 For the process of professionalisation in the older parties, see Kathryn Rix, Parties, Agents and 
Electoral Culture in England, 1880-1910 (Woodbridge, 2016), pp. 48-122. 
207 Thorpe, Parties at War. Political Organization in Second World War Britain, pp. 256-268. The South 
Wales Regional Council of Labour had been set up in 1937 in response to Communist activity in the 
coalfield; the Lancashire and Cheshire Regional Council of Labour followed in 1938; other regions 
would have to wait until 1942 or later, pp. 259-260. See Cliff Prothero, Recount (Ormskirk, 1982), pp. 
53-54 for developments in South Wales. 
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and helped establish the basis for later prosperity: all of this was achieved through the 
active financial support of the trade unions. 
Co-operative politics and finance 
Beyond the unions, the Co-operative movement also had a role to play in Labour 
politics and finance. Retail co-operative societies were important institutions in 
working-class communities across Britain, offering members a huge variety of goods 
and services; it was possible to ‘live within the Co-op’.208 The movement ‘attempted to 
mobilise support around issues relating to consumption rather than production’, 
offering co-operation as an alternative to capitalism through democratic control and 
the dividend, a cash return of a society’s profits to members on an annual or quarterly 
basis.209 Total co-operative membership stood at 6.5 million in 1,118 societies in 1931, 
rising to 8.7 million in 1,065 societies by 1940, exceeding trade union membership by 
some way, yet, as Nicole Robertson has argued, there were ‘a multitude of meanings 
attached to such membership’.210 Some were activists committed to the ideal of the 
‘Co-operative Commonwealth’, others purely ‘dividend hunters’, whilst many stood 
somewhere in between. This complexity was replicated in co-operative attitudes to 
politics: political action had been a topic of debate within the movement for some 
                                                          
208 Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson, ‘Taking stock: an introduction’ in Black and Nicole Robertson 
(eds.), Consumerism and the Co-operative movement in modern British history. Taking stock 
(Manchester, 2009), p. 4. 
209 Nicole Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960. Minding 
their Own Business (Abingdon, 2010), p. 4. Robertson’s monograph represents a significant 
contribution to a growing body of work on co-operation in Britain. See in particular the collection by 
Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson (eds.), Consumerism and the Co-operative movement in 
modern British history. Taking stock (Manchester, 2009) for co-operative influences on the culture of 
consumerism; see also Peter Gurney, ‘Co-operation and the ‘new consumerism’ in interwar England’, 
Business History 54:6 (2012), 905-924. For the commercial aspect, see John F. Wilson, Anthony 
Webster, and Rachael Vorberg-Rugh, Building Co-operation. A Business History of the Co-operative 
Group, 1863-2013 (Oxford, 2013) and Johnston Birchall, Co-op: the People’s Business (Manchester 
and New York, 1994). For co-operative culture, Peter Gurney, Co-operative Culture and the Politics 
of Consumption in England, 1870–1930 (Manchester, 1996) and Peter Gurney, “The Curse of the Co-
ops’: Co-operation, the Mass Press and the Market in Interwar Britain’, English Historical Review 
130:547 (2015), 1479-1512. For the role of women in the movement see, Gillian Scott, Feminism and 
the Politics of Working Women: The Women’s Co-operative Guild, 1880s to the Second World War 
(London, 1998) and Jean Gaffin, and David Thoms, Caring and Sharing. The Centenary History of 
the Women’s Co-operative Guild (Manchester, 1983). Anthony Webster, Linda Shaw, and Rachael 
Vorberg-Rugh (eds.), Mainstreaming co-operation. An alternative for the twenty-first century? 
(Manchester, 2016) includes a number of interesting essays; useful older works include G. D. H. Cole, 
A Century of Co-operation (London, 1944) and A. M. Carr-Saunders, P. Sargent Florence, and Robert 
Peers, Consumers’ Co-operation in Great Britain. An Examination of the Co-operative Movement, 
revised edition (London, 1942 [original 1938]). 
210 Cole, A Century of Co-operation, pp. 371-2; Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and 
Communities in Britain, 1914-1960, p. 214. 
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decades before the 1917 decision of the Co-operative Congress to establish the 
National Co-operative Representation Committee, which in 1919 became the Co-
operative Party. The party was to be a department of the Co-operative Union, the 
federal body to which all co-operative societies affiliated.211 Debate focused on the 
new party’s relationship with Labour: whilst the two had much in common in terms of 
overlapping membership and a shared opposition to capitalism, many co-operators 
were committed to maintaining their independence: even by 1935, only around 500 
co-operative societies out of over 1,000 had affiliated to the Co-operative Party.212 
Whilst the first Co-operative MP, A. E. Waterson, elected for Kettering (Northants.) in 
1918, immediately took the Labour whip in Parliament, and local agreements between 
DLPs and Co-operative political councils were set up in some constituencies, formal 
alliance with Labour was narrowly rejected by the 1921 Co-operative Congress.213 The 
Cheltenham Agreement of 1927 went some way towards formalising relations 
between the two parties, allowing for local co-operative affiliation to DLPs and 
establishing a national joint committee of the Labour NEC and Co-operative Party 
executive.214 Nationally, the Co-operative Party did not affiliate to Labour, although 
some individual co-operative societies did do so, most notably the Royal Arsenal Co-
operative Society [RACS]. The question of Labour affiliation remained divisive into the 
                                                          
211 See Rachael Vorberg-Rugh and Angela Whitecross, ‘The Co-operative Party: an Alternative Vision 
of Social Ownership’ in in P. Ackers, and A. J. Reid (eds.), Alternatives to State-Socialism in Britain. 
Other Worlds of Labour in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2016), pp. 57-92; Robertson, The Co-
operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960, pp. 155-158 for a summary. Most writers 
on the subject have highlighted grievances at the movement’s treatment by the wartime coalition as 
a critical factor in this decision; Sidney Pollard’s account emphasises instead an ideological 
conversion to political action over a longer period. For this debate, see Sidney Pollard, ‘The 
Foundation of the Co-operative Party’ in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds.), Essays in Labour History 
1886–1923 (London, 1971), pp. 185-210; Tony Adams, ‘The Formation of the Co-operative Party 
Reconsidered’, International Review of Social History 32:1 (1987), 48–68; Sidney Pollard, ‘The Co-
operative Party—Reflections on a Re-consideration’, International Review of Social History 32:2 
(1987), 168–73; Tony Adams, ‘Co-operators and Politics – a rejoinder’, International Review of Social 
History 32:2 (1987), 174-179. 
212 Dean E. McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition 1931-1938 (London, 1938), pp. 117-118. These 
502 societies represented 66 per cent of total co-operative membership. For a broader discussion, 
see Nicole Robertson, “A Union of Forces Marching in the Same Direction’? The Relationship between 
the Co-operative and Labour Parties, 1918-39’ in M. Worley (ed.), The Foundations of the British 
Labour Party. Identities, Cultures and Perspectives, 1900-39 (Abingdon, 2009), pp. 213-230. 
213 Thomas F. Carbery, Consumers in Politics. A History and General Review of the Co-operative Party 
(Manchester, 1969), pp. 26-28. As Carbery and Keith Gildart both note, Waterson was ‘primarily a 
Labour party man’: he had been leader of the Labour group on Derby Council, and was secretary of 
the NUR Midland District Council. Keith Gildart, ‘Waterson, Alfred Edward (1880-1964)’, Dictionary of 
Labour Biography XII, pp. 292-297; Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in 
Britain, 1914-1960, p. 168. 
214 The agreement was only ratified narrowly by the Co-operative Congress, by 1,960 votes to 1,843, 
demonstrating continuing divisions over political action. Carbery, Consumers in Politics. A History and 
General Review of the Co-operative Party, p. 32. 
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1930s, whilst, as Robertson demonstrates, the position could vary considerably at 
local level.215 The basis of the Co-operative party, at local level in the retail co-
operative societies and at the national level under the auspices of the Co-operative 
Union, meant that it was typically well-funded: a ½ d per year affiliation fee was paid 
on behalf of some 3.5 million members of societies which affiliated to the Co-operative 
Party in 1931, with this figure rising to 5.3 million by 1939.216 In contrast to Labour’s 
‘modest resources’, the Co-operative Party was ‘plentifully supplied with funds, which 
it spends freely on essentials and otherwise’; it had built up a reserve of some £15,000 
by 1935.217 The tensions which were continue to mark relations between the two 
parties in the 1930s were in part the result of ‘apparent Co-operative affluence in a 
world of Labour penury’; Labour had been forced to deny that the Cheltenham 
Agreement did not represent a grab for co-operative resources.218 The relative 
richness of resources available for Co-operative politics would have an impact on 
Labour electoral finance and candidatures in the 1930s, as will be seen below. 
 
Unions and general election finance 
 
As noted earlier, union political fund expenditure was heaviest in general election 
years. Unions would often make a substantial grant to the Labour party nationally: the 
scale of such grants would vary as resources allowed. In 1931, large grants were made 
by the NUGMW (£5,000), NUR (£2,000) and NUDAW (£1,000). The size of the 
NUGMW grant is notable: arguably it was influenced by a sense of the union being at 
the centre of the fight, with two of its most prominent figures and candidates, J. R. 
Clynes and Arthur Hayday, being Labour deputy leader and TUC President 
respectively. The biggest grants in 1935 were made by the NUR (£4,000), NUGMW 
                                                          
215 Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960, pp. 167-178; 
Nicole Robertson, ‘The Political Dividend: Co-operative Parties in the Midlands, 1917-39’ in M. Worley 
(ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots. Essays on the Activities of Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45 
(Aldershot, 2005), pp. 147-169 for the position in Birmingham, Nottingham, and Kettering. 
216 McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition 1931-1938, p. 117; Nicole Robertson, ‘The Political 
Dividend: Co-operative Parties in the Midlands, 1917-39’, p. 162. 
217 McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition 1931-1938, p. 120. The Co-operative Union provided the 
Party with around £6,000 annually; large grants also came from the national Co-operative Wholesale 
Society and the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society; ibid, pp. 119-120. 
218 Carbery, Consumers in Politics. A History and General Review of the Co-operative Party, p. 41; G. 
W. Rhodes, Co-operative – Labour Relations 1900-1962 (Loughborough, 1962), p. 34. 
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(£2,500) and TGWU (£2,000).219 The MFGB did not make election grants to the party 
nationally in 1931 or 1935: it seems to have preferred to focus resources on 
constituency expenditure amongst its district unions, although the crisis in Federation 
leadership in the autumn of 1931, with the illness and death of Arthur Cook and 
Thomas Richards, and the 1935 wage campaign which coincided with the general 
election may also have been influential.  
The bulk of union general election expenditure went towards supporting sponsored 
candidates. Figure 2.9 illustrates the contrast between Labour candidates with 
different sponsoring bodies. In each general election in the period considered here, 
candidates sponsored by trade unions were able, on average, to substantially 
outspend their DLP-sponsored colleagues; as such their average expenditure was 
also higher than the overall Labour average. All of these figures fell in 1931; only the 
trade union average increased slightly in 1935, due to fewer union candidates being 
put forward. The best-resourced Labour candidates were those sponsored by the Co-
operative Party. On the basis of their comparative success rates, it could certainly be 
argued that the Co-operative Party were not getting much of a return on their 
investment, not least in comparison with the unions.220 Indeed, the amount of money 
spent by the Co-operative Party on elections seems to have been very great when 
compared to its influence. The unions would not have been able to spend so liberally 
on elections in an era of strained political funds, particularly when expectation of 
success was a factor in deciding to sponsor candidates in the first place, as argued in 
the following chapter. 
                                                          
219 For 1931: TU/GENERALB/1/A/7 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1931, Half-Yearly Report and 
Balance Sheet, July-December 1931; MSS.127/NU/1/1/19 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 
1931, Report and Financial Statements for 1931; NUDAW, Annual Report 1931; neither the NEC 
papers ofthe Labour Party Annual Conference Reports detail donations to the 1931 general election 
appeal, but for 1935 see Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1936, p. 54. The RCA gave £750 
and the AEU £250. NUDAW was unable to make a national grant owing to its other commitments; 
see NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1935, minutes of meeting of 10 November 1935. The TGWU 
and AEU do not seem to have made national grants in 1931: MSS.126/TG/1186/A/9 TGWU, Minutes 
and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and Emergency Committee, 1931, minutes of 
special meeting of Finance and Emergency Committee 6 October 1931 makes no mention of a 
national grant: other financial obligations seem to have been the reason. 
220 See figures 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter 3. 
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Figure 2.9 General election expenditure by Labour candidates, 1929-35, by sponsor 
 
 
 
Body sponsoring candidates 
 
 
 
 
Expenditure 
(£) 
 
 
No. of 
candidates 
 
Average 
expenditure 
per candidate 
(£) 
DLPs (1929) 131,381 364 361 
Trade unions (1929) 75,544 139 543 
Co-operative Party (1929) 7,032 12 586 
ILP (1929) 16,802 54 311 
All Labour candidates, 1929 230,758 569 406 
DLPs (1931) 96,525 315 306 
Trade unions (1931) 69,350 138 503 
Co-operative Party (1931) 8,431 15 562 
ILP (1931) 6,638 23 289 
All Labour candidates, 1931 180,943 491 369 
DLPs (1935) 119,022 398 299 
Trade unions (1935) 65,474 129 508 
Co-operative Party (1935) 11,503 21 548 
SSP (1935) 556 4 139 
All Labour candidates, 1935 196,554 552 356 
 
 
Source: Calculated from Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election of May, 
1929, PP. (114), 1929-30; Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election of 
October, 1931, PP. (109), 1931-32; Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election 
of November, 1935, PP. (150), 1935-36.  
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Election expenses were subject to a legal maximum, which varied in accordance with 
the number of electors in a constituency. That Labour candidates sometimes 
exceeded it, as demonstrated below, requires some explanation. In cases where the 
candidate was defeated, no problem arose, but matters were more complex if they 
were elected. An election petition had been pursued against J. J. H. Moses, the 
successful Labour candidate for Plymouth Drake, in 1929 over allegations of bribery 
and illegal expenditure. With representation from Stafford Cripps, Moses was cleared 
of all charges and awarded damages of some £3,000; this was to be the last such 
petition until 1955.221 It is likely that the example of Moses’ vindication was sufficient 
to dissuade other defeated opponents from instigating a petition.222 Moreover, in the 
context of large National government majorities, pursuing petitions against Labour 
MPs might have appeared unduly vindictive. In cases where Labour’s opponents 
overspent and won, the issue seems clearer cut: the cost of a challenge was beyond 
constituency parties’ financial resources, particularly if they proved unsuccessful and 
Moses’ damages were representative. For the same reason, support from the NEC 
was unlikely to be forthcoming; this was compounded by the delay in the publication 
of returns of expenses, which usually came in the year following an election. 
The NUR’s candidates, as might be expected given the position of its political fund, 
were generally the best-financed. In 1931, the NUR was responsible for almost all of 
its ten candidates’ election expenditure. Only in the case of James Wilson, being the 
only NUR candidate standing in a double member borough at Oldham, did the union’s 
contribution amount to less than 98 per cent of the total spent. It spent an average of 
£842 per candidate, although in several cases this was substantially exceeded, most 
notably in William Dobbie’s campaign at Stalybridge and Hyde (Cheshire), where, out 
of a total expenditure of £1,323, Dobbie only had to find £4 elsewhere. In two cases, 
the union’s expenditure actually exceeded the legal maximum for election expenses, 
at Ashton-under-Lyne (Lancashire), where J. W. Gordon was the candidate, and at 
                                                          
221 Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps. A Biography (London, 1949), p. 80; Colin Cooke, The Life of Richard 
Stafford Cripps (London, 1957), p. 109; Chris Bryant, Stafford Cripps. The First Modern Chancellor 
(London, 1997), p. 80-82. 
222 George Ward, the NUR’s candidate for Plymouth Sutton, overspent in 1935, but was not challenged; 
although he did not win the seat, the Moses case may have been in the minds of Plymouth 
Conservatives. In any case their own successful candidate, Nancy Astor, had also spent more than 
the legal maximum.  Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election of November, 
1935, PP. (150), 1935-36. 
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Rossendale (Lancashire), where the NUR was represented by Arthur Law. Gordon 
had been defeated in a by-election at Ashton earlier in the year on the death of the 
sitting NUR MP, Albert Bellamy. The intervention of a New Party candidate, and 
Catholic opposition to his support for the Labour government’s education policy 
probably contributed to Gordon’s defeat on that occasion,223 and the large expenditure 
seems to reflect the union’s determination to win the seat back. Such heavy 
expenditure, however, was far from effective: no NUR candidate was successful.224 
Once again, the NUR spent on average the most per candidate, £892, £50 higher than 
in 1931, and it continued to be responsible for the bulk of total expenses, still over 95 
per cent in single seat constituencies. As in 1931, it spent more than the legal 
maximum in two seats: at Manchester Ardwick, where Joseph Henderson was the 
Railwaymen’s candidate (116 per cent of the legal maximum), and at Plymouth Sutton, 
where the NUR’s George Ward was able to outspend his Conservative opponent 
Nancy Astor. Both received £1,006 from the union, in Ward’s case his entire 
expenditure, possibly suggesting that the NUR was particularly targeting the seat. With 
these exceptions, expenditure as a proportion of the legal maximum varied between 
56.6 per cent (Wilson at Gateshead) and 99.7 per cent (Barstow at Barrow-in-
Furness). The ‘cheapest’ NUR seat was Leeds South, where Harry Charleton spent 
£539, of which the union supplied £527.225 The NUDAW was also responsible for the 
bulk of its four candidates’ expenditure in 1931, over 95 per cent in all cases apart 
from that of Ellen Wilkinson at Middlesbrough East, who was able, probably due to her 
political prominence relative to the other NUDAW candidates, to find nearly £200 of 
her total expenditure of £668 from other sources. Only Wilkinson’s expenses 
approached the legal maximum, in her case £752. The union spent an average of 
£608 per candidate, although Wilkinson and Wilson, contesting Jarrow, were paid 
£486 each. This figure is inflated by the £774 spent by the NUDAW’s Political General 
Secretary W. A. Robinson at Shipley (West Yorkshire): Robinson had unsuccessfully 
fought a by-election in the constituency in 1930, and although his general election 
                                                          
223 MSS.127/NU/1/1/19 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1931, Report and Financial Statements 
for 1931. 
224 Calculated from: MSS.127/NU/1/1/19 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1931, Report and 
Financial Statements for 1931; Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election of 
October, 1931, PP. (109), 1931-32.  
225 Calculated from: MSS.127/NU/1/1/23 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1935, Report and 
Financial Statements for 1935; Return of the Expenses of each Candidate at the General Election of 
November, 1935, PP (150), 1935-36. 
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expenditure was slightly short of the £798 the NUDAW contributed on that occasion, 
again, this relatively high expenditure is probably indicative of a desire to win back 
what had been a union seat until the death of the previous MP, William Mackinder.226 
The NUDAW again came closest to the NUR in terms of average expenditure per 
candidate with £710, although Wilfrid Burke’s campaign at Burnley (£898) and 
Robinson, now fighting St. Helen’s (£887) exceeded this significantly. Over 90 per cent 
of all its seven candidates’ expenditure was met by the union, including Wilkinson, 
now fighting Jarrow (Durham). Only in the case of Burke did total expenditure exceed 
two-thirds of the legal maximum.227 
The NUGMW paid, on average, the lowest election expenses in 1931 of the unions 
considered here. Nowhere did it pay more than 60 per cent of the legal maximum, 
which might initially make its opposition to the implementation of the Hastings 
Agreement, discussed later, appear incongruous given that it overspent the limits 
imposed by the Agreement only marginally in four of the eleven seats it contested in 
1931. It was, however, responsible for most of its candidates’ total expenses. All £600 
spent by its President J. R. Clynes at Manchester Platting came from the union, as did 
all but £2 of the £505 spent by Walter Windsor at Nottingham East. The General 
Secretary, Will Thorne, only had to find £1 of his expenses elsewhere, although he 
was unopposed at West Ham Plaistow. The NUGMW paid less than half of the total 
expenses at Preston, although this was a double member borough in which Edward 
Porter was the union’s candidate. There is an interesting comparison here with the 
NUR’s sponsorship in double member constituencies: the Railwaymen paid 53 per 
cent of the total expenses for both candidates, the General and Municipal Workers just 
45 per cent. Only Jack Jones at West Ham Silvertown relied on a sizeable proportion 
of non-NUGMW expenditure, and his campaign was the cheapest of all of the union’s 
official candidates, costing £290 in total, of which the union contributed £215. Jones, 
the only NUGMW candidate to fight and win in 1931, was returned with a majority of 
nearly 15,000, suggesting that in the right constituency a relatively small expenditure 
could go a long way.228 In 1935, the average amount spent on each candidate by the 
                                                          
226 Calculated from NUDAW Annual Reports, 1930 and 1931; Return of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 
(109). 
227 Calculated from NUDAW Annual Report 1935; Return of Election Expenses PP 1935-6 (150). 
228 Calculated from TU/GENERALB/1/A/7 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1931, Half-Yearly Financial 
Reports 1931; Return of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 (109). 
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NUMGW rose to £498, but remained lower than the other unions considered here with 
some MFGB exceptions. Six of its candidates were elected in 1935. Generally the 
union paid over 90 per cent of its candidates’ total expenses, the exceptions being 
Thorne, Jones, Windsor – now fighting Hull Central – and O. G. Willey at Birmingham 
West, although the union still met more than three-quarters of the expenditure in each 
case. On this occasion Thorne did face an opponent whom he was able to narrowly 
outspend and heavily defeat. Most expenditure reached around half of the legal 
maximum, although Clynes, Hayday (Nottingham West) and Porter (Warrington, 
Lancashire) spent slightly more, although nothing close to the maximum itself.229 
The AEU gave grants in blocks to each of its three official candidates in 1931, initially 
of £250 each, followed by a second payment of £200 to David Adams at Barrow-in-
Furness (Lancashire), £250 to Robert Young at Newton-le-Willows (Lancashire), and 
£300 to J. E. Mills at Dartford (Kent); an average of £500 to each candidate. This 
accounted for 96 per cent of Young’s expenses, but only 71 per cent of Adams’ and 
just 55 per cent of Mills’. This probably reflects the relative strength of the constituency 
party: Dartford DLP paid affiliation fees for 1903 members in 1931, compared with just 
323 Barrow DLP members. The variation between proportions of the total expenditure 
paid by the union is probably also a reflection of the AEU’s system of up-front grants, 
whereas other unions worked out such expenses after the campaign.230 Unfortunately 
the union’s records do not show election expenditure by constituency for 1935, but 
Young, this time successful, was able to spend over £200 more than in 1931. 
The RCA did not itemise political expenditure, but the following figures have been 
calculated based on the union paying 90 per cent of its candidates’ expenses. This 
policy cannot be confirmed in the union’s own accounts, but is mentioned as being the 
union’s rate of contributions to election expenses in a document circulated at the 
Hastings Agreement discussions, which were chaired by the RCA’s George Lathan. 
Assuming the union did meet its full obligations, then the average expended on RCA 
candidature in 1931 would be £597, and excepting double member seats, the highest 
                                                          
229 Calculated from TU/GENERALB/1/A/11 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1935, Half-Yearly Financial 
Reports 1935; Return of Election Expenses PP 1935-6 (150). 
230 Calculated from MSS.259/AEU/4/1/10 AEU, Reports and Proceedings, 1931, Annual Financial 
Report 1931; MSS.259/AEU/1/1/44-45 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Jul.-Sep. 1931 and Oct.-Dec. 
1931, September and October meetings; Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1931; Returns of 
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expenditure by the union would have been in Hackney Central, where Fred Watkins 
spent a total of £761 (estimated RCA contribution £685), and Bristol South, where the 
General Secretary A. G. Walkden was the candidate, spending a total of £765 (RCA 
estimate £689). In these instances, as well as in St. Pancras South East where H. G. 
Romeril was the union’s candidate, expenditure just exceeded 60 per cent of the legal 
maximum; for most RCA candidates, only around a third of the legal maximum was 
spent.231 In 1935, the RCA had increased its number of candidatures to ten, and, 
allowing for the same 90 per cent estimate, probably spent an average of £548 per 
candidate. Walkden’s campaign was once again the most costly at £764, although the 
union probably only paid £688 of this, whilst F. B. Simpson’s campaign in Ashton-
under-Lyne was at £558 (£502 union) was cheaper, and more successful, than the 
NUR’s attempt to get Gordon elected there four years earlier (£819). Expenditure by 
the union’s candidates as a proportion of the legal maximum ranged from 36 per cent 
(Lathan, fighting Sheffield Park) to 77 per cent (Simpson).232 
The case of the MFGB is slightly different in that expenses paid by the Federation 
might only account for part of the ‘union’ contribution to election expenses: district 
unions might make themselves responsible for some of the expenditure. It has been 
possible to make some calculations in this regard for South Wales and County 
Durham.233 In some instances, the grant from the Federation to a district was larger 
than the MFGB candidate expenditure in that district. In 1931 Tom Cape, fighting 
Workington (Cumberland), received £498, spent £466, and won the seat. In North 
Eastern Derby (Derbyshire), Frank Lee also received £498, of which he spent £482 in 
his narrow defeat by a National Conservative candidate.234 The Durham Miners’ 
Association received £3489 from the MFGB, and its candidates spent a total of £3306. 
Possibly the remainder was used to aid non-MFGB Labour candidates in the county; 
                                                          
231 Calculated from MSS.55/4/AR/10 RCA, Annual Reports with accounts and balance sheets, 1931-
35, Annual Report 1931; Return of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 (109), Labour Party NEC Papers, 
minutes of meeting of 12 June 1933, Appendix I to Constituency Finance Conference. 
232 Calculated from MSS.55/4/AR/10 RCA, Annual Reports with accounts and balance sheets, 1931-
35, Annual Report 1935; Return of Election Expenses PP 1935-6 (150). 
233 Estimates for Durham are calculated on the basis of figures in W. R. Garside, The Durham Miners 
1919-1960 (London, 1971), p. 350. Garside gives the total political fund expenditure for each year, 
and my estimates for election expenses are based on the difference between election years and what 
expenditure would be in a ‘normal’, i.e., non-election, year. South Wales figures from 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/1 SWMF Balance Sheets, 1918-39, balance sheet for 1931. 
234 Calculated from: SWCC.MNA/NUM/1/1/29 MFGB Proceedings and Reports, 1931, Annual Financial 
Report 1931; Returns of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 (109); J. E. Williams, The Derbyshire Miners. 
A study in industrial and social history (London, 1962).  
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that the additional political expenditure of the DMA in 1931 was somewhere near 
£4100 suggests this may have been the case.235 On average, £472 was spent by each 
Durham Miners’ candidate, and one, Joshua Ritson contesting Durham, was able to 
just outspend his opponent. By contrast an average of £212 was spent by each Miners’ 
candidate in South Wales, although four of the ten – George Daggar (Abertillery, 
Mon.), Aneurin Bevan (Ebbw Vale, Mon.), Charles Edwards (Bedwellty, Mon.) and 
George Hall (Aberdare, Glam.) – were unopposed. The former trio spent £17 between 
them; Hall spent nothing. The MFGB granted a total of £2,992 on the basis that South 
Wales was entitled to five candidates; this would have amounted to £598 per 
candidate, or £299 if spread evenly between all ten candidates. The lack of opposition 
in four constituencies meant that opposed candidates could count on a larger share. 
D. L. Davies at Pontypridd (Glam.) spent the most, £441, but only £2,119 was spent 
in total, around 80 per cent of the allowance from the MFGB, and a amount of this was 
refunded to the national Federation after the election.236 £523 was spent on average 
by Lancashire MFGB candidates, although the expenses received from the Federation 
only met 72 per cent of the district’s total expenditure of £2,616. In Scotland, the 
average expenditure was £341 per MFGB candidate. In West Yorkshire, two MFGB 
candidates, William Lunn at Rothwell and Thomas Grundy at Rother Valley, were able 
to outspend their opponents, and both were among the six Yorkshire Miners’ 
candidates elected. An average of £542 was spent, and a total of £4,881 compared to 
an MFGB grant of £4,385. The Yorkshire Association seems to have been in the 
healthiest position in regard to its own political funds. Only three out of 43 MFGB 
candidates spent more than half of the legal maximum.237 Although Yorkshire was 
relatively well-resourced, in general MFGB candidates were run at a low cost: the large 
size of the Federation’s expenditure in the 1931 election was due to the number of 
candidates, rather than any particular generosity on its behalf.  Out of forty MFGB 
candidates in 1935, nine were returned unopposed, including seven of the twelve 
standing in South Wales. The SWMF was thus able to refund some £1,060 of the 
£2,650 it was allocated by the MFGB, although the total expenditure of its candidates 
was £2,633, suggesting that some of this money came from its own funds or other 
                                                          
235 See Garside, The Durham Miners 1919-1960 chapter 8. 
236 SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/1 SWMF Balance Sheets, 1918-39, balance sheet for 1931. 
237 SWCC.MNA/NUM/1/1/29 MFGB Proceedings and Reports, 1931, Annual Financial Report 1931; 
Return of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 (109). 
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sources. W. H. Mainwaring spent the most, £624 in Rhondda East, where his 
opponent was the CPGB’s Harry Pollitt; this was almost twice Pollitt’s expenditure. S. 
O. Davies at Merthyr Tydfil (Glam.) spent over three times as much as his ILP 
challenger, a total of £319. The SWMF again spent the least of the MFGB’s districts 
on average, £219 per candidate. The average spent by Scottish MFGB candidates 
was £375, although the Federation’s grant of £1,500 covered only just over half the 
total expenditure of its candidates, who found a further £1,626 elsewhere. Willie 
Adamson was able to outspend his Communist opponent Gallacher but not defeat 
him. In Lancashire the MFGB allocation covered 95 per cent of expenses; an average 
of £487 was spent by each of its three candidates who faced contests; its fourth 
candidate was unopposed, spending £72. In Durham the Federation now supported 
five official candidates, all of whom were elected, at an average expenditure of £505 
each. The MFGB granted £2,500, and only an extra £27 needed to be found 
elsewhere. Ritson, once more contesting Durham, could again outspend his opponent. 
The DMA’s above ‘normal’ expenditure for 1935 was around £4,400, and again it 
seems to have made grants to Labour candidates in county seats who were not 
fighting under the auspices of the Federation.238 Yorkshire MFGB candidates were 
once more the best-resourced: five of the seven outspent their opposition, at an 
average expenditure of £550 per candidate. Total expenses reached £3,849, of which 
the Federation supplied 88 per cent, £3,400. Tom Williams at Don Valley (West 
Yorkshire) spent the most, £644, which was equal to around 37 per cent of the legal 
maximum. Four out of forty MFGB candidates spent more than half of the legal 
maximum: Ritson, Mainwaring, James Brown in Ayrshire South and Tom Smith at 
Normanton (West Yorkshire). It seems that, in terms of election expenses, the MFGB 
would have had very little difficulty in complying with the terms of the Hastings 
Agreement.239 
Unofficial or assisted candidates were generally members of the union concerned, but 
sponsored by their DLP, rather than being on a parliamentary panel. Often these 
                                                          
238 Hugh Dalton outspent his opponent at Bishop Auckland; at Seaham, Emmanuel Shinwell’s 
expenditure of £955 was comparatively close to that of his well-resourced opponent Ramsay 
MacDonald, who spent £1,289. Shinwell’s majority was over 20,000. Return of Election Expenses PP 
1935-6 (150); Garside, The Durham Miners 1919-1960. 
239 Calculated from D.845.14 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1935, Annual Report 1935; 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/1 SWMF Balance Sheets, 1918-39, balance sheet for 1935; Return of Election 
Expenses PP 1935-6 (150). 
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candidates were fighting seats less likely to return a Labour member, and the financial 
help of their union here could go a long way, even if it did not produce victory. For 
example, in 1931 a £50 grant by the AEU to one of their members fighting Richmond 
(Surrey) amounted to a third of his total expenditure, whilst a grant of the same amount 
to an unofficial NUGMW candidate at Tavistock (Devon) equalled 44 per cent of the 
candidate’s total expenses. Six NUR members fighting seats in 1931 received grants 
of £50 each, and the ten members of the union contesting the 1935 election, but not 
on the union’s panel, were helped with the same sum. The NUGMW supported eight 
unofficial candidates in 1931 and twelve in 1935 with sums ranging from £25 to £100, 
with George Lansbury receiving the latter amount on both occasions. The RCA 
supported no less than eighteen unofficial candidates in 1935 to the tune of £50 each. 
None were successful, but some unions were not always as jealous of their funds as 
might be assumed.240 
The development of the Hastings Agreement will be covered in more detail below, but 
on the basis of election expenditure in 1931 and 1935, unions were in quite different 
positions in terms of how far they were already in compliance with its prescriptions in 
terms of the portion of electoral expenditure affiliated organisations would be allowed 
to supply at elections after 1935. A limit of 80 per cent of 60 per cent of the legal 
maximum, i.e., 48 per cent, was then to come into force. As mentioned, it seems the 
MFGB would have little difficulty here: only seven of its total of 83 candidatures over 
the two elections exceeded 50 per cent of the maximum. This part of the agreement 
would perhaps be less of an obstacle for the NUDAW and the NUGMW, who at both 
elections generally paid over 90 per cent of their candidates’ total expenses and would 
instead have difficulty with the requirement that an affiliated organisation not pay more 
than 80 per cent of total expenses. The NUR, by contrast, would have difficulties on 
both counts: not only did it usually pay much closer to 100 per cent of its candidates’ 
total expenses, but as a proportion of the legal maximum, its grants tended to be well 
over the new limit of 48 per cent: in four of its 21 candidatures across both elections, 
                                                          
240 Return of Election Expenses PP 1931-2 (109) and PP 1935-6 (150); TU/GENERALB/1/A/7 NUGMW, 
Reports and Minutes, 1931 and TU/GENERALB/1/A/11 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1935, Half-
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1931 and 1935; MSS.259/AEU/4/1/10 AEU, Reports and Proceedings, 1931 and TU/ENG/1/A/39, 
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more than the legal maximum was spent; in three of these instances some 112 per 
cent of the maximum was spent. The RCA’s grants were not problematic in terms of 
the legal maximum, but likely exceeded the new limit of 80 per cent on total union 
contributions. It is difficult to tell exactly how much MFGB money was spent on each 
candidature, as there is no breakdown available of how the money it supplied to 
districts was distributed between candidates; however, given that the districts 
themselves very likely contributed too, in total union contributions were probably often 
more than eighty per cent of total expenses. 
 
Regulation: the Hastings Agreement and after 
 
As the previous section suggests, in many cases trade unions were responsible for 
providing grants to meet very substantial proportions of the electoral expense incurred 
by their sponsored candidates. This, or rather this combined with the relative financial 
weakness of many constituency parties, was increasingly recognised as a problem. At 
the 1931 Scarborough party conference, a resolution was moved instructing the 
Executive to ‘invite the Trades Union Congress to join in an inquiry to formulate a 
scheme for the better allocation of the Political Levy and other Political Funds’. The 
mover emphasised the problem in rural constituencies in particular where ‘little support 
is received from industrial organisations’ and suggested that divisional parties were 
limited in their choice of candidates ‘on account of financial stringency’.241 Arthur 
Hayday of the NUGMW and that year’s TUC fraternal delegate, opposed the resolution 
‘not because I have no regard for the feelings that prompt it, but in order to show the 
futility of its passage’ – the TUC had no political funds of its own, or any measure of 
control over the political funds of its affiliate unions, and as such an approach would 
achieve nothing. Hayday offered no alternative, but after his intervention the ‘previous 
question’ was carried, ending the discussion.242 Although not particularly constructive, 
Hayday’s contribution did at least suggest that trade unions might be amenable to 
some action on the problem, provided it was not considered by them to be 
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impracticable. In private session at the following year’s conference in Leicester, the 
below resolution was agreed: 
That this conference appreciates the generous assistance rendered by 
Trade Unions and other National organisations which make annual block 
grants, and in many Constituencies relieve DLPs of the entire costs of 
Parliamentary Elections. We also recognise that in many Rural 
Constituencies where Trade Union membership is weak, and where DLPs 
are solely responsible for electoral commitments, the sacrifice of Party 
members in these areas is enormous. We call upon the National Executive 
of the Party to consider and report comprehensively on the question of 
financing Labour candidates for Parliament and candidates running in 
association with the Labour Party.243 
Although there is no record of any debate which took place on the resolution, it is not 
difficult to see why it was able to obtain wider support: the implicit criticism of the 
unions in the Scarborough resolution had been replaced by praise, and moreover, it 
was much more practical, simply requiring the Executive to consider and report on 
the matter without necessarily requiring any union action until after the report had 
been made. Moreover, it did not raise the difficulty of the potential of any efforts to 
improve the situation being coordinated through the TUC, and the corresponding loss 
of control by individual unions over part of their political finances or the development 
of any additional machinery to administer such funds.  
The National Executive, however, did not rush into action; it was only on 21 December 
1932 that it decided to empower Henderson to consult with the General Council and 
the leaders of the larger trade unions on a ‘scheme whereby a uniform contribution 
towards Constituency Finance could be agreed to’ and report to the next National 
Executive meeting. Henderson also seems to have been seeking a loan towards 
general party finance from the larger unions at this point.244 This informal approach 
seems to have produced few results: the issue did not come up at any of the following 
three meetings, until on 20 April 1933 Henderson admitted he had been unable to 
consult the General Council on the subject. That he referred only to the General 
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Council suggests that possibly some kind of central pooling of union resources 
perhaps through the TUC was being contemplated at this stage. Given the lack of 
progress made so far by Henderson, the Executive resolved that its Finance and 
General Purposes Sub-committee would make arrangements to proceed with the work 
instead.245 The Sub-committee agreed at its May meeting to invite representatives of 
those unions promoting candidatures to attend a conference the following month on 
the subject of ‘trade unions and constituency finance’; no representatives of the Co-
operative party were to be involved at this stage.246 Some unions, however, had 
already begun to make their own arrangements: Ernest Bevin had written to C. T. 
Cramp late in 1932 to inquire as to whether the NUR would be amenable to attending 
a conference of larger unions to discuss the uniformity of constituency allowances.247 
Possibly Bevin was pushing on independently given the delay in addressing the issue 
by the National Executive, and although Cramp replied in the affirmative, no further 
action seems to have been taken. It does not appear that Bevin had approached any 
other union leaders at this point: presumably he expected to be able to rely on support 
from Cramp given that the two unions, after the MFGB, were responsible for the largest 
number of candidatures. 
Representatives of 22 organisations, now including the Co-operative Party, met to 
discuss constituency finance on 12 June at a conference dominated, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, by the contributions of Bevin and Cramp. All major sponsoring unions 
were officially represented, with the exception of NUDAW, whose Political General 
Secretary W. A. Robinson attended in his capacity as a member of the National 
Executive. George Lathan of the RCA, as chair of the Finance and General Purposes 
Sub-committee, opened the meeting by circulating a  document showing the present 
rates of grants and expenses allowed by different unions plus a number of alternative 
proposals, and suggesting that the National Executive would be particularly pleased if 
the saving made by any reduction or regulation of grants was to be redirected either 
to union branch affiliations to local parties, or to a central fund to enable the Executive 
to ‘finance candidatures in special constituencies’.248 In terms of grants, the alternative 
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proposals included suggestions of either a flat rate to be introduced after the next 
election, or an immediate scaling down to such a rate, with variations for county and 
borough constituencies. It was suggested that election expenses might also be subject 
to a flat rate, again varied for county and borough seats, or a percentage of the legal 
maximum expenditure to apply in all constituencies.249 Shepherd, the National Agent, 
presented the documents drawing attention to the great variety in schemes now being 
operated by different unions, and after a general discussion some specific proposals 
were considered. Cramp suggested that grants for election expenses should be on a 
sliding scale or percentage, Bevin flat rates for borough and county seats of £400 and 
£500 respectively. Cramp’s proposal was adopted by twenty votes to five, and there 
was no serious opposition to the suggestion that ‘eighty per cent of sixty per cent’ of 
the legal maximum should be the maximum proportion a sponsoring organisation 
should pay, provided the constituency party was required to make at least some 
contribution.250 It was agreed nineteen to three that a uniform annual payment should 
be the basis of organisation expenses in constituencies, and Bevin’s suggestion that 
these should be limited to £200 in county and £150 in borough constituencies was 
carried ‘Almost unanimously’. Cramp’s attempt to raise the borough limit to £200 too 
only found six supporters.251 This may well have reflected NUR priorities, as at the 
stage twelve of its thirteen placed candidates had been adopted in borough 
constituencies; only four of the TGWU’s eleven were borough candidates.252 Lathan 
again raised the possibility of a central fund, but Bevin suggested that ‘it might be 
impossible for the Unions to agree to the proposal in the form as presented’, and that 
instead the National Executive might circulate a list of the constituencies and 
candidates it had in mind to affiliated unions to consider supporting. This hardly met 
the problem and appears to confirm McKibbin’s suggestion that unions were ‘not 
prepared to surrender the autonomy of their political expenditure’.253  
The National Executive agreed the proposals with some minor amendments in July, 
but they had still to gain the approval of the party conference at Hastings in September. 
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Financial matters were dealt with in private session and there is no verbatim report of 
the proceedings, but it is clear that speakers from the NUR and the TGWU supported 
the proposals, whilst the RCA opposed, presumably leaving Lathan in a rather 
embarrassing position given his close involvement in the drafting in July.254 An attempt 
to move the reference back of the agreement was defeated by 1,426,000 votes to 
836,000, a substantial minority. Presumably the AEU delegation voted with the 
majority: in terms of election expenses the union had used an identical scheme in 
1931, whilst James Kaylor, a member of the AEU Executive Council, was one of the 
party National Executive’s appointed speakers on the subject.255 The MFGB 
delegation almost certainly voted against: the Miners had been due to debate the 
scheme at a Federation special conference just prior to the party conference, but this 
was then postponed until December. The MFGB Executive had intended to 
recommend that no change be made,256 possibly on the grounds that grants for 
constituency organisation were the prerogative not of the Federation, but its district 
unions. The General and Municipal Workers very likely opposed the scheme: its 
political sub-committee had reported in August that the new regulations ‘would act as 
a restrictive measure on unions like ours’ and that union delegates should be 
instructed to vote against them.257 The combined block votes of the RCA, MFGB and 
NUGMW in 1933 totalled 698,000 – the remaining 138,000 of the opposition’s total 
vote came from several smaller sponsoring unions as well as a number of constituency 
parties: delegates from Stockport and Nottingham Borough Labour parties had moved 
and seconded the reference back.258 The ‘agreed additional regulations’ for 
‘Parliamentary Candidates and Constituency Finance’ were as follows: 
1. A written agreement between Affiliated Organisations responsible for 
the promotion of candidates, and Constituency Labour Parties, to ensure: 
 a. That the CLP shall itself undertake to pay not less than 20% of the 
election expenses of such candidate. 
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 b. That an Affiliated Organisation shall not undertake to contribute to the 
election expenses of such candidate a sum in excess of 80% of the actual 
election expenses, and in no case shall its contribution exceed 80% of 
60% of the maximum expenses allowed by law... 
 c. An Affiliated Organisation shall not undertake to pay to the funds of a 
CLP for organisation and registration expenses an annual sum in excess 
of £150 in a Parliamentary Borough as defined by the National Executive 
Committee, or £200 in a Parliamentary County. 
 2. Clause 1 shall come into operation after the next General Election... 
3. …[Schema for reduction in annual expenditure where association of 
Affiliated Organisation with CLP continues after the next Election, either by 
three or four annual reductions]. 
4. …[Stipulates that this applies to individuals, whether candidates or not, 
who make financial contributions to CLPs].259 
The use of ‘eighty per cent of sixty per cent’ is unusual, appearing both rather arbitrary, 
and a convoluted way of saying 48 per cent. That under half of the legal maximum 
was permitted from affiliated organisations had the symbolic significance of 
demonstrating that Labour could do more with less money than its opponents, whilst 
also helping to counter potential allegations of union financial domination. The formula 
arrived on appears to have been deliberately obtuse, setting a limit which, while formal, 
left enough ambiguity for the actual expenditure to be left to the discretion of the 
sponsoring body.  
Pinto-Duschinsky characterises the Hastings Agreement as a compromise in the 
‘underlying conflict within the Labour movement between the unions, with their large 
blocks of cash’ and the constituency parties, many of whom had become ‘lazy’ through 
reliance on union grants.260 How far was this the case? Morgan implies that the ‘main 
target’ was not likely to have been the unions, but perhaps instead, the self-financing 
candidate;261 although as Thorpe suggests, the new limits ‘still left considerable scope 
for wealthy candidates’.262 Certainly to suggest that the unions were the target of the 
Agreement seems to overlook the contribution of Bevin and Cramp in particular in 
giving shape to the new regulations. Despite, as referred to above, the relative 
                                                          
259 Ibid., pp. 36-7. My italics. 
260 Pinto-Duschinsky, British Political Finance 1830-1980, pp. 77-80. 
261 Morgan, Bolshevism and the British Left. Part One. Labour Legends and Russian Gold, p. 171. 
262 Thorpe, Parties at War. Political Organization in Second World War Britain, p. 264. 
 
110 
 
buoyancy of the NUR’s political fund, both would have been concerned in a period in 
which generally pressure on political funds was high, to reduce expenditure where 
possible. The opposition of the NUGMW to the proposals perhaps makes more sense 
when considered in light of the increasing internal pressure from its districts for a 
greater allocation from the political fund: at this proportion afforded to the union 
centrally was only fifty per cent and so it is perhaps unsurprising that its leadership 
reacted against what must have seemed like a further demand, this time external, to 
decide how its political fund should be spent. Hayday had argued in 1931 that ‘the 
political funds of the trade unions are raised out of the contributions of men whose 
wages are all too low, and they represent a great sacrifice on their part…we would not 
agree to allocate portions of the sacrifices made by trade union members for the 
promotion of very doubtful candidatures’;263 in the context of the debate, ‘doubtful’ 
seemed more likely to mean ‘politically unreliable’ than ‘hopeless’, but his point was 
that such spending had to be done in a way that was responsible and respectful of the 
sacrifices of members. Such pressures arguably combined with a genuine desire on 
the part of trade unionists to see the constituency parties stand on their own feet 
financially: the introduction of the Agreement seems to be an example of the union 
‘restraint’ recognised by Minkin.264 
 
The impact of Hastings 
It is difficult to assess the initial impact of the Hastings Agreement in terms of election 
expenses, given that there was no general election until 1945, by which time, as 
Andrew Thorpe has demonstrated, the finances of constituency parties were generally 
very much healthier.265 By the 1950 general election, the limits imposed by the 
Agreement had been revised upwards to take account of inflation.266 Therefore 
perhaps the most effective way to assess its early impact is through an examination 
of annual grants by unions for constituency expenditure. The Hastings Agreement set 
new limits of £150 in borough and £200 in county constituencies, to come into force 
after the next general election, and a scheme whereby annual grants might be reduced 
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to the agreed maxima: in boroughs, those between £150 and £200 to be lowered by 
three annual reductions and those above £200 by four; in counties, those under £300 
by three reductions, and those exceeding £300 by four.267 How far were unions already 
in compliance with these terms, and if not, how successful were they in making 
reductions after 1935? 
Itemised expenditure is not available for all unions, notably the RCA. There seems to 
have been some fluctuation in the AEU’s constituency grants, but by 1934-35, its three 
adopted constituencies received around £800 between them.268 The MFGB did not 
make grants for constituency organisation, at least not nationally: instead it contributed 
to the salaries of its elected MPs, in line with the number of levy-payers in each district, 
so that, for example, in 1932 five South Wales Miners’ MPs received MFGB salaries, 
corresponding to a political membership of 50,000.269 Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the union’s role in forging the Agreement, grants paid by the TGWU were already 
safely within its terms; local agreements made after 1935 continued in the same 
way.270 
The NUDAW’s annual grants in 1931 had been £496 and £501 respectively to Shipley 
and Westhoughton DLPs, and the rather higher figures of £634 and £747 to Jarrow 
and East Middlesborough, although possibly these figures balanced the rather lower 
election expenditure in the latter two constituencies. In 1932, a more ‘normal’ year, the 
union paid £370 to Jarrow and £412 to Westhoughton, and a total of £352 to 
constituencies where Robinson was the candidate, he having abandoned Shipley 
when adopted for St. Helens. The NUDAW also became responsible for candidatures 
at Burnley and Manchester Clayton during the year, and in their first full year of 
NUDAW support, 1933, they received £356 and £282 respectively. At this point, with 
the exception of Jarrow, which received £467 in 1933, expenditure between NUDAW 
constituencies appears to have been approaching a degree of uniformity, and in 1934 
                                                          
267 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1933, p. 37. 
268 MSS.259/AEU/4/1/10-11 AEU, Reports and Proceedings, 1931-32 and TU/ENG/1/A/37-39, AEU, 
Bound Reports, 1933-35, Annual Financial Reports, 1931-5. 
269 SWCC.MNA/NUM/1/1/30 MFGB Proceedings and Reports, 1932, Annual Report 1932. 
270 See, for example, MSS.126/TG/1154/12 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1933: £100 was 
the typical annual TGWU grant. For a later local agreement, MSS.126/TG/1186/A/15 TGWU, Minutes 
and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1937, 
minutes of FGPC meeting of 8 April 1937. George Deer became the union’s candidate for Lincoln with 
a £50 annual grant. 
 
 
112 
 
its grants to all seven, which now included Rossendale and Thornbury, were between 
£300 and £400: Clayton’s £303 the lowest, and St. Helen’s £400 the highest. This 
pattern continued into 1935, when Jarrow received the most money, £372. The 
NUDAW then, already seemed to be making some progress towards uniformity and a 
lowering of grants.271 
The NUR’s 1931 political fund statement grouped all ‘Parliamentary and constituency 
expenses’ together, but it is possible to make some estimates as not all of its 
sponsored candidates were in Parliament. Therefore George Ward and H. Kegie 
received £200 each in constituency expenses, William Dobbie £150, and J. W. Gordon 
£250. In 1932, four NUR candidates received £200 in constituency expenses, another 
pair £100 each. Ardwick was granted £230 through Joseph Henderson’s candidature, 
and South Leeds, where the NUR’s Harry Charleton was the candidate, £250. In 1933 
£200 was paid on behalf of eight of the union’s candidates, and in 1934 all were 
receiving £200 annually, apart from South Leeds, which continued to receive £250. 
The NUR’s grants, then, seem to have largely been in line already with the Hastings 
conditions, suggesting that the union’s main difficulty would be in reducing its large 
election expenditure.272 The NUGMW’s half-yearly financial statements for 1931-5 
demonstrate that generally the union paid around £400 per annum towards 
organisation expenses in each of its sponsored constituencies, although in some years 
some constituencies, such as Margaret Bondfield’s Wallsend in 1933, only received 
£300. By 1935, both Plaistow and Preston’s allowances had been reduced to £200. 
Although the NUGMW did pay uniform rates, they would require substantial reduction 
after 1935 to meet the Hastings Agreement’s terms. 
The NUR made arrangements early in 1936 to reduce its constituency grants. The 
union seems to have interpreted the limits to electoral expenditure as being 60 per 
cent of the legal maximum, rather than 80 per cent of 60 per cent. As its unsuccessful 
candidates had not yet been re-adopted for their respective constituencies, it 
suggested a four-year scale of reductions for the three borough seats its MPs sat for. 
Pontefract, where Adam Hills was the NUR MP, was already receiving a £200 rate, so 
no reduction was needed. At Ardwick and Rotherham, grants would be reduced from 
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£200 to £150 by an annual reduction of £12 10s, and at South Leeds from £250 to 
£150 in reductions of £25. By 1940, this had largely succeeded, and grants to newly-
adopted constituencies were started on the Hastings rates.273 The NUGMW, given its 
larger grants, appears to have had more difficulty. Although a scale of reductions was 
introduced, the reduction in most of the union’s adopted constituencies amounted to 
around £30 annually in 1936, and £24 in 1937, at which point Clynes, for example, in 
the Manchester borough seat of Platting, was still receiving £336 per year. Although 
the union had more success in recently adopted seats – Reading, for example, where 
Bondfield was now the candidate, received £228 in 1937 – in 1938 most of its 
candidates, even in borough seats were still receiving £280 annually. In the first half 
of 1939, the union stopped itemising its organisation grants by constituency in the 
political fund account, so it is impossible to tell how much was spent on each 
constituency. However, the substantial increase from £1059 10s spent in the last six 
months of 1939, compared with £1409 spent in the first half of 1940, may imply that, 
at least for this half-year, the NUGMW found its commitments under the Agreement 
very difficult to keep.274 The NUDAW seems also to have struggled: in all of its 
constituencies, despite a big drop from 1935 to 1936 in expenditure, the average spent 
stayed between £250 and £310 through 1937-39, followed by a slight increase in 
1940.275 
Labour’s relationship with the Co-operative Party was also affected by the Agreement. 
Relations between the two parties deteriorated in the early 1930s. Labour had 
assumed that the Cheltenham Agreement reached in 1927 was temporary, hoping 
that in the longer term, the smaller party would ‘surrender its finances and autonomy 
to Labour’s policy and organisation’.276 With the Co-operative Party keen to maintain 
a degree of independence, tensions arose at constituency level over financial control. 
In 1932 the Birmingham Co-operative Party tightened its candidate selection 
procedure, with eligibility for political grants requiring prior approval by the Co-
operative Party executive before seeking a Labour nomination: a measure ‘both to 
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prevent the Labour party forcing it to foot the bill for ‘no hope’ elections and to prohibit 
it from nominating a candidate who would then join the Co-operative Party and attempt 
to claim the political grant’.277 As Angela Whitecross notes, there is ‘no evidence to 
suggest that the Hastings Conference decision was in anyway targeted at curbing the 
influence of the Co-operative Party in constituencies’, yet its effect was ‘immediate’.278 
Negotiations began in December 1933 between the parties at national level, with 
Labour seeking to assert more control over local Co-operative agents and the funds 
with which their salaries were paid, although this led to a stalemate, with Labour 
temporarily refusing to endorse Co-operative candidates where the Co-operative Party 
directly employed the agent in 1935.279 Co-operative Party opposition to implementing 
the Hastings Agreement’s terms also held up endorsements in several constituencies. 
Whilst a temporary agreement was reached in May 1937, negotiations were continuing 
by September 1939, when the Co-operative side decided to suspend them for the 
duration of the war; difficulties would continue into the post-war years.280 The intense 
focus on organisational problems arguably hindered development of distinctive Co-
operative policy solutions during the 1930s.281 The variety of financial arrangements 
under which Co-operative candidates stood jarred with Labour’s pursuit of uniformity, 
and reawakened the dispute over Co-operative affiliation to Labour. A Co-operative 
party representative was only present at the first of the 1933 discussions on 
constituency finance; the unions’ position shaped the party’s priorities here, arguably 
to the detriment of Co-operative relations. If the Agreement had not been aimed at the 
Co-operative Party, it did provide Labour with a tool with which to attempt to force the 
smaller party to accept greater uniformity and control.   
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Difficulty in implementing the Agreement could foster calls for its modification. A report 
by the NUGMW’s National Executive in 1938 suggested that the Hastings terms ‘had 
engendered no small degree of opposition, which is growing as the maximum grants 
are being reached. And it is not improbable that an early attempt will be made to modify 
or return to the status quo in regard to this matter’.282 How far this was the case is 
difficult to tell, and this may simply have been part of the union leadership’s strategy 
to reassert central control over its political fund: the report warned that if the 
Agreements was altered, the balance of the central political fund ‘would soon be 
absorbed’.283 The balance did improve through 1939 but the position remained 
uncertain at this point. Opposition to the Agreement resurfaced in the Miners’ 
Federation at its 1938 conference. The Federation does not seem to have given the 
Agreement much consideration before this, and the debate which ensued was in effect 
that which had been forestalled in 1933 by the cancellation of the special conference. 
A resolution from the Northumberland district was carried, proposing to seek to rescind 
the regulations. It expressed disagreement with the decision of the Labour party 
conference at Hastings, which by this time had been in place for nearly five years. 
Opposition seems to have been around the requirement of that constituency parties 
pay at least twenty per cent of election expenses, as the miners of Northumberland 
were ‘levied up to the hilt already for all conceivable objects’.284 This was perhaps 
more of a concern in mining constituencies, where there was considerable overlap in 
personnel between the local party and the union lodges, but little opposition to the 
specific terms of the Hastings Agreement was raised, and the debate seems to have 
become an opportunity for delegates to air a range of perceived grievances: for 
example, Foster, a Lancashire delegate was more concerned about the ‘danger of 
losing miners’ candidates or miners’ representatives’ in the county.285 However, the 
resolution as passed did not carry any particular instructions to the Executive, 
rendering it more a symbolic statement of opposition than a real attempt to rescind the 
Agreement. The Federation submitted a resolution on the subject to the 1939 party 
conference; in the absence of specific instructions, this simply called for the 1933 
terms to be rescinded. Support came from Warrington DLP, where the NUGMW’s 
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Edward Porter was the prospective candidate. The NEC agreed to consider the 
resolution with a view to further consultations with unions and constituency parties: no 
vote was taken. This effectively stymied opposition pending more discussions, which 
were in turn delayed by the war situation. The Hastings Agreement would continue to 
stand for the time being.286 
If there was such dissatisfaction with the Hastings system, why was it not modified? 
Perhaps in the medium term, the impact of the war on the finances of constituency 
parties has obscured the development of this attempt to regularise Labour 
constituency finance, and the rather complex world of trade union sponsorship in the 
1930s. If the system of union sponsorship and the attempt to regularise it through the 
Hastings Agreement did tend to focus resources on more supposedly ‘winnable’ seats, 
as contemporary critics such as Dean McHenry,287 and others within the labour 
movement argued, some unions were attempting to stretch their political funds, which 
were in some instances already quite stretched, further, particularly in terms of 
supporting a growing number of unofficial candidates through smaller grants in 
election expenses.  
Moreover, after 1931 it was precisely those seats which were ‘winnable’ that Labour 
needed to prioritise in order to recover its parliamentary strength. Although the 
argument that something like a central fund might have been more useful in terms of 
breaking through in areas of Labour weakness, this was simply not practicable in the 
1930s, as Bevin and others observed. The NUDAW general secretary dismissed a 
proposal for such a scheme at the union’s 1937 annual delegate meeting as ‘utterly 
unworkable’.288 In the economic context of the 1930s, trade unions had to show often 
shrinking political memberships that they were using smaller political fund resources 
in a realistic and responsible fashion. Allowing outside control over political funds could 
have provoked widespread opposition and led to a further reduction in political fund 
income. Opposition to the Hastings terms within unions who might have had the 
strength to overturn it was never effectively co-ordinated, and often expressed in 
ambiguous terms.  Furthermore, an advantage of the Hastings system over a central 
fund was the link it maintained between constituency and sponsoring union. A 
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centralised system might have been seen as giving too much control over 
candidatures to the party’s National Executive; the system of union sponsorship still 
required a nomination from the local branch of a union, and involved those members 
of union executives or leaderships with responsibility for political affairs closely in 
constituency problems. Arguably this involved them materially as well as in principle 
in the organisation of democratic politics, and strengthened support for the electoral 
system as a means to achieving union goals.  
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Chapter 3 
Candidates and constituencies 
 
 
The direct sponsorship of Parliamentary candidates by the party’s affiliated 
organisations was a distinctive feature of Labour’s political identity for much of the 
twentieth century. Although socialist societies such as the ILP, SDF and Fabian 
Society, as well as the Co-operative party, did support candidates, in the vast majority 
of cases, sponsorship involved the financial backing of a trade union. Such 
candidatures represented a major and frequently complex site of union engagement 
with democratic politics in general, and those of Labour in particular. As a vehicle for 
the direct representation of labour in the House of Commons, the practice of union 
sponsorship was already ‘deeply rooted’ by the time of the foundation of the Labour 
Representation Committee in 1900; it remained in place, although much modified, as 
a ‘vestigial reminder’ of this original purpose into the 1990s.289   
Often it could be contentious. Lewis Minkin noted the tendency for sponsorship 
payments to be ‘treated in a censorious way in editorials and the polemic of everyday 
politics’ due to the sway they allegedly gave the unions over their candidates. 290 On 
the surface at least, candidate sponsorship can appear to represent union domination 
of the Labour party at its most transparent. The party’s Midlands District Organiser, 
Herbert Drinkwater, lamented in 1936 how ‘frankly, our movement does not show up 
at its best at meetings for the selections of candidates, and this is the case more 
especially when Trade Union candidates come forward backed by the finance of their 
Union’.291 Even the party leader Clem Attlee reflected, rather more laconically, that the 
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‘influence of the Trade Unions is, perhaps, greatest in the sphere of the choice of 
parliamentary candidates’.292 The events of August to October 1931 imbued candidate 
selection with an additional significance. The selection of new candidates, and indeed 
the reselection of existing ones, had become part of the routine post-election activity 
of the constituency parties through the 1920s.293 During the 1924-29 parliament, 
despite an initial flurry of selections and reselections, many CLPs were able to take a 
relatively leisurely approach to choosing their next representative.294 The National 
Government’s assumption of office engendered not only a sense of urgency in 
candidate selection, but its October victory at the polls provided the context for a 
broader debate within the labour movement around the role and responsibilities of 
constituency parties.295 The issue of parliamentary candidatures was one aspect of 
this wider discussion, although other features of which, such as NEC representation, 
were more prominent in debate at party conference. Trade unionists took an active 
part in this debate, of which the negotiation of the Hastings Agreement, as outlined in 
the previous chapter, constituted a major element. Drinkwater’s comments above must 
be understood within this setting. Given the scale of the National Government’s 
landslide, and the collapse of Labour representation in Parliament from its 1929 height, 
many more constituencies than previously were available for potential candidates to 
seek selection in, whilst a larger number of former and new candidates sought a 
constituency to fight.296 Recent experience emphasised the need for loyalty from 
potential candidates; the Mosley and National Labour defections served to entrench 
mistrust of moneyed individuals pursuing nomination, although this did not always 
preclude the selection of such nominees.297 Similarly, difficulties with the Independent 
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Labour Party – the behaviour of ILP parliamentarians who regularly voted against the 
government on grounds of socialist principle during 1929-31, and the dispute over 
party discipline which this prompted, resulting in the non-endorsement of some 23 
candidates at the 1931 general election and ultimately leading to the ILP’s decision to 
disaffiliate from Labour in August 1932 – emphasised the necessity of loyalty.298 
Ensuring a suitable nominee was important, as 
there is nothing like an early selection of the right candidate to hearten the 
ranks and set the machine in motion. It is important that it should be the right 
candidate, and constituencies are well advised to enjoy single blessedness 
a little longer rather than jump at the first offer. We have seen many sad 
mistakes, and these have by no means all been occasioned by an indecent 
haste to get hold of a candidate’s money.299 
Union nominees were a significant part of this picture, constituting a distinct, if highly 
varied, body of candidates. While there may be ‘a false distinction between self-
sponsorship and sponsorship by an affiliated organisation’, there was more to union 
candidatures than the financial aspect.300 Their continued presence shaped the party’s 
culture. As George Mathers, an RCA candidate, noted in The Labour Candidate, if the 
‘simple declaration of adherence to principles’ was the only basis for selection, there 
was an increased danger of the movement falling ‘into the hands of placemen with no 
practical knowledge of, or interest in, working class needs and aspirations’. In this 
sense union candidates proved a ‘safeguard’, requiring as they did the support of their 
own organisations.301  This point can be too easily overlooked: union candidatures 
contributed to keeping the party rooted in working class experience, providing Labour 
in parliament with ‘overwhelming majority of its working class members’.302 This was 
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a distinctive contribution to the political culture of the period, and as such how trade 
unions negotiated the terrain of candidate selection requires closer attention. 
Much of the existing literature on the subject concentrates on the post-war period. Both 
Austin Ranney and Michael Rush deal with union sponsorship in broader discussions 
of candidate selection in the two main parties. Ranney documents the different 
‘pathways to Parliament’ within the Labour movement, through the trade unions, Co-
operative party, and the ‘unsponsored’ route, although his treatment of these is rather 
brief.303 Rush offers more sustained analysis, as does Martin Harrison in his study of 
the party-unions relationship, although in both cases focusing on the decades after 
1945; several of their insights are pertinent to this discussion.304 William Muller’s 
survey of trade union MPs only touches on candidatures, but his account of the 
changing role of union officials in parliamentary representation requires attention in 
the context of the 1930s; Lewis Minkin’s study details the changing role of sponsorship 
in Labour representation into the 1970s and 1980s.305 Kevin Morgan’s important 
contribution deconstructs the myth of Labour’s advance as based purely on organised 
working class support, highlighting the continuing influence of wealthy individuals. He 
suggests that the ‘momentum for trade union representation was not maintained’ into 
the 1930s, arguing that the ‘whole question needs looking at afresh’.306  
This study seeks to make a close examination of trade union candidates, considering 
patterns of sponsorship across the period and how the union contribution to Labour’s 
political identity in terms of candidatures was shaped, through internal trade union 
selection procedures and the interplay of national and local political contexts which 
determined the constituencies in which they stood.307 
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Patterns of union sponsorship 
 
Unions chose to sponsor Labour candidates for a variety of reasons. Several had 
maintained traditions of sponsorship which pre-dated the formation of the LRC, most 
notably the Miners, whose first candidates had been returned as Lib-Lab MPs in 1874. 
The logic of sponsorship was bound up closely with the very principle of independent 
Labour representation in Parliament. Broad priorities were held in common across the 
sponsoring unions, although unsurprisingly the emphasis varied. First, these unions 
all faced industrial questions which they felt could best be solved through legislative 
change. Safety was the most basic of these, although many unions had an interest in 
wider questions of occupational health. In certain industries, notably mining, the matter 
of the legal regulation of working hours and wages was prominent. The organisational 
problems faced by a given industry might also influence a union’s interest in 
parliamentary representation, for example, in railways or cotton. Such interest was in 
turn reinforced by action taken by the state on industrial questions. Parity with 
employers’ interests also mattered: the RCA, with the smallest membership of these 
unions, regularly published in its annual reports a list of railway directors in parliament, 
next to a list of railway workers’ representatives, which made for bleak reading after 
1931.308 Nevertheless, the point was clear: if the employers were represented in 
parliament, so the union must be too. Secondly, these unions shared concerns around 
issues of political and social issues which again, could best be met by state action. 
Indeed, some unions were increasingly integrated into social policy, for example, in 
the administration of unemployment insurance following the 1911 National Insurance 
Act. A third priority was the defence of union interests against governmental or judicial 
interference in their own affairs. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927 
loomed large in this regard throughout the 1930s, whilst earlier challenges such as the 
Taff Vale and the Osborne judgments retained much of their symbolic power. Minkin 
points to the instrumental role of sponsored Members in defending union interests, 
whether as a fall-back in the context of failed negotiations, to put tactical pressure on, 
or acquire information from, ministers, or to garner publicity. He notes that such 
sponsorship could appear outdated in the post-war environment of apparently 
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permanent corporate relations between trade unions and the state, but this was not 
the case in the period under consideration here, given the limited success of the TUC’s 
corporatism at this stage. Having a sponsored MP could also give a union prestige 
within the movement, even if the MP was not particularly effective; moreover, it 
contributed to keeping the party in Parliament rooted in working class experience.309 
Rush notes that unions were not interested in losing elections, being ‘principally 
interested in sponsoring MPs rather than candidates’.310 Yet there could also be 
prestige in backing a number of candidates, whilst a sense of loyalty of duty to the 
labour movement could also prompt unions to become sponsors. 
Definition of a trade union candidate, or for that matter a trade union MP, is potentially 
problematic. All candidates, as party members, were required under the party’s 
constitution, to ‘if eligible, be a member of a Trade Union affiliated to the Trades Union 
Congress or recognised by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress as a 
bona fide Trade Union’.311 Thus in a certain sense most eligible candidates were ‘trade 
union candidates’. A sponsored candidate, however, for the purposes of this 
discussion, was one who was supported financially by a trade union. This entailed 
both the supply of election expenses and funding for constituency maintenance, as 
well as recognition as an ‘official’ candidate of the union. A substantial proportion of 
Labour candidates at each general election, for instance, were railway workers of 
various kinds – based on the available information, at least 52 candidates in 1929, 36 
in 1931, and 53 in 1935. Of this total, only twenty, eighteen and 23 respectively were 
the officially sponsored candidates of the railway unions.312 
It is difficult to establish with a high degree of accuracy exactly how many candidates 
were sponsored by trade unions in the interwar period. The Labour party’s own annual 
reports give no indication as to how many candidates were sponsored by trade unions 
and Divisional Labour parties respectively at the General Elections of 1922, 1923 and 
1924, although they do reveal how many candidates were supported by the Co-
operative party. The later practice of noting a candidate’s sponsoring organisation after 
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his or her name in the full list of election candidates was not followed in these years. 
It is possible that this is simply the result of a stylistic preference in the production of 
the election report on the part of the party’s National Agent, Egerton Wake, who died 
some months before the 1929 election. It is also possible that due to the difficulties of 
organising the funding of three elections in rapid succession, the identity of the 
sponsoring organisation was not given particular significance. It is reasonable to 
estimate that union sponsored candidates during these contests were greater in 
number than the 139 who fought seats for Labour in 1929: this is suggested by the 
singling out of the ‘remarkable number’ of DLP-sponsored candidates for special 
praise in the 1929 report, and that some unions were reporting having to scale back 
their grants to constituency parties by 1925 due to the burden of the additional electoral 
expenses.313 Even when the party did give official figures for the elections of 1929, 
1931 and 1935, accuracy as regards numbers remains problematic. The figure of 139 
union-sponsored candidates for 1929 does appear to be correct, but the party’s own 
figures for 1931 conflict: the figure of 129 is stated in the main report, but 132 appear 
on the list of candidates a few pages later. Inspection of union records suggests that 
138 is probably a more accurate figure, although neither is this unproblematic. 
Similarly, for 1935, 129 appears to be closer to the real number than the figure of 132 
given in the party report.314 Both Harrison and Muller give slightly different modified 
totals, in Harrison’s case based on union records.315  
Figure 3.1 gives the totals by sponsoring organisation for all Labour candidatures at 
general elections, figure 3.2 those for all successful Labour candidates. The general 
pattern was of a slow but tangible decrease in union candidatures across the period, 
whilst such candidates also tended to be more likely to be elected. This was due in 
large part to the way in which sponsorship ‘followed the contours of local trade union 
strength in industrial areas’.316 The MFGB gives the strongest example of this; Rush 
notes ‘the concentration of its electoral effort in safe and impregnable seats’. Location, 
                                                          
313 Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1923-25 and 1929; NUDAW, Annual Report 1925. 
314 Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1929; 1932, pp. 9 and 11-27; 1936. 
315 Although presumably not the same ones considered here. Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour 
Party since 1945, p. 265-267; Muller, The Kept Men?, p.30. Others such as F. W. S. Craig, in British 
Electoral Facts 1832-1987 (fifth edition, Aldershot, 1989), table 7.03 and 7.04, seem to have followed 
the party’s official figures. 
316 Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, p. 245. 
 
125 
 
Figure 3.1 All Labour candidatures by sponsoring organisation, general elections 1918-45 
 
 
Sponsor 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 1931 1935 1945 
Trade unions 163 (157) (129) (144) 139 138 129 126 
DLPs 140       364 315 398 445 
Co-operative Party 0 11 10 10 12 15 21 33 
ILP/Socialist Societies 54       54 23 4   
Total Labour candidates 357 413 428 515 569 491 552 604 
(Unendorsed)           22     
         
Union candidates as % of 
total Labour candidatures 
45.7% (38.0%) (30.1%) (28.0%) 24.4% 28.1% 23.4% 20.9% 
 
 
Source: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, modified by trade union records; G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London, 1948). 
Note: The bracketed figures for 1922, 1923 and 1924 are rough estimates based on the lists of MPs and current prospective candidates published in the party’s 
annual reports. They do not give an accurate representation of the numbers of sponsored candidates at these general elections, and are not used to inform 
calculations elsewhere in this chapter, but they do give an indication of the general pattern of union sponsorship. 
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Figure 3.2 Successful Labour candidatures by sponsoring organisation, general elections 1918-1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, modified by trade union records; G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London, 1948).  
 
 
1918 
 
1922 
 
1923 
 
1924 
 
1929 
 
1931 
 
1935 
 
1945 
Trade unions 49 85 98 86 115 32 79 121 
DLPs 5 19 35 25 128 13 66 249 
Co-operative Party 0 4 6 4 9 1 9 23 
ILP/Socialist Societies 3 34 52 36 36 0 
  
Total Labour MPs 57 142 191 151 288 46 154 393 
(Unendorsed) 
     
6 
  
Trade union MPs as % 
of successful 
candidates 
86.0% 59.9% 51.3% 57.0% 39.9% 69.6% 51.3% 30.8% 
% of trade union 
candidates successful 
30.1% 54.1% 76.0% 59.7% 82.7% 23.2% 61.2% 96.0% 
% of total Labour 
candidates successful 
16.0% 34.4% 44.6% 29.3% 50.6% 9.4% 27.9% 65.1% 
Difference in success 
rate 
14.1% 19.8% 31.3% 30.4% 32.1% 13.8% 33.3% 31.0% 
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rather than the individual candidate, explains the logic behind the large number of 
mining candidatures: there was a feeling that coalfield constituencies should be 
represented by mining candidates.317   This concentration in safer seats could be a 
point of contention: it appeared to represent a maldistribution of resources, with union 
support going where it was least needed.  Pressure on political funds, as highlighted 
previously, goes some way to accounting for this:  the majority of trade unions, Rush 
contends, were ‘primarily interested in winning seats not losing them’.318  
Figure 3.3 gives the total of sponsored candidates at the general elections of 1929-45 
by trade union. The 1929 figures can help contextualise union candidate sponsorship 
in the 1930s. The 1929 general election was contested by the largest number of 
Labour candidates to date, with the ‘remarkable number of 364’ sponsored by DLPs.319 
Thirty out of 85 affiliated unions, representing a political membership of 1,821,450, 
sponsored 139 Labour candidates, of whom 115 were elected The MFGB was the 
largest sponsor, leading by some way. Other major sponsors included the TGWU, 
NUR, NUGMW and RCA. Most of these unions, allowing for the TGWU-Workers’ 
Union merger, also supported candidates at the 1931 and 1935 general elections. A 
number of usually smaller unions sponsored either one or two candidates; these 
organisations, as will be seen below, did not all continue to sponsor into the 1930s. In 
total union candidatures accounted for just under a quarter of all Labour candidates in 
1929, and 40% of those elected. A substantial body of 54 candidates were sponsored 
by the ILP in 1929, with 36 successful. Tensions within the ILP were already apparent, 
with disagreement over the function of the ILP parliamentary group and its relation to 
the wider ILP. One group, including the ILP chairman James Maxton and his fellow 
Clydeside MP John Wheatley, argued that ILP conference decisions should take 
precedence over Labour policy; they were opposed by others including Emmanuel 
Shinwell who felt that their primary loyalty should be to the Labour party.320 While 
Maxton and his allies were prepared to directly criticise and even vote against the 
Labour government, the wider ILP parliamentary group continued to support the 
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government; the group was open to all with ILP membership, and as such its potential 
membership exceeded 200 MPs including those sponsored by other organisations.321 
The 1930 ILP conference resolved to reconstruct the group on the basis of acceptance 
of ILP conference decisions, which would also be mandatory for future candidates: 
just eighteen MPs chose to remain in the group on these terms. Labour concerns over 
the pledge resulted in a tightening of PLP Standing Orders, barring votes against PLP 
decisions apart from on the grounds of conscience, whilst tension was heightened by 
the NEC’s refusal to endorse Tom Irwin, the ILP’s candidate for a by-election at 
Renfrew East in November 1930; similar disputes followed in several other 
constituencies.322 
Candidatures proved problematic for Labour at the 1931 general election. Although 
some 491 official Labour candidates stood, many were last-minute appointments, 
particularly in constituencies where the current MP or candidate had chosen to follow 
MacDonald in supporting the National government.323 Union candidatures presented 
less difficulty. Some 27 unions out of 83 affiliates, representing 1,842,953 political 
members sponsored a total of 138 candidates. The MFGB and TGWU again 
supported 43 and 17 candidates respectively. The NUR’s total dropped by one due to 
J. H. Thomas’ defection to the National Government, whilst the NUGMW now 
supported an additional three candidates. The NUDAW’s sponsored candidates fell to 
four, due to the death of William Mackinder, MP for Shipley (West Yorkshire), in 1930, 
and the union’s failure to retain the seat at the by-election which followed.  The RCA 
still sponsored eight candidates.324 Several unions who had sponsored candidates in 
1929 did not do so again in 1931: some of these had been relatively small unions 
whose candidates had been defeated in 1929, such as the Blacksmiths, whose William 
Taylor lost at Chorley (Lancashire), and the Blastfurnacemen, who Henry Nixon had 
unsuccessfully represented at Gloucester.325 The ASLEF’s general secretary John 
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Bromley had retired as MP for Barrow-in-Furness (Lancashire), where the AEU’s 
David Adams, a businessman and long-standing Newcastle councillor, was now the 
candidate.326 Despite the decision of the 1930 ASLEF Annual Assembly of Delegates 
to institute a special levy to support Bromley’s candidature in the context of shrinking 
political fund income and financial problems within the constituency party, in January 
1931 Bromley announced his intention to leave the Commons at the next election, 
citing his frustration both with the caution of the Labour government, and the manner 
in which its Education Bill had been undermined, partly through the opposition of 
several Catholic Labour backbenchers; for Bromley such disloyalty contrasted with the 
discipline of trade unionists who would not have voted to defeat the government in 
spite of reservations about its policies.327 F. E. White of the Plasterers, who had fought 
and lost at Stroud (Gloucestershire) in 1929, did not contest the seat again in 1931. 
The Plasterers’ union had decided in 1924, during a flurry of political activity which 
also saw them affiliate to the National Council of Labour Colleges for the first time, to 
promote White, the union’s Bristol organiser, as a candidate. By 1931, their political 
membership, never large, had dipped and the resulting loss of income presumably 
precluded a 1931 candidature. Two unions who had not been sponsors in 1929 did 
back candidates in 1931: the Operative Bleachers sponsored J. Barrow at Chorley, 
previously contested by the Blacksmiths’ Taylor. The two years since the last election 
had seen a huge increase in the Bleachers’ political membership from 2,000 to 10,000, 
equalling that of the Dyers’ union, who already sponsored a candidate; this may have 
prompted the Bleachers to take similar action. 328 The other new sponsoring union was 
the Life Assurance Workers, who funded S. L. Treleaven’s campaign at Liverpool 
Everton. This seems to have been a case of the union stepping in in an emergency: 
the sitting Labour candidate, Derwent Hall Caine, had followed MacDonald in August 
and stood for National Labour.329 The Conservative toy manufacturer Frank Hornby 
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won the seat in a three-cornered fight. Treleaven, who came third, was readopted for 
the constituency in 1932, but this time as a candidate of the local party.330 Union 
candidates now accounted for 28 per cent of all Labour candidates, and nearly 70 per 
cent of those elected. The Co-operative Party, standing by Labour in the crisis, 
increased its candidatures by three to fifteen: these included its main national 
personalities A. V. Alexander (Sheffield Hillsborough), Samuel Perry (Kettering, 
Northants.), Alfred Barnes (East Ham South), and the first Co-operative MP, A. E. 
Waterson (Nottingham Central). All were defeated apart from the relative newcomer 
William Leonard, who held the seat, Glasgow St. Rollox, for which he had been 
returned at a by-election earlier in the year.331 ILP candidatures presented a difficulty. 
The 1931 Labour party conference had overwhelmingly voted to deny endorsement to 
candidates who refused to accept Standing Orders. 23 ILP candidates accepted and 
were endorsed; a further 24 refused to do so, resulting in their fighting the election 
without endorsement. Seventeen fought as ILP candidates, the rest as ‘Independent 
Labour’; in two cases, they faced official Labour opposition.332 Six were elected, of 
whom four – Maxton, John McGovern, George Buchanan and David Kirkwood – were 
closely associated with the radical ILP traditions of Clydeside.333 
At the 1935 general election, DLP representation increased to a new record of 398 of 
a total of 554 Labour candidatures. Union candidatures appear to have declined 
slightly both in number and as a proportion of all Labour candidates: they now 
represented 24 percent of candidatures and 51 per cent of successful candidatures. 
27 out of 74 affiliates, with a total political membership of 1,770,354 sponsored a total  
                                                          
330 Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1932, p. 289. 
331 For Alexander, see John Tilley, Churchill’s Favourite Socialist. A Life of A. V. Alexander (Manchester, 
1995); for Perry, Keith Gildart, ‘Perry, Samuel Frederick (1877-1954)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography 
XII, pp. 226-233. Leonard’s was ‘a seat for which the Co-operative Movement was to be truly thankful’ 
given the approach of the National government to the issue of co-operative taxation, Thomas F. 
Carbery, Consumers in Politics. A History and General Review of the Co-operative Party (Manchester, 
1969), p. 37. 
332 John McGovern (Glasgow Shettleston) and John Beckett (Camberwell Peckham) faced Labour 
opponents. Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931, pp. 182-183. For the full list of unendorsed 
candidates, see Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1932, p. 295. 24 names are listed; they do 
not include C. A. O’Donnell, who fought Glasgow Hillhead, apparently also without Labour 
endorsement: he does not appear in the full list of candidates elsewhere in the Report either, although 
sources such as The Times House of Commons 1931 (London, 1931) suggest he fought in the Labour 
interest, as he had in 1929: he was likely the 25th unendorsed candidate.   
333 The others were Richard Wallhead (Merthyr Tydfil) and Josiah Wedgwood (Newcastle-under-Lyme). 
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Figure 3.3 Sponsoring unions: numbers of candidates at general elections, 1929-45. 
Union 1929 1931 1935 1945 
NUAW (Agricultural)       3 
NAULAW (Life Assurance)   1   1 
AUOBCAW (Bakers)     1   
ABFSWS (Blacksmiths) 1       
NUBOMKT (Blastfurnacemen) 1       
OBDFA (Op. Bleachers)   1 1   
USB&ISS (Boilermakers) 4 4 2   
NUBSO (Boot & Shoe) 5 5 3 4 
AUBTW (Builders)   1 1 1 
CMSA (Chainmakers) 1 1     
NUCAW (Clerks)       1 
LSC (Compositors) 2 2 2 2 
NUDAW (Distributive & Allied) 5 4 7 7 
ASDBFKT (Amalg. Dyers) 1 1 1   
ETU (Electricians)       1 
AEU (Engineering) 3 3 3 4 
NUFW (Foundry) 1 1     
NUGMW (General & Municipal) 8 11 11 10 
BISAKTA (Iron & Steel) 5 4 2 2 
ASLEF (Loco Engineers & Firemen) 1   1 1 
MFGB (Miners) 43 43 40 35 
NASOHSPD (Painters) 1 1 1   
UPA (Patternmakers) 1 1 1 2 
DPRS (Postal)       1 
NSPW (Pottery) 1 1 1   
NATSOPA (Printers) 1 1 1 1 
NAOP (Plasterers) 1       
PSU (Prudential Staff) 1       
RCA (Railway Clerks) 8 8 10 9 
NUR (Railwaymen) 11 10 12 13 
NUS (Seamen)     1   
NAUSAWC (Shop Assistants) 1 1 2 1 
UTFWA (Textile Factory) 6 8 6 3 
NUTW (Textile) 1 1 1   
TGWU (Transport & General) 11 17 11 18 
TA (Typographical) 1 1 2 2 
NUVB (Vehicle Builders) 1 1 1   
ASW (Woodworkers) 6 5 4 4 
WU (Workers' Union) 6       
TOTAL 139 138 129 126 
 
Source: Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, modified by trade union records; Cole, A History of  
the Labour Party from 1914. 
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of 129 candidates. The MFGB and TGWU totals declined slightly, whilst the NUR, 
RCA and NUDAW all increased their candidatures to twelve, ten and seven 
respectively. Three unions who had not contested seats in 1931 now did so: J. W. 
Banfield, the Bakers’ general secretary, had won Wednesbury (Staffordshire) in a 
1932 by-election and successfully defended the seat, whereas an ASLEF candidate, 
Walter Monslow now stood at Newcastle Central.334 Charles Jarman, of the National 
Union of Seamen, which had re- affiliated to the party in 1933, contested Birmingham 
Yardley. No longer sponsoring were the Foundry Workers, whose only candidate, 
Arthur Henderson, died just prior to the election, the Life Assurance Workers, and the 
Chainmakers. C. H. Sitch had been the Chainmakers’ MP for Kingswinford 
(Staffordshire) since 1918, and lost his seat in 1931. He was also the union’s general 
secretary, but was gaoled for defrauding the union’s funds in 1933. After this the union 
seemed to be in serious decline politically: by June 1936, its political membership had 
fallen to just 50. In these circumstances it was unlikely to have wanted to sponsor a 
candidate; Arthur Henderson junior won the seat as the local party’s candidate.335 In 
an environment of press and government hostility to co-operation, the Co-operative 
Party increased its candidatures to 21.336 The now-disaffiliated ILP stood candidates 
in seventeen seats; all faced Labour opposition, with four ILPers proving successful. 
Disaffiliation led to the ‘complete reshaping of Scottish Labour politics’, with one of 
Labour’s previously strongest regions becoming one of the weakest. One reaction was 
the formation of the Scottish Socialist Party [SSP], which claimed over 1,000 members 
by September 1932, including many of the former Scottish ILP’s leading figures such 
as Patrick Dollan, Tom Johnston and David Kirkwood. The SSP’s establishment, 
based on the need to ‘replicate the comprehensive organisation of the ILP, rather than 
address the organisational needs of the Labour Party’ led to some confusion and 
                                                          
334 For Monslow see Keith Gildart, ‘Monslow, Walter (Baron Monslow of Barrow-in-Furness) (1895–
1966)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography XIII, pp. 251-266. A supporter of Bromley, Monslow had been 
active in local government in Wrexham and enjoyed a growing reputation in the union, elected to the 
National Executive in 1937-39, and appointed a full time organiser in 1940. In 1945 he followed in 
Bromley’s footsteps, being elected as an ASLEF-sponsored MP for Barrow-in-Furness, holding the 
seat until his retirement in 1966. 
335 Labour Party Annual Conference Reports 1935-6; Arthur Marsh and Victoria Ryan, The Seamen. A 
History of the National Union of Seamen (London, 1989), p. 135; Eric Taylor, ‘Sitch, Charles Henry 
(1887–1960)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/47381, accessed 23 May 2017]. 
336 See Peter Gurney, “The Curse of the Co-ops’: Co-operation, the Mass Press and the Market in 
Interwar Britain’, English Historical Review 130:547 (2015), 1479-1512. 
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duplication of functions, although it did affiliate to Labour; the smaller organisation 
backed four of its own candidates in 1935.337 
The total candidatures of a number of medium-sized sponsoring unions declined 
between 1929 and 1935 and requires some explanation. BISAKTA had sponsored 
four candidates in 1931, of whom only one, Tom Griffiths at Pontypool 
(Monmouthshire), was successful. The union’s finance committee revealed that as a 
result of the election expenses paid, the union’s political fund was in deficit of £546: 
as a result, it was decided to reduce future candidatures to two.338 Although not 
popular with many in the union, the NUBSO’s 1934 conference reduced its number of 
candidates from five to three,339 and the Woodworkers’ new rules also limited their 
number of candidatures, which had been as many as six in 1929, to just four.340 These 
developments were partly as a result of a decline in the availability of political fund 
resources, in the context of the 1927 Act and the slump; they also reflected a shift 
towards the concentration of a larger number of candidatures being sponsored by a 
few unions.  
While finance was a major consideration in decisions about how many candidates to 
sponsor, political membership could also provide a useful metric, and might be 
incorporated into the union’s rulebook. The AEU’s rules stipulated that ‘there shall be 
elected one candidate for every 15,000 members contributing to the Political Fund of 
the Union’.341 In this period the Engineers’ political membership was never high 
enough for it to support another official candidate, and any attempt to do so by its 
Executive might well have struggled to secure the support of the majority of members 
– and, after 1935, a rapidly growing majority – who did not contract in to the fund. The 
AEU was not the only union to tie its support for candidates to a particular political 
                                                          
337 Keith Laybourn, ‘The disaffiliation crisis of 1932: the Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) and the opinion of ILP members’, in K. Laybourn and J. Shepherd (eds.), Labour and Working 
Class Lives. Essays to celebrate the life and work of Chris Wrigley (Manchester, 2017), p. 113; W. W. 
Knox, and A. Mackinlay, ‘The re-making of Scottish Labour in the 1930s’, Twentieth Century British 
History 6:2 (1995), 174-193. This was to be the SSP’s only general election contest: it was wound up 
in 1940 following defeat in an ongoing legal dispute over funds with the ILP, and its members joined 
the Labour Party.  
338 Arthur Pugh, Men of Steel. A Chronicle of Eighty-Eight Years of Trade Unionism in the British Iron 
and Steel Industry (London, 1951), p. 474. 
339 Alan Fox, A History of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, 1874-1957 (Oxford, 1958), 
p. 473. 
340 Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers Rules (Manchester, 
1937), Rule 36. 
341 AEU Rules, (London, 1931), Rule 45.2. 
 
134 
 
membership: the MFGB had adopted a similar policy at a special conference in 1928, 
agreeing to support one candidate for every 10,000 political members.342 However, 
the position here was slightly more complicated. Although the Federation nationally 
was responsible for providing the candidates’ election expenses, the district unions 
were responsible for all other aspects of the candidature, including the actual 
administration of those expenses. The combined effect of the introduction of 
contracting in from 1927, and the aftermath of the 1926 lock-out had considerably 
reduced the political memberships, and the political fund reserves, of the district 
unions. By 1929, several districts had more sitting MPs who they again intended to 
back as candidates than their much reduced political memberships allowed under 
MFGB rules. Figure 3.4 illustrates this. The South Wales Miners’ Federation was 
entitled on the basis of its political membership to MFGB financial support for four 
candidates in 1929, five in 1931 and six in 1935, yet in fact ten, ten and twelve SWMF 
candidates stood respectively at each election. In contrast other districts did not take 
up their full allocation of candidates: the Durham Miners’ Association is the best 
example. This may have been the result of the Durham Miners supporting a larger 
number of DLP candidates. Although the SWMF was able to give £10 to Monmouth 
DLP’s candidate, Michael Foot, in 1935, the DMA gave more substantial amounts to 
support Hugh Dalton at Bishop Auckland and Emmanuel Shinwell at Seaham at the 
same election.343 The large number of uncontested seats in the South Wales coalfield 
also likely contributed to the discrepancy: in 1931, SWMF candidates had clear runs 
at Aberdare, Abertillery, Bedwellty and Ebbw Vale; in 1935, Aberdare, Rhondda West, 
Neath, Ogmore, Pontypridd, Abertillery and Bedwellty were all uncontested.  
The position was quite different in the general unions, which by 1935 supported a 
relatively small number of candidates despite large political memberships. The 
TGWU/Workers’ Union sponsored one candidate per 12,235 and 13,853 political 
members in 1929 and 1931 respectively, although by 1935 the figure had decreased 
to one candidate per 22,520 political members. This fall requires some explanation: it 
was not due to a significant increase in political membership, but was arguably instead  
                                                          
342 See D.845.62 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1929-30, MFGB executive meeting, 12 April 1929. 
343 MNA/NUM/3/3/58 SWMF Political Correspondence. Sidney Owens (Foot’s Monmouth Agent) to 
Oliver Harris, 31 October 1935; Harris to Owens, 6 November 1935. 
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Figure 3.4 MFGB Areas: candidates at general elections, 1929-35 
 
 
 
 
MFGB Area 
1929 1931 1935 
Candidates 
entitled to 
MFGB 
support 
Total 
candidate
s 
Candidates 
entitled to 
MFGB support 
Total 
candidate
s 
Candidates 
entitled to 
MFGB 
support 
Total 
candidate
s 
Cleveland 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cumberland 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Derbyshire 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Durham 10 7 10 7 10 5 
Lancashire 4 5 4 5 4 4 
Midlands 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Northumberland 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Scotland 2 7 3 7 2 7 
South Wales 4 10 5 10 6 12 
Yorkshire 10 9 9 9 9 7 
Total 34 43 36 43 36 40 
 
Note: Figures from MFGB Annual Proceedings & Reports, 1929, 1931 and 1935. The 1929 MFGB Annual Report gives the number of candidates receiving the 
Federation support to which they were entitled as 32. The MFGB figure excludes two candidates from the Scottish Area, which had not supplied the names of 
its candidates when the Federation’s list was being compiled. See MFGB Executive Committee minutes for 12 April 1929; these candidates are included above. 
A grant of £100 was supplied for each candidate beyond the limit to which the area was entitled.
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the result of the process of consolidating the merger with the Workers’ Union.344 The 
WU had added six candidates to the TGWU’s eleven nominees in 1929, and although 
several of these six were still in place as TGWU candidates in 1935, the union now 
returned to backing eleven candidates, implying the 1931 figure was an inflated one – 
more so, perhaps, given the late candidature of Ernest Bevin himself for Gateshead, 
discussed below. Political fund reserves stayed almost static until 1936, and so an 
expansion of candidatures would have been difficult to justify, particularly in the 
aftermath of TGWU frustration with the party’s action over the selection at Clay Cross 
in 1933.345 Perhaps the most interesting figures based on political membership are 
those of the RCA, the smallest of the main sponsoring unions in terms of political 
membership, which punched considerably above its weight by supporting one 
candidate for as few as every 4800 political members in 1935.346 This also strongly 
suggests that political membership alone was not sufficient to account for the number 
of candidatures; we must turn to the unions’ own procedures for selection developed 
in order to explore this further. 
 
Choosing the candidates: parliamentary panels 
 
Unions used different systems to select and support their candidates. Making sure the 
right candidates were chosen was a chief consideration, and many trade unionists 
were acutely aware of this. Defining the ‘right’ candidate, however, was more difficult. 
Ability to effectively represent their organisation mattered, although there was a 
danger of being rather too representative of the membership to the detriment of other 
qualities, as the comments of one UTFWA conference delegate illustrate.  
He was afraid that the L[egislative] C[ouncil] […] had too narrow an outlook, 
and had not found out what the ordinary elector looked out for in a 
Parliamentary candidate. They did not ask if a man could run four looms, or 
walk about a mulegate, or if he knew anything about cotton […] They, as 
                                                          
344 These calculations use affiliated political membership figures. The TGWU affiliated on 235,500 
members in 1931, and 247,715 in 1935. Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1931 and 1935. 
345 This is considered in detail below. 
346 In 1935, ten candidates on an affiliated membership of 48,000. Labour Party Annual Conference 
Report, 1935. 
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textile people, had got to realise that, and widen their outlook. […] The 
sooner they realised that Parliament should not be considered as a rest 
house for tired trade union officials, the sooner they would get something 
actively done.347 
In some unions, a democratic mandate from the membership at large was considered 
necessary; political loyalty was also required. As the comments above demonstrate, 
an individual’s aptitude for the role of MP was not always prioritised over other 
considerations. Internal selection procedure was determined to a large extent by which 
attributes were most prized. As indicated above, the federal unions allocated places 
in proportion to the size of their constituent unions. This had a geographical basis in 
the MFGB, whose district unions were responsible for nominating candidates. This 
seems to have been on a mainly ad hoc basis, although after 1935 the Durham district 
introduced a new system whereby lodges in a division were balloted to select a union 
candidate, whom they were then bound to support at the next divisional selection 
conference.348 The Federation at national level was largely excluded: local 
representativeness was the key consideration here. A more common approach was 
the use of a ‘parliamentary panel’ of candidates, for which the union would then 
attempt to find suitable seats. The method used for the selection of panel candidates 
varied, although there was often an elected element. Two unions, the NUR and AEU, 
prioritised a democratic mandate above all, balloting their entire memberships.349  
The NUR offers the best example of this. The union had first introduced a panel system 
in 1923, when a special conference agreed to ballot for seven additional candidates 
to supplement the union’s existing five MPs. With ‘a view to eliminating nominations 
with no prospect of success’, each prospective candidate required the nominations of 
twenty branches, and to have been a fully paid-up member for not less than five years 
preceding nomination. The Industrial General Secretary and the Organising 
Secretaries were prohibited from standing, but there was to be no age limit. Following 
the election, the Executive Committee would ‘endeavour to secure suitable divisions 
                                                          
347 T. McCall of the Textile Warehousemen, TU/3/2/5 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual 
Conference, 1936, pp. 37-8. 
348 W. R. Garside, The Durham Miners, 1919-1960. (London, 1971), p. 348. 
349 This was a reflection of the AEU’s craft union tradition of elections for every available position. 
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near or adjacent to the candidates’ place of residence’.350 This had important 
implications for the NUR’s later approach to candidatures: prospective candidates 
would need to be reasonably well known, at least sufficiently to gain the support of the 
requisite twenty branches, and furthermore, decisions about sponsorship would be 
based primarily not on the suitability of particular constituencies, but the convenience 
of the candidate.  
The union balloted its membership to add an additional five candidates to its existing 
seven MPs in 1930, with William Dobbie, Joseph Henderson, J. W. Gordon, George 
Ward and H. Kegie being elected.351 Ten NUR candidates fought the 1931 general 
election, and, all of them having been defeated, three, G. H. Sherwood, Arthur Law 
and F. G. Burgess retired. A series of developments had embarrassed the union 
through 1930-1: from J. H. Thomas’ disappointing record as the Labour minister 
responsible for tackling the problem of unemployment, his subsequent defeat in the 
ballot for the party Executive in 1930, and his decision to join the National government 
in August 1931, the loss of an NUR seat at the Ashton-under-Lyne (Lancashire) by-
election earlier that year, and the defeat of all of its candidates in October. In this 
context, the union seems to have been determined to improve both its Parliamentary 
standing and reputation in the wider movement, and so its Executive decided early in 
1932 to ballot for an additional eight panel members, increasing the size of the panel 
to fifteen. The candidates who had retired remained eligible for re-election. The union 
was also concerned to take ability as a future MP into consideration; to this end an 
age limit of 60 had been introduced in 1931, although Burgess, who was older, was 
able to avoid exclusion by virtue of having previously been an NUR MP.352  An 
exhaustive ballot was conducted by the Proportional Representation Society in April 
on the transferable vote system. There were 44 candidates. The entire political 
membership was sent ballot papers, of which 53,521 eligible papers were returned – 
around a quarter of the union’s 1932 levy-paying members.353 This suggests that even 
                                                          
350 MSS.127/NU/1/1/11 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1923, NUR Agenda and Decisions of 
the Special General Meeting, December 1923, pp. 7-8. There were 34 candidates; 80579 valid ballot 
papers were returned.  
351 There were a total of 23 candidates; 70,630 valid ballot papers were returned. MSS.127/NU/1/1/18 
NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1930, minutes of executive committee, July 1930 special 
meeting. 
352 MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, minutes of executive committee, 
March 1932 quarterly meeting. 
353 The eight elected, including their branch and final vote, were: 1). F. G. Burgess, Maidstone, 25136; 
2). Arthur Law, Newton Heath No. 1, 18643; 3).William McAdam, Glasgow No. 8, 16659; 4). G. H. 
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in unions which did hold a panel ballot, interest in the choice of parliamentary 
candidates among even the political membership was not particularly high, especially 
when compared with the 97,898 members who voted to choose delegates to that 
year’s union annual general meeting.354 When Gordon retired from the panel on the 
grounds of ill health in 1933, he was replaced by the first runner-up, Adam Hills, who 
had come ninth. To be well-known within the union was clearly an advantage in panel 
elections: Dobbie, Henderson and Hills had all served on the Executive, but also had 
backgrounds in local government,355 and a big vote in a particular region could 
potentially make the difference between panel election and defeat. On Law’s death in 
1934, the Executive decided not to fill the vacancy on the panel, arguing that not only 
was the 1932 ballot held so long ago as to be irrelevant, but also that the current panel 
of fourteen ‘is two more than the number in 1923, when we had 90,000 more political 
members and £3474 more annual income’; moreover, the previous year’s decision to 
introduce an examination for candidates would mean the ‘heavy expense’ of 
organising both the examination and a national ballot just to fill one place on the panel. 
Given such financial considerations, the panel would remain at fourteen members.356  
Four NUR MPs were elected in 1935, and three of these were to remain on the panel, 
in addition to James Wilson, by virtue of his having previously been an MP.357 Harry 
Charleton would no longer be entitled to the union’s support after the next election, 
having reached the age limit. The five candidates elected to the panel in 1932 would 
remain until July 1937, by which date a new ballot for a further eight candidates – now 
reducing the panel back to the original size of twelve – would need to be held. Five 
years on the panel without success was the limit, and Kegie and Ward were now 
required to step down.358   
                                                          
Sherwood, Wakefield No. 3, 17500; 5). P. G. Barstow, West Hendon, 14556; 6). John Benstead, 
Peterborough No. 1, 12164; 7). J. Grierson, Gorton No. 2, 11410; 8). C. J. Kelly, King's Cross No. 2, 
10339. MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, NUR Agenda and 
Decisions of the Annual General Meeting, 1932, pp. 78-97 
354 MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, minutes of executive committee, 
March 1932 quarterly meeting,  
355 All had been aldermen: Dobbie in York, Henderson in Carlisle, and Hills in Newcastle. 
356 MSS.127/NU/1/1/22 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1934, NUR Agenda and Decisions of 
the Annual General Meeting, 1934, pp. 92-3. 
357 Wilson sat as one of the two Members for Oldham, 1929-31. He had previously represented Dudley, 
winning a by-election for Labour in March 1921, before losing the seat at the 1922 general election. 
358 MSS.127/NU/1/1/24 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1936, NUR Agenda and Decisions of 
the Annual General Meeting, 1936, pp. 10-13. 
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The new panellists would be the first to be examined on their broader credentials. The 
test covered knowledge of ‘English, public speaking, the history and objects of the 
national and international trade union, Labour and co-operative movements, 
and…legislation affecting transport’, supplemented by an oral test. The NUR was at 
this stage the only union to introduce such a test, and although perhaps indicative of 
a consciousness of the need to professionalise its selection of candidates, the subjects 
tested seem to have been as much to do with political loyalty as with detailed 
knowledge of the politics of railway issues or parliamentary skills, as the extract in 
Figure 3.5 demonstrates. The union was the first, however, to make use of an 
examination of any kind, an approach that would be common more common after 
1945.359 The NUR was taking the first steps towards the professionalization of the 
selection process. 42 of the fifty nominees qualified for the test, and just thirteen scored 
the requisite sixty per cent to go forward to the ballot. Pending several appeals about 
the outcome of the test, the announcement of the ballot result was delayed until the 
1937 annual general meeting, and the 43,484 eligible papers returned again suggest 
a lack of interest among the political membership, particular when contrasted with 
previous ballots; this may in itself have contributed to the move away from basing the 
choice entirely on an elected basis.360 
The RCA had been experimenting with an elected panel system since 1917. At this 
point it sponsored just one candidate, A. G. Walkden at Wolverhampton West, but its 
initial attempt at forming a panel was unsuccessful: a two-thirds majority was needed 
for election, which only one candidate succeeded in attaining. The following year, the 
union instead selected an additional fifteen candidates to form the panel. From 1919, 
it was agreed that the panel, apart from those who had been adopted for 
constituencies, would be elected at each annual conference. A 1923 report on 
candidatures supported the continuation of this system, but concerns were clearly  
                                                          
359 Tests became a key part of an ambitious AEU sponsorship strategy during the 1950s, also involving 
training of various kinds. See Irwin Richter, Political Purpose in Trade Unions (London, 1973), pp. 52-
58. By the 1960s, BISAKTA, NUBSO, and the Scottish Area of the NUM were also using examinations 
as part of their selection procedure, whilst the NUR had moved over to a co-option strategy. Rush, 
The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, appendix C, p. 293.  
360 The eight elected, including their branch and final vote, were: 1). William McAdam, Glasgow No. 8, 
18267; 2). P. G. Barstow, West Hendon, 18536; 3). W. T. Proctor, Pontypool No. 1, 17756; 4). A. 
Balfour, Aberdeen No. 1, 17823; 5). J. B. Hynd, Wood Green, 18888; 6). D. T. Jones, Pontypridd No. 
2, 13780; 7). I. O. Thomas, Battersea No. 1, 16642; 8). W. Wilcock, Chorley, 13330. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/25 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1937, NUR Agenda and Decisions of 
the Annual General Meeting, 1937, pp. 143-147. 
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Figure 3.5 Extract from NUR Parliamentary Panel Written Examination Paper, 1936 
Questions 7-12: The Political Labour Movement 100 
marks 
7 Explain the origin of the Labour Party? 20 
marks 
8 Explain the 'Osborne' Judgment and how the difficulty it created was 
overcome? 
20 
marks 
9 What are the main objects of the Labour Party and what are the 
conditions of membership? 
20 
marks 
10 Why has the Labour Party so far refused the application of the 
Communist Party for affiliation? 
10 
marks 
11 What were the chief proposals in the Labour Party Programme at the 
last General Election, including all those involving public ownership? 
20 
marks 
12 Name the international body to which the Labour Party is affiliated? 10 
marks 
 
Source: MSS.127/NU/1/1/24 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1936: NUR Executive, minutes 
of quarterly meeting, September 1936, Political Sub-committee report. 
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emerging as to whether the union was overstretching itself. Two of the report 
committee published their reservations as an appendix, arguing that the policy 
followed so far was ‘fundamentally unsound…no attempt has been made to build up 
any reserve…we should work from responsibilities to finance, not finance to 
responsibilities’ and suggested a policy of one candidate per 10,000 members.361 
Such concerns continued to resurface. A resolution was moved at the 1934 
conference suggesting an identical ratio of candidates to members, although this was 
easily defeated.362 The Executive seem to have been reluctant to place all of the 
candidates in constituencies, perhaps due to financial anxieties; despite the full panel 
consisting of fifteen members, only ten of these fought the 1935 general election. The 
system of voting for the panel at annual conference, thereby using branch block votes, 
meant that the proportion of the political membership represented was high: for 
example, 42,725 of a possible 48,000 votes were registered for F. B. Simpson when 
he topped the poll in 1934.363 This allowed the Executive to continue to refer to the 
RCA’s high level of political engagement, but disguised how far the membership at 
large was interested in participating politically. The Executive did not always have its 
own way with the panel: in 1936 it had attempted to withdraw its support for the Halifax 
constituency, where its candidate, A. W. Longbottom, had been readopted. The 
Halifax branch, with Longbottom as their delegate, appealed against this at the 1937 
RCA Conference, arguing that they could not break existing commitments, and that 
moreover, it was likely that Halifax would return a Labour candidate at the next 
election. George Lathan’s reply for the Executive insisted that the RCA’s methods in 
terms of candidatures were ‘infinitely more satisfactory’ than those of many other 
unions, but was unable to convince the conference to reject the appeal, and 
Longbottom remained the candidate.364 The Executive arguably did make its own 
position difficult here by refusing to reveal its reasoning for dropping Halifax, but this 
did demonstrate that on occasion a union conference could exercise control over 
parliamentary candidatures in the face of platform opposition. 
                                                          
361 MSS.55/4/POL/2-24 RCA policy statements, 1914-63, ‘Report of Committee to inquire regarding 
Parliamentary Candidatures and Related Questions’, 1923. 
362 MSS.55/1/CON/60a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1934. 
363 Ibid. 
364 MSS.55/1/CON/65b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1937, pp. 71-8. 
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The NUDAW also used an elective panel system to choose its candidates. By 1925 it 
was sponsoring seven candidates. Death and retirement had left the union with two 
parliamentary candidates in 1932, Ellen Wilkinson and Rhys J. Davies MP, in addition 
to W. A. Robinson, the union’s political general secretary. That year’s annual delegate 
meeting agreed a new parliamentary representation scheme, in which an additional 
four candidates were to be elected to form a panel of six. Six substitute candidates 
were also to be elected to fill vacancies that might arise in the main panel. Eligibility 
required five years political membership, and candidates who were without a seat after 
six years were obliged to retire from the panel, whilst remaining eligible for the 
substitute panel. Substitute panellists were to retire at the end of every two years in 
line with other elected positions in the union. Panel members who were adopted for 
constituencies other than those organised through the union would forfeit their place, 
as did Tom Myers when adopted for Stretford (Lancashire) in 1934. Getting into 
Parliament was not impossible for substitute panellists: Evelyn Walkden topped the 
substitute poll in 1934 and then found himself as NUDAW candidate for Rossendale 
(Lancashire) at the 1935 general election, owing to the withdrawal of the union’s C. R. 
Flynn, who was also NUDAW’s Northern Divisional Officer, at short notice.365 NUDAW 
was one of the handful of sponsoring unions which operated a substitute panel, and it 
seems to have been a relatively efficient way of maintaining interest in additional 
parliamentary representation whilst not, at least for a six-year period, placing existing 
panellists in any uncertainty. The election of substitute panellists by the annual 
meeting, as in the RCA, however, does make it difficult to assess the level of 
engagement with the process through the union more broadly.  
Elected panels could be time-consuming, whether conducted by membership ballot or 
on a card vote at conference. This was particularly the case where existing candidates, 
having been defeated at an election, had to re-apply as panellists. If a CLP was keen 
to re-adopt them, it was forced either to wait, or worse, wait and conduct a new 
selection if the former candidate had not made it back onto the union’s panel. The 
general unions operated selective panel systems, perhaps in recognition of the 
impracticality of panel elections within unions organised internally along trade as well 
                                                          
365 Although he was defeated on this occasion. NUDAW, Annual Reports, 1934 and 1935. For Flynn 
see Margaret ’Espinasse and John Saville, ‘Flynn, Charles Richard (1882-1957)’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography III, pp. 80-81.  
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as geographical divisions. This left the choice of candidate to the Executive. Panel 
size was still a matter of debate, however: the NUGMW panel was set at twelve by the 
1930 biennial congress, although the places were only filled at the discretion of the 
Executive. Alternative suggestions of ten and fourteen panellist were rejected, 
presumably twelve was chosen as a compromise, although the union did expand its 
total candidatures to eleven in 1931.366 Attempts to increase the panel to fifteen were 
rejected by the 1932 and 1934 congresses: it is notable that the union only had two 
MPs at this time. The selection system excluded the membership from the process to 
some extent, although the Executive was willing to respond to local appeals for 
candidates and delegate responsibility to its district organisations.367 Perhaps 
inevitably, selection resulted in candidates who were well-known to the Executive 
being chosen – including several officials. Arguably the system introduced by the 
TGWU in 1933 gave the greatest flexibility. Prior to this the union’s approach had been 
somewhat confusing: although ‘reserve’ candidates were already in place alongside 
the TGWU’s ‘official’ or ‘active’ list, in 1928 the union sought nominations for a 
‘secondary list’ of candidates in order to be prepared for any selection emergencies.368 
The absorption of the Workers’ Union, including its parliamentary candidates, in 1929 
had the potential to complicate matters further, but it was not until the spring of 1933 
that an overhaul was made. The problems of parliamentary candidatures were clearly 
animating Bevin at this stage, with the Hastings Agreement arising from the 
discussions initiated by him soon afterwards. A report to the TGWU Executive Council 
recommended that the number of candidates the union might support would be left at 
the Council’s discretion, whilst instead of the existing lists a central file would be 
compiled of ‘suitable’ union members recommended ‘from time to time’ by the union’s 
Area and National Trade Group Committees. A statement of ‘the qualifications of the 
members concerned’ would be needed in order to help the Executive make a decision 
about suitability, this question having been ‘not closely examined’ in the compilation 
of the last list in 1931. The file would be used by the Executive in considering all future 
parliamentary nominations to allow them to select a candidate ‘with special regard to 
                                                          
366 TU/GENERALB/1/A/6 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1930, NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress 
Report 1930; Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1931. 
367 TU/GENERALB/1/A/8 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1932, NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress 
Report, 1932 and TU/GENERALB/1/A/10 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1934, NUGMW Biennial 
Delegate Congress Report, 1934. See the case of Warrington in 1934, discussed below. 
368 MSS.126/TG/1154/7 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1928. 
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the nature of the constituency’ involved.369 Not only did this go some way to separating 
the initial consideration of candidatures from the electoral cycle, consequently 
reducing delay in the reselection of candidates after an election which was often a 
hallmark of the panel system, but it lessened the likelihood of area or trade group 
complaints over the constitution of panels, with the details of possible candidates 
available only to the Executive, and no formal limit to the number of candidatures the 
union was prepared to entertain. A supportive area or trade group secretary was a 
clear advantage to a potential candidate, but nomination was still possible even where 
personal relations were poor: the future general secretary Jack Jones may have 
considered his area secretary in Liverpool, Harry Pugh, a firmly hostile ‘old adversary’, 
but Pugh was still prepared to recommend him directly to Bevin as ‘a very good 
candidate’ for the West Toxteth division of the city.370 This was a different approach to 
the professionalization of candidatures than that taken by the NUR, but efficiency and 
flexibility in selection could be much improved by this method. 
For their advantages, however, the methods of selection employed by unions often 
served to entrench the relatively elderly and overwhelmingly male image of the union 
MP or candidate. In those unions which used an elected panel, to be reasonably well-
known within the organisation was essential, and in general, age worked as an 
advantage here; younger contenders were more likely to be eliminated earlier in the 
process. The case of the AEU is illustrative: of 36 nominees on the first ballot for the 
union’s 1932 panel, the average age was 48.9 years, but that of the eight remaining 
on the final ballot was 57.6 years. In the election to the 1936 panel, the 34 first-round 
candidates were aged 51.1 years on average; the final eight averaged 60 years.  The 
four successful finalists were aged 59 on average in 1932, and 63 in 1936.371 The 
                                                          
369 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/11 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
Emergency Committee, 1933, appendix iii to GEC minutes of 22 May 1933, ‘Report and 
recommendations of the Finance and General Purposes Committee regarding the Union 
Parliamentary List’. 
370 Jack Jones, Union Man. The Autobiography of Jack Jones (Abersychan, 2008 [original 1986]), pp. 
36-37, 84-85; MSS.126/EB/X/23, Bevin notes of discussions, 1936-40: ‘Note of discussion between 
the general secretary and Brother H. O. Pugh, 21 February 1939’. Jones considered Pugh to be 
attempting to engineer his removal from the TGWU National Dock Group Committee; given that Pugh 
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possible that Pugh’s recommendation was of less benevolent origin: if elected to Parliament, Jones 
would forfeit his committee place.  
371 Calculated from AEU ballot slips in AEU EC Minutes 1932 and 1936. 1932 first ballot, 
MSS.259/AEU/1/1/47 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Apr.-Jun. 1932, meeting of 25 May 1932; 
second ballot, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/48 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Jul.-Sep. 1932, meeting of 18 
July 1932. 1936 first ballot, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/63 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Apr.-Jun. 1936, 
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NUR candidates were noticeably more youthful than those of other unions, with an 
average age of 44 years in 1932 and 42.6 years in 1936 – but here an age limit was 
applied.372  
More striking was the tiny number of women trade union candidates. Pamela Graves 
has argued that a ‘deep-seated attachment to the idea of separate gender spheres’ 
within the labour movement, embodied by the separate Women’s Sections of the party 
from 1918, inhibited effective co-operation between the sexes, effectively shutting 
women out of the deliberations of the national party, whilst blinding male colleagues 
to the value of labour women’s organisational, propaganda and management skills; by 
the 1930s, in waiving gender claims in support of party unity, Labour women ‘accepted 
integration into the mainstream party on the terms offered by the male majority’.373 
Fewer women parliamentary candidates was one effect of this process. Allowing for 
the limited nature of the data for the 1922, 1923 and 1924 elections, after 1918 only 
two women – Margaret Bondfield of the NUGMW, and Ellen Wilkinson of the NUDAW 
– contested parliamentary elections as sponsored candidates of Labour-affiliated 
unions during the whole interwar period.374 Just two others were members of 
                                                          
meeting of 29 June 1936, and second ballot, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/64 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, 
Jul.-Sep. 1936, meeting of 26 August 1936. Admittedly the same four nominees were elected in both 
ballots, so the average age was four years older in 1936. 
372 These figures are calculated from the 44 nominees in the 1932 ballot, and 42 in the 1936 one. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, NUR executive, minutes of March 
1932 quarterly meeting, Political Sub-committee report; MSS.127/NU/1/1/24 NUR, Annual 
Proceedings and Reports, 1936, NUR executive, minutes of June 1936 quarterly meeting, Political 
Sub-committee report. 
373 Pamela Graves, Labour Women. Women in British Working-Class Politics 1918-1939 (Cambridge, 
1994), pp. 216, 221-222. 
374 Mary Macarthur was the National Federation of Women Workers’ candidate for Stourbridge 
(Worcestershire) in 1918; for Macarthur see David E. Martin, ‘Macarthur, Mary (1880-1921)’, 
Dictionary of Labour Biography II, pp. 255-260.  The list of ‘available’ candidates in the 1924 Labour 
Party Annual Report shows Eleanor Stewart, a senior Scottish District Organiser for the Workers’ 
Union, as having WU sponsorship. Stewart fought Edinburgh North in 1924 and 1929. In the party’s 
reports from 1925 onwards, she is recorded as the candidate of the divisional party; it seems likely 
she was sponsored by the WU in 1924, subject to the caveats relating to the 1922-24 elections 
outlined above. Her committee rooms were at the WU’s Edinburgh office, and her agent was a WU 
colleague, Angus Robertson. MSS.126/WU/4/1/18-22 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 
1923-28 for details of District Organisers and their addresses; ‘North Edinburgh – Miss Eleanor 
Stewart – Labour Candidate’, Edinburgh Evening News, 27 October 1924. Stewart was a prominent 
figure in the STUC; see C. Burness, ‘Stewart, Eleanor (b. 1889)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, online edition, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/54412, accessed 3 Jan 2018].  
Leah Manning was sponsored by the unaffiliated National Union of Teachers; she was the first woman 
to be included in its panel, in 1928. The NUT Executive chose a panel of nine from amongst its own 
members, with three representatives of each major party. Manning remained a panellist until 1932, 
when the NUT cut its panel size to three and stopped providing constituency maintenance payments: 
this effectively put an end to her candidature at Islington East, which she had fought in 1931. L. 
Manning, A Life for Education. An Autobiography (London, 1970), pp. 76-77, 83-84. Another teacher, 
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parliamentary panels, and in both cases only for brief periods: Mary Carlin, TGWU 
National Woman Officer, and Alice Foley, a Weavers’ official, of the UTFWA. Although 
some of the major sponsoring unions – the MFGB, AEU, and to a lesser extent the 
NUR – had either an exclusively, or almost exclusively, male membership, and so 
unsurprisingly favoured male candidates, other organisations did have a more 
substantial female membership on which they might have drawn for potential 
candidates. UTFWA is the most obvious example: women made up the majority of the 
membership in the Cardroom and Weavers’ amalgamations.375 Yet the cotton unions 
were officiated largely by men, and although each amalgamation elected its own 
panellists, the inflexibility of a system which did not allow one amalgamation to 
nominate a new candidate, even if panel spaces were available, meant that on the 
whole, well-known male officials dominated selection. It is notable that Foley’s time on 
the UTFWA panel as a substitute, starting from the 1936 conference, coincided with 
the Weavers being able to elect a larger number of nominees than previous years 
owing to an UTFWA conference decision to increase the panel’s size.376 By the time 
of her resignation from the panel in March 1939, several of the other panellists chosen 
alongside her had already been adopted by constituencies.377 
As Foley herself noted, male officials were often ‘antagonistic to the idea of women 
aspiring to be anything more than paying-members within the organisation and for a 
long time my presence in the office was tolerated rather than accepted’.378 The sexism 
associated with the male-dominated culture of much trade unionism was plainly a 
hindrance. Carlin made several attempts to gain a place on the TGWU’s list, first 
                                                          
Alice Bacon, was adopted as the Labour candidate for Leeds North-East in 1938, although she does 
not seem to have had union sponsorship despite being ‘active in the affairs’ of the NUT. ‘North-East 
Leeds Division – Normanton Woman to be Labour Candidate’, Yorkshire Evening Post, 4 October 
1938. See also R. Reeves & R. Carr, Alice in Westminster. The Political Life of Alice Bacon (London 
& New York, 2017), pp. 30-37. This pattern continued into the post-war period: Rush notes that only 
two women were union-sponsored candidates at elections between 1950 and 1966. Rush, The 
Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, p. 222. 
375 The 1931 figures were: Cardroom Operatives, 44,000 women and 11,000 men; Weavers’ 
Association: 127,000 women and 32,000 men. TUC Report, 1931. 
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applying in early 1932, becoming one of only two applicants to be placed on a ‘Special 
Official Union Reserve List’.379 As the rather ambiguous name might imply, this was 
hardly promising; when the new system was introduced in 1933, her application was 
rejected, despite expressing her willingness to compete for the Nottingham South 
candidature recently vacated by the union’s A. R. Ellis.380 Despite being nominated as 
a prospective candidate for Gloucester in 1934, she was refused permission to 
accept.381 Even with support from the TGWU Women’s Guild, through a resolution of 
its annual conference ‘urging the union to finance as many Women Parliamentary 
Candidates as possible, and recommending that the Secretary of the Guild should be 
one of the candidates’, she was again rejected in 1935, with the Executive pointing to 
the lack of vacancies on the union’s list; the broader appeal of the Women’s Guild for 
more female candidates was simply ‘noted’.382 This response was far from 
encouraging. Whilst it might have been possible to justify Carlin’s continued rejections 
on the grounds that the union did not want to lose the services of its most prominent 
female officer, this does not seem to have been the case: by 1937, the Executive was 
considering proposals to effectively abolish the women’s guild as a national section of 
the union through decentralisation of its membership into their geographical or trade 
groups, whilst the extended leave of absence offered to Carlin may have been a hint 
that her early retirement would be welcome.383 A sexist interpretation of Carlin’s 
persistence as her being ‘difficult’ may have been a factor in the Executive’s failure to 
support her claim; in any case it is difficult to imagine a male Group Secretary, enjoying 
the full support of his section, with offers of nomination, and equivalent long service 
on the party’s National Executive, being repeatedly refused outright in this way. 
In this context Bondfield and Wilkinson were very much the exceptions. By the mid-
1920s, Bondfield was arguably the most senior woman within the trade union 
movement, having been the first woman to be elected to the TUC Parliamentary 
                                                          
379 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/10 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
Emergency Committee, 1932; GEC minutes, 23 February 1932. 
380 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/11 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
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382 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/13 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1935; GEC Minutes, 21 August 1935. 
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Committee in 1918, and the first female occupant of, in her words, ‘the supreme 
position in the industrial wing of Labour ’ as TUC chair in 1923-4.384 As Chief Woman 
Officer of the NUGMW, for the union’s most recent official historian she increasingly 
‘came to represent the public face of the union’ alongside Thorne and Clynes.385 
However, in practical terms the scope of her union role had already been reduced, first 
through a narrowing of the responsibilities of the union’s Women’s Department in 
1924, and then the abolition of separate representation for women within the 
organisation in 1928.386 As such she faced little difficulty in getting leave-of-absence 
from the union when serving as a government minister, and her prominence was likely 
considered an asset to the union,387 allowing it to project an image of equality, whilst 
facilities for distinctive women’s representation was submerged within the union’s 
broader organisation. Her standing within the movement was not necessarily an 
advantage, however, as Bondfield observed ‘I never chose, nor was given, an easy 
constituency. Both Northampton and Wallsend had been hard to fight and difficult to 
win’,388 particularly in comparison with some of the seats fought and won by her 
colleagues in the NUGMW leadership. Reading, where she was adopted as NUGMW 
candidate in 1937, was hardly more auspicious: although Labour has won the seat in 
1929, it had been with a majority of just 850 in a three-cornered contest where the 
third-placed Liberal had polled nearly 8,000 votes.389 In the case of Wilkinson, ‘her 
talents for campaigning and her charisma’ encouraged NUDAW – ‘few unions were as 
enlightened and progressive’ – and in particular its President, her close collaborator 
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John Jagger, to push her forward as a candidate.390 Her reputation was already such 
that in the union’s initial 1923 ballot to select four parliamentary candidates, she 
topped the poll by over 2,000 votes, despite her known CPGB membership at that 
stage.391 Given her obvious talent, coupled with a strong personal profile within the 
union as its national women’s organiser and a reliable ally at the top of the 
organisation, it would perhaps have been more surprising if Wilkinson had not been a 
sponsored candidate.392 
Prospective women candidates faced similar difficulties in the Co-operative Party, 
despite the apparent strength of women’s co-operation. Estimates suggest that two-
thirds of co-operators were women; by the late 1930s the Women’s Co-operative Guild 
[WCG] combined a large membership with a well-established reputation ‘unique in 
British politics as a self-governing organisation of working-class housewives’. Under 
the leadership of Margaret Llewelyn Davies from 1889-1921, the WCG pursued a 
wide-ranging socialist-feminist agenda, in defiance of Co-operative officials when 
deemed necessary; membership, like that of the wider co-operative movement, was 
politically heterogeneous.393 From the mid-1920s, with Eleanor Barton as general 
secretary, the WCG’s organisation became increasingly centralised, and its traditional 
radical political identity surrendered to a more orthodox Labour loyalty. Barton’s Guild 
base provided a ‘springboard for her role in the Co-operative Party’; she had a place 
on the official list of Co-operative candidates from 1918, contested Birmingham King’s 
Norton in 1922 and 1923, and Nottingham East in 1929.394 However, the separate 
gender spheres within the co-operative movement harmed Barton’s opportunities, 
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despite her being ‘the most prominent and powerful Guildswoman committed to 
Labour-Co-operative politics’. Within the Guild, as a leader she may have been ‘strong 
to the point of intransigence’, but in the Co-operative Party she was a more marginal 
figure. The vast majority of the Party’s executive was drawn from the trading side of 
the movement, with just one Guild representative; despite the establishment of a 
special fund in 1928 to assist in fighting parliamentary elections, Guildswomen 
experienced considerable difficulty in securing nominations: Barton herself was not 
readopted for Nottingham East after the 1929 general election; a by-election in the 
constituency in 1930 was fought instead by the erstwhile Co-operative MP A. E. 
Waterson.395 This reflected women’s experience in the wider Co-operative movement: 
where despite their numerical strength, they were rarely able to secure places on 
committees dealing with the business side of Co-operative activities.396 Caroline 
Ganley did succeed in gaining the Co-operative Party nomination to fight Paddington 
North in 1935, although this likely owed as much to her long career in London local 
government as her participation in the Guild; her background in the largely male world 
of the Social Democratic Federation may also have been an advantage.397 
Despite the limitations outlined above, selection did guarantee both material and moral 
support from a union to its candidates. Firstly, unions sought to help their candidates 
to get selected. Political officers and sub-committees expended considerable effort in 
pursuit of appropriate constituencies for their candidates. Invitations were regularly 
received from constituencies and some follow-up work was usually required before 
making a decision, although inquiries were also made on the initiative of union political 
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officers themselves; the geography of selection will be considered in more detail in the 
following section.  In addition to providing funding for election expenses and 
constituency maintenance, unions often provided their candidates with travelling and 
accommodation expenses: the majority of minutes relating to parliamentary 
candidates in the AEU Executive Council records for the period concern such 
expenses, for visits to constituency events or selection conferences. In some cases a 
union might also send a prominent official to offer support at selection conferences: 
NUDAW’s W. A. Robinson attended on behalf of the union’s candidates on several 
occasions.398 Although there was a danger of this looking heavy-handed, the intention 
was to provide reassurance to the selectors as to the union’s support – financial and 
otherwise – for the candidate. Where funds allowed, support might continue beyond 
an election defeat: this was particularly the case in 1931. It was TGWU policy to find 
a defeated candidate who had been an MP alternative employment, typically 
‘organising work of a general character’ for the union, whether ‘under the direction of 
the general secretary’ at headquarters, as in the cases of George Dallas, W. T. Kelly 
and G. H. Oliver in 1931, or in their own region, as in the cases of J. H. Hall, J. H. Palin 
and J. E. Edmunds after the same election.399 The NUR’s rules precluded the formal 
provision of employment for defeated candidates in the same way, but Cramp still 
attempted to secure some general manual work at Unity House for F. G. Burgess after 
his defeat at York.400 
The disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932 had a significant effect on some trade union 
candidatures. Two candidates, David Kirkwood of the AEU, and George Buchanan of 
the United Patternmakers’ Association, had been sponsored by their unions in 1929, 
but stood as unendorsed candidates in 1931 and were elected. The AEU made it clear 
to Kirkwood, the Member for Dumbarton Burghs, that their future support of his 
candidature depended on his acceptance of PLP Standing Orders once the ILP had 
disaffiliated: Kirkwood promptly re-joined the PLP in August 1932. He had been 
opposed to disaffiliation, and the following month would become one of the founders 
                                                          
398 For example, he accompanied C. R. Flynn to a selection conference at Rossendale, NUDAW, 
Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1933, report of 4 September 1933. 
399 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/9 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
Emergency Committee, 1931, GEC meeting of 16 November 1931. For Dallas, see Kenneth Dallas, 
‘Dallas, George (1878-1861)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography IV, pp. 69-74; for Palin, see Keith 
Laybourn, ‘Palin, John Henry (1870-1934)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography IV, pp. 134-136. 
400 Although his offer was refused. MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, 
minutes of March 1932 quarterly meeting. 
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of the Scottish Socialist Party.401 Buchanan’s case proved more protracted, and 
demonstrated the extent to which a union might be prepared to support a candidate 
over an issue of party discipline. Buchanan had been returned as an unendorsed 
‘Independent Labour’ candidate with ILP backing at Glasgow Gorbals in 1931. The 
UPA did not appear unduly concerned at first, only deciding in late November to inquire 
why the party would not endorse Buchanan.402 Resolution might have proved easier, 
with the union likely pushing Buchanan to accept the Standing Orders and join the 
PLP, if Buchanan had not been elected UPA president at the start of 1932.403 Although 
on the industrial side this was unproblematic, politically it placed the union in a 
dilemma: the UPA could not easily discipline its president over a political issue. His 
eligibility as a party conference delegate provided the first instance of trouble, in the 
context of the ILP’s decision to disaffiliate from Labour in the summer of 1932. The 
NEC made it clear to the UPA’s secretary Allen Findlay that Buchanan would be 
refused as a delegate.404 Although there was some pressure from union branches for 
Buchanan to act according to party rules on pain of withdrawal of support, the UPA 
largely took on a protective approach.405 It is worth noting that the union’s political 
membership had increased during the year, perhaps in part due to sympathy for 
Buchanan’s position.406 Following a meeting with party representatives in July, the 
UPA’s position hardened: informing the party at the last minute that Buchanan would 
                                                          
401 See AEU Monthly Journal, December 1931, for copies of correspondence relating to Kirkwood’s 
refusal to agree unreservedly to the party’s standing orders. MSS.259/AEU/1/1/48 AEU, Executive 
Council Minutes, Jul.-Sep. 1932, meeting of 6 September 1932 for Kirkwood’s return to the PLP; it 
took rather longer for the union to finally agree to meet the remaining balance of Kirkwood’s election 
expenses for 1931. MSS.259/AEU/1/1/54 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Jan.-Mar. 1934, meeting 
of 7 February 1934. W. W. Knox, and A. Mackinlay, ‘The re-making of Scottish Labour in the 1930s’, 
Twentieth Century British History 6:2 (1995), 174-193, p. 178. 
402 MSS.101/P/1/10 UPA, Minute Book, 1930-31, executive council meeting of 25 November 1931. It 
was still deciding what to do about this in January 1932: ibid., meeting of 11 January 1932. For 
Buchanan, see William Knox, ‘Buchanan, George (1890-1955)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography VII, 
pp. 50-53. 
403 Hostility among Glasgow UPA branches towards the previous president, A. E. Wardale, over his 
handling of a Clydeside dispute in September 1931 probably contributed to Buchanan’s success: the 
election a more radical, Glasgow-based figure may have seemed an appropriate corrective. 
Coatbridge, Glasgow South East, Glasgow North, Clydebank, Glasgow South, and Greenock 
branches had all written to the executive demanding Wardale’s resignation. UPA, Minute Book, 1930-
31, executive council meeting of 9 September 1931. 
404 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 22 June 1932. 
405 For a letter from Gateshead branch to this effect, see MSS.101/P/1/11 UPA, Minute Book, 1932, 
executive council meeting of 1 July 1932. 
406 Affiliated political membership increased by 602 to 5399 from 1931-32, TUC membership by 163 to 
11239. Although the figures are relatively small, in a union of the UPA’s size, a 5 per cent increase – 
from 43 to 48 per cent of total membership – in such a short period was significant. Calculated from 
the figures in TUC and Labour party annual reports, 1932. 
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not be a delegate, the Executive resolved to ‘take a vote of the members for or against 
continuing our affiliation with the Labour Party’, scheduled for the branch meetings in 
November.407 This was a significant show of support for Buchanan, although the ballot 
result showed little appetite for disaffiliation, with only 105 votes against continued 
affiliation.408 This had the effect of fudging the position, and it was not until 1934 that 
a further attempt at clarification was made. The UPA Executive resolved to meet the 
party’s Organisation Sub-committee to discuss the difficulties ‘arising out of their 
affiliation to the Labour party on the one hand, and the financial support they had given 
to Mr G. Buchanan in connection with his election expenses on the other’.409 Party 
representatives were not encouraged, with W. R. Smith, who had chaired the meeting, 
informing the NEC that ‘it was extremely unlikely that the Association would take action 
to bring Mr Buchanan into line with the Party’.410 This time, however, the UPA did take 
action, the executive resolving ‘that we are only prepared to finance Parliamentary 
Candidates who are prepared to accept the Constitution and Standing Orders of the 
Labour Party’.411 Buchanan was thus excluded from receiving the union’s official 
support, but this did not mean that a scheme of voluntary contributions from UPA 
members was ruled out.412 Whilst a levy on members to this end was blocked by the 
Executive, a voluntary appeal fund was established to support Buchanan’s 
candidature at the 1935 election, although branches were barred from making 
                                                          
407 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 30 September 1932; UPA, Minute Book, 
1932, executive council meetings of 12 July 1932 and 13 October 1932.  
408 UPA, Minute Book, 1932, executive council meeting of 29 December 1932. The voting was as 
follows: for continued affiliation, 476; against, 105; majority for, 371. 581 total votes from a political 
membership of over 5,000 – i.e., around 10 per cent turnout – might appear to reflect a considerable 
lack of interest in a potentially momentous decision for the union’s political identity, but that the vote 
took place at branch meetings on a late November evening, rather than a ballot vote of the full 
membership may be behind this low figure: only the most committed members would be in attendance, 
and the wider membership may not have been aware that the issue was even on the agenda; indeed 
there were some complaints that Buchanan had not been given the opportunity to outline his own 
views – note the letters from Rugby and Leeds West branches at the same meeting.  
409 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of Org. Sub-committee meeting of 14 February 1934. 
410 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 1 March 1934. 
411 MSS.101/P/1/12 UPA, Minute Book, 1934, ‘business pursuant’ to executive council meeting of 3-5 
May 1934, undated. 
412 MSS.101/P/1/13 UPA, Minute Book, 1935, executive council meeting of 7-8 February 1935 for an 
early reference to this. Findlay was instructed to write to the NEC, noting how they were prepared to 
accept candidates from ‘another Association who also ran candidates in another political Party; 
possibly this was a reference to the National Union of Teachers, although an RCA branch chairman 
stood as an ILP candidate against Labour at Clackmannan and East Stirling in 1935, as did a 
Cumberland miners’ agent at Whitehaven (see The Times House of Commons 1935); see also 
comments below. UPA, Minute Book, 1935, executive council meeting of 16-17 May 1935. 
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donations from branch funds.413  When Buchanan did eventually re-join the PLP in 
1939, the UPA nominated him for the Gorbals Labour candidature, and the NEC 
offered its endorsement in June.414 The UPA had successfully negotiated a seven-
year balancing act, managing to support Buchanan throughout, although not always 
through the usual formal channels. The Executive’s actions, particularly from 1934-35, 
demonstrate its desire to meet the party’s expectations, whilst avoiding public criticism 
of its president. This may be represent a spirit of craft union independence: support 
for Buchanan in the wider union remained strong – even by 1939, Motherwell branch 
continued to refuse to pay the political levy over the party’s position on Buchanan, 
despite gentle encouragement from the Executive to do so.415 Buchanan’s case 
demonstrates how far unions might be prepared to back prominent candidates, even 
against the Labour party, in particular circumstances. 
In several instances trade union candidates found themselves facing ILP opponents. 
This problem was confined in 1931 to two double-member constituencies, Norwich 
and Stockport, both contested by one official and one unendorsed Labour 
candidate.416 Labour’s Norwich candidates since 1923 had been Dorothy Jewson of 
the ILP, and W. R. Smith of NUBSO. In 1929 Smith had been victorious but Jewson 
defeated: in 1931, the latter was refused endorsement. Smith threatened to resign as 
a candidate until Norwich Labour Party withdrew the ‘moral support’ it had offered 
Jewson; the campaign, marked with bitterness, saw both candidates defeated. In the 
years following disaffiliation, as Gidon Cohen has demonstrated, Norwich remained 
an ILP stronghold, with Labour reliant on the ILP for its majority on the council until 
                                                          
413 UPA, Minute Book, 1935, executive council meeting of 16-18 October 1935. The council divided 3-
3 over the establishment of a levy, reaffirming the present position of only officially financing Labour 
candidates.  
414 MSS.101/P/1/17 UPA, Minute Book, 1939, executive council meeting of 17-18 May 1939; Labour 
Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 28 June 1939. By this stage the ILP parliamentary 
group favoured re-affiliation to Labour; Buchanan took a unilateral decision to rejoin following 
equivocation by the ILP conference on the issue. See Gidon Cohen, The Failure of a Dream. The 
Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II (London, 2007), pp. 159-161; see also p. 
71 on the UPA’s involvement. 
415 UPA, Minute Book, 1939, executive council meetings of 15-17 March 1939, 17-18 May 1939. 
416 In Stockport, the RCA’s A. E. Townend was the official, and the ILP’s Tom Abbott the unofficial 
candidate. Abbott was an important ILP figure in Lancashire; he was to leave the party in 1934 over 
the organisational reforms pushed through by the Marxist Revolutionary Policy Committee, and went 
on to be the founding general secretary of the Independent Socialist Party [ISP] later that year. Cohen, 
The Failure of a Dream. The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II, pp. 99-101. 
For the ISP, see Gidon Cohen, ‘Special Note: The Independent Socialist Party’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography XI, pp. 231-238. 
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1936; the smaller party continued to thrive in part due to the financial stability which 
was the product of the popularity of the ILP social club, Hardie Hall. When Fenner 
Brockway succeeded Jewson as the ILP candidate in 1935, he faced two Labour 
opponents, Glenvil Hall and C. J. Kelly, the latter being sponsored by the NUR: on this 
occasion the official campaign ‘largely ignored’ the ILP, reflecting the desire for closer 
co-operation which was shared by many within the Norwich labour movement.417 Five 
further union candidates faced ILP opponents in 1935. The NUGMW’s Arthur Whiting 
fought both a Conservative and the ILP’s Bob Edwards at Chorley (Lancashire), with 
Whiting coming second and Edwards losing his deposit. Wilfrid Heywood of the 
National Union of Textile Workers faced Fred Jowett in Bradford East; here the split 
Labour vote helped the Conservative take the seat.418 In Merthyr Tydfil, S. O. Davies 
of the MFGB comfortably defeated the ILP’s Claude Stanfield in a straight fight. Davies 
was an effective candidate in such a contest, as an established left-wing critic of 
Labour orthodoxies and a long-standing ILP member himself.419 In two seats union 
candidates faced ILPers who were also trade union officials, although fighting without 
the backing of their union. At Kilmarnock (Ayrshire) the Labour candidate, NUBSO’s 
James Crawford, faced opposition from the ILP’s John Pollock, chair of NUDAW’s 
Scottish Area Council. The sitting MP, National Labour’s Kenneth Lindsay, held the 
seat fairly comfortably. NUDAW records make no mention of Pollock’s candidacy, 
ignoring him rather than publicising his efforts, even critically.420 The ILP’s electoral 
strategy in 1935 prioritised candidates with a strong local connection: this made Tom 
Stephenson, a prominent Cumberland Miners’ official, the ‘obvious choice’ to contest 
                                                          
417 Gidon Cohen, “Happy Hunting Ground of the Crank’? The Independent Labour Party and Local 
Labour Politics in Glasgow and Norwich, 1932-45’ in M. Worley (ed.), Labour’s Grass Roots. Essays 
on the Activities of Local Labour Parties and Members, 1918-45 (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 65-70. One 
concession to this desire was the selection of the former ILP general secretary John Paton as the next 
Labour candidate for the constituency. 
418 Jowett received 8,983 votes and Heywood 7,329; the Conservative Hepworth was elected with a 
majority of 2,148. 
419 He had won the seat at a by-election in 1934, in a three-cornered fight in which the ILP’s Campbell 
Stephen finished last. Davies succeeded as MP the late Richard Wallhead, who had been unendorsed 
in 1931 but re-joined the PLP since. Cohen, The Failure of a Dream. The Independent Labour Party 
from Disaffiliation to World War II, pp. 66-67. For Davies, see Robert Griffiths, ‘Davies, Stephen Owen 
(1886-1972)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography VIII, pp. 45-55 and Robert Griffiths, S. O. Davies. A 
Socialist Faith (Llandysul, 1983). 
420 Cohen, The Failure of a Dream. The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II, 
p. 68. Pollock himself seems to have had more sense than to make NUDAW headquarters aware of 
his candidacy: the reaction from the union’s political general secretary, Robinson, was likely to have 
been hostile.  
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Whitehaven, where he faced Frank Anderson of the RCA.421 This was an important 
marginal seat, and Anderson campaigned effectively against Stephenson, securing 
the support of national MFGB figures and making it difficult for Stephenson to 
distinguish his platform from that of Labour.422 Anderson’s election literature carried 
endorsements from Will Lawther, the MFGB vice-president, and Jim Griffiths, 
president of the SWMF. It dealt with Stephenson harshly, suggesting that if elected 
‘Poor Tom’ would return to his ‘spiritual home among the Tories, with other ILP lights’, 
whilst emphasising Anderson’s own socialist credentials.423 The contest was close, 
Anderson winning a narrow majority of 352 over the Conservative candidate and sitting 
MP, Nunn, with Stephenson gaining 1,004 votes: the split vote had not cost Labour 
the seat. Union responses to ILP opponents could vary. Whilst past ILP disloyalty 
which offended against the culture of acceptance of majority decisions could provoke 
a hostile reaction, for many trade unionists, the ongoing split was simply a matter of 
regret. This was expressed succinctly by John Marchbank of the NUR in the union’s 
weekly following the 1935 election. 
 
I will not say much about the position of the ILP. The conflict between it and 
the official Labour Party is regrettable, and I wish it could be brought to an 
end: it is costly, on both sides, if we count only the forfeiture of deposits.424 
 
Union officials as candidates 
 
The interwar period has been seen as marking the ‘passing of the general secretaries’ 
from Parliament, as part of the same gradual process of separation of the industrial 
and political functions of the movement – also reflected in the tendency for general 
secretaries to serve on the TUC General Council while their assistants, or lower-
                                                          
421 Keith Gildart and Gidon Cohen, ‘Stephenson, Tom (1895-1962)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography XI, 
pp. 266-274. Stephenson chose to fight Whitehaven rather than his own constituency of Workington, 
to avoid opposing his friend and Cumberland Miners’ Association colleague, Tom Cape. 
422 Ibid., p. 269. 
423 LP/ELEC/1935/1 General election material, 1935, file 8, ‘England: Counties’, Frank Anderson’s 
Election Bulletin. It is notable that the MFGB figures who Anderson’s literature quoted were all national 
figures, rather than local ones – perhaps seeking to avoid a split within the CMA. 
424 John Marchbank, ‘The Problem of Minorities’, Railway Review, 22 November 1935. 
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ranking officials, sat on the party Executive. Certainly examples of the leading national 
officers of unions sitting in the Commons after 1940 are very few, with Ernest Bevin 
and Frank Cousins, both of the TGWU, in 1940 and 1965-66 respectively being the 
most prominent – and both in exceptional circumstances which propelled them into 
the Cabinet.425  However, despite this, during the 1930s a surprisingly large number 
of trade union national officers stood as Labour candidates. They were not always 
general secretaries, and they were not always successfully elected, but this does 
suggest that this ‘passing’ took place largely between 1931 and 1940. By the end of 
the decade only a handful of national officers remained either as candidates or in 
Parliament. This phenomenon requires rather closer attention than Muller and others 
have been able to give it. Equally, that some unions persisted in supporting their 
national officers as candidates requires further explanation. Some unions, such as the 
MFGB, the Woodworkers, and the Boot and Shoe Operatives, had changed their rules 
prior to 1931 to prohibit national officers becoming parliamentary candidates, but for 
others, including those under inspection here, the equivalent process took place during 
the 1930s.426 This process, as will be demonstrated, did not always rely upon an 
alteration of rule to achieve, and could be ambiguous or halting. However, by 1940 it 
appeared to be largely irreversible.   
The Railway Clerks’ Association provides an interesting example of this process and 
is worth exploring in some detail. The first RCA Labour candidate was A. G. Walkden, 
selected for Wolverhampton West in 1912; Walkden’s Chief Assistant Secretary, 
George Lathan, also became a candidate as a member of the union’s parliamentary 
panel in 1918.427 A report on ‘Parliamentary Candidates and Associated Questions’ 
prepared following the RCA’s 1923 Annual Delegate Conference went into some detail 
                                                          
425 Muller, The Kept Men?, pp 28-31; Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Volume 2, 
Minister of Labour, 1940-1945 (London, 1967); Margaret Stewart, Frank Cousins. A Study (London, 
1968), pp. 116-144; Geoffrey Goodman, The Awkward Warrior. Frank Cousins: His Life and Times 
(London, 1979), pp. 379-501. 
426 Frank Hodges had been forced to resign the MFGB general secretaryship on his election in 1923 for 
Lichfield (Staffordshire), see Chris Williams, ‘The odyssey of Frank Hodges’, Transactions of the 
Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion, New Series, 5 (1999), 110-130, p. 121. The Woodworkers had 
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followed by 1922. S. Higenbottam, Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. Our Society’s History 
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427 For Walkden, see Adrian Tranter, ‘Walkden, Alexander George (1st Baron Walkden of Great 
Bookham) (1873-1951)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography V, pp. 221-226; for Lathan, David E. Martin, 
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on other aspects of candidatures, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, but offered no 
comment on the position of the union’s main officials in relation to candidatures: the 
issue seems to have simply been beyond the remit of the report committee, which 
included F. B. Simpson, a future RCA Labour MP.428 However, the success of both 
Walkden at Bristol South and Lathan at Sheffield Park in 1929 altered the context of 
the RCA’s deliberations. By 1931, the regular absence of both main officials was being 
felt at the union’s head office, and the Executive Council introduced an emergency 
resolution at that year’s Conference approving the present position but expressing the 
opinion that ‘it is undesirable that authority should be given for the nomination of any 
more full time officers of the Association, except by the direct instructions of Annual or 
Special Conference’.429 An amendment seeking to establish the principle that fulltime 
officials elected to Parliament should resign their union position as ‘both this 
Association and their constituents are bound to suffer’ was lost, but another, modifying 
the Executive’s resolution to remove any reference to the position in relation to 
officials, was carried, effectively stalling any development until the following year.430 
The Executive tried again in 1932, presenting a report on ‘RCA Staff Organisation and 
Parliamentary Candidatures’. This reasserted the union’s 1910 case for nominating 
Walkden as a candidate, arguing that ‘An exceedingly important range of the 
Association’s work had to be accomplished through Parliamentary action’ whilst it 
would also strengthen the general secretary’s position ‘when dealing with industrial 
questions’, as well as allowing him to deal directly with those railway directors who 
were MPs. The report suggested that those questioning the desirability of having 
officials as candidates ‘were not active participants in the Association’s work in 1910, 
or even in 1918, and are not, therefore, familiar with what took place in those years’, 
in effect implying rather patronisingly that critics were too young to understand. The 
various duties of all members of head office staff were then described, and concluded 
that the present arrangements should continue, although ‘we cannot see our way 
to…the placing of any further members of our staff…as prospective parliamentary 
candidates.’ It was defiant about Lathan and Walkden’s right to be candidates: the 
industrial work of the union ‘was not in any way impaired’ as a result of their being in 
                                                          
428 MSS.55/4/POL/2-24 RCA policy statements, 1914-63, ‘Report of Committee to inquire regarding 
Parliamentary Candidatures and Related Questions’, 1923. 
429 MSS.55/1/CON/56a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1931, p. 35-6. Unfortunately 
verbatim reports of the RCA’s conferences are only available for some of the years referred to here. 
430 Ibid. 
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Parliament, and ‘no further provision would be necessary if both were again 
elected’.431 Probably the appeal to the general importance of parliamentary 
representation strengthened the Executive’s case: certainly there remained sufficient 
sceptics to ensure that the report was only adopted at the Annual Conference by a 
relatively narrow majority of 27,700 to 21,100. In moving the reference back of the 
report, Jacques, a Maidenhead delegate, argued that whilst it was desirable that one 
or other of the main officials should be MPs, both should not. His argument that the 
report was confusing and offered the wrong conclusions clearly found substantial 
support among the Association’s membership.432 It is probably no coincidence that in 
that year’s election to the union’s parliamentary panel, Lathan and Walkden were only 
returned in sixth and seventh place respectively.433 Lathan was readopted for Sheffield 
Park later that year, and Walkden for Bristol South in 1933: in both cases earlier than 
a number of RCA panellists elected above them.434  
The RCA’s 1934 Conference rejected an attempt to bar the general secretary from 
being eligible for Parliament. The mover of the resolution, Harries of Abergavenny, 
asked ‘if you are going to have your chief officers locked up in Parliament, what chance 
have you got? It is difficult enough as it is to get the general secretary to come and 
visit us…’ The ‘previous question’ was moved to preclude discussion, and carried only 
fairly narrowly on a show of hands 175-137, despite the fact that a rather stumbling 
left-wing speech earlier in the Conference by Harries had been picked apart easily by 
Lathan in his reply.435 The Executive’s position seems to have been one of defending 
the prerogative of two well-known and prestigious officials in the face of substantial 
minority dissatisfaction. 436 By the 1935 Conference, however, this position had shifted. 
Walkden was due to retire from his union post in 1936, Lathan in 1937; moreover, a 
general election was expected before then. The Executive made clear it wished to 
                                                          
431 MSS.55/4/POL/2-24 RCA policy statements, 1914-63, ‘RCA Staff Organisation and Parliamentary 
Candidatures’, 1932. 
432 MSS.55/1/CON/57a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1932. Frank Jacques had been 
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continue to support them as candidates after their retirement, but that in future, ‘the 
best interests of the Association will not be served by having both the General 
Secretary and the Chief Assistant placed as candidates’, recommending that only one 
or other of their successors be regarded as available for the parliamentary panel.437 
This entailed the rescinding of the 1932 report and effectively endorsed the position of 
Jacques and the minority of 1932.  Debate at the 1935 Conference revolved around 
the union’s financial responsibility for candidates after they had retired from union 
positions. A Leeds delegate moved an amendment to force the Executive to be more 
specific, suggesting that wording of its resolution left open the possibility of both 
successors standing as candidates. Burnley, the speaker, recalled the difficulties of 
1929-31 and ‘the RCA being governed from Westminster in between divisions…I 
myself…have seen Assistant Secretaries hastening down Whitehall with attaché 
cases to go into consultation with our two chief officers in the House of Commons’ His 
case was rejected by Simpson, now the President, ‘as we do not want the whole 
position to be prejudiced by individual considerations’.438 Arguably it had been just 
these individual considerations which had governed the RCA leadership’s position up 
to this point, in seeking to give Walkden and Lathan as much freedom as possible, but 
now denying it to at least one of their successors. However, anticipation of both being 
elected in the near future must surely also have been a factor here: potentially losing 
another pair of only recently appointed officials to regular parliamentary duties would 
have been highly disruptive. An attempt to formally separate the two secretaries’ roles 
into one industrial and one political, as practiced by NUDAW and other unions, was 
defeated, Simpson again pleading for freedom of manoeuvre on the grounds of not 
knowing who the future occupants of both posts would be. By the time the issue was 
discussed at the 1936 Conference, not only were Walkden and Lathan back in 
Parliament, but William Stott had been elected to succeed Walkden as general 
secretary. In this context, the RCA’s Halifax branch was able to carry a resolution 
against the platform stipulating that future general secretaries after Walkden would be 
ineligible for election to parliament; if already MPs they would be required to stand 
down at the next dissolution. A. W. Longbottom, Halifax delegate and prospective 
candidate, sought to put the issue ‘firmly and finally…on a proper footing’, arguing, 
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with some justification, that for several years the RCA had ‘subordinated policy for 
expediency’ due to Walkden and Lathan’s positions. Another speaker referred to the 
increase since the 1935 election in the RCA’s representation in parliament rendering 
the ‘dire necessity’ of having the general secretary there ‘obsolete’.439 Walkden asked 
the delegates ‘not to tie your hands’ by carrying the resolution but his appeal was 
unsuccessful.440 The conference then debated the deletion of the Rule 16, which 
provided for a Parliamentary general secretary. This post had hitherto been filled by 
Walkden, and seems to have been simply a formal recognition of his parliamentary 
work: indeed, no nominations for a successor had been submitted, implying it was 
little-known by the general membership. In the context of the Halifax resolution being 
carried, the Executive now backed away from their original intention of deletion, and it 
was decided instead to let the post stand vacant.441 This seems to have been a final 
attempt at creating room to manoeuvre on the leadership’s part, but clearly the position 
was now anomalous and the 1938 Conference agreed to its deletion.442 After Lathan’s 
retirement, F. B. Simpson, already MP for Ashton-under-Lyne, became Chief Assistant 
Secretary. His unexpected death in 1939 gave the 1940 Conference the chance to 
carry a resolution requiring the Chief Assistant Secretary not to seek election to 
Parliament, by a card vote majority of 31,700 to 24,350. The Executive’s speaker, 
Priestley, noted the ‘rather unique pleasure’ of asking Conference to support a 
resolution from the floor and stressed the need for an industrial specialist to fill the 
role.443 The size of the minority was substantial, but the Executive’s position had 
clearly shifted considerably since 1932. This seems to have been as a result of the 
combination of persistent pressure from the membership over the separation of 
industrial and political roles with a growing recognition on the part of the union’s 
leadership that their industrial work would be made relatively easier if able to have the 
full time services of both national officials. That the process was ambiguous and 
contested seems to have grown out of the leadership’s deference to the personal 
authority and existing candidatures of Walkden and Lathan, and later Simpson. 
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However, the position by 1940 had altered such that after this, the full time national 
officials of the RCA did not stand as Labour candidates.444 
This process within the National Union of Railwaymen was less protracted, but also 
reflected the tensions between industrial and political priorities. There was nothing to 
prevent NUR Presidents becoming candidates; both William Dobbie and Joseph 
Henderson did so in this period. The president’s presence was not demanded at the 
union’s headquarters, Unity House, beyond chairing quarterly Executive meetings: 
they were lay officials and working railwaymen.  Since 1919, the position of general 
secretary had been split, with J. H. Thomas acting as parliamentary general secretary 
and the overall head official, while C. T. Cramp served as industrial general secretary. 
The two had exchanged their respective memberships of the General Council and 
party NEC in 1929-30 to allow Thomas, now a Cabinet minister, to focus entirely on 
the political side.445 Thomas’ decision to follow MacDonald into the National 
government in August 1931, however, precipitated a split with the union, and at a 
special general meeting days after the 1931 general election, Thomas’ appeal against 
the removal of his union pension was overwhelmingly rejected, and the meeting voted 
61 to 15 to abolish the post of parliamentary general secretary. The Executive had 
hoped to report on the matter at a later date, but this decision, no doubt heavily 
influenced by animosity towards Thomas, precluded a more detailed report. So closely 
was Thomas personally associated with the position, that in the context of early 
November 1931, it was simply disposed of.  
The position of the General and Municipal Workers’ union was rather different, in that 
most of its prominent national officers served in Parliament at some point during the 
period, or continued to be candidates. In the 1929 parliament, both the union’s 
Chairman-President J. R. Clynes (Manchester Platting) and Chief Woman Officer 
Margaret Bondfield (Wallsend, Northumberland) served in the Cabinet, whilst the 
general secretary Will Thorne represented West Ham Plaistow. The national industrial 
officer Jack Jones had sat for the neighbouring seat of West Ham Silvertown since 
1918, whilst Charles Dukes, Lancashire district secretary and later Thorne’s successor 
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as general secretary represented Warrington (Lancashire) from 1929-31.  Arthur 
Hayday, the vice-president, was the candidate for Nottingham West. Clynes’ 
successor as Chairman, Fred Marshall, was elected for Sheffield Brightside in a 1930 
by-election, and returned as an MP for the same constituency in 1935, having lost his 
seat in 1931. Muller suggests that this situation weakened the NUGMW’s leadership 
in the 1930s,446 although only Thorne and Jones retained their seats in 1931, but 
problem of the general secretary having to divide his time between union and 
parliamentary duties was acknowledged after Dukes’ election to replace Thorne at the 
1934 Biennial Delegate Conference of the union. A resolution was moved declaring 
that ‘the work of the General Secretary on the industrial side of our Union demands 
his full time, and he should not accept position as a Parliamentary candidate.’ Moving, 
Keeley, a London delegate admitted that the parliamentary position might be the more 
spectacular’ but was of ‘secondary importance so far as the life of our class was 
concerned’. The ‘best men’ should be kept on the industrial side. The seconder, 
Evans, is likely to have been alluding to Thorne in his suggestion that if political work 
was added to Dukes’ new industrial duties ‘he would probably be an old man before 
his time’.447 Mark Hewitson of the Northern district attacked the resolution, suggesting 
that it was a step towards de-politicising trade unionism: ‘It would mean starting with 
the general secretary, but why not include the whole of the officials?’ Thomas 
Williamson spoke in similar terms, suggesting that this implied the withdrawal of union 
representatives on municipal councils. Marshall and another speaker, Pickles, referred 
to the usefulness of having someone with the expertise of a general secretary in 
parliament, and summing up Arthur Hayday stressed how the parliamentary 
representation enhanced the union’s prestige. He also implied that such a stipulation 
would be unfair, as no notice of it had been circulated with the nomination papers for 
the general secretaryship.448 The resolution was lost by 35 votes to 66, a not 
insignificant minority voting against, suggesting that Muller’s judgment was shared by 
a proportion of the membership.  The conflation of the position of the general secretary 
with all NUGMW political action by the leadership loyalists Hewitson and Williamson 
seems to have been enough to mobilise conference opinion against the proposal, 
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although this precluded more detailed debate on the resolution’s merits. A decision 
after the vote that the resolution’s defeat meant that ‘kindred resolutions on the same 
subject’, of which presumably there were several, ‘should be regarded as being 
disposed of’.449 Dukes, however, seems to have had no intention of remaining as a 
candidate, despite having been re-adopted for Warrington. The union’s national 
executive, on Dukes’ prompting, decided in March 1935 to empower the Lancashire 
district to select a union nominee to succeed Dukes as the candidate. It is perhaps 
noteworthy that the Executive emphasised that only if adopted by the divisional party 
as the candidate would the union’s nominee be added to the official NUGMW 
parliamentary panel: the union was prepared to face the loss of Warrington as one of 
its constituencies; equally it did not want to add to its parliamentary panel 
unnecessarily if this could possibly be helped. In the event a NUGMW candidate, 
Edward Porter, was selected, necessitating his withdrawal as a candidate at 
Preston.450 Personal considerations seem to have influenced an attempt at the 1938 
Biennial Conference to induce Dukes to stand for Parliament: not only was he named 
in a resolution asking that he be allowed to stand, but the mover argued that it was ‘a 
tragedy that he had ever been out of Parliament’. On hearing Dukes’ response – that 
the general secretaryship was a full time position and that he felt no urge to return to 
politics – the resolution was withdrawn.451 This was indicative not only of a 
generational difference between Dukes and the older officials, for whom bridging the 
industrial and political worlds had seemed quite natural, but strongly suggests a 
powerful sense, increasingly shared by union leaders, of trade union leadership as a 
professional, full time occupation.  
Exceptional circumstances could compel trade union officials who would otherwise 
likely have stuck to the industrial sphere to enter the political fray, often at short notice; 
more commonly at by-elections but also in the context of the 1931 crisis. Such 
instances were usually a result of considerable organised pressure from party 
headquarters. The cases of two general secretaries in particular are illustrative in this 
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regard: George Hicks of the Building Trade Workers at Woolwich East, and Ernest 
Bevin of the TGWU at Gateshead.452 
The death of the Earl Russell in early March 1931 deprived the Labour government of 
its Under-Secretary of State for India. Little time was wasted in securing the agreement 
of Harry Snell, MP for Woolwich East, to serve as his replacement, with a seat in the 
House of Lords: according to Snell’s autobiography, he was approached by 
Henderson about the post on the evening of Wednesday 11 March, appointed 
following an interview with MacDonald the following morning, and spent his last day in 
the House of Commons on Friday 13 March. Snell’s reluctance is tangible throughout 
his account – ‘I would not have asked the Government to pass to me the salt’ – finding 
himself clinging ‘almost fiercely’ to the green benches of the Commons on his final 
afternoon there, and regretting ‘that my friends in Woolwich would be put to the 
expense and inconvenience of a by-election’.453 Snell had been a ‘reassuring local 
candidate, first elected in 1922.454 A special meeting of the AUBTW Executive Council 
was hastily convened ‘as a matter of urgency’ on Friday 20 March to discuss a letter 
dated two days earlier from William Barefoot, secretary of the Woolwich divisional 
party, offering Hicks, the union’s general secretary, ‘a pressing and unanimous 
invitation’ to stand as Snell’s successor. Barefoot stressed the ‘great joy’ Hicks’ 
acceptance would bring to local movement and noted that he had already secured the 
endorsement of the national leadership, with Henderson ‘particularly anxious that you 
shall accept’.455 A deputation from Transport House, accompanied by Barefoot and 
armed with a letter of support from Henderson, arrived to press the Executive to give 
its consent to Hicks’ candidature. Henderson’s letter emphasised both the possibility 
of securing a large majority in what was a relatively safe Labour seat, and the necessity 
of demonstrating the party’s commitment to restoring trade union rights,  despite the 
recent defeat of the attempt to amend the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, by 
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returning ‘a prominent Trade Union official’ to the House. Growing trade union 
disillusionment with the government’s record was a problem, and permitting Hicks to 
‘step into the breach at this very important by-election’ would be of great assistance to 
the party as it attempting to respond to this.456 Members of the deputation reinforced 
Henderson’s points: Party Chairman Stanley Hirst observed the ‘great need for 
representative Trade Unionists’ to serve in Parliament and the certainty of a large 
majority, whilst National Agent G. R. Shepherd noted that although there was no 
shortage of potential candidates, the party was ‘concerned to-day to try and restore 
the confidence of the working class of this country’, insisting that it was ‘they and not 
Bro. Hicks who had made the approach in this matter’; Acting Secretary Jim Middleton 
added that ‘the fact of selecting one who had sprung from the working class and had 
risen to the highest position in the trade union movement’ would serve as a ‘great 
stimulus to […] rally the workers’. Barefoot argued that the strength of the local party 
was such that Hicks would need to spend little time in the constituency, and ‘moreover, 
the House of Commons was within easy access of the General Office of the union’.457  
The deputation seems to have made quite an impression on the AUBTW’s Executive 
– not only was the appeal a pressing one requiring a rapid decision, but it came  
directly from the major figures in the party’s national organisation. The builders’ union 
was hardly a political heavyweight: as it usually only sent a delegation of three to party 
conferences; this may well have been the first time several of the lay Executive 
councillors had come into contact with leading figures on the political side, who were 
now appealing openly to their sense of duty to the Labour movement to help the party 
in its hour of need. It is notable that the points relating to the convenience and ease of 
a Hicks candidacy were left to the local representative, Barefoot – as was the question 
of finance later in the meeting.458 The Executive agreed to allow Hicks’ name to go 
forward and provide financial support for his candidature, effectively abandoning its 
prior policy, agreed only in 1928, not to accept responsibility for financing 
Parliamentary candidatures.459 In thanking the Executive for its support, Hicks referred 
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to the invitation from Woolwich as an honour ‘not only to himself, but to the union as a 
whole’: it seems likely from their response to the appeal that his colleagues felt 
similarly. The participation of Barefoot – who would act as Hicks’ agent – was a 
guarantee against any local difficulties: Hicks was the sole nominee, unanimously 
adopted by the constituency party on 22 March.460  It would perhaps be going too far 
to suggest that Snell was manoeuvred out of the Commons to make way for Hicks – 
he was clearly an able, if aging, figure – but the speed and highly orchestrated manner 
in which the latter’s candidacy was secured does suggest a desire on the part of party 
leaders to use the opportunity originally provided by the loss of Russell to get a major 
trade union figure into the a safe seat, providing solidity during a particularly difficult 
period for the Labour government. Given John Bromley’s recent declaration of his 
intention to stand down at the next election, securing the presence in the House of 
another prominent member of the TUC General Council was likely also a 
consideration. The AUTBW’s prestige can only have been increased by the fact that 
Hicks was able to hold the seat in October 1931 as one of a much-reduced number of 
Labour MPs, which in itself vindicated the move to secure him as a candidate seven 
months earlier. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that as Hicks’ by-election campaign in 
Woolwich East was underway, another major figure on the industrial side, the 
Engineers’ general secretary J. T. Brownlie, was fighting a by-election in Sunderland 
following the death of the sitting Labour member, Alf Smith of the TGWU. Admittedly 
Brownlie was approaching retirement as an AEU officer, whilst Sunderland was a less 
promising prospect than Woolwich East – as was substantiated by Brownlie’s defeat 
– but this may well be another example of the same phenomenon, given that Brownlie, 
like Hicks, had not previously been a Parliamentary candidate.461   
                                                          
be adopted as Labour candidates, but providing any further sums towards election expenses, let alone 
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Ernest Bevin’s candidature for Gateshead in October 1931 offers further insight into 
these complexities. Since the establishment of the TGWU in 1922, Bevin had shown 
little interest in a Parliamentary career, being preoccupied with his industrial work.462 
The formation of the National government was the catalyst for a change in his position. 
His comment on the crisis, that ‘this is like the General Strike, I’m prepared to put 
everything in’ may have given Henderson cause for alarm in terms of his desire for 
closer party-union co-operation and to ‘regulate the unions’ industrial action to the 
political and electoral requirements of the party’,463 but it also contained a possibility 
for advancing this strategy further by securing arguably the major figure in the 
industrial Labour movement as a Parliamentary candidate. This might reflect some of 
Henderson’s frustration at his treatment by TUC leaders during the crisis, by letting 
them ‘face the criticism’ of the electors.464 When considered alongside the pursuit of 
Hicks some months earlier, however, it is possible to perceive a more deliberate and 
persistent attempt to produce the kind of co-operation Henderson desired between the 
two wings of the movement by securing key trade union figures to contribute to 
Labour’s efforts in the Commons. 
By October, in the context of widespread anticipation of an early election, Bevin found 
himself ‘pressed from all quarters to place myself at the disposal of the Labour 
Party’.465 Henderson in particular was applying the pressure: he had approached not 
only Bevin himself, but Hirst, the Party Chairman and TGWU Financial Secretary ‘on 
several occasions’, as well as making a ‘strong appeal’ to the chairman of the union’s 
General Executive Council, Herbert Kershaw, having invited him to meet privately to 
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discuss the subject on the first evening of the party’s annual conference at 
Scarborough.466 This placed Bevin in something of a dilemma. Although confessing 
himself anxious ‘to respond to the call of the Party, and especially so having regard to 
the probable industrial consequences of the present political situation’, the union’s 
rules would require him to give up the general Secretaryship if he entered Parliament. 
This he was strongly disinclined to do, considering his ‘work in connection with the 
consolidation and development of the Union had not yet been completed’.467 
Writing to Henderson on 2 October, he acknowledged that ‘you will think I am very 
difficult in regard to this political business’, but given this difficulty and the ‘divergence 
of opinion’ within the union on the issue, the TGWU Executive would have to make a 
decision when it met at Scarborough. The delay would mean telling the Seaham 
(Durham) Divisional Labour Party ‘not to bother’ considering Bevin as a candidate, so 
as not to ‘interfere or hold up nominations’. 468 It can be inferred that both Henderson 
and the local party had appealed to Bevin to stand against Ramsay MacDonald at 
Seaham, and both Bevin and William Coxon, the DLP secretary and eventual 
candidate, had been forced to deny rumours of Bevin’s candidacy there.469 A 
MacDonald-Bevin contest would certainly have had symbolic value, whilst Henderson 
and others may well have felt that it would take a candidate of Bevin’s stature to have 
any realistic chance of defeating MacDonald in the constituency: the likes of H. N. 
Brailsford, Sir Patrick Hastings, and Harold Laski were also among rumoured 
nominees.470 A defeat for Bevin in such a contest, however, would have been 
extremely embarrassing, and this possibility may have been a factor in his decision 
not to pursue the offer. In any case, as he explained to Henderson, ‘if I ran at all, I 
should endeavour to get a seat near London, to make things as easy as possible’.471   
The TGWU’s Executive met on the evening of 6 October at Scarborough, after the 
second day’s proceedings of the party conference. Members unable to attend were 
circularised and their views reported. Bevin outlined the case for his candidature, in 
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terms of the critical political position, his own role in the events of the crisis, the need 
for political consolidation of the trade unions and that it was believed that he could 
‘render real assistance’ to that end. Hirst and Kershaw referred to their discussions 
with Henderson, Hirst noting that the latter had insisted upon the ‘necessity of securing 
the assistance in Parliament of national figures on the industrial side’. After ‘lengthy’ 
deliberation, the meeting was adjourned to the following day. It is not clear at what 
time the meeting reconvened, but it seems likely to have been, again, in the evening 
after the day’s conference proceedings had concluded. By this point the writs for a 
general election had been issued, which can only have added to the sense of 
urgency.472 Bevin now appeared more determined. After more ‘long and careful 
consideration’ the Executive decided to allow him to stand, whilst continuing as 
general secretary, on the grounds that ‘the confidence of the members would be 
shaken by any change in the leadership of the Union at the present time’. No particular 
constituency was specified, although some financial issues were discussed.473 Here, 
as in the AUBTW’s case, existing union policy had been abandoned in order to 
facilitate the candidature of a key official at a critical moment. Henderson’s influence 
had again been important. If the Executive were meeting in the evening, then that very 
afternoon they would have heard ‘Uncle’ Arthur opposing a resolution barring 
permanent officials of the party from filling ‘dual roles’ as MPs. Henderson emphasised 
that such a decision would affect not only the party’s own staff, but also ‘other 
organisations […] every Trade Union’. His remark that ‘we have been going on for 
years in this way, and I do not think the Party has suffered’ would not have been lost 
on the TGWU Executive members, and given his efforts, it is not unlikely that 
Henderson had Bevin in mind when referring to trade unions which managed to follow 
this practice.474 
Bullock remarks that, his candidacy being approved, Bevin was ‘at once offered the 
nomination for Gateshead’.475 This requires further discussion given that Bevin had 
expressed his preference for a constituency near the capital. The Labour candidature 
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for the constituency became available due to the sudden death of the sitting MP, 
Herbert Evans, on the day of the dissolution of Parliament, 7 October, so had not been 
under consideration previously.476 Certainly it appeared a good prospect, having been 
held by Labour since 1922 with a brief Liberal interlude during the 1923-4 Parliament. 
The barrister James Melville had held the seat for Labour with a majority of over 16,000 
in 1929, securing over half of the votes in a four-cornered contest, before being 
appointed Solicitor-General by MacDonald.477 Gateshead was the party’s strongest 
area in the north-east in terms of municipal results in county boroughs across the inter-
war period, whilst the large proportion of the local workforce in the shipbuilding, 
engineering and coal industries suffering unemployment, appeared, superficially at 
least, to provide a ready audience for Labour propaganda.478 Evans had held the seat 
in a straight fight at a June 1931 by-election caused by Melville’s death with a much 
narrower majority of 1,392, so in the context of the crisis, victory was far from assured, 
particularly once the Conservative, National Labour and New Party candidates 
dropped out of the running.479 Proximity to Seaham did mean that Bevin was able to 
speak in MacDonald’s constituency several times during the campaign, and it seems 
likely that Bevin’s candidature owed something to this.480 However, the determining 
factor was the sudden emergence of a vacancy for a Labour candidate in a reasonably 
‘winnable’ constituency.  
Unlike George Hicks six months earlier, Bevin had to face a contested selection 
conference before being adopted by the constituency party. The sudden nature of the 
vacancy owing to Evans’ death and the pressure of the impending general election, 
as well as Gateshead’s distance from London, mitigated against the kind of close co-
operation between national and local party officials that had helped ease Hicks into 
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the Woolwich East candidature; the accusations of trade union ‘dictation’ during and 
since the August crisis would hardly be assuaged were the General Council’s leading 
personality to be presented with a promising candidature unchallenged, although there 
was understandable excitement within the Gateshead labour movement over the 
possibility of his candidacy.481 Bevin was one of four nominees before the selection 
conference delegates on 12 October; eventually defeating a wealthy, Oxford-educated 
journalist, Richard Fisher, by 77 votes to 40 after the other two nominees, both local 
men with ILP support, had been eliminated due to their refusal to undertake to accept, 
if elected, the standing orders of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Whilst there were 
concerns that Bevin would be unable to give much time to Gateshead owing to his 
trade union commitments, his experience and superior economic knowledge helped 
secure his adoption over Fisher, in whom one delegate discerned ‘more than a little of 
the money touch’.482 During the campaign Bevin’s opponent, the National Liberal 
Thomas Magnay, made effective use of his own local connections, portraying Bevin 
as a carpet-bagger who only came to Gateshead ‘a few weeks ago’ in comparison to 
Magnay’s four decades; he also exploited the claims of TUC ‘dictation’, a charge to 
which Bevin was ‘particularly vulnerable’.483   
In the event, Magnay secured a majority of almost 13,000. Although Bevin declared 
himself ‘very glad indeed’ to have been able to poll the previous Labour vote, a 
unanimous request for him to continue as Gateshead candidate was refused by the 
union’s Executive, on the grounds that the urgency of the circumstances no longer 
existed.484 The union had no desire to make a habit of allowing the general secretary 
to contest Parliamentary seats, but on this occasion a significant exception had been 
made. 
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34,764. This total would have been enough to win the earlier by-election, when Evans defeated 
Conservative Cuthbert Headlam by 22,893 votes to 21,501. 
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The ‘adoption market’: electoral geography and placing union candidates 
 
In comparison to those aspirant MPs sponsored by constituency parties or by the Co-
operative party, trade union candidates were disproportionately more successful, 
tending to be concentrated more heavily in ‘safe’ seats. The effect of this on Labour’s 
Parliamentary activity will be analysed in the next chapter, but here closer examination 
of how unions chose where to pursue candidatures is required. One point of criticism 
of the sponsorship system was that union resources were often concentrated in 
constituencies where they were arguably least required, leaving more marginal 
divisions short of much-needed funds and attention. Despite this union-sponsored 
constituencies provided a foundation of continuity. The number of union candidatures 
in seats not previously won by Labour at general elections provides a useful illustration 
of the extent of this phenomenon. At the 1929 general election forty out a total of 139 
trade union candidates contested seats never previously won by Labour. Of this forty, 
more than a third were fought by a continuing candidate. In 1931 the total fell to 
sixteen, and in 1935 to just eleven.485 A core of seats which were always union ones 
was developing, and whilst there was some expansion into new areas in 1945,486 the 
overall figures stayed similar into the 1960s.487 This pattern was largely in place by the 
1930s. 
                                                          
485 In 1931, these seats were: Bethnal Green South West (TGWU); Bury (UTFWA); Hull North West 
(NUBSO); Leeds North East (NUBSO); Liverpool Exchange (TGWU); Middlesbrough West (NUR); 
Nottingham East (NUGMW); Plymouth Sutton (NUR); the second Preston seat (NUGMW); Chorley, 
Lancashire (Op. Bleachers); Heywood and Radcliffe, Lancashire (UTFWA); Middleton and Prestwich, 
Lancashire (UTFWA); Royton, Lancashire (UTFWA); Stafford, Staffordshire (NUBSO), Pudsey and 
Otley, West Yorkshire (Painters); and Greenock, Renfrewshire (USBISS); of these, three (Bury; 
Middleton and Prestwich; Stafford) were fought by the same union as in 1929, and two with a 
continuing candidate (Bury; Middleton and Prestwich). In 1935, the seats were: Birmingham West 
(NUGMW); Leeds North East (NUBSO); Liverpool Fairfield (ASW);  Middlesbrough West (NUR); 
Plymouth Sutton (NUR); Thornbury, Gloucestershire (NUDAW); Chorley, Lancashire (NUGMW); 
Heywood and Radcliffe, Lancashire (TGWU); Middleton and Prestwich, Lancashire (UTFWA); 
Royton, Lancashire (op. Bleachers); and Greenock, Renfrewshire (USBISS); of these six were fought 
by the same union as in 1931, and four (Leeds North East; Middlesbrough West; Plymouth Sutton; 
and Greenock) with a continuing candidate. Labour had briefly held Heywood and Radcliffe following 
a 1921 by-election. 
486 Eleven seats never previously won by Labour were contested by union candidates in 1945. Of these, 
Exeter (NUR); Hartlepool (NUR); Liverpool Walton (RCA); Faversham, Kent (TGWU); Bosworth, 
Leicestershire (NUBSO); Harborough, Leicestershire (NUBSO); Burton, Staffordshire (NUBSO); 
Barkston Ash, West Yorkshire (NUAW); and Aberdeen South (AEU), had not previously been 
contested by trade union candidates. Only five sponsored candidates were defeated in 1945; notably 
four of them were amongst these eleven. 
487 See the figures given by Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, pp. 165-166.  
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The choice of where to stand candidates was relatively straightforward for the federal 
unions, based as they were on strong regional identities. MFGB candidates contested 
coalfield seats, whilst nominees of the textile unions overwhelmingly stood in 
Lancashire and parts of Yorkshire, although by the late 1930s, frustrated by its lack of 
Commons representation, the UTFWA annual conference passed a resolution urging 
consideration of constituencies outside the cotton areas.488 Given that the process of 
selection necessitated nomination by a union branch attached to a constituency party, 
there was little likelihood of, say, a mining candidate in Suffolk or a cotton one in 
Hampshire. In their own areas however, with greater authority within local parties, 
there was a much better chance of getting their nominee accepted as the Labour 
candidate. 
Other unions took a different approach. For those who operated a panel or list system 
on a national basis, the key relationship was between the union and its individual 
candidate, rather than a particular constituency – although this did not preclude close 
and long-standing associations between particular unions and certain constituencies, 
in some cases even long into the post-war period.489 Whilst there was a reduced 
chance of selection – with a thinner spread of members over the country, fewer were 
concentrated in any given constituency – this could be advantageous in allowing union 
executives or political sub-committees extensive scope in terms of constituency 
choice.  
Various factors might influence a decision on where to attempt to place a candidate. 
The perceived ‘winnability’ of the seat was a key consideration. As described in the 
previous chapter, union leaderships were often under considerable pressure to 
produce tangible results from political expenditure. This might involve the marginality 
of the seat in question. Several unions made use of recent election results in assessing 
the suitability of a constituency.490 The strength of the local Labour party was also 
significant here, both in terms of its membership activity and financial security: some 
unions made building up the DLP part of their policy. The level of attention paid to such 
                                                          
488 TU/3/2/7 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1938, pp. 79-80. 
489 For example, Whitehaven (Cumberland) was held by Frank Anderson of the RCA/TSSA from 1935 
until Anderson’s death in 1959; in the Yorkshire coalfield, Rother Valley, Don Valley, and Barnsley 
(later Barnsley Central) were represented by NUM-sponsored members until 1967, 1979, and 1987 
respectively. See Andrew Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners (London, 1984), pp. 133-146. 
490 See minutes of the NUR’s political sub-committee, printed in NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 
and NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, for many examples of this. 
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details might differ between unions. NUDAW was perhaps the most thorough here, 
gathering reports on constituencies from the existing agents on some occasions.491 
Constituencies were often rejected as possibilities on these grounds. Even the 
UTFWA, concentrating almost entirely on Lancashire, had an order-of-preference list 
which was used when determining which constituencies to allow its candidates to be 
put forward for.492 There could be considerable leeway, however: a request for a textile 
candidate from Middleton and Prestwich DLP was rejected in 1937 on the grounds 
that the division was not considered ‘a suitable constituency for this Association to 
finance in the placing of one of its candidates’, despite having been fought – albeit 
unsuccessfully – by an UTFWA candidate at every general election since 1918.493 
There is less evidence of lists being kept in the same way by other unions. This is 
perhaps surprising in some cases – it might be expected that the NUR, for example, 
would exhibit a preference for ‘railway towns’, but it does not seem to have pursued 
them particularly – although the same reflections still applied.494 
Links with local figures could also play a part in constituency choice. Several national 
union officials combined these roles with a local identity as a major figure in the Labour 
movement in their region or city. Arthur Hayday served as TUC chair 1931-32 and 
NUGMW Midlands district secretary, as well as being the union’s vice-president, but 
his local credentials were more significant in his candidature for Nottingham West.495 
His connection with the city dated to 1906 when he first visited as an ILP propagandist; 
he was a borough council candidate from 1910, and served in the key position of 
                                                          
491 See George Craddock’s report on Thornbury (Gloucestershire), NUDAW, Political Secretary’s 
Reports to Executive Council, report of 10 August 1933. 
492 TU/3/4/10 UTFWA, Political Sub-Committee, correspondence etc., 1930-35, Sub-committee re: 
Parliamentary Constituencies and Candidates, 20 June 1932. All were in Lancashire (unless stated 
otherwise); the order of preference was given as: 1. Bolton; 2. Sowerby (West Yorkshire); 3. Burnley; 
4. Preston; 5. Blackburn; 6. Oldham; 7. Heywood and Radcliffe; 8. Huddersfield (West Yorkshire); 9. 
Bury; and 10. Middleton and Prestwich. The union was only prepared to take financial responsibility 
for six candidates in total, so on this occasion the committee decided to initially offer their panellists 
to the first five constituencies, with numbers 6-10 only coming into play if one of the first five rejected 
the UTFWA candidate, or ‘in the event of Bolton not accepting two of our candidates’. The Legislative 
Council added Ashton-under-Lyne to the list in eighth place following an appeal from the DLP, 
TU/3/1/5 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1932, meeting of 5 July 1932. 
493 TU/3/1/9 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1936-37, meeting of 30 July 1937. Despite Middleton 
and Prestwich being last on the union’s list, that UTFWA had still contested it on these occasions may 
be indicative of the union’s lack of success in getting its candidates adopted for more preferable seats.  
494 Sam Davies and Bob Morley, County Borough Elections in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A 
Comparative Analysis. Volume 2: Bradford-Carlisle (Aldershot, 2000) include several tables detailing 
percentages of the workforce in particular trades by county borough, calculated from the 1931 Census, 
appendices 7-15, pp. 689-691. 
495 He was MP for the constituency from 1918-31, and 1935-45. 
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Trades Council president from 1913; he was an important figure in pushing the 
Nottingham labour movement to support the First World War, sitting on the local War 
Emergency Committee.496 His wartime patriotism was a factor in his election in 1918 
as Nottingham’s first Labour MP, but ‘undoubtedly’ so too was ‘his personal following 
amongst the town’s trade unionists’, indeed, he was ‘the most important trade union 
official’ in Nottingham, as part of a right-wing leadership group which had ‘tightened 
its grip’ on the local movement by the mid-1920s.497 Hayday was not the only national 
trade union leader to have a dual role as a local personality, although he was one of 
the more successful. The NUDAW political general secretary, William A. Robinson, 
was one of the senior figures in Liverpool Labour politics. He served as a borough 
councillor from 1911 and an alderman 1919-25, and again from 1931, including a 
period as leader of the Labour group.498 One of a handful of ‘powerful figures […] 
elected regardless of their union’s importance’ in the leadership of the Liverpool 
Trades Council, he was less fortunate in his attempts to become a Liverpool MP, being 
defeated at West Toxteth in 1918, Wavertree in 1924, and Exchange in 1929; his 
eventual election to Parliament for St Helens (Lancashire) in 1935 probably owed 
more to his position as a NUDAW sponsored candidate than his local connections.499  
A strong personal connection could prove crucial even when the local figure was not 
the candidate. The Labour candidate for Hull Central, J. M. Kenworthy, succeeded to 
a peerage in March 1934 on the death of his father.500 Kenworthy had been the MP 
from 1919-31, joining Labour from the Liberals in 1926. By July, Walter Windsor, a 
NUGMW panellist, had been installed as his successor. Windsor’s local connection 
appeared tenuous: he was president of the Bethnal Green North West DLP, where he 
had been the MP from 1923-29, and a member of the London County Council. The 
                                                          
496 Peter Wyncoll, The Nottingham Labour Movement, 1880-1939 (London, 1985), pp. 140, 155, 163-
165, 176. 
497 Ibid., pp. 182, 194-195, 250 
498 Sam Davies, Liverpool Labour. Social and Political Influences on the Development of the Labour 
Party in Liverpool, 1900-1939 (Keele, 1996), pp.112-114. 
499 Ibid., pp. 68, 73-74. Robinson was also Trades Council President, 1922-23; he was also defeated a 
Shipley (West Yorkshire) in 1930 at a by-election, and 1931. Several studies of his NUDAW colleague, 
Ellen Wilkinson, appear to elide William A. Robinson, NUDAW political general secretary and 
Liverpool councillor, with another NUDAW colleague, Wright Robinson, NUDAW Manchester 
divisional officer and Manchester councillor. This is an understandable misidentification, but these 
were two different men: W. A. was always given both his first initials in NUDAW minutes in to clarify 
this. Wright Robinson left a diary, which has been a useful source for Wilkinson’s biographers; a W. 
A. Robinson diary would have been of particular interest to this study, but one does not seem to have 
survived! See Beers, Red Ellen, pp. 69-70; Perry, ‘Red Ellen’ Wilkinson, pp. 144-145. 
500 ‘The New Baron Strabolgi’, Hull Daily Mail, 13 March 1934.  
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choice was more surprising given Windsor’s earlier withdrawal from Nottingham East, 
which he had fought in 1931, on the grounds of its distance from the capital preventing 
him from giving the constituency sufficient attention.501 The key figure in securing his 
candidacy for Hull Central was W. E. Copeland, a longstanding Labour councillor in 
Hull, and NUGMW Executive member.502 During discussion of a letter from the union’s 
East Coast District suggesting one of the available candidates be nominated for the 
Hull Central vacancy, Copeland was on hand: a member of the selection committee in 
the constituency, he outlined the ‘prospects of success’. This was enough to prompt 
the Executive to disregard an existing invitation to Windsor from Smethwick Labour 
party, and push him forward for Hull. Within a few weeks, the ‘necessary action had 
been taken’.503 Copeland had been present during earlier discussions about placing 
Windsor, and his action was carefully calculated; the letter would have come from his 
close ally and fellow Hull councillor T. W. Kerry, in his capacity as NUGMW East Coast 
Secretary; Copeland himself was the district president. It is likely he knew Windsor 
well, having served on the union’s executive together from 1929. Windsor was 
selected in July, and went on to win the seat in November 1935.504 He noted that his 
victory was remarkable given that ‘his agent and himself were comparative strangers 
in the division’; the agent, Ewan G. Carr, had followed Windsor from London.505 That 
he too was soon a Hull councillor surely owed something to the influence of Copeland, 
himself now an alderman.506 Individuals such as Copeland who straddled the national 
                                                          
501 TU/GENERALB/1/A/8 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1932, executive meeting of 21 January 1932, 
18 February 1932; general council meeting of 26 February 1932. The council decided against 
nominating Windsor for Jarrow (Durham), despite Windsor’s own willing: a contest against the higher-
profile Ellen Wilkinson was unlikely to go the way of their man, and in any case, the constituency was 
even further from London. 
502 Copeland had first been elected to the council in 1920, Davies and Morley, County Borough Elections 
in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative Analysis. Volume 4, ch. 9, ‘Hull’; he joined the 
union’s executive in 1929, ‘Honour for Councillor Copeland’, Hull Daily Mail, 8 March 1929. 
503 TU/GENERALB/1/A/10 NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1934, executive meeting of 3 May 1934 and 
special meeting of 19 May 1934. This involved getting the agreement of the union’s London district, 
where Windsor was an official. 
504 ‘Central Hull Labour Candidate – Former MP as Secret Choice’, Hull Daily Mail, 09 July 1934; 
NUGMW, Reports and Minutes, 1934, executive meeting of 26 July 1934. 
505 ‘What Hull Election Winners and Losers Think of It’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 November 1935; ‘Central Hull 
Labour Party – Appointment of first Full Time Agent’, Hull Daily Mail, 17 September 1934. 
506 Carr was returned unopposed in 1938 for West Central ward – within Windsor’s constituency. Davies 
and Morley, County Borough Elections in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative Analysis. 
Volume 4, ch. 9, ‘Hull’. For Copeland, see ‘Honour for Councillor Copeland’, Hull Daily Mail, 28 June 
1929; ‘National Appointment for Hull Alderman’, Hull Daily Mail, 1 August 1939; ‘Tribute to Late Ald. 
Copeland’, Hull Daily Mail, 22 January 1945. 
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industrial and local political contexts, then, could play a significant role in the placing 
of union candidates. 
The local electoral context was also relevant to the placing of union nominees, 
although it seems to have been of rather lower importance as a factor, perhaps 
because there was not necessarily a correlation between municipal and parliamentary 
electoral success in a given constituency.507 The kind of seats preferred, however, 
often did contain some wards where an established tradition of Labour voting at 
municipal elections already existed. A. G. Walkden’s Bristol South constituency 
provides a good example. The seat included some of Labour’s strongest wards in the 
city: Bedminster East, with fifteen victories from seventeen contests across 1918-1939 
and Bedminster West, with eleven wins from seventeen. Following the 1936 redrawing 
of boundaries, Labour won two out of three contests in the new Bedminster ward, and 
five from five in Somerset ward.508 
Other factors might include particular industrial features which made a constituency 
attractive to a particular union. That 62 per cent of the adult male population worked 
in metal and engineering trades in Barrow-in-Furness (Lancashire) certainly helped 
prompt the AEU’s rapid move to stake its claim to the candidature there after the 
ASLEF’s John Bromley indicated his wish to retire.509 Overall there was a preference 
for borough rather than county seats, with exceptions including county seats in the 
coalfields, such as Sedgefield (Durham), Rothwell (West Yorkshire), or Bedwellty 
(Monmouthshire). An effect of this was that ‘rural’ constituencies did tend to get 
overlooked, although there was some Agricultural Workers’ sponsorship.510 Of the 202 
                                                          
507 For example, Labour won the parliamentary seat of Carlisle in 1922, 1923 and 1929, but was not 
able to take control of the council during the interwar years. Its peak year in municipal terms was 1935, 
although the party failed to win the parliamentary seat at that year’s general election. Davies and 
Morley, County Borough Elections in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative Analysis. 
Volume 2, ch. 9, ‘Carlisle’, pp. 586-640. 
508 Ibid., ch. 3, ‘Bristol’, pp. 195-303. Only some of the wards within the Bristol Central constituency, St. 
Paul and St. Philip & St Jacob South, had comparable Labour-voting records. 
509 MSS.259/AEU/1/1/42 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Jan.-Mar. 1931, minutes of 20 February and 
23 February 1931; MSS.259/AEU/1/1/43 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Apr.-Jun. 1931, minutes 
of 28 April 1931; MSS.259/AEU/1/1/44 AEU, Executive Council Minutes, Jul.-Sep. 1931, minutes of 
23 July and 27 July 1931; Sam Davies and Bob Morley, County Borough Elections in England and 
Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative Analysis. Volume 1: Barnsley-Bournemouth (Aldershot, 1999), p. 
69. 
510 The NUAW would contribute election expenses, but not constituency payments, so this was not full 
sponsorship. Although party annual reports did occasionally list candidates as being representatives 
of the NUAW, none of these contested the 1929, 1931 or 1935 elections.  See Clare V. J. Griffiths, 
Labour and the Countryside. The Politics of Rural Britain 1918-1939 (Oxford, 2007), pp. 156-158. 
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rural constituencies considered by Clare Griffiths, only 47 were contested by a union-
sponsored candidate at interwar general elections.511 There does seem to have been 
a turn away from the rural seats by sponsoring unions by the 1930s; seats such as 
King’s Lynn (Norfolk), Oswestry (Shropshire) and Yeovil (Somerset) had been 
contested by trade union candidates in 1918, but would not be again. Of the 47 
constituencies, just 25 received union sponsorship during the general elections of 
1929, 1931 and 1935. As Griffiths notes, there were significant ‘cultural and 
geographical’ obstacles in organising the Labour vote in large rural constituencies with 
scattered populations; nor was the ‘continual financial crisis’ many rural DLPs found 
themselves in likely to encourage unions to part with limited political funds, even if 
there were other factors which did make a constituency appear promising.512 
Although it fell to the party NEC to give final endorsement to a candidature, the actual 
selection was down to the DLP concerned. Trade unions’ national strength did not 
always count here; the NUR saw its candidates beaten on several occasions.513 
Certain unions were particularly ineffective in this regard; the length of time a union’s 
candidates remained on the party’s ‘available candidates’ list without being selected 
gives a good indication of this. Smaller unions, or those who only put one candidate 
forward, were most affected here. It might be known that little money would follow their 
adoption, or a particular individual would not be the sort of candidate required, but was 
the only one on offer. William Holmes of the Agricultural Workers remained an 
‘available candidate’ from 1932 to 1940 without selection success, whilst J. P. Gardner 
of the Furniture Trades Association, Chris Lancaster of the Life Assurance Workers, 
and Bill Heywood of the National Union of Textile Workers all spent several years on 
the list. Yet UTFWA also struggled: of nine candidates on the ‘available’ list in 1936, 
seven were still awaiting a successful nomination a year later.514 The union’s policy of 
withdrawing its remaining candidates once eight had been selected probably had an 
influence here, although its officials in particular tended to be ‘less effective as 
                                                          
511 Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside: see appendix A, pp. 342-347, for a full list of these 
constituencies. My calculations exclude the elections of 1922, 1923 and 1924 for reasons outlined 
earlier. 
512 Ibid., pp. 166, 176. 
513 Including twice in one week in June 1935, when William McAdam was defeated at Coatbridge, and 
C. J. Kelly at Ashton-under-Lyne. The Coatbridge nomination went to a candidate with no sponsorship. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/23 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1935, special meeting of EC, 11 July 
1935. 
514 See Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, 1924-1940, ‘Available List’ details. 
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politicians’ despite being technically adroit’ on cotton questions such as wage 
calculation.515  
It is difficult to assess to what extent a candidate’s financial backing might influence 
his or her selection. Rush argues that it was ‘doubtful’ whether selection conference 
delegates were primarily concerned with financial questions: the majority would be 
swayed by ‘the performance of the candidates on the platform, by trade union and 
other loyalties, and by political considerations’, even in constituencies with a small 
individual party membership where union money might be most appreciated.516 
Nominees, however, might ‘think and hope’ financial considerations were important.517 
To some extent this is borne out by the evidence available. Mary Agnes Hamilton 
noted of her successful selection meeting at Blackburn, a double member borough, 
that ‘the crucial question […] was not about finance – I had stated blankly that I could 
do nothing, and the silence on this was quite non-committal’.518 It is possible that faced 
with an articulate and obviously middle-class candidate, the delegates may have felt 
that definitions of being able to ‘do nothing’ were relative, but even after her selection 
she was not expected to contribute financially, ‘poor as the local party was’.519 The 
fact that ‘Lady Hamilton’ was running in tandem with a well-resourced RCA candidate, 
Harry Gill, may, however, have helped matters. Attending a selection conference at 
Sowerby (West Yorkshire), Evelyn Walkden of NUDAW noted that there was much 
‘cavilling against T. U. financed candidates’; as such he made clear that as a union 
candidate, he had no desire for preferential treatment and if selected would need to 
consult his union before making any financial commitments. The delegates took him 
at his word and chose the other nominee, leaving Walkden lamenting ‘the peculiar 
mercenary ambitions of some constituencies’.520 Some local parties’ insistence on 
having a candidate ‘answerable to us alone’, without any outside financial backing, 
could be an irritant to trade unionists, when ‘immediately a candidate is chosen on 
such grounds it is to the Trade Unions that an appeal is made for financial assistance 
                                                          
515 TU/3/1/4 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1930-32, meeting of 29 December 1931 approved 
six candidates being selected; this later rose to eight: TU/3/1/9 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 
1936-37, meeting of 13 July 1936. Alan Fowler, ‘Lancashire to Westminster: a study of cotton trade 
union officials and British Labour 1910-39’, Labour History Review 64:1 (1999), 1-22, p. 17, but 
passim. 
516 Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, pp. 232-233. 
517 Ibid., p. 232. 
518 Mary Agnes Hamilton, Remembering my Good Friends (London, n.d.[1944]), p. 173. 
519 Ibid., p. 174. 
520 NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1936, report of 10 December 1936. 
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and the very people who voice the above sentiments are the first to criticise if that 
assistance is not forthcoming in good measure’.521 As the selection cycle began again 
late in 1935, G. R. Shepherd insisted that ‘I have the best of reasons for believing that 
the demand for monied candidates is on the decrease’, whilst admitting ‘far too many 
selections’ were still made on this basis.522 Despite the Hastings provisions, reports of 
selections made primarily on financial grounds, although the regular failure of many 
trade union candidates to get selected would imply this depended very much on the 
particular constituency. For candidates without sponsorship, ‘trade union money’ 
became an easy scapegoat following a selection conference defeat, and some of the 
criticism should be seen in this light.523 Certain constituencies almost always selected 
trade union candidates, although the sponsoring organisation varied: they would seem 
logical places to detect the sort of ‘mercenary ambitions’ referred to, yet even here the 
picture was more complex. The selection of a Seamen’s candidate, the union’s 
Scottish district secretary Charles Jarman, for the very much inland Birmingham 
Yardley, seems a particular anomaly.524 Certainly finance was discussed at a private 
meeting between Jarman and the DLP secretary,525 yet despite a relatively low 
individual membership in comparison to other Birmingham DLPs, the Yardley 
constituency contained Labour’s strongest interwar Birmingham ward in terms of vote 
share, Saltley, with the party winning 56.1 per cent of votes there across the period.526 
Moreover, one of the Saltley councillors was the TGWU Area No. 5 Secretary, James 
Crump, who had Bevin’s ear; the two unions had been working together on a joint-
parliamentary committee.527 The NUS, having recently voted to re-affiliate to the party, 
was keen to secure a parliamentary representative, and the availability of a 
constituency such as Yardley was too good an opportunity to pass over.528  
In many seats, close relationships developed over long periods. These could provide 
stability in terms of continuity of candidate and agent, as well as a regular source of 
                                                          
521 George Mathers of the RCA, writing in The Labour Candidate, October-November 1933. 
522 G. R. Shepherd, ‘A Political Miracle’, Labour, December 1935. 
523 ‘The Adoption Market’, The Labour Candidate, March 1936. 
524 The TGWU, rather than the NUS, organised canal workers. 
525 MSS.175/1/1/8 NUS, Minute Books, 1934-39, meeting of executive council, 19 July 1935. 
526 Davies and Morley, County Borough Elections in England and Wales, 1919-1938: A Comparative 
Analysis. Volume 1, ch.5 ‘Birmingham’, pp. 219-336. 
527 The next chapter briefly discusses this committee. For Crump, see Eric Taylor, ‘Crump, James 
(1873-1960)', Dictionary of Labour Biography V, pp. 76-78. 
528 MSS.175/1/1/8 NUS, Minute Books, 1934-39, meeting of executive council, 20 July 1934. 
MSS.175/6/Jar/1-4 Charles Jarman Papers contain various correspondence relating to Yardley. 
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funding. Yet they could also cause conflict, particularly where lengthy experience of 
sponsorship developed a sense of propriety by unions over ‘their’ seats. This was a 
particular problem where the party tried to find suitable seats for ex-ministers during 
the 1931-35 parliament. The NUR issued an ‘emphatic protest’ to the party over the 
nomination of Arthur Greenwood for the Wakefield by-election in early 1932: the union 
had sponsored the constituency for several years and ‘we are of the opinion that such 
action will not tend to produce the solidarity and goodwill necessary for the building up 
of constituencies for Labour’, although urged its members locally to ‘afford every 
support’ to Greenwood’s campaign.529 This blend of privately-expressed grievance 
with a public appeal for loyalty was typical of union responses to such 
disappointments.530 However, a dispute over the selection for the Clay Cross 
(Derbyshire) constituency following the death of the sitting TGWU MP, Charles 
Duncan, was more problematic.531 Duncan had been seriously ill for some time, and 
at least one other union was already circling in anticipation of his resignation;532 Bevin 
had coaxed him into retiring early from his TGWU post.533 It was clear that the seat, 
one of Labour’s safest with a 1931 majority of nearly 10,000, would soon be vacant. 
The TGWU had lined up Ben Smith, previously MP for Bermondsey Rotherhithe, as 
its prospective nominee. Within a day of Duncan’s death in July 1933, rumours were 
circulating that the party secretary Arthur Henderson would be the Labour candidate, 
                                                          
529 MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, minutes of June 1932 quarterly 
meeting. 
530 The NUR made a further protest in 1937 over the same issue, this time in relation to pressure for 
‘front bench’ candidates at the Stalybridge and Hyde (Cheshire) by-election. Labour party NEC 
Minutes, 1937, NEC meeting of 6 September 1937; MSS.127/NU/1/1/25 NUR, Annual Proceedings 
and Reports, 1937, executive committee, June 1937 quarterly meeting. Other examples include the 
SWMF’s protest over its candidate’s defeat at Pontypridd, NEC meeting of 26 January 1938; for an 
AEU protest over the Dartford (Kent) nomination, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/61 AEU, Executive Council 
Minutes, Oct.-Dec. 1935, meeting of 4 November 1935. It is notable that majority of these cases 
occurred over by-election candidatures. During the ordinary process of selection, the rejection of a 
union’s candidate was less of a blow: other constituencies remained in need of candidates, so there 
would still be further opportunities. 
531 For Duncan, see David E. Martin, ‘Duncan, Charles (1865-1933)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography II, 
pp. 123-127. 
532 NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1932, report of 30 November 1932. 
Robinson was to report ‘on the position of the Clay Cross Division into which he was directed to make 
inquiries at your last meeting’. The Executive’s minutes for the two previous meetings make no 
reference to Clay Cross, implying that the discussion was ‘off the record’, although Robinson’s report 
was ‘noted’ by the Council: NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1932, minutes of 9 October 1932, 
13 November 1932, 4 December 1932. 
533 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/10 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
Emergency Committee, 1932, GEC minutes of 22 February 1932. Duncan was already in hospital at 
this point. 
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although Henderson would not be drawn on whether he sought the nomination.534 An 
NUR candidate, P. G. Barstow, was in the field, whilst A. V. Alexander of the Co-
operative Party had also been nominated. Duncan had enjoyed the strong support of 
the Derbyshire Miners Association, but no Miners’ candidate was amongst the initial 
nominations. The DMA protested against their exclusion, going as far as to 
contemplate running against the official Labour candidate if the DLP did not relent; in 
the event it did so, allowing Samuel Sales to be put forward as the Miners’ nominee.535 
Ultimately Henderson did stand and was selected; Sales made it clear that the DMA 
would have been happy to withdraw for Henderson if the other unions had also agreed 
to do so.536 The TGWU in particular were not. Bevin insisted to his executive that ‘every 
step possible’ had been taken to safeguard the seat for the union, and a letter 
expressing ‘protest and resentment’ was sent to the party executive, with further action 
to be determined pending the NEC’s reply.537 The TGWU had lost confidence in the 
party’s ability to ‘promote the political interests of the union’, and refused to pay its 
1933 affiliation fee.538 Although the NEC congratulated Henderson on his successful 
election in September, it agreed to set up a committee of inquiry into the selection, in 
close consultation with representatives of the TGWU. These discussions continued for 
several months. A report was finalised in March 1934, after an initial version had been 
rejected by the union in December 1933.539 Bevin had discussed the Clay Cross 
position with Henderson at the 1932 party conference at Leicester, although both men 
                                                          
534 ‘Mr. Henderson and Clay Cross – Possible Labour Candidate’, Derby Evening Telegraph, 7 July 
1933. It was noted that if Henderson were to contest the seat, the Samuelite Liberals were unlikely to 
challenge him in light of his work as President of the Disarmament Conference; this did prove the 
case; ‘Mr. Arthur Henderson – Silence about Clay Cross Candidature’, Derby Evening Telegraph, 10 
July 1933. 
535 J. E. Williams, The Derbyshire Miners. A Study in Industrial and Social History (London, 1961), p. 
836. 
536 ‘Mr. Henderson to Contest Clay Cross’, Derby Evening Telegraph, 31 July 1933. Henderson received 
50 votes, Sales 16, Smith 14, and Barstow 7. As late as G. R. Shepherd’s report to the party NEC on 
the by-election at their meeting of 26 July 1933, it appeared that Henderson had withdrawn the 
nomination made on his behalf. Labour Party NEC Minutes 1933. 
537 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/11 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1933, FGPC meeting of 31 July 1933. Certainly he had tried to get 
other unions’ support for Smith, including the NUDAW. See NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to 
Executive Council, 1933, report of 4 August 1933. TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive 
Council and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1933, GEC meeting of 22 August 1933. 
538 Labour Party NEC minutes 1933, NEC meeting of 6 September 1933. 
539 Labour Party NEC minutes: NEC meetings of 6 September 1933, 29 September 1933, 25 October 
1933, 20 December 1933, 1 March 1934, 28 March 1934. TGWU, Minutes and reports of General 
Executive Council and Finance and General Purposes Committee: FGPC meetings of 13 September 
1933, 28 September 1933, 3 November 1933, 29 December 1933, 8-9 February 1934, 26 April 1934; 
GEC meeting of 20 November 1933. 
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disputed what had been said; the TGWU had made its interest in the seat ‘perfectly 
clear’ to the NEC’s elections sub-committee following this. The union particularly 
objected to the apparent preferential treatment given to Henderson, notably his being 
taken on a tour of the constituency by a divisional officer of the party prior to the 
selection conference, and the action taken by the then-party chairman, Joseph 
Compton, ‘in asking an individual to work up the constituency for a particular 
candidate’, i.e., Henderson.540 The report’s recommendations, including consultation 
with the existing sponsoring organisation before the NEC took any action to nominate 
a candidate, were accepted by the union, and the outstanding fees – minus the 
contribution to the party by-election insurance fund due for the Clay Cross contest – 
were finally paid in April 1934.541 Despite this, anger did not easily subside. The TGWU 
Area No. 6 Committee wrote to the union Executive in damning terms as late as May 
1935, regretting that Henderson ‘should have allowed himself to be elected as Member 
for the Clay Cross Division […] thereby depriving the constituents of parliamentary 
representation’ whilst he was chairing the Disarmament Conference, a protest the 
executive endorsed and forwarded to the party NEC.542 It is difficult to imagine the 
Henderson of a few years prior being caught up in an organisational controversy in 
this way; he was now in poor health, and Dalton noted that he was ‘losing his tactical 
sense, once so acute, pretty badly’ and had to ‘practically be pushed out’ of the party 
secretaryship.543 Unsurprisingly, Henderson ‘didn’t like’ the Clay Cross verdict,544 and 
the union had been particularly bellicose, reflecting the extent to which Bevin 
considered the selection a personal slight in the context of the Leicester conversation. 
When a similar situation arose over another seat in which the TGWU was interested, 
Doncaster, it is noteworthy that a much more restrained approach was taken by Arthur 
Deakin, acting general secretary during Bevin’s leave of absence.545  
                                                          
540 ‘Report Re Clay Cross Enquiry’, Labour Party NEC Minutes 1934, NEC meeting of 27 March 1934. 
541 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/12 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1934, FGPC meeting of 27 April 1934; Labour Party NEC Minutes, 
FGPC meeting of 14 May 1934. Perhaps wisely, the NEC decided not to pursue the outstanding by-
election fund contribution, NEC meeting of 16 May 1934.  
542 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/13 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1935, GEC meeting of 29 May 1935. 
543 Hugh Dalton, The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 1945-60, ed. B. Pimlott (London, 1986), 
entry dated ‘1934-5’, p. 184. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Labour Party NEC Minutes 1938, NEC meeting of 28 September 1938. Dalton had already 
suggested that the party should prioritise finding a seat for the defeated TGWU candidate, George 
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Competition between unions over winnable seats could also cause conflict. The NUR, 
keenly aware of its parliamentary weakness following the 1931 election, moved quickly 
to place its candidates in promising constituencies; in December 1931 the union’s 
political sub-committee identified a list of seven seats where ‘our local branches, or 
the local Labour Party’ had made inquiries about the possibility of an NUR candidature. 
Top of the list was Rotherham, which had been represented by Fred Lindley of the 
Woodworkers from 1923, until his narrow defeat by 762 votes in October 1931.546 The 
ASW had being providing a grant of £300 annually towards the salary of a full-time 
agent; the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act had sufficient impact on the 
union’s political fund to force it to scale back its commitments after the 1929 general 
election: £100 was now the most it could make available for the Rotherham agent’s 
salary. When the DLP declined to make up the difference, notice was given to the 
agent, G. E. Caine, who was replaced on a part-time basis by the DLP secretary, G. 
C. Ball of the NUR.547 It was almost certainly Ball who alerted his union’s political sub-
committee to the possibility of the Rotherham nomination; the first Lindley knew of a 
new selection conference was by a letter received from the ASW head office on 15 
January 1932, the morning of the conference. It appeared that Ball had not notified 
the local ASW branch, with the result that, not having received any nominations, 
Lindley was barred from addressing the selection conference; William Dobbie, the 
NUR president, was selected, having already been safely nominated by three local 
branches of the union.548 The NUR, and Ball in particular, had been ruthless in their 
efforts to secure an attractive nomination for their man. The ASW complained to the 
party NEC of having been unfairly ‘ousted […] after spending thousands of pounds 
and doing the spade work’ in the constituency, yet an NEC investigation found that 
                                                          
Dallas, who was also serving as party chairman. Labour Party NEC Minutes 1938, elections sub-
committee, meeting of 5 January 1938. 
546 MSS.127/NU/1/1/19 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1931, minutes of December 1931 
executive committee quarterly meeting: report of political sub-committee, 8 December 1931. 
547 ‘Rotherham Election Bombshell – How the New Labour Candidate was Selected – Mr F. W. Lindley 
Breaks his Long Silence’, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 21 February 1933. 
548 Ibid. According to Lindley, he received notice of the conference on 15 January 1932, the day it was 
due to take place. The local NUR branches had nominated Dobbie at least a week earlier: 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932, minutes of special executive 
committee meeting, 7 January 1932. The ASW complained that Ball had given notice not to the local 
branch, but to an ASW member, Coghill, who was ‘neither an official nor a local officer of the Society’. 
Instead, ASW head office had received a standard letter sent to all affiliated unions advertising the 
selection conference dated 12 January – itself hardly much time to organise a branch nomination.  
Labour Party NEC papers, meeting of organisation sub-committee, 17 February 1932. Local MFGB 
and ISTC members were also unhappy about the amount of notice given, ‘Socialist Dispute – 
Selection of Rotherham Candidate’, Yorkshire Post, 5 March 1932. 
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despite ‘an absence of businesslike proceedings on both sides’, there were insufficient 
grounds to block Dobbie’s endorsement.549 In this way the NEC’s organisation sub-
committee, led by Lathan, effectively minimised the dispute rather than risking broader 
conflict with the NUR by refusing to endorse the candidacy of its president. Lindley 
was rapidly adopted for Leeds Central, and the ASW’s complaints remained largely 
private. Only in the context of a by-election in Rotherham a year later, when Dobbie 
was all but assured of a large majority, did Lindley make public his side of the story in 
a press interview: public loyalty to the party was the typical trade union response.550 
Union candidatures affected the DLPs involved in several ways beyond simply 
financial help in the shape of election expenses and grants. These constituencies were 
more likely to have a full-time agent: over the period 1931-39, of all Labour agents, an 
average of 45.6 per cent were employed in constituencies where the candidate had 
union sponsorship, whilst over the same period, only 28.7 per cent of those agents 
receiving grants-in-aid from the party nationally to top up their salaries, suggesting that 
where there was union sponsorship, agents were better paid.551 As such, the 
withdrawal of union support after an election defeat, or its delay pending a new panel 
selection, could have an adverse impact on local political organisation. Some unions 
did take steps to mitigate this: NUDAW followed a policy of retaining the existing agent 
when it took over sponsorship for a new constituency.552 There was often a 
considerable degree of supervision and investment from union executives. Detailed 
reports from agents were submitted to the NUDAW executive for approval on a 
monthly basis; agents for UTFWA-sponsored constituencies reported directly to the 
union’s annual conference.553 It is not clear to what extent these reports were acted 
                                                          
549 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 27 January 1932; meeting of organisation 
sub-committee, 17 February 1932; NEC meeting of 23 March 1932; emergency meeting of 
organisation sub-committee, 23 March 1932; NEC meeting of 27 April 1932. 
550 Lindley’s comments to the Sheffield Daily Telegraph’s correspondent to the effect that he had been 
‘stabbed in the back’ did cause the NEC some concern; Lindley was advised that the NEC found his 
version of events inaccurate and felt regret at the form of his intervention. Dobbie was concerned that 
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Back – How Labour Dropped Mr. Lindley’, Sheffield Independent, 21 February 1933, and letters from 
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551 These figures are calculated from the lists of agents in Labour Party Annual Conference Reports; 
Co-operative party agents are excluded. 
552 NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1933, report of 29 September 1933. 
553 NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, passim; see for example TU/3/2/4 
UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1935. 
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upon, but they did help union leaderships keep note of any relevant constituency 
developments. The AEU, by contrast, seems to have taken little interest in 
constituency affairs. In some cases unions were prepared to urge re-organisation of 
local party’s if the existing machinery was found to be inadequate.554  
The nature of Labour’s appeal to the local electorate might also be affected by 
sponsorship. Jon Lawrence has suggested that Labour made use of a ‘workerist’ 
public language which allowed it to hold its own in industrial communities.555 Union 
candidates would logically be natural purveyors of such rhetoric. Certainly union 
candidates made direct appeals to workers in the industries their organisations 
represented, for example, UTFWA issuing a suggested paragraph for insertion into its 
candidates’ election addresses dealing with cotton issues in 1935.556 NUDAW 
supplied its own ‘Notes for Speakers’ in both the 1931 and 1935 campaigns.557 The 
kind of anti-employer, communal vision of the ‘public’, referred to by Lawrence is 
evident in several union candidates’ election addresses. The TGWU’s Ben Smith 
stressed the ‘anti-working class measures’ supported by his Conservative opponent, 
and highlighting in some detail her shareholding in the sugar company Tate and Lyle, 
and criticising its large dividends: ‘every time a worker puts a lump of sugar in his tea 
[…] providing a subsidy to people interested in sugar’.558  
The workplace cultures of particular unions could influence the type of language 
candidates employed. Charles Jarman of the NUS offers one example, stressing the 
solidarity of workers in his own industry: ‘our history is teeming with stories of sacrifice 
to save lives at sea. Is it too much to believe that shore workers have the same human 
feelings […] I venture to say it is not’.559 The railway unions offer an interesting 
contrast. The 1931 election address of the RCA’s Fred Watkins, for instance, makes 
                                                          
554 For example, the TGWU and the Lincoln constituency; George Deer was the union’s candidate. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/15 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1937, GEC meeting of 2 December 1937. 
555 J. Lawrence, ‘Labour and the politics of class, 1900-1940’ in D. Feldman and J. Lawrence (eds), 
Structures and Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge, 2011), 237-260, pp. 240-241. 
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557 LP/ELEC/1931/2 General election material, 1931, box 2; LP/ELEC/1935/1 General election material, 
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558 LP/ELEC/1935/1 General election material, 1935. Ben Smith, election address (Bermondsey 
Rotherhithe). 
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Yardley). Jarman also attacked the Means Test as ‘anti-British’. 
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its case largely through the inclusion of detailed statistics on the national income, 
extent of cuts, and the likely effects of tariff reform; whilst Watkins briefly noted that he 
was a ‘convinced Socialist’, much of his appeal is in more general terms and is largely 
shorn of the language of class: it emphasises the ‘securities and satisfactions’ a 
Labour government would provide, arguing that the National government’s policy ‘will 
be disastrous for the large majority’ of his Hackney Central electorate. Such an appeal 
seems to be a product of the white-collar, clerical work culture of the RCA, focusing 
on detail whilst appealing in broad rather than class-based terms.560 This differs 
considerably from the kind of language used by NUR candidates: William Dobbie’s 
address to the electors of Stalybridge and Hyde (Cheshire) at the same election is 
much more partisan in tone, repeatedly referring to the ‘Tory Party’ as opposed to the 
National government. His appeal is also more explicitly socialist and arguably 
catastrophist in content, noting that capitalism ‘is in the process of decay’, referring to 
the ‘disease’ afflicting the country: the language is that of atrophy. Dobbie concludes 
that the ‘spectre of want and insecurity […] haunts the working people of this 
country’.561 This appears to reflect one aspect of the NUR’s politics, as an industrial 
union seeking to appeal to all railway workers: there is little reference to the industry, 
but the broadly class-conscious language used conveys something closer to the spirit 
of the industrial NUR in contrast to the clerical RCA. 
The MFGB candidates’ election literature is also revealing.562 It might be anticipated 
that MFGB candidates would be most likely to draw on their distinctive work culture in 
their language. Several of the union’s candidates in 1931 did make explicit reference 
to mining or mines policy in their literature.563 This does not appear to be the case with 
the candidates of other unions to anything approaching the same extent. Yet many 
MFGB candidates made no reference to mining beyond the inclusion of mines on a 
                                                          
560 LP/ELEC/1931/1 General election material, 1931, box 1, Fred Watkins, election address (Hackney 
Central). 
561 LP/ELEC/1931/1 General election material, 1931, box 1, William Dobbie, election address 
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list of industries that a Labour government would nationalise.564 In 1929, a special 
election edition of the Miner was issued in each coalfield, with photographs of the area 
union’s candidates and an address focused on the particular coalfield’s issues. The 
special also incorporated an MFGB manifesto, whilst the versions issued in certain 
areas, most notably Yorkshire, also included a separate manifesto from the area 
union.565 This effort to appeal specifically to the mining electorate was not repeated in 
1931; perhaps in part due to the MFGB’s leadership crisis, whilst in any case the 
regular version of the Miner had ceased publication in 1930. Arguably the MFGB’s 
identity as a conspicuously loyal Labour supporting union influenced the decision of 
many of its 1931 candidates to focus on issues beyond mining in their appeals to the 
electorate.   
Gender issues appear to have made a relatively limited impact on the appeals of trade 
union candidates. The MFGB’s G. W. Shield (Wansbeck, Northumberland) was a 
notable exception, making an explicit appeal ‘to the Woman Voter’ in his election 
address; this may be reflective of the recognition of the role played by women in mining 
communities, for example during the 1926 lock-out.566 However, the local campaigns 
of Labour’s political opponents might be specifically calculated to combat union-
sponsored opponents by making use of gender: the choice of younger female 
candidates as Conservative candidates against prominent trade unionists in safe 
Labour seats in 1935 may have been in part an opportunity to portray the 
Conservatives as representatives of the ‘public’, as against the sectional, masculine 
world of organised labour; typically, however, these candidates were defeated.567 
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Chapter 4 
Parliamentary politics 
 
 
They did not seek in any shape or form to say what the Party was to do, but 
they did ask that the primary purpose of the creation of the Party should not 
be forgotten. It was created by the Trade Union Movement to do those 
things in Parliament which the Trade Union Movement found ineffectively 
performed by the two-Party system. 
Walter Citrine at meeting of TUC General Council and Labour Party NEC, 
November 1931.568 
 
Trade union Members of Parliament stand up in the British House of 
Commons and out of the wealth of their personal experience put the true 
picture of industrial life before the Nation’s legislators. On all matters 
affecting workers’ standards they bring to bear expert knowledge derived 
from years of factory and workshop experience. In legislation dealing with 
Factories, Coal Mines, Transport, Workmen’s Compensation, Industrial 
Diseases, Juvenile and Woman labour, they render extremely valuable 
services, always pressing for greater protection and security. 
Fred Marshall MP, Chairman’s Address to NUGMW Biennial Delegate Congress, 
June 1938.569 
 
A phenomenon on the Labour side is the elderly trade unionist who has, in 
his youth, fought great battles for the cause. As a result he is retired by his 
union to Parliament, where he spends his declining years leading a 
comfortable life on a reasonable salary. His work is not arduous, life is 
                                                          
568 Comments of Citrine reported in MSS.292/20/16 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1931-32, Minutes 
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friendly, pleasant and comfortable. Back home he has great standing as a 
Member of Parliament; his self-esteem is satisfied by the adulation he 
receives when he returns to his own constituency where he is regarded as 
a hero and a most important person. His only anxiety in this happy, lazy life 
is that a Parliamentary situation might lead to a General Election and then 
he might lose his seat in the House. 
This kind of back-bencher is intensely loyal to the Party machine, but is not 
overly interested in its principles. This is quite reasonable as all the active 
years of his life have been spent in trade union work, where rigid loyalty and 
discipline are necessary, and he carries on the unquestioning attitude of 
mind. During those years his interest in the political side of the movement 
was secondary. He has a clear conscience, for he feels that being in the 
House is a reward for a lifetime of work in the union. 
These Members are usually first-class people who have been worn out by 
a hard life of work and struggle. They find the atmosphere of Parliament 
utterly unlike their previous battlefields, and they are too old and exhausted 
to orientate themselves to a new outlook and a new career. They are 
intimidated by the lush atmosphere of social correctness imparted to the 
House by generations of Tories, and are afraid to speak in the House 
because their accents are ‘common’ and their vocabulary is homely and 
direct. Rather than risk making fools of themselves, in their own eyes, they 
spend most of their time in the smoking rooms, where they give one another 
a feeling of great importance by gossiping, often maliciously, about those 
Members of the Party who are taking an active part in the work of the House. 
They alternate between a nagging feeling of inferiority in the House, and the 
compensation of being the Big Man in their district every time they return 
home. They weaken the Labour Party, as there are many young, vigorous, 
unafraid members who would be far more useful in the House. It is a sad 
end to a brave active life. 
Patricia Strauss in Bevin and Co., 1941.570 
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Whilst in one sense Walter Citrine’s remarks quoted above during the post-mortem 
of the 1931 general election campaign constituted a lecture to the Labour leadership 
on what the TUC general secretary saw as the proper relationship between the party 
and the unions, in another they emphasized – from the mouth of one of the country’s 
most powerful and prominent trade unionists – the centrality of parliamentary action 
and representation to the unions’ political strategy. Despite the disappointment felt by 
many in the labour movement in the performance of the 1929-31 Labour government 
and the party’s parliamentary weakness following its collapse, in general trade union 
parliamentarism remained undiminished. There was little pressure for a return to the 
tactics of the industrial ‘direct action’ popular in the years following the First World 
War, which had been undermined by the experience of the General Strike in 1926 
and the period of retrenchment that followed.571 The circumstances of economic 
slump, growing unemployment and declining union membership with its associated 
impact on union funds were hardly conducive to the resurrection of such an approach. 
At the other extreme, even the more sophisticated advocates of the corporatist 
approached embodied in the Mond-Turner discussions such as Walter Milne-Bailey 
and Citrine himself continued to envisage a primary role for parliamentary 
institutions.572 This did not entail an uncritical approach to Parliament, and trade 
unionists took part in intra-party debates on the reform of parliamentary process. 
However, beyond the more corporatist approach of the TUC it is possible to 
distinguish a variety of union parliamentarisms.573 Crucial here is the role of the trade 
union-sponsored Labour MPs. The views of Marshall and Strauss quoted above offer 
two contrasting visions of the role and importance of such Members, and each was 
at play to some extent in what is discussed below. Typically in the interwar period, 
the smaller the Parliamentary Labour Party was, the greater the proportion of union 
sponsored MPs there were within it, as usually those areas with the most developed 
union organisation locally were more likely to return Labour MPs, although there were 
notable exceptions to this such as County Durham in October 1931.574 The period 
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under study here is generally seen as one in which the basis of power in the 
movement shifted from the parliamentary party to the party’s national organisation 
outside Parliament, and with it the unions; a study of union MPs can examine how far 
in the context of greater union strength within the PLP could be used to assert this 
presumed power. Writing in 1960, Martin Harrison noted that the relationship between 
sponsored MPs and their unions had ‘never been adequately traced’, yet in the half-
century since, relatively few historians have sought to do so; the lack of consideration 
given to interwar sponsorship of MPs is particularly noticeable.575 Irving Richter’s 
1973 study of Political Purpose in Trade Unions closely details the development of 
the AEU’s post-war relationship with its sponsored MPs, yet, as will be seen below, 
the AEU’s approach was strikingly different before 1945.576 Harrison himself covers 
a number of unions in the period 1945-60.577 Lewis Minkin’s account in The 
Contentious Alliance (1991) is much more nuanced, dealing with the (re)development 
of union machinery for liaison with sponsored MPs, notably in the NUR, as well as 
the financial context of sponsorship, but this study is also based firmly in the post-war 
period, and in particular developments from the 1960s onwards as union co-option of 
sitting MPs began to supersede earlier practices such as the selection or election of 
parliamentary panels, with a corresponding sense of crisis in direct union 
representation in the Commons.578 The only academic study dedicated solely to union 
MPs is William Muller’s The Kept Men? (1977); Muller again deals primarily with the 
post-1945 period but aspects of his analysis are relevant to what follows below.579 A 
lack of sources may account for some of this apparent neglect: of those sources 
explicitly related to sponsored MP activity, only some 1920s minutes of the TGWU’s 
parliamentary group and a small amount of correspondence between the Trade Union 
Group of MPs, to which all sponsored MPs were entitled membership, and the TUC 
survive. However, more conventional trade union sources – executive minutes, 
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576 Irving Richter, Political Purpose in Trade Unions (London, 1973), esp. pp. 29-69. 
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annual and conference reports, and journals – can be used to reconstruct something 
of the world of the 1930s trade union MP. What follows will attempt to establish 
something of the context in which union-sponsored MPs were operating in the period, 
followed by a closer examination of the role of the union MPs themselves, the nature 
of their liaison with their unions, and their role in the labour movement more broadly, 
suggesting that for the most part, unions allowed their MPs relative autonomy and 
exercised comparative restraint in their relationship with those members for whom 
they were financially responsible. 
 
The Parliamentary Labour Party, 1931-1940 
 
The position of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in the years of the National 
governments was a difficult one in several respects. Labour was to remain in 
opposition for nearly a decade, with little hope of implementing its policies, from August 
1931 until the party’s entry into the Churchill coalition in May 1940. The PLP elected 
in 1931 was the smallest in numbers since Labour’s emergence as a serious 
contender for political power in the years following the First World War, and indeed, 
the smallest since December 1910, facing a huge National government majority. The 
near trebling in the size of the PLP after 1935 scarcely dented the continuing National 
hegemony, and for the remainder of the decade, the prospect of the party returning to 
government based on a majority of its own appeared remote. Subjecting the 
government to a parliamentary defeat was almost out of the question; Labour’s 
representation in the House of Lords was also minimal.580 The problem of the small 
size of the PLP was compounded by the loss of much of its established leadership. 
The major Parliamentary leaders of the 1920s had either defected to National Labour 
or lost their seats in the electoral catastrophe of October 1931, although several 
prominent figures returned during the course of the decade, either at by-elections or 
in a more substantial group at the 1935 election. The distorting effect of the 1931 result 
produced a PLP heavily weighted towards comparatively safe constituencies, many of 
which were in mining areas in South Wales or the West Riding of Yorkshire. Given the 
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tendency for trade union sponsored candidates to stand in generally safer seats, this 
meant a large total of union sponsored MPs in general, and a disproportionate number 
of miners’ MPs in particular when contrasted with the strength of the Miners’ 
Federation in the movement at large. Although a PLP more diverse in sponsorship 
and geographical base was returned in 1935, these MPs remained a significant group; 
certainly before 1935, it was possible to argue that the PLP was unrepresentative of 
the Labour party at large. A further problem, however, and also one particularly notable 
during the 1931-5 parliament, was the perceived isolation of the PLP from the rest of 
the Labour movement, certainly relative to the late 1920s, when a majority of the party 
National Executive (NEC) was composed of Labour MPs. The party’s extra-
parliamentary institutions – the NEC and its policy subcommittees, the revived 
National Joint Council (NJC; from 1934, the National Council of Labour, NCL), and 
even the party conference, in which MPs, usually in attendance as ex officio delegates, 
had no voting rights – appeared to take a greater share of responsibility for the 
development of Labour policy and organisation.581 The return to Parliament of several 
NEC members in 1935 redressed the balance to some extent, but much important 
work was done prior to this with relatively little PLP input. 
These difficulties – size, leadership, unrepresentativeness, and perceived isolation 
from the wider Labour movement – made the PLP an object for pity, or worse, ridicule, 
for many contemporary observers. The Deputy Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones 
found its leadership during 1931-5 ‘pitiable’.582 Labour views could be particularly 
condescending. According to Beatrice Webb, the former Cabinet minister A. V. 
Alexander had ‘a low opinion of the Parliamentary Labour Party as a whole, alike in 
character and intelligence’.583 For Hugh Dalton, another member of the 1929-31 
Labour government, the party in parliament before 1935 was ‘a poor little affair’; its 
members ‘political cripples’.584 Both Alexander and Dalton would likely have assumed 
leadership roles within the PLP if they had succeeded in retaining their seats in 1931, 
and their comments must be seen in this context, despite Dalton’s later claim to have 
                                                          
581 The following chapter discusses the NJC/NCL. 
582 Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters 1931-50 (London, 1954), p. 156. This is notable given that Jones 
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been ‘very little troubled by these hypothetical reflections’.585  However, non-
parliamentarians were also critical. Harold Laski considered that, outside the 
leadership trio of George Lansbury, Clement Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps, ‘not a 
single member of the parliamentary party rises above the mediocrity’.586 Beatrice 
Webb’s comments on Lord Ponsonby, then leading the party in the House of Lords, 
are particularly revealing. The aristocratic Ponsonby, she wrote, was an asset to the 
PLP ‘on account of his moral refinement, culture, personal disinterestedness and 
undoubted charm of bearing and manner, reinforced by a long experience of human 
nature in politics’: presumably the qualities she found lacking in the PLP’s House of 
Commons membership.587 It is difficult not to see an element of class prejudice in 
these comments; Mrs Webb had previously grouped George Hall and Jack Lawson, 
both undersecretaries in the 1929-31 government who also sat in the 1931 parliament, 
amongst the ‘poor lot’ of manual workers represented in the administration.588 Other 
Labourites identified more positive aspects; Ernest Thurtle thought that the PLP ‘was 
more a band of brothers in those days than it had ever been before or has been since’, 
although he suggests that a ‘great deal’ of the responsibility for this lay with ‘Lansbury’s 
constant encouragement and the inspiration of his example’.589 Tom Williams recalled 
the period 1931-5 as ‘the most exhilarating of my whole parliamentary life’.590 Clem 
Attlee singled out the miners’ MPs George Hall, Tom Williams and David Grenfell as 
having done ‘extraordinarily well’ in the circumstances.591 However, his judgment on 
the PLP generally in this period acknowledged its difficulties: many MPs were ‘older 
members – holders of safe seats in the mining areas – who were not accustomed to 
speak frequently in the House and could not contribute much beyond their votes’.592 
The image of a small, weak PLP dominated by ageing trade unionists, and miners in 
particular, remains a powerful one. The return of a much larger and more diverse PLP 
in 1935 did not put an end to such criticisms; although these now often focussed more 
on Attlee’s own leadership. G. D. H. Cole was troubled by the parliamentary party’s 
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‘increasing leaderlessness’; the Webbs shared his views ‘about the incompetence of 
the PLP’.593 
Historians, with some exceptions, have not studied the PLP and its membership and 
organisation in detail for any period, beyond its relevance to the careers of party 
leaders; that this should be the case for the 1930s is perhaps unsurprising given the 
difficulties faced by the party in the period and the views of contemporaries referred to 
above.594 One work purporting to take Labour’s parliamentarism as its main subject 
makes only the scantest of references to the parliamentary party in the chapter dealing 
with the 1931-5 period, and only then in reference to the PLP’s refusal to amend its 
standing orders to accommodate the ILP.595 Dedicated studies of the period do cover 
the PLP, but not in great detail. Pimlott’s Labour and the Left in the 1930s offers some 
important observations on the PLP’s relationship with the wider movement and on the 
1935 leadership election, but includes no dedicated section on the parliamentary party, 
whilst, more recently, John Swift’s Labour in Crisis, despite its focus on Attlee’s 
leadership in the 1930s, deals only briefly and rather unsatisfactorily with the PLP 
itself.596 Biographies of Labour parliamentarians can offer an insight into the inner life 
of the PLP, but naturally consider it primarily in relation to their subjects.597 The 
comparative neglect of the 1930s PLP is arguably also a consequence of a gap in the 
sources: although minutes were taken at the plenary meetings of the PLP and the 
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meetings of its Executive, those for the period from November 1937 to May 1941 did 
not survive the Blitz. However, the PLP’s activities and development in this period can 
be reconstructed through those minutes which do survive, despite their brevity, used 
in conjunction with other sources including the reports of parliamentary activity in the 
party’s Annual Reports. The remainder of this section will analyse the membership 
and organisation of the PLP during the period 1931-40, and offer some comment on 
its development, before the trade union MPs are considered in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
Although much of what follows will consider developments across the period 1931-40 
as a whole, it should be remembered that in effect two rather different Parliamentary 
Labour Parties are being dealt with: the rump PLP elected in October 1931, and the 
much larger group of Labour representatives returned in November 1935. Although 
they faced a similar challenge in terms of the continued parliamentary dominance of 
the National government, there were several important features of each Labour cohort 
which were distinctive; moreover, the party either chose or was forced to adapt both 
its internal organisation and parliamentary tactics to reflect the changing 
circumstances which emerged partly as a result of these features. 
Perhaps the most obvious such feature is the size of the PLP and the geographical 
base from which its members were drawn. Just 46 Labour MPs were returned to the 
Commons in October 1931 (along with a further six unendorsed candidates largely 
backed by the ILP), a third of whom represented constituencies in South Wales, with 
several each from the West Riding of Yorkshire and East London, a handful from 
Lancashire, three from Scotland, and a smattering of others. By contrast, the PLP 
elected in 1935 numbered three times as many at 154 members and represented a 
far more varied group of constituencies, including some such as the Western Isles not 
previously won by Labour. Another marked difference was in parliamentary 
experience, particularly of the frontbench kind which was conspicuously lacking in 
1931: although there were some important older heads, not least George Lansbury, 
two MPs were new to the House, five had less than a year’s worth of Commons 
experience and a further seven had only sat in the House during the period of the 
second Labour government: these combined constituted nearly a third of the 1931 
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PLP.598 Moreover, some of the longstanding members such as Fred Hall (Normanton, 
W. Yorks.), despite their long service had in fact made only a limited contribution as 
parliamentary speakers. While by-elections did restore some more heavyweight 
figures to the PLP such as Arthur Greenwood, Arthur Henderson and Christopher 
Addison, the 1935 election brought back a swathe of former ministers including J. R. 
Clynes, Thomas Johnston, Herbert Morrison, A. V. Alexander, H. B. Lees-Smith and 
Hugh Dalton. In terms of age, there was not a great deal of difference between the two 
cohorts, with relatively elderly average ages of 55.8 years in 1931 and 55.1 years in 
1935, although these figures mask distinctions between various sections of the PLP, 
as will be discussed below.599 Only thirteen of the whole 1935 PLP were under 45 
years old. The gender dynamic of the parliamentary party also shifted slightly: the 1931 
PLP were all male. The absence of any women Labour MPs may have resulted in less 
of the bawdy, sexist jokes that earlier women MPs such as Leah Manning had put up 
with; it likely also encouraged a drinking culture, one outlet of which was the Masonic 
lodge of which several Labour MPs and former MPs – including a number of trade 
unionists – were members.600 Ellen Wilkinson (Jarrow, Co. Durham) was the only 
Labour woman elected in 1935, although she was joined by several others over the 
following years.601 Without significant women’s representation, the PLP, in both its 
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outlook and image, was hardly likely to blaze a trail on such issues as equal pay, family 
allowances and maternal health, allowing the National government to look much more 
female-friendly. Class and occupational background also varied: the first group came 
largely from manual backgrounds, with notable exceptions such Attlee, Cripps and 
Salter, whilst the second group included a larger group of former manual workers and 
a greater number of professionals. The basis of sponsorship was also much more 
variegated in the 1935 PLP: this issue will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent 
section, and it will suffice to note here that the majority of the 1931 group had trade 
union sponsorship, most prominently from the Miners’ Federation which was 
responsible for funding the election campaigns of exactly half of the whole PLP; across 
the rest of the decade there was a slow shift towards divisional party sponsorship of 
MPs so that by May 1940, the unions and the DLPs had the same number of 
sponsored members.602 In terms of links with the other major institutions of the Labour 
movement outside Parliament, the PLP was entitled throughout the period to three 
representatives on the National Joint Council/National Council of Labour. The later 
MacDonald years had seen a record number of MPs serving simultaneously on the 
party’s National Executive – as many as eighteen in 1929-30 – yet by 1932, only 
Lansbury remained; although the total crept up it was not until 1935 that anything 
approaching the previous level of overlap was reached.603 Similarly, the 1931 PLP had 
fewer members who were also serving on the General Council of the TUC than in 
previous years, yet this was not reversed by 1935 in the context of a growing 
separation of industrial and political functions on the union side of the movement.604 
                                                          
 
602 The unions and the DLPs sponsored 79 MPs each at this point. See Labour Party Annual Conference 
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In this sense Muller’s characterisation of this period as that of ‘the passing of the 
General Secretaries’ from the House is apt, although a number of serving union 
general secretaries continued to hold Commons seats even later in the decade and 
beyond.605  
Of the PLP’s leaders in this period, Arthur Henderson had the closest links to the trade 
unions, both through his broader role as party secretary and treasurer, and as a long-
term nominee of his union, the Foundry Workers. This link was severed, however, after 
his Burnley constituency was lost in October 1931, with the septuagenarian Christian 
pacifist George Lansbury, the only member of the former Labour Cabinet to hold his 
seat, taking over unopposed as PLP chairman. Although receiving some unofficial 
sponsorship from the NUGMW, Lansbury had few formal links to the unions, despite 
his popularity in the Labour movement at large. With Clement Attlee and Stafford 
Cripps, he formed a ‘socialist triumvirate’ at the head of the PLP;606 that the three men 
took on so much of the burden of parliamentary work between them is indicative of the 
weakness of the PLP during 1931-35. Lansbury was ‘omnipresent’ on the opposition 
frontbench, mentoring weaker Labour speakers.607 The PLP’s organisation under his 
tenure consisted of a small Executive of seven, who were all re-elected each year. 
Four of the seven were union MPs, whilst with one exception, all of the five whip posts 
were filled by Miners.608 His leadership style, based on acting as Labour’s spokesman 
rather than its leader, might have had much to commend it to trade unionists were it 
not for his occasional departures from agreed party policy, which arguably reflected a 
disregard for majority decisions where he had personal objections; indeed, this would 
ultimately cost him his job as leader in 1935.609 Away from the House for most of 1934 
following a severe fall, on his return Lansbury’s resistance to a policy of sanctions on 
Italy over the Abyssinia invasion found him out of step with much party and trade union 
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opinion, and it was in the wake on a damning attack on his prevarication over the issue 
by Ernest Bevin at the 1935 party conference that he resigned.610 
Attlee had deputised during Lansbury’s absence and succeeded as leader, first 
temporarily prior to the 1935 general election, and then on a permanent basis after the 
leadership election that followed when the new PLP assembled. In the first ballot, 
Attlee took 58 votes, against 44 for Herbert Morrison and 32 for Arthur Greenwood, 
before defeating Morrison by 88 to 48 in the final ballot. Attlee’s biographer suggests 
that due to ‘Bevin’s pressure, the trade unions were for Greenwood’ and against 
Morrison, due in part to his position on the administration of nationalised industries; 
clearly the bulk of Greenwood’s vote switched to Attlee in the second round.611 It 
seems likely, however, that the trade union vote split in three directions. Attlee’s work 
in the previous Parliament helped garner the support of the MFGB MPs; he was 
nominated for the leadership by Tom Williams (Don Valley, W. Yorks.) and Dai Grenfell 
(Gower, Glam.).612 Support for Greenwood came from the general unions: Clynes, 
although at least initially for Morrison himself, had reported to Dalton that several 
NUGMW MPs backed Greenwood, whilst in addition to implied TGWU support, his 
proposers were Joseph Compton (Manchester Gorton) of the NUVB, and James 
Walker (Motherwell, Lanark.) of BISAKTA.613 Yet there was also support from trade 
unionists for Morrison: George Lathan (Sheffield Park) secured six RCA votes for him, 
with the RCA MPs actually cancelling a meeting with railway managers in order to be 
present to vote; Ellen Wilkinson (Jarrow) of NUDAW also favoured him.614 Morrison 
was nominated by T. E. Naylor (Southwark South East) of the LSC and David Adams 
– although it is unclear if this was David Adams (Consett, Co. Durham) of the AEU, or 
his TGWU namesake (Poplar South). If the former, then the craft union vote may have 
leant towards Morrison; if the latter, then perhaps Bevin had less influence over his 
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sponsored MPs than is often supposed.615 Attlee was at least been a sufficiently 
amenable figure to many trade union MPs. Although his formal links to the unions, 
beyond his membership of the NUCAW, were relatively limited, he had given some 
thought to problems of union structure and organisation, notably in an ILP pamphlet 
published shortly after he first entered Parliament.616 Socialism for Trade Unionists 
supported ‘one big all-embracing union’ as the ‘best solution’ to organisational 
problems, whilst predicting that ‘the craft union as an exclusive body has had its day’, 
a position which members of the NUR and the general unions were likely to view with 
some sympathy.617 Union MPs continued to play a significant part in the PLP’s 
structures under Attlee’s leadership, often in the whip positions. Although the return of 
several senior figures resulted in the loss of trade union posts on the Executive, a new, 
larger elected front bench was instituted from the 1937-38 session. Whilst indicative 
of a more collegiate style of leadership under Attlee, this also allowed more union MPs 
to take prominent positions in Labour’s parliamentary work.618  
 
The ‘Loyal Lump’: trade union Members of Parliament619 
 
The 1929 general election was the first and only occasion in the interwar period when 
Labour MPs sponsored by divisional parties outnumbered those with trade union 
backing, with the proportion of the PLP sponsored by unions falling to just 39.9 per 
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Rhys J. Davies, J. A. Parkinson, and F. O. Roberts were the five trade unionists elected to the new, 
enlarged front bench. Labour Party Annual Reports 1936-39; PLP Minutes, 26 November, 3 
December and 17 December 1935; 3 & 11 November 1936; Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 146. 
619 This phrase, characteristically, is Dalton’s. See Ben Pimlott, The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-
40, 1945-60 (London, 1986), entries for 21 and 22 May 1930. 
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cent.620 The 1931 election result dramatically reversed this, with 69.9 per cent of the 
new PLP being union-sponsored.621 This figure fell to 61.4 per cent by the 1935 
dissolution, and of the PLP elected that year, just over half of Labour MPs had union 
sponsorship. Union MPs largely reflected the membership of their sponsors: in gender, 
with all but one sponsored MP being male – only NUDAW, which sponsored Ellen 
Wilkinson, had a substantial female membership; and in background and education: 
most had had only limited, if any, post-elementary education, usually through Ruskin 
College or the Central Labour College, although there were notable exceptions: Dai 
Grenfell was a qualified mine manager, G. H. Oliver (Ilkeston, Derbyshire from 1935) 
had trained as a solicitor, whilst the RCA group reflected that union’s clerical 
membership base. Middle class MPs tended to be those backed by their local parties; 
as yet there was little sign of the co-option which marked later union sponsorship.  
Generation could be a significant factor. Union MPs were generally older than their 
DLP counterparts: an average age of 57.4 years for all union MPs in 1931, compared 
with 55.8 for the PLP as a whole; the figures for 1935 are 57.9 years and 55.1 years 
respectively.622 This was not uniform across the sponsoring unions: some union MPs, 
notably those of the NUGMW, were often older still, aged on average 66 years in 1931; 
the AEU members were 63.3 years old on average in 1935. By contrast a younger 
group of mining MPs, largely representing the Yorkshire area were returned to the 
House at by-elections from 1934-37, including Tom Smith (Normanton), Wilf Paling 
(Wentworth), George Griffiths (Hemsworth) and Frank Collindridge (Barnsley). 
Generational differences between MPs were perhaps most pronounced amongst the 
representatives of the MFGB. In his study of the Scottish miners, Alan Campbell 
suggests some ‘ideal types’ as a conceptual tool for understanding the development 
of mining union politics, an analysis that can also be helpful in explaining something 
of the politics of the MFGB MPs. He suggests that the work culture of the ‘independent 
collier’ was succeeded by that of the ‘bureaucratic reformist’ from the 1880s: this type 
of trade unionism was premised on federations of county unions, pursuing 
independent Labour rather than Liberal politics, and with the ultimate industrial goal of 
nationalisation of the mines. This ‘type’ was succeeded in the next generation by the 
                                                          
620 Prior to this the proportion had never fallen below fifty per cent. 
621 Although union MPs outnumbered DLP MPs once more by the time of the dissolution of Parliament. 
622 Although some union MPs, notably those of the NUGMW, were often older still, aged on average 66 
years in 1931; the AEU members were 63.3 years old on average in 1935. 
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‘militant miner’, emerging just prior to the First World War, although none of these 
types were historically discrete.623 Some of the older MFGB MPs in the 1931 and 1935 
parliaments such as Fred Hall (Normanton) arguably displayed some of the 
characteristics of the first two ‘types’, although this assessment is somewhat tentative: 
Hall had been a Lib-Lab MP from 1905. Arguably for some of his generation, the point 
of parliamentary effort was labour representation: with this achieved, such MPs might 
be content to stay, as Hall seems largely to have been, a less active backbencher. For 
those of the ‘militant miner’ generation, however, a more oppositional politics was 
characteristic. This might motivate a greater desire to use Parliamentary 
representation to secure change, which could propel such MPs into a more prominent 
parliamentary role: the likes of Tom Williams and Aneurin Bevan seem to fit this 
assessment. Alternatively, it could make them more receptive to a more radical 
socialist politics. Campbell notes that the politics of the CPGB was more compatible 
with this ‘type’, which may help to account for the stronger inclination of some of the 
younger MFGB MPs – again, Bevan is an example – to become involved in, for 
instance, united front activities. Certainly Bevan and others such as Ted Williams 
(Ogmore, Glam.), as well as the younger Yorkshire MPs, brought a spikier approach 
to their Labour politics than mining MPs of an older generation.    
In both Parliaments the MFGB provided the largest group of sponsored MPs, with 23 
in 1931 and 35 in 1935. A further nine union MPs joined the MFGB cohort in 1931, 
two each from the TGWU and NUGMW along with one each from five smaller 
unions.624 Another 45 sponsored MPs were elected alongside the Miners in 1935: 
seven from the TGWU, six each from the NUGMW and RCA, five from the NUDAW, 
four from the NUR, three from the AEU, two each from the Compositors and 
Woodworkers, and one each from ten other unions.625  
                                                          
623 Alan Campbell, The Scottish Miners, 1874-1939. Volume Two: Trade Unions and Politics (Aldershot, 
2000), pp. 4-7. 
624 These five were David Williams (Swansea East) of the Boilermakers, George Hicks (Woolwich East) 
of the AUBTW, Rhys J. Davies (Westhoughton, Lancs.) of the NUDAW, Thomas Griffiths (Pontypool, 
Mon.) of the BISAKTA and Val McEntee (Walthamstow West) of the ASW. 
625 These ten were J. W. Banfield (Kingswinford, Staffs.) of the Bakers, Alf Short (Doncaster) of the 
Boilermakers, Willie Brooke (Batley and Morley, W. Yorks.) of the Dyers, J. R. Leslie (Sedgefield, Co. 
Durham) of the NAUSAWC, Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, Stoke) of the UPA, Arthur Hollins (Stoke-on-
Trent, Hanley) of the NSPW, F. O. Roberts (West Bromwich) of the TA, Joseph Compton (Manchester 
Gorton) of the NUVB, as well as the returning Williams and Hicks. 
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A ‘Trade Union Group’ of MPs had existed prior to 1931; it seems to have met fairly 
frequently, if on an erratic basis. After the 1931 election, its meetings stopped: with the 
trade unions MPs now making up the majority of the PLP, there was no need for a 
separate group. By 1937, however, the Group had been revived, with the NUDAW’s 
Rhys J. Davies as secretary, F. C. Watkins of the RCA as treasurer, and the NUR’s 
William Dobbie as chair.626 The Group arranged with the TUC to hold regular meetings 
following meetings of the General Council, so a report of business could be heard; it 
would also be supplied with all TUC circulars.627 Meetings often heard reports from 
trade union leaders on their positions on new legislation, or visiting speakers including 
the American Secretary of Labour, Frances Perkins.628 The Group was a forum for 
information and discussion, but does not seem to have any intention to pursue 
combined action on policy issues. Indeed, as the discussion of the 1935 leadership 
elected indicated, joint action by the trade union MPs as a bloc tended not to take 
place.629 The activity of the trade union MPs is considered below in case studies of 
two union groups. 
 
Case study: the Mining Members 
The Members of Parliament sponsored by the Miners’ Federation require special 
attention here. The 23 MFGB MPs constituted exactly half of the PLP elected in 
October 1931, whilst after 1935, although divisional parties now provided the largest 
group of Labour MPs, the Federation remained by some distance the largest sponsor 
of union Members. The ‘Mining Members’, as Federation officials commonly referred 
to the group, had long been the subject of criticism, from Ramsay MacDonald’s 
dismissal of the parliamentary talents of a ‘party of checkweighers’ in the early 1920s, 
through to the ranks of unimaginative loyalists who so dismayed the ILP’s Jennie Lee 
                                                          
626 MSS.292/753/2 TUC file, ‘Labour Party – Parliamentary TU Group correspondence etc, 1925-49’, 
Rhys J. Davies to Walter Citrine, 21 January 1937. 
627 TUC file, ‘Labour Party – Parliamentary TU Group correspondence etc, 1925-49’, TUC 
memorandum, ‘Notes on Contacts with the Trade Union Group in the House of Commons’, 13 April 
1938. The operation of the Group now became far more professional than its pre-1931 version. 
628 See the Group’s Reports for the sessions 1937-38, 1938-39, and 1939-1940 in the same TUC file. 
Its Executive of eight included George Griffiths (MFGB), Sam Viant (ASW), Willie Brooke (Dyers), W. 
H. Mainwaring (MFGB), W. T. Kelly (TGWU), Arthur Jenkins (MFGB), Arthur Hayday (NUGMW), and 
F. B. Simpson (RCA), plus Ben Smith of the TGWU as vice-chair. 
629 For the Trade Union Group in the post-war period, see Richter, Political Purpose in Trade Unions, 
pp. 129-164. 
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following her arrival in the Commons later in the decade.630 This image of the mining 
MP was a powerful one and arguably its potency, combined with the numerical 
strength of the MFGB MPs in the PLP after 1931, provided a frame for much of the 
criticism of the Parliamentary party at large during this period. Historians’ assessments 
have not tended to diverge greatly from this analysis, if the presence of Aneurin Bevan 
amongst the group is usually noted as an exception.631  Yet any detailed study of the 
PLP in the years after 1931, and the role of trade union MPs within it, necessitates a 
closer examination of the ‘Mining Members’. How far did MFGB-sponsored Members 
conform to this stereotype? More importantly, what was the nature of their role within 
the PLP, and how far did they contribute to Labour’s parliamentary efforts?  
It should be noted that despite their apparent strength, as a proportion of the PLP, this 
was a weaker MFGB group of MPs than for some years previously. Although group 
organisation remained in place with regular meetings, and a fairly effective liaison 
between the group and the Federation nationally developed over the period, the 
Federation lost twenty seats in 1931, whilst of its two former Cabinet ministers, Willie 
Adamson was defeated and Vernon Hartshorn was dead.632 Moreover, Ebby Edwards 
who had emerged through 1931 as the Mining group’s key figure, was also out of 
Parliament.633 In terms of their contribution to Labour’s efforts in the House, it could 
be argued that as a group the MFGB MPs did not pull their weight.  
Although necessarily a somewhat imprecise measure, the number of Hansard 
columns in which each Member is recorded as speaking in during the 1931-5 
Parliament can give some indication as to the relative contribution to debate of 
individual members and different sections of the PLP.634 Despite making up fifty per 
cent of the PLP in 1931, MFGB MPs were only responsible for 38.4 per cent of that 
session’s Labour contributions. This increased to 44.6 per cent in the 1933-34 session 
                                                          
630 Jennie Lee, This Great Journey. A Volume of Autobiography 1904-45 (London, 1963), p. 112.  
631 For a typical example, see Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump. The Labour Government of 
1929-1931 (London and Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 73-75. 
632 For Adamson, see William Knox and John Saville, ‘Adamson, William (1863-1936) in W. Knox (ed.), 
Scottish Labour Leaders, 1918-1939 (Edinburgh, 1984), pp. 58-61; for Hartshorn, see Joyce Bellamy 
and John Saville, ‘Hartshorn, Vernon (1872-1931)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography I, pp. 150-152. 
633 Edwards is discussed in more detail in the section on liaison below. 
634 This has been calculated by adding the total number of Hansard columns a member is recorded as 
speaking in, rather than for, which would have complicated calculations considerably; thus an MP who 
spoke in columns 9-14 is counted as having spoken for six columns rather than five. Following 
Hansard indexes, this system does not differentiate between written and oral questions and speeches, 
although it has been possible to establish which Members tended to make longer speeches. 
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when there were several major debates on unemployment insurance, but across the 
parliament still only averaged 39.2 per cent. This is lower than the corresponding figure 
for DLP Members, 40.6 per cent, although the DLP figure was only substantially higher 
than the MFGB one in the final year of the Parliament. Even some MFGB MPs who 
served for the whole term made relatively little contribution in speaking terms, for 
example, D. L. Davies (Pontypridd, Glam.), Thomas Grundy (Rother Valley, W. Yorks) 
and Sir William Jenkins (Neath, Glam.).635  Yet despite this, four MFGB MPs were 
amongst Labour’s top ten contributors in terms of Hansard columns – Tom Williams 
(Don Valley), Dai Grenfell, Jack Lawson (Chester-le-Street, Co. Durham) and Joe 
Tinker (Leigh, Lancs.). Moreover, even the quieter mining MPs could speak with 
knowledge on conditions in their district and the industry more broadly, so fulfilling the 
sense of the trade union MP alluded to by Marshall above.636 Federation MPs also 
had a considerable role to play in the PLP’s organisation. Williams and Grenfell held 
their places on the PLP Executive across the decade, with Willie Lunn (Rothwell, W. 
Yorks.) serving until 1936 and George Hall (Aberdare, Glam.) and Jack Lawson joining 
them in 1939, having served on the party’s frontbench both before and after the switch 
to a fully elected frontbench in 1937.637 James Griffiths (Llanelli from 1936) was also 
elected to the frontbench in 1938, and returned in a much higher position the following 
year. Several of these figures would go on to serve in Cabinet, along with Aneurin 
Bevan who was unsuccessful in his attempts to be elected to PLP posts in this period. 
Until 1935, the MFGB MPs held a near monopoly on the Whip positions, with only 
Thomas Groves as a non-mining Whip from 1931-5, and the only non-sponsored Whip 
thereafter.638 However, PLP Executive elections also demonstrate the limits to which 
the MFGB MPs were prepared to act as a united group. They could have dominated 
the Executive in the 1931 Parliament, but with eleven Miners standing for the seven 
                                                          
635 For Grundy, see Robert G. Neville, ‘Grundy, Thomas Walter (1864-1942)’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography III, pp. 89-90. 
636 For example, Joseph Batey on the Coal Mines Bill in 1934. HC Debs, 5th series 28 March 1934 vol. 
287 cc. 2030-2037. 
637 For these MFGB MPs, see Joyce Bellamy, ‘Lunn, William (Willie) (1872-1942)’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography II, pp. 253-255; Joyce Bellamy and John Saville, ‘Hall, George Henry (1st Viscount Hall of 
Cynon Valley) (1881-1965)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography II, pp. 145-148; Joyce Bellamy and David 
E. Martin, ‘Lawson, John James (Lord Lawson of Beamish) (1881-1965)’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography II, pp. 227-230. 
638 As far as candidate figures are available, Groves was also the only non-sponsored candidate for a 
whip post in the period, excluding Ernest Thurtle’s aborted candidature in 1935. For Groves, a former 
coachmaker and West Ham councillor, see Margaret ’Espinasse and Ann Holt, ‘Groves, Thomas 
Edward (1882-1958)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography V, pp.91-93. 
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positions, the split in their vote meant only three were elected. This also applied to the 
English Whip positions – three Miners stood for two posts, with the result that the non-
miner, Tom Groves, topped the ballot.639 Personal ambitions and differences between 
MPs from the various coalfields likely had an effect here; the split over whether to vote 
against the Defence Estimates in 1937 also took the latter shape.640  
 
Case study: the NUR MPs in action 
William Dobbie’s success in the Rotherham by-election in late February 1933 gave the 
NUR its first parliamentary representative since 1931. Dobbie, a former Lord Mayor of 
York and the serving NUR President, arguably represented a return to the forefront of 
Labour politics for the Railwaymen following the union’s politically traumatic 
experience which began with its loss of representation on the party’s NEC in 1930, on 
to the defection of Political General Secretary J. H. Thomas to National Labour in 
August 1931 and the defeat of all of its parliamentary candidates including its sitting 
MPs two months later. Dobbie had won a seat on Labour’s NEC in October 1932 and 
entered the Commons five months later. Although three other NUR MPs would join 
him in 1935, Dobbie seems to have been the NUR’s most effective parliamentarian in 
this period, capable of speaking on a breadth of topics beyond immediately industrial 
issues; moreover, his Parliamentary performance was sometimes reflective of an 
identifiable shift leftwards within the union in the later 1930s. His maiden speech dealt 
largely with unemployment and the means test, Dobbie expressing his amazement at 
what he perceived as the House of Commons’ complacency in this regard.641 The PLP 
often utilised him to move or second amendments on transport legislation, for example 
on the Road Traffic Bill in June 1934, whilst he became a regular questioner of 
government ministers of a number of issues, notably arms manufacture, pensions, Air 
Raid Precautions and the position of ex-servicemen.642 He spoke frequently and often 
                                                          
639 Labour Party Annual Report 1932; PLP Minutes, 10 November 1931. A desire not to appear to 
dominate the party may also have been at play here. 
640 The South Wales MFGB MPs wished to continue to vote against the Estimates; those from 
Lancashire, including Gordon MacDonald, and Durham, backed Dalton’s argument for abstention. 
Dalton, The Fateful Years, pp. 136-137. 
641 HC Debs, 5th series, 2 March 1933, vol. 275 cc. 612-4. 
642 HC Debs 5th series, 28 June 1934, vol. 291 cc. 1361-4. See also his contributions on 13 Dec 1934, 
vol 296 cc 695-7 on rail issues relating to the Central Electricity Board and 14 May 1935, vol. 301 cc. 
1595-7 on transport aspects of the Government of India Bill. 
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powerfully on foreign affairs during the Spanish Civil War, arguing in October 1936 
that ‘if the Spanish democracy goes down, this country and this Government will have 
been parties to the assassination of democratic Spain’; during the same debate he 
intervened to defend the Communist Willie Gallacher from insult, whilst Hansard 
records him as shouting ‘hear, hear!’ to the suggestion that the Popular Front in Spain 
represented a step towards the dictatorship of the proletariat.643 His passionate 
critique of the existing rate of services dependents’ allowance as a ‘bloody disgrace’ 
saw him ejected from the chamber late in 1939, declaring ‘I do not care a damn about 
order… In the name of these hungry people I cannot give any apology to anybody in 
this House or in this country… On behalf of these people I leave the House because 
to me the needs of these people are greater than the prestige of this House’.644 
Dobbie’s seniority, both within the union, and then as its longest continuously serving 
MP by 1935 made him effectively the leader of the small group of NUR MPs elected 
that year. Joseph Henderson (Manchester Ardwick), his successor as union President 
from 1934, Adam Hills (Pontefract, W. Yorks) and Harry Charleton (Leeds South) were 
unable to match his range or passion in the House. Henderson was far from a regular 
contributor to debates and his few major speeches tended to be confined to industrial 
issues within Lancashire;645 he left the House in no doubt that considered himself  an 
NUR representative, declaring in his maiden speech ‘I represent the railway operatives 
in what I have said’.646 Neither Hills nor Charleton proved particularly effective as NUR 
MPs, although for contrasting reasons. Hills’ parliamentary career was blighted by 
illness: he spent several periods in hospital and was unable to make his maiden 
speech until July 1938.647 This proved his only major contribution in the Commons 
beyond occasional questions largely on local issues; he died in June 1941. Charleton, 
                                                          
643 HC Debs 5th series, 29 October 1936, vol. 316 cc. 110-2, 116 and 127. 
644 HC Debs 5th series, 5 Dec 1939, vol. 355 cc. 421-5. 
645 See, for example, HC Debs 5th series, 3 Feb 1937, vol. 319 cc. 1695-1701. 
646 HC Debs 5th series, 13 Dec 1935, vol. 307 cc. 1322-5. This contrasts sharply with Dobbie, who 
seems not have referred specifically to his NUR background in such a way at all after his election. It 
is hard to imagine him describing himself during a debate as ‘one who is prominent in the trade union 
world’ as Henderson once did (see the reference to Hansard in the previous footnote). 
647 HC Debs 5th series, 18 July 1938, vol. 338 cc. 1920-3 for the speech. The content suggested Hills 
was unfamiliar with parliamentary conventions here, which might be indicative of regular absence: he 
made none of the customary references to his constituency or the fact that this was his first speech, 
keeping to some general points about the Unemployment Assistance Board. Somewhat ironically, he 
was congratulated on his maiden effort by Frank Anderson, RCA-sponsored MP for Whitehaven, 
whom Hills had beaten to the final place on the NUR’s parliamentary panel on the twenty-fourth count 
in 1933. MSS.127/NU/1/1/21 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1933, Decisions of the 
Executive Committee, Quarterly Meeting of March 1933. 
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a former London County Council alderman and Midland Railway engine driver, had 
sat for Leeds South from 1922-31. Although returned in November 1935, he was due 
to pass the NUR’s parliamentary age limit, meaning that although entitled to NUR 
support for the duration of the parliament, his sponsorship would terminate at the next 
general election.648 Charleton had never been a frequent contributor to debates, but 
now his parliamentary interventions seem to have dwindled to a minimum.649 This may 
have been in part due to his election as a Labour Whip shortly after the election, but 
his resignation from the union’s Parliamentary panel over an Executive decision to 
reduce the NUR MPs’ parliamentary allowance in September 1937 was also likely a 
factor.650 Charleton reacted badly to his constituency party’s failure to consider his 
continuation as their (unsponsored) parliamentary candidate, and may have done 
similarly here; certainly, he stopped signing the NUR group’s quarterly reports. A 
young, middle-class candidate, Hugh Gaitskell, was selected by the Leeds South DLP 
in the meantime. Gaitskell’s biographer alleges that Charleton ‘boycotted the 
constituency altogether for four years’, in protest.651 Charleton’s exit from the NUR 
panel seems to have given the DLP the opportunity of replacing him with a younger, 
more vigorous candidate. Charleton may have become estranged from his union, but 
liaison with their sponsored MPs could be a substantial part of a union’s political work. 
 
 
                                                          
648 See MSS.127/NU/1/1/24 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1936, Decisions of the Executive 
Committee, Quarterly Meeting of March 1936 (Report of Political Sub-committee). 
649 His first speech in the Parliament was in April 1937 in a debate on the London Passenger Transport 
Board, and delivered largely from the perspective of a London resident rather than the NUR MP for 
Leeds South. This was fairly anecdotal: ‘I live about a mile to the west of Edgware Station close to the 
Metropolitan and I know from my friends and neighbours…’, although it did contain a brief reference 
to the feelings of railway workers. HC Debs, 5th series, 26 April 1937, vol 323 col 135-6. His only other 
speech of any length was on the Charities (Fuel Allotment) Bill, HC Debs 5th series, 9 December 1938, 
vol 342 col 1545-6. 
650 See below for more details. The relevant minutes are in MSS.127/NU/1/1/25 NUR, Annual 
Proceedings and Reports, 1937, Decisions of the Executive Committee, Special Meeting of 
September 1937 (for the salary reduction) and MSS.127/NU/1/1/26 NUR, Annual Proceedings and 
Reports, 1938, Decisions of the Executive Committee, Special Meeting of August 1938 (for 
Charleton’s resignation). 
651 See Philip Williams, Hugh Gaitskell (Oxford, 1982), p. 78. Williams’ suggestion of the union’s ‘furious’ 
reaction is not borne out by the reports on the selection conference in its executive minutes, see NUR, 
Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1937, Decisions of the Executive Committee, Quarterly Meetings 
of September and December 1937; the NUR’s own relationship with Charleton was likely somewhat 
strained at this point, and there is no sense in the minutes of any complaint over the NUR nominee 
Tom Proctor’s defeat in the final vote. 
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Liaison 
 
How far did those unions which sponsored MPs seek to make use of their 
parliamentary representatives? Although sponsorship generally entailed no formal 
obligations to the union involved on the part of a sponsored Member, the reliance upon 
financial support from a union in election campaigns and for constituency parties 
during the course of a parliamentary term, as well as a supplementary allowance for 
the Member in some instances, could potentially give a union some influence over its 
sponsored MPs. Plainly, as Harrison noted, any attempt at coercion on the part of the 
union would raise constitutional issues around the breach of parliamentary privilege, 
and besides, as will be shown, few union leaderships thought seriously in such terms. 
Whilst arguing that rules allowing unions to mandate their MPs were ‘empty relics’ by 
the post-war period, Harrison did suggest that ‘old habits’ by which some unions 
‘exerted considerable pressure on their Parliamentary groups’ were at one 
(unspecified) stage ‘not considered improper’, citing the Miners as an example.652 How 
far was this the case during the 1930s, as unions continued to move away from the 
earlier practice of permitting their top officials to sit in the House and the symbolic 
association of the industrial and the political such figures represented broken? A close 
examination of the ways in which the major sponsoring unions sought to liaise with 
their MPs can reveal much about the ways in which unions understood parliamentary 
representation, and the part it played in their broader industrial strategy. Perhaps 
understandably given the respective size and level of organisation of their 
parliamentary groups, unions adopted diverse approaches to liaison. The larger the 
group of MPs, the more difficult effective co-ordination became, and so even within a 
union, a variety of practices often overlapped, as will be seen in the study of the Miners’ 
Federation below. Some unions exhibited a growing professionalism in their approach 
to parliamentary liaison, most significantly in the TGWU. Others, notably the 
Engineers, took a rather more ad hoc approach, and did not begin to develop a more 
professional basis for liaison until after 1945. Successful co-ordination typically relied 
on close networks of personal relationships between MPs and union figures, whether 
recognised in terms of official posts or responsibilities, or not. While it is apparent that 
                                                          
652 Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, pp. 292-293.  
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several varieties of parliamentarism existed side-by-side even within unions, all were 
perhaps most strongly characterised by a kind of constitutional restraint: unions did 
not attempt to use their financial influence to obligate their MPs, but recognised their 
independence to act, and indeed in certain cases were prepared to defend it against 
the party leadership. Sponsored MPs in turn made differing uses of the link with their 
unions: often for information, or to access a level of authority in the eyes of the 
government which being a (Labour) Member of Parliament in the conditions of the 
1930s did not give them, but being a representative of a responsible national industrial 
organisation did. 
 
The MFGB 
I think it can be honestly stated that since I have been General Secretary 
there has been less friction between the Miners’ Federation and the MPs 
than at any previous time, and you know that in our industry we cannot 
merely deal with the industrial side and ignore the political side. The miner, 
every minute of his working hours, is under legislation. 
Ebby Edwards to MFGB Annual Conference, July 1939.653 
The industrial weakness of the MFGB following the 1926 lock-out and the 
intransigence of the mining employers nationally meat that the Federation was more 
inclined than some other unions to seek redress through legislation; clearly having a 
number of parliamentary representatives was an advantage. There were some 
complicating factors in establishing effective liaison, most notably the tension between 
the mineworkers’ unions at district level and the national Federation, yet this was 
mitigated to some extent the by relative weight of the Miners’ group in the PLP, and 
the strength of personal association derived from the fact that many of the Federation-
sponsored MPs had previously served as district officials, or on their district or the 
Federation’s executives. However, it remained unclear what a Miners’ MP might 
perceive his industrial ‘constituency’ to be – should he answer to the MFGB of the 
SWMF, for instance? This was compounded by the payment of Federation 
parliamentary salaries, which came from MFGB funds but were administered through 
                                                          
653 D.845.18 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1939, Report of the Annual Conference, p. 164. 
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the districts. How districts were able to ‘use’ their MPs was never well clarified: 
certainly there were no formal rules that the MFGB attempted to enforce, although it 
is possible to draw some conclusions here based on how the Federation dealt with the 
issue of district-MP liaison in practice. Given all this it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
MFGB made use of a variety of methods in order to liaise effectively with its MPs. 
These MPs were seen very much as part of the Federation’s industrial strategy, 
although the MFGB easily acknowledged that their parliamentary role was much 
broader than this. Although the Miners’ group of MPs was smaller, even after 1935, 
than it had been in the 1920s, effective liaison was facilitated by the existence of a 
large enough number of Miners’ MPs to act as a group, as well as the fact that two of 
the top national Federation officials, Ebby Edwards (general secretary from 1932) and 
Will Lawther (vice-president and then president), had served in Parliament themselves 
and as such, arguably could be more realistic in terms of their expectations of the 
group. Certainly their experience, and increasingly professionalised management of 
the MFGB gave the Federation of the 1930s an advantage when contrasted with the 
often shambolic leadership of the Cook-Smith period preceding it. Indeed, it was an 
advantage over most of the other major sponsoring unions: only the RCA and 
NUMGW had any serving top officials in this period who had prior parliamentary 
experience.654 The MFGB made use of its MPs in several ways, including proposing 
or seeking to amend legislation to benefit mineworkers’ interests, to organise access 
to government on industrial questions, and to ask questions and get information from 
ministers, an aspect of the MPs’ work which should not be underestimated given that 
the Federation had no research department or dedicated officer to do this work 
independently. In turn MPs sought information and guidance from the Federation 
officials; the relative informality of liaison, reinforced by the pragmatism of the 
Edwards-Jones-Lawther Federation leadership, appears to have been both mutually 
satisfactory for a time, and distinctive when contrasted with methods adopted by other 
unions. 
At the July 1929 meeting of the MFGB Executive, the first held after the Labour party 
took office that June, the committee considered a letter from Charles Edwards, 
                                                          
654 And in both cases this was problematic, given that, unlike the MFGB, these unions had yet to 
establish rules prohibiting such officials from simultaneously serving in the House – see the discussion 
of RCA (Walkden and Lathan) and NUMGW (Thorne especially) in chapter three. 
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described as ‘Secretary of the Mining Group of MPs’, seeking to renew ‘the periodical 
discussions between the Committee and the Miners’ Members which had previously 
been decided upon’. The Executive agreed to inform Edwards that it was ‘only too 
pleased’ to do so, although a proposed meeting the same evening is not recorded in 
the following days’ minutes. 655 No minutes of the miners’ group survive, whilst the 
MFGB’s records make no further reference to Edwards in the capacity of Secretary 
during the lifetime of the Labour government – the Federation’s decision to cease the 
payment of salaries to its sponsored MPs appointed to government positions affected 
Edwards following his appointment as a junior Lord of the Treasury, despite this being 
largely a sinecure as a government whip.656 This, as well as any increased 
parliamentary workload the position entailed, seems to have been sufficient to break 
his direct personal link with the Executive. At this stage there was no formal system 
for the activities of MFGB MPs to be reported regularly to the Executive, and 
occasional meetings between the Federation officials and the group of mining MPs 
seem to have been the preferred means for liaison.657 Possibly it was felt unnecessary 
to appoint a new group Secretary at this stage, given that the main national officials 
(A. J. Cook as General Secretary, Herbert Smith as President until his resignation in 
November 1929, and Thomas Richards first as vice-President and then President) and 
on occasion the full Executive were involved in direct negotiations with the Labour 
government over the Coal Mines Act and its application through much of 1930-1.658 
Given this, during the progress of the Coal Mines Bill through Parliament the position 
of the MFGB MPs was largely one of loyalty to the government, despite criticism of 
their refusal to support amendments ‘ostensibly designed to improve’ the Bill by what 
the Federation referred to as ‘certain irresponsible’ Labour MPs,659 and as such more 
                                                          
655 D.845.62 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1929-30, MFGB Executive Minutes, 11 July 1929. 
656 Ibid for the decision on MPs’ salaries; for Edwards’ salary, MFGB Reports and Proceedings 1929-
30:  Parliamentary Fund Account for year ending 30 June 1930, MFGB Annual Conference 1930, p. 
232. Government appointees were paid only for the first week of June 1929, a total of £5. The Account 
suggests some inconsistency with payments to Cabinet members, but this was not the case. Vernon 
Hartshorn’s £198 covered the period before he joined the government as Lord Privy Seal in June 
1930. Nor was Willie Adamson, appointed Secretary of State for Scotland, an exception, despite 
receiving £126 – this was a payment of arrears due. See MFGB Executive Minutes, 15 August 1929.  
657 See, e.g., MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1929-30, MFGB Executive Minutes, 13 February 1930; 
MFGB, Proceedings and Reports 1931, MFGB Executive Minutes, 25 March 1931. 
658 See Neil Riddell, Labour in Crisis. The second Labour government, 1929-31 (Manchester and New 
York, 1999), pp. 62-69. Several MFGB MPs were part of the Federation’s deputation to a Cabinet 
Sub-committee on mining questions in April 1931. MFGB Reports and Proceedings 1931, MFGB 
Executive Minutes, 17 April 1931. 
659 MFGB Proceedings and Reports 1929-30, Executive Committee’s Report, MFGB Annual 
Conference 1930, pp. 83-4. The Executive felt that attempts to force such amendments would allow 
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formal group liaison in order to put forward a separate MFGB position might have 
exposed the Federation’s internal divisions over the Bill.  
If the organisation of the Miners’ group is difficult to reconstruct for this period, it is 
clear that by the final months of the Labour government, Ebby Edwards (MP for 
Morpeth) was emerging as its key figure: Edwards was now acting MFGB President 
having taken the place of the ailing Richards in July, and it was he who was chosen to 
follow the party leaders in the Commons debate on the Coal Mines Bill in July 1931: 
his ‘sombre utterance with its moving passages’ supporting a measure which was in 
many ways unsatisfactory to the Federation was an important contribution, Edwards 
making it clear he was speaking on behalf of the MFGB.660 In September, with Labour 
returned to opposition, he was elected in eighth place, ahead of several former 
ministers, to the PLP Executive: that he was the highest placed trade unionist was 
testament to his growing prestige. In one sense his defeat at Morpeth in October 
resolved a dilemma for Edwards, in that it allowed him to stand for and be elected to 
the Federation Secretaryship in March 1932 without resigning his seat, which MFGB 
rules would have obliged him to do. It is hard to say what Edwards would have done 
if he had held Morpeth in October 1931. Page Arnot suggests he had been in effect 
filling both the secretarial and presidential roles during the illnesses of Cook and 
Richards, so certainly he would have had a difficult decision to make. It is perhaps not 
going too far to speculate that had he remained in the House, he would have continued 
as the major figure in the Miners’ group, and possibly on the Labour frontbench too.661 
As MFGB secretary, however, Edwards was to maintain a major influence over the 
Federation’s parliamentary activities. 
                                                          
opposition parties to wreck the Bill, but that the Mining Members’ refusal to support such amendments 
had resulted in ‘some misconception among our members’. 
660 See Robin Page Arnot, The Miners in Crisis and War. A History of the Miners’ Federation of Great 
Britain from 1930 onwards (London, 1961). pp. 56-59. 
661 In the circumstances of 1931-2, neither the MFGB Secretaryship or a Labour seat in parliament were 
particularly attractive options, but the evidence suggests Edwards was likely to be committed to the 
Presidency, which would have allowed him to continue in the Commons: although there was no 
vacancy for general secretary when he stood as President in July 1931, he had overwhelming support 
from across the Federation with some 81 per cent of the vote – only Yorkshire declined to support him 
in favour of its own Herbert Smith, whose candidature was arguably something of a protest one against 
the seven and a half hours clause. A Smith victory would have been problematic for both Federation 
and government given the delicate state of negotiations over the Bill, and so whilst Edwards was in a 
sense a unity candidate, his victory was an emphatic one. See ibid., pp. 82-83 for the results; also 
MFGB Proceedings Reports and 1931, MFGB Annual Conference 1931. 
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It might have been expected that one of the three Miners’ MPs on the PLP executive 
– Dai Grenfell, Tom Williams, or Willie Lunn – might have now become the central 
figure in the Miners’ group, but this was not what occurred in practice, although 
Grenfell in particular remained close to the Federation Executive, for example in 
discussions over the provisions of a Minimum Wage Bill he was drafting early in 
1933.662 Neither Williams nor Lunn seem to have had much to do with the Federation 
nationally, and in any case all three had daily PLP business to prioritise. Tom Cape 
(MP for Workington, Cumberland) and Gordon MacDonald (MP for Ince, Lancashire) 
now emerged as the two key figures in liaison on the parliamentary side and remained 
so for much of the decade, Cape as chair of the group and MacDonald as its 
secretary.663 Cape was one of the MFGB’s most experienced parliamentarians having 
sat continuously since 1918; his role as an official of the Cumberland district meant he 
was a prominent figure at Federation conferences – arguably the most prominent of 
its MPs during the 1930s at such events. As the sole representative of a smaller mining 
district he may have been seen as an effective means of circumventing the differences 
between larger districts which had emerged during the Labour government’s 
legislative difficulties over the industry, not least between South Wales and Yorkshire 
who now provided the bulk of the MFGB MPs between them. Cape also had the most 
experience of serving on the Federation Executive – a body he returned to for a brief 
period in 1937, and then again in 1938-9 – of the Miners’ MPs, which was undoubtedly 
an asset in facilitating liaison between the two.664 That he and Ebby Edwards were two 
of the three MFGB MPs who opposed the Liberal amendment which established the 
May Committee in 1931 suggest their political instincts were attuned.665 Gordon 
MacDonald had only served for a year on the Federation Executive from July 1920, 
but seems to have been close to Edwards – correspondence between the Executive 
                                                          
662MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1933, MFGB Executive Minutes, 5 January 1933; on his 
appointment as Minister of Mines in May 1940 he was sure to attend an Executive meeting at his own 
request at the earliest opportunity – see D.845.19 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1940, MFGB 
Executive Minutes, 24 May 1940. 
663 For Cape, see Keith Gildart, ‘The Miners' Lockout in 1926 in the Cumberland Coalfield’, Northern 
History 44:2 (2007), 169-192 and Joyce Bellamy and John Saville, ‘Cape, Thomas (1868-1947)’, 
Dictionary of Labour Biography III, pp. 31-32; for MacDonald, see Peter Ackers, ‘MacDonald, Lord 
Gordon of Gwaensygor (1888-1966)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography X, pp. 127-131. 
664 He had served on the MFGB Executive in 1915-16, 1918-19, 1922-23, 1924-25 and 1926-27; he 
was a substitute for the deceased J. R. Barker for four months in 1937 and also served 1938-39 and 
1940-41. See D.845.16 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1937, MFGB Executive Minutes 24 March 
1937; Page Arnot, The Miners in Crisis and War, appendix. Federation Executive membership ran 
from July to June of the year in question. 
665 Page Arnot, The Miners in Crisis and War, pp. 70-71. 
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and Miners’ group went through him,666 and it is plausible that he may have found 
much in common with Edwards as the only new mining MPs from their respective 
districts in 1929.667 He was not a regular at MFGB conferences, although his few 
contributions here give the impression of pragmatism and reliable loyalty to the 
leadership.668 He was able to command sufficient authority in Parliament to become a 
PLP whip at the first opportunity in 1931 and be invited to join the speaker’s panel in 
1934. Early in his period in office, Edwards stressed to Federation delegates that he 
was in ‘constant consultation’ with Cape and MacDonald on political issues, and this 
remained the case in the following years.669 The pair sometimes attended Executive 
meetings to consider tactics over industrial legislation, usually for a broad discussion 
of strategy rather than tactical detail which was left to the discretion of the group.670 
Edwards corresponded closely with MacDonald on various issues including mining 
recruitment, limited by a 1926 Act, and the release of the Harworth prisoners.671 
Annual conference resolutions on political subjects were forwarded directly to 
MacDonald as well as the party, TUC and Mining Association.672 It is only possible to 
trace the correspondence recorded in the Federation’s minutes, but it is likely it was 
rather more voluminous than the examples given here. Meetings of the officials with 
the whole group of MPs were still held from time to time, for example on the coal-
selling scheme in 1938 and cost-of-living in relation to levels of workmen’s 
compensation in 1940, but these in general seem to have declined over the period.673 
                                                          
666 Note the discussion over a letter from Cape on oil from coal to the Executive at the June 1933 Special 
Conference: this confused Jones, who assumed it was on behalf of the Miners’ group; Cape explained 
it was in a personal capacity and Edwards clarified – correspondence from the group came through 
MacDonald. D.845.13 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1933, Report of the Special Conference, 
p.13. 
667 This is necessarily somewhat speculative, but several of the other Lancashire mining MPs elected 
in 1929 were not only more established in the House, but also much older than MacDonald – almost 
a generation so in the case of J. A. Parkinson, so it seems plausible that he may have been inclined 
to socialise more with other new younger MPs, including Edwards, who was only four years 
MacDonald’s senior. 
668 See, for example, his contributions at the 1933 Annual Conference and 1937 Special Conference in 
favour of flexibility through the vague wording of resolutions. 
669 MFGB, Report of the Annual Conference 1932, p. 33. 
670 See, e.g., MFGB Executive Minutes, 23 November 1933 on wages – on this occasion it was agreed 
‘to leave the ways and means of presenting our case to the Miners’ group in the House, they being 
supplied with all the available data’. 
671 See MFGB Executive Minutes 15 August 1935; 14 April 1938 and MFGB Annual Conference Report 
1938, pp. 524-5. 
672 MFGB Executive Minutes 17 August 1939. 
673 MFGB Executive Minutes, 10 February 1932; 24 January 1940. 
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MPs regularly used the Federation as a source of information: sometimes this involved 
deferring to the Federation’s view on a particular coalfield issue, for example George 
Hall writing for clarification of the MFGB’s view before advising in a constituency case 
on recruitment.674 Certainly MPs were concerned not to inadvertently contradict 
Federation policy, which could be complicated on matters where the Federation had 
yet to reach a decision, for example on what line to take over the taxation of oil derived 
from coal in 1933. Tom Cape had written seeking advice urgently on this issue ahead 
of a parliamentary debate, but it was decided to leave it to a forthcoming conference 
to decide, with the result that the MFGB MPs played little part in the debate with the 
exception of Grenfell, summing up for the party.675 MPs used the January 1937 Special 
Conference on the Harworth situation as an opportunity to get detailed information to 
use in the House, with Batey reminding delegates that the MPs could force a debate 
as well as just ask questions.676 MPs were often among the delegates to Federation 
conferences and as such, as will be seen in the following section, delegates had the 
opportunity to question or challenge them directly, although typically at such meetings 
if the role of MFGB MPs was referred to, it was in congratulation for their efforts. 
Possibly their presence was the result of the limit funds available to many districts to 
send delegates, particularly if conferences were called at short notice. Special 
conferences were usually held in London, so MPs were on hand and could help fill out 
a district’s delegation cheaply if it was short of funds.677 
The proper relation of districts with their MPs could prove problematic, and it is here 
where a rough line seems to have been drawn between industrial and political 
questions. The Lancashire district tried to use their MPs to arrange a meeting with the 
Secretary of Mines on overtime issues in 1933, resulting in a reprimand from Edwards 
in the form of reminder to all districts that ‘it is not in the best interest of the national 
miners’ organisation for district officials or Miners’ Members of Parliament to take 
matters to any government departments that could be raised by the Federation 
centrally’.678 This response reflected MFGB sensitivity to potentially divisive industrial 
issues between the district related to pay and hours; on, for example, industrial 
                                                          
674 MFGB Executive Minutes, 17 December 1937. 
675 MFGB Executive Minutes 31 May 1933; 20 July 1933; MFGB June SCR 1933. 
676 MFGB Special Conference Report 1937, pp. 12 onwards – see the contributions of Tinker, 
Mainwaring and MacDonald. 
677 For example, there were no Scottish delegates at some Special Conferences. 
678 MFGB Executive Minutes 11 November 1933. 
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diseases they were more flexible – James Griffiths faced no criticism for arranging a 
meeting with the Home Secretary on silicosis in 1934.679 On more explicitly political 
issues districts were permitted much greater autonomy: in August 1934 Lancashire 
were told that ‘it is up to our district organisations to use the Labour Members of 
Parliament and especially our Miners’ Members…in political propaganda’, in this case 
the withdrawal of the Incitement to Disaffection Bill.680 ‘Parliamentary salaries’ could 
also cause problems between the districts and their MPs. The name is slightly 
misleading: introduced before MPs received official salaries from 1911, these were 
payments from the MFGB to cover Members’ expenses. They did not preclude mining 
MPs from receiving their genuine parliamentary salary of £360; that the name was 
retained seems instead to hint at the survival of an older, archaic culture of political 
representation in the Federation. Such ‘salaries’ were paid out of the MFGB’s central 
political fund and administered by the districts on the basis of the number of levy 
payers per district: every 10,000 levy-payers would entitle a district to one 
parliamentary salary. For much of this period, the South Wales Area had more Miners’ 
MPs than MFGB salaries would support, so in practice these were pooled, although 
the district still had to provide the MFGB with a list of those MPs for whom salaries 
would be paid. Will John (Rhondda West) was surprised  when he received a cheque 
in December 1935 for a parliamentary salary in the post from the MFGB and returned 
it to the SWMF, who explained  the pooling arrangements and that his name had been 
forwarded now that South Wales was entitled to a further MP’s salary.681 The issue of 
salaries could be used to pressure districts into increasing their number of levy-payers 
– South Wales salaries were cut off for a time in 1933-4 – but pooling arrangements 
such as that practiced by the SWMF minimised disruption for MPs.682 
The language used in MFGB resolutions relating to parliamentary activity is indicative 
of how relations were envisaged, with the emphasis often on empowerment rather 
than instruction, for example in a report by Jones in 1937 on recommendations on the 
                                                          
679 MFGB Annual Conference Report 1934, pp. 27-8. Awareness of silicosis was more pronounced in 
South Wales than some other districts at this stage.  
680 MFGB Executive Minutes, 16 August 1934. 
681 MNA/NUM/3/3/58, SWMF Political Correspondence: W. John to O. Harris, 12 December 1935; 
Harris to John 12 December 1935. For John, see John Saville, ‘John, William (1878-1955)’, Dictionary 
of Labour Biography I, p. 195. 
682 See comment on Parliamentary ‘salaries’ above. 
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action to be taken on a number of Bills.683 This gave the sense of the MPs being 
imbued to speak with the authority of the Federation, rather than simply following its 
orders, which could have important implications for the way they were received. 
Certainly the MPs themselves felt this gave them additional prestige, as Joe Tinker 
argued at a February 1935 special conference: ‘Many times we have been asked, 
when we have put questions down, as to whether the Miners’ Federation was behind 
us. Having the Miners’ Federation behind us we shall be treated with greater respect 
than what we otherwise would be.’684 This empowerment extended to allowing MPs to 
take the initiative on a range of issues in the Commons: Tinker’s work on nystagmus 
cases began as a private endeavour which in time allowed him to feed information 
back to the Federation, as did that of Duncan Graham on conditions of entry into the 
industry;685  William Whiteley’s Coal Mines (Employment of Boys) Bill had been 
introduced in the House before the Federation Executive decided to declare its 
support;686 whilst Joe Batey’s correspondence with government officials over the loss 
of pensions by the long-term unemployed seems to have been initiated by Batey 
himself an then referred to the Federation, to give a few examples.687 In this spirit the 
Federation was prepared to defer to its MPs on political issues: in April 1936, the 
Executive decided to consult its MPs ‘in order to ascertain if there was any particular 
subject on which they would like the Federation to submit a resolution’ to that year’s 
party conference.688 Moreover, it was prepared to support them against the party 
leadership if necessary: Lawther and Jim Bowman were able to convince party officials 
to reconsider forcing Aneurin Bevan to sign a special undertaking in order to gain re-
                                                          
683 MFGB Executive Minutes, 15 October 1937: on three Bills, MPs were ‘instructed’ once but 
‘empowered’ twice; this was not uncommon (include some other examples). 
684 Tinker at MFGB Special Conference, February 1935, Special Conference Report, p. 27. For Tinker, 
see Stephen Catterall, ‘Tinker, John Joseph (Joe) (1875-1957)’, Dictionary of Labour Biography XII, 
pp. 269-275.  
685 MFGB Executive Minutes, July 1934 and Annual Conference Report 1934. 
686 MFGB Executive Minutes, 30 December 1936. Notably MPs were given discretion on how to act on 
the Bill – see Executive Minutes, 20 April 1937. 
687 MFGB Executive Minutes, 11 May 1933 – the unusual phrasing of the minute, that it was Batey 
‘through whom the matter had been raised by the Federation’ as well as Edwards’ admission that this 
was in response to a request from the Durham area, seems to imply that this was an instance of an 
MP taking the initiative and then being ‘empowered’ by Federation support. For Graham, see R. Page 
Arnot and Joyce Bellamy, ‘Graham, Duncan MacGregor (1867-1942)’ in W. Knox, (ed.), Scottish 
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Batey, Anthony Mason and Barbara Nield, ‘Batey, Joseph (1867-1949)’, Dictionary of Labour 
Biography II, pp. 31-33. 
688 MFGB Executive Minutes, 29 April 1936. 
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admittance to the party after his expulsion in 1939, in the Federation’s view such an 
undertaking was unnecessary, and its officials were prepared to take this further ‘in 
the event of the Labour party’s reply being unsatisfactory’, requesting a meeting with 
the full party NEC if the situation was not resolved.689 
The personal basis of much of the MFGB’s liaison, as well as its flexibility and the 
relative freedom given to MPs, seems to have largely worked effectively, but the ‘usual 
method’ was vulnerable to slips in communication. The Executive, for reasons not 
entirely clear but possibly to do with the supply of draft Bills, had grown dissatisfied by 
the summer of 1939 and sought to formalise the basis for liaison, drawing up proposals 
for a ‘liaison officer’ to be appointed to establish closer links with the Miners’ MPs, on 
a salary drawn from the political fund. This came as a surprise to MacDonald, and the 
MPs’ secretary wrote expressing the group’s opinion that no such appointment was 
necessary.690 Cape put the MPs’ views at that July’s conference, but a decision was 
held over pending broader Federation reorganisation. Certainly there was recognition 
of the need for a more professional basis of operation: E. Moore, speaking for Durham, 
urged the need for a research officer to complement the group’s work, whilst Edwards 
argued that ‘a mass of information is lying there that is not even being tabulated for 
the Executive Committee’.691 This seems to have been a problem of 
professionalization of union functions rather than any major fault on the part of Cape 
and MacDonald, although MacDonald’s failure to supply copies of a number of Bills 
that autumn can hardly have reassured the Executive.692 For the time being, however, 
a more formalised, professional approach would have to wait. 
 
The TGWU 
Such an approach was slowly developing elsewhere; most significantly in the TGWU, 
which pioneered a professional research department to liaise with its MPs in the late 
1930s.  From the amalgamation of fourteen unions into the TGWU in 1922, the union’s 
sponsored MPs were considered representatives not of the union at large, or its 
Executive Council, but of its Political and International Department. The new General 
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Executive Council, which met for the first time in August 1922, and not on a regular 
basis until 1923, was hardly in a position at this early stage to oversee the activities of 
the union’s sponsored MPs.693 Responsibility therefore lay with the Political and 
International Department, by the union’s own admission, ‘rather a new feature in the 
Trade Union Movement’. The Department was ‘conducted’ by its secretary, the 
veteran dockers’ leader and MP for Salford North, Ben Tillett.694 This position seems 
to have been given to Tillett to placate his supporters among the dockers given his 
lack of a larger role in the new union and give him something important-sounding to 
do away from TGWU headquarters: as his biographer admits, Tillett was now very 
much in the ‘twilight period of his career’.695 Even so, the Secretaryship of the 
Department was a potentially significant role. Until his defeat in 1924 Tillett also acted 
as president of the group of MPs, with Frank Stillwell, also secretary of the TGWU 
Legal Department, becoming the group’s secretary. The Department would be 
responsible for the production and supply of daily bulletins ‘bringing up points of 
interest’, and in the preparation of parliamentary questions. Group members were to 
‘send in any suggestions and branches to be asked to submit particulars’: interaction 
with the union’s membership, then, was envisaged.696  Although weekly meetings were 
often mooted,697 they remained irregular and infrequent during the period for which 
minutes survive, with the exception of the duration of the 1924 Labour government, at 
least until the summer recess, when meetings were held approximately fortnightly. 
With Tillett heading the department, liaison was not particularly effective and Bevin 
took the opportunity offered by Tillett’s retirement in 1929 under the age limit for 
officials to reorganise the basis of the TGWU’s parliamentary liaison. That the union’s 
group of MPs had been expanded by the addition of the former Workers’ Union MPs 
also helped drive this change. Bevin was adamant that he now wanted the 
parliamentary group ‘straightened out’; by autumn, the Political and Statistical 
                                                          
693 Ken Coates and Tony Topham, The Making of the Labour Movement. The Formation of the 
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and representatives of the Political and International Department of the Transport and General 
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Departments had been reorganised under the control of Joe Taylor, secretary of the 
union’s convalescent home and an old Bristol ally of Bevin’s, and May Forcey.698 
Forcey had provided secretarial support to Bevin for several years, most notably in the 
preparation of his case at the Shaw Inquiry in 1920 when she had been dubbed ‘the 
woman behind the Dockers’ KC’ by the Daily Mail.699 These were two trusted 
confidants, and although there was some trouble in enforcing Tillett’s retirement, by 
early 1930 Bevin could report that the new arrangements were ‘bearing splendid 
fruit’.700  
From early in 1931 a parliamentary group report was presented by Bevin himself to 
the quarterly meetings of the GEC, implying a more proprietorial approach on his part, 
particularly over transport legislation; the death of Harry Gosling, union president and 
Whitechapel MP may have been a factor in this development.701 The reduction in 
TGWU parliamentary representation from thirteen to just two following the 1931 
general election was a major set-back in further progress within the union on the 
political front, and much of the department’s work was now taken up with issues 
around candidate selection and providing new roles for those defeated.702 Neither of 
the two remaining MPs provided a particularly agreeable means of putting a TGWU 
case in the House. Charles Duncan (Clay Cross), the former general secretary of the 
Workers’ Union was already seriously ill. Bevin had convinced him to retire six months 
early from his new role in the WU section of the TGWU, and he spent as much time in 
hospital as in the Commons in the following years, dying in July 1933. Dave Adams 
(Poplar South) was a new MP at the 1931 election; Bevin had been opposed to his 
selection as Sam March’s successor as the Labour candidate, preferring either of the 
other two TGWU officials in the running, J. H. Hall and J. E. Corrin. TGWU official 
                                                          
698 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/7 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
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opposition was withdrawn following a meeting with Adams and local party officials, but 
the union made it clear they were only providing sponsorship ‘for the specific purpose 
of this candidature’, i.e., Adams could not be sure of future sponsorship after a further 
general election.703 Bevin’s hostility to Adams seems to have stemmed from an 
unofficial dock strike in 1923, when Adams, the local TGWU official, allowed the 
unofficial strike committee from the breakaway stevedores’ union to use his office as 
a committee room, ‘a situation which he seems to have accepted; certainly he 
remained on the premises himself’.704 Bevin is likely to have seen this as a betrayal – 
collusion in an attempt to undermine the TGWU. Adams was also one of the Poplar 
councillors imprisoned during the rates rebellion and was close to Lansbury, which 
was also unlikely to help his cause in the eyes of his General Secretary.  
Bevin came increasingly to turn to MPs who were TGWU members, but unsponsored, 
to push the union’s case in the House. Following Duncan’s retirement Bevin had begun 
a reconciliation with Neil Maclean, who became a TGWU member in early 1933. 
Maclean, variously an ILP and Workers’ Union sponsored MP for Glasgow Govan 
since 1918, had been expelled from the WU in 1927 for ‘issuing unauthorised circulars 
attacking members of the executive over alleged misuse of union funds’, although his 
own profligacy with union expenses had seen him lose his own seat on the WU 
executive. Consequently he was forced to stand without Labour endorsement at the 
1929 election, although he did not face Labour opposition. At the time of the WU’s 
amalgamation with the TGWU, he owed the union considerable legal costs dating from 
the controversy surrounding his expulsion. His unpopularity amongst erstwhile WU 
colleagues, as well as his radical socialist reputation, in other circumstances might 
have prevented a reconciliation, but in the post-1931 context, Bevin appreciated the 
usefulness of parliamentary allies; perhaps crucially in Maclean’s case, his past 
activities had not offended Bevin personally, in contrast to those of Adams.705 Arthur 
Greenwood became another congenial link to the PLP following his return for 
                                                          
703 TGWU GEC Minutes, August 1930 and February 1931. 
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Wakefield. By the summer of 1934 Bevin could claim that the Political Department was 
operating ‘more effectively than ever’, as well as being appreciated by Labour MPs for 
whom it was supplying amendments and the information to support them with on the 
committee stage of Bills; this it was claimed, had secured ‘such satisfactory results in 
connection with the legislation with which we have been concerned’.706 Taylor’s role 
was expanded, allowing him to take over the presentation of the group report to the 
GEC from September 1934; although how far Forcey remained involved is unclear, 
although given her record and Bevin’s satisfaction with the results of the reorganisation 
it seems likely she was.707 A Joint Parliamentary Committee for Shipping and 
Waterside Industries was also set up under Taylor in collaboration with the National 
Union of Seamen, with Greenwood and Maclean among its members.708 By 1935, 
then, the TGWU had developed an increasingly professional means of parliamentary 
liaison based on detailed research and collaboration beyond its single sponsored MP, 
allowing it achieve satisfactory results in terms of industrial legislation. 
The 1935 general election resulted in a group of seven TGWU sponsored MPs being 
returned to the House, with three other non-sponsored MPs, Alfred Short (Doncaster 
– a national TGWU official but unsponsored), John Parker (Romford, Essex) and 
Robert Richards (Wrexham) joining the union’s parliamentary group alongside 
Greenwood and Maclean.709 Ben Smith was appointed group chair. The GEC now 
appeared to be in far more confident mood politically, passing resolutions at its first 
1936 meeting on various political issues, including government arms and education 
policy, something of a departure from normal practice, although there seems to have 
been little attempt to follow these up with the MPs.710 The new conditions did present 
some difficulties: Taylor had for some time been combining his political role with that 
of secretary of the TGWU convalescent home, as well as being a Parliamentary 
candidate himself for Bristol Central. The GEC had hoped to have Smith present when 
the quarterly political report was under discussion, but in Taylor’s remaining period in 
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249-257. 
710 MSS.126/TG/1186/A/14 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, 1936, TGWU GEC Minutes March 1936. 
 
228 
 
charge of the department, he failed to do so. Smith’s presence at the Executive would 
certainly have been helpful in terms of tightening liaison, and possibly the overlap of 
Taylor’s various roles was a handicap in terms of putting pressure on Smith to do so. 
Taylor’s departure in February 1937 for a post at the Workers’ Travel Association 
provided Bevin with another opportunity to make ‘certain adjustments’ in political 
liaison.711   
Taylor’s replacement, appointed in June, was John Price, a former Newport docker 
and multilingual Ruskin scholar, with several years’ experience at the LSI in Geneva 
behind him. Price was to be head of a newly combined Political, Research, Education 
and International Department, with responsibility for drawing up the union’s first 
education scheme for its officers.712 It is evident that Bevin considered the appointment 
of Price as something of a coup; Topham argues he was specifically ‘head-hunted’ by 
Bevin.713 Price seems to have been a quick success in terms of carrying through the 
departmental reorganisation; at his first appearance at the GEC he presented an 
apparently lengthy circular, which does not survive, ‘inviting the full use of the 
Parliamentary group on all matters which could be usefully dealt with through the 
medium of Parliament’ and seems to have soon mastered the details of the situation 
in constituencies with TGWU candidates.714 This was an impressive start, and by the 
next GEC meeting, Smith finally began to put in quarterly appearances before the 
Council. Bevin’s quarterly reports to the GEC were full of praise for the department, 
although he was ‘gravely concerned’ in December 1937 by the parliamentary group’s 
lack of ‘a single member of the group who acts as a kind of magnet to attract our 
members to the political work’: the union might now have the best department for 
research and liaison in the movement, but it lacked the parliamentarians to drive home 
this advantage and impress this success onto the membership.715 Certainly Bevin was 
thinking here in terms of using the union’s MPs and their activity as a means of 
increasing political fund contributions; a piece in the following month’s TGWU Record 
made this point rather bluntly, stressing how recent work by each of the union’s MPs 
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713 Ibid., p. 50. See TGWU Record, August 1937 for a profile of Price which reflects this. 
714 TGWU GEC Minutes, August 1937. 
715 TGWU GEC Minutes, December 1937. 
 
229 
 
had benefitted the membership and urging a push to recruit new levy-payers.716 By 
May, however, Bevin was heartened by the ‘more active’ group, and that summer there 
was an attempt to give the department greater responsibility, by ensuring that 
sponsored MPs who wanted to address union meetings arranged to do so through the 
department, although this was resisted by the MPs themselves.717 Price remained in 
post until 1943 before returning to Geneva.  
The experience of the TGWU in this period demonstrated the most innovative move 
towards a professional research department to liaise with MPs, in considerable 
contrast to, say, the MFGB as well as the union’s own Tillett phase of the 1920s. The 
TGWU, then, was taking parliamentary representation increasingly seriously, 
developing a professional department to support its MPs’ work; moreover, it did not 
limit this support to those MPs to whom it had made financial commitments, implying 
that its leadership considered parliamentary representation as both too important a 
component in its industrial strategy to be left to  a limited number of sponsored MPs 
alone, as well as an opportunity to contribute to the improved presentation of Labour’s 
case in Parliament. It was a more bureaucratic approach than that followed by the 
Miners’ leadership, but produced results, pointing the way towards the much more 
professionalised research and political departments of trade unions in the post-war 
years.  
 
Other unions 
In no other union was parliamentary liaison as multi-faceted as that of the MFGB, or 
as professionalised as the TGWU; in some instances, practice was very different. 
Although no AEU MPs were elected in 1931, the union resumed responsibility for 
David Kirkwood’s candidature early in 1932 when acceptance of PLP standing orders 
was made a condition of sponsorship,718 although there seems to have been little 
attempt to influence his behaviour in parliament, or indeed much of a sense of relation 
to him at all beyond issue of finance: an ongoing dispute over who was responsible 
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for the election expenses he incurred in 1931 was settled early in 1934, whilst the 
union covered his travel expenses.719 An exception was his report of the activity of the 
TGWU-NUS-PLP committee on shipping late in 1934; he does not seem to have given 
regular reports, nor the executive council asked for them. David Adams (Consett, Co. 
Durham) and Robert Young (Newton-le-Willows, Lancs.) seem to have also had 
predominantly financial relationships with their executive council after their return in 
1935. Kirkwood was called on to give an explanation of some ‘bombastic’ comments 
on apprentices’ strikes during 1939, and told that he had ‘no authority in or outside the 
House of Commons to speak on matters relating to the policy of the AEU’, implying 
that the union was largely prepared to leave its MPs to their own devices in 
parliamentary terms, provided they were not in conflict with – or, if the above statement 
was intended literally, permitted to refer to – AEU policy.720 The low level of 
contracting-into the political levy may have been a factor here; certainly the union did 
not seek to make much use of its MPs, suggesting its interest in retaining them might 
lie more in the realm of prestige than policy. NUDAW’s parliamentary liaison was 
conducted through its political general secretary, W. A. Robinson. Robinson’s monthly 
reports to his executive suggest that his focus was much more on constituency 
organisation in those seats in which the union was sponsoring a candidate, rather than 
what its MPs did in Parliament, although, as will be seen below, Robinson did not 
always provide the strongest political lead.721 The NUMGW had a ‘House of Commons 
Committee’ during the period of the second Labour government, Arthur Hayday noted 
at the union’s 1930 Congress, although it was unable to make much use of the large 
number of non-sponsored NUGMW MPs on this committee as ‘they were not 
cognisant of the Union’s policy on industrial matters’. In the same speech Hayday 
advanced the notion of ‘better control’ over union MPs as a justification for expanding 
the union’s panel of candidates, although the NUMGW’s leadership showed relatively 
little interest in influencing the behaviour of their parliamentary representatives in the 
decade which followed.722 In contrast to the TGWU, the NUGMW was unable to 
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effectively incorporate non-sponsored MPs into its parliamentary activity, despite 
having four by 1935 and six thereafter, in addition to its official MPs, possibly through 
being disinclined to try given Hayday’s comments. With only Thorne and Jones in the 
Commons during the 1931 parliament there was no attempt to resurrect the 
Committee, and pressure from the union’s lay general council to make use of the MPs 
in specific instances was largely resisted,723 although Thorne did make occasional 
reports to the Council on recent parliamentary activity.724 After Thorne’s retirement as 
general secretary there was no attempt to reintroduce or regularise reports such as 
this, so liaison probably relied on informal discussions between Charles Dukes, 
Thorne’s successor, and those MPs who were regularly in attendance at Head Office, 
notably Jones, Clynes and later Marshall.725  
The NUR was rather more successful at formalising parliamentary liaison. William 
Dobbie’s election as MP for Rotherham in February 1933 put the union’s President in 
the Commons, and liaison was facilitated in his early months in the House by his 
membership of the union’s standing political sub-committee. On his impending 
retirement as President, it was decided that some scheme was necessary whereby he 
could be kept in close touch with head office and the executive, to ‘so ensure that 
every possible advantage of his position as MP will be utilised for the benefit of the 
NUR’.726 The resulting scheme involved the unions’ MPs – at this stage still only 
Dobbie – to send a jointly written report to each quarterly meeting of the Executive, 
whilst Head Office would assist ‘in preparing briefs etc’.727 It is not clear how far the 
unions four MPs after 1935 made use of any such briefs in the years that followed – it 
would appear fairly little on the contributions outlined above, but a regular report from 
the parliamentary group was sent in to the Executive every quarter. There was rarely 
much discussion of its contents, but it did at least mean that the union’s leadership 
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was kept abreast of its MPs’ activities, although making little attempt to influence 
them.728 
 
Union MPs in the wider Labour movement 
 
Sponsored MPs also had a role to play in the wider labour movement outside 
Parliament: most importantly, within their own unions. The relationship between union 
memberships and their sponsored Members of Parliament requires some comment. 
Where political liaison with a sponsored Member was attempted, as has been seen, 
such activity might be co-ordinated on the union side either under the auspices of a 
dedicated political department or officer, or through direct or indirect contact with the 
union’s executive body. This alone can give us little indication of how sponsored MPs 
were perceived amongst the general membership of their unions, or indeed how far 
memberships at large were aware of the parliamentary activity their political levy 
payments helped to support. Certainly lay members of union executives would be able 
to impart some sense of the nature of this activity when they returned to their branches, 
although this would likely be in an unofficial capacity given their status as elected 
representatives on executives rather than delegates, whilst in any case industrial 
rather than political business took precedence at most meetings of union executives. 
Nor would the national and local press necessarily be of great help to the ordinary 
trade unionist seeking information about what their union’s sponsored Members had 
been doing: the former might give little sense of a sponsored Member’s usefulness to 
his or her union, and local press reports of, say, Walter Windsor’s speeches in the 
House, would hardly be of use to the majority of members of the NUGMW who lived 
neither in nor near enough to his Hull Central constituency to access them easily. 
Other more direct means of communication were available, and it is to these that we 
will now turn. If it is impossible to tell exactly how far union memberships were aware 
of their sponsored MPs’ activities, an examination of the role of MPs at union delegate 
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conferences, and coverage of their activities in union journals can at least give us 
some indication of how far these activities were publicised and the engagement of 
memberships at large with them. Moreover, they can be revealing as to the meaning 
of parliamentary representation within a union’s own political culture. 
 
Union delegate meetings 
Most sponsoring unions held delegate meetings either annually or every two years. 
These theoretically at least provided an opportunity for elected delegates to ask 
questions or challenge their executive’s annual or biennial report, which usually 
included a brief section on political activities during the preceding period; moreover, it 
was also a rare opportunity for delegates to see their sponsored MPs in the flesh if the 
latter were present. Such meetings constituted the sovereign authority within the 
union: in formal terms executive committees merely carried out their instructions. 
Naturally much of the proceedings were given over to exclusively industrial business 
although all found some time for discussion of political issues. This section will deal 
briefly with sponsored MPs presence at and participation in delegate meetings. As will 
be seen, although approaches varied between unions, on the whole the participation 
of MPs in these meetings was generally limited unless they also held an industrial role, 
although there were some exceptions to this; in all cases practice here is indicative of 
a political culture which recognised the primacy of Parliament and allowed MPs 
considerable freedom from any pressure to account for their political activities to the 
membership at large: any attempt to mandate MPs’ behaviour would be resisted, 
although typically such an issue did not arise.   
Labour MPs were a rare sight indeed at the Transport and General Workers’ Biennial 
Delegate Conferences during the period. In the 1920s, there had usually been some 
Parliamentary presence owing to several national officials also being sitting MPs: 
Harry Gosling and James Sexton were present in their capacity as union President 
and National Docks Official respectively in 1925 and 1927. 1929 marked a high point 
with five MPs present, three of whom were merely ‘in attendance’ and thus without the 
right to speak or vote. By the 1931 Conference, Gosling was dead; whilst Sexton and 
Tillett, both shortly to lose their seats, became the last sitting Members of Parliament 
to attend a TGWU Delegate Conference until Ernest Bevin’s own appearance ten 
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years later, addressing the delegates as Minister of Labour.729 A ‘B. Smith (Docks)’ 
attended throughout the ‘thirties as a delegate of the London Area,730 but it is not clear 
if this was the Member for Bermondsey Rotherhithe.731 This seems a striking absence, 
and may have been the result of variety of factors given that there seems to have been 
no explicit attempt to exclude the union’s MPs: firstly, the fact that much of the agenda 
was necessarily taken up by industrial business given the breadth of industries in 
which the TGWU had an interest, leaving limited time for political resolutions; secondly 
the timing of the union’s conferences in July just before the summer Parliamentary 
recess, when MPs might have been less inclined to lose a week at Westminster to sit 
through these largely industrial discussions which might have little bearing on their 
own work, and thirdly, compounding the previous factor, the distance from London at 
which the Conferences were often held during the period: Douglas on the Isle of Man 
in 1935, Torquay in 1937 and Bridlington in 1939.732 In any case, the absence of the 
TGWU MPs certainly adds weight to the argument that Bevin’s union was more 
interested in a corporatist industrial strategy for pursuing its goals during this period, 
although it is possible to perceive a move back towards the BDC engaging more 
closely with TGWU parliamentarians following Price’s arrival in 1937: he attended the 
1939 and following conferences, whereas Joe Taylor had not been present in earlier 
years; the 1939 BDC also exchanged fraternal greetings with MPs for the first time, 
sending its good wishes to the sick W. T. Kelly and receiving a message of 
encouragement from Arthur Greenwood.733 Certainly there was no attempt to hold 
MPs to account for their activities in the House. 
The exclusion of its sponsored Members from the AEU’s annual National Committee 
meetings is perhaps less noteworthy but still indicative of the more relaxed nature of 
                                                          
729 MP numbers at each BDC were as follows – 1925: three (Gosling and Sexton in their official 
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the Engineers’ political engagement in the period. Far from the hundreds of delegates 
at the TGWU’s conferences, attendance at AEU NC meetings was much more strictly 
controlled by rule, with just forty representatives of the union’s twenty districts 
present.734 If the NC could only accommodate three of the union’s seven-strong 
Executive Council, it was hardly likely to encourage its MPs to attend. The Annual 
General Meeting of the NUR similarly excluded MPs due to the strict basis of 
representation: eighty delegates were elected on the single transferable vote system 
by geographically grouped NUR branches, along with a handful of Executive 
representatives. On just three occasions during the period was a sitting Labour MP in 
attendance: William Dobbie in 1933, and Joseph Henderson at both the Annual and 
Special General Meetings in 1936 were both in the final year of their service as NUR 
President, and thus heavily involved in the proceedings from the chair.735 The 
convention of delivering a presidential address allowed some scope for making 
reference to their work in the House, but Dobbie alluded only briefly to his status as 
an MP in his 1933 address, suggesting that watching the ‘serried rows of the 
representatives of Capitalism’ from the opposition benches he could see ‘very little 
difference between the principles of Fascism and those of our own Governing classes’; 
three years later Henderson simply did not mention it, although both made broad 
reference to international politics.736 In Henderson’s case, at least, this was not an 
area in which he was a regular parliamentary contributor, or indeed, much of a 
contributor at all save a speech on the arms estimates in 1940, which arguably lends 
some credence to Strauss’ notion quoted above of the union MP, quiet in the House 
but the ‘Big Man’ when back in his own ‘constituency’.737 
In both the RCA and the NUGMW, MPs were regularly present at delegate meetings 
owing to their holding of official posts rather than their status as the unions’ 
parliamentary representatives. The RCA’s Annual Delegate Conference was one of 
the movement’s largest with direct representation of over 500 branches, as well as the 
full executive and secretariat. No delegate list survives for the 1938 ADC, but following 
the return of six RCA MPs at the 1935 general election, all of those Members still on 
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active union service were typically present, with the sole exception of George Mathers 
who held no official union role.738 A lack of verbatim reports for most years makes it 
difficult to assess their participation, although it is clear that Lathan was usually called 
upon to reply to political resolutions on behalf of the leadership. There seems to have 
been some dissatisfaction within the union about both the level of political discussion 
at the ADC, and the accountability of the MPs to it. A resolution moved at the 1937 
Conference demanded ‘a report on the efforts and accomplishments of the RCA 
Members of Parliament’ be circulated in advance of future ADCs, and that ‘reasonable 
time’ be allotted for the discussion of political questions: the first part of the resolution 
implied the existing information for members was inadequate, and may have been 
directed in part at Walkden, now retired from RCA service but an MP and recipient of 
union sponsorship. The resolution was defeated, despite only one speaker opposing 
it: Stott, the new General Secretary – significantly not an MP and thus not appearing 
to be defending his own activity or lack of it – whose conciliatory line and promise of 
better information in future was probably enough to appease a conference which had 
already defeated the platform over the union’s parliamentary panel.739 Certainly there 
was not much room for political debate on the agenda, and some delegates must have 
been frustrated at having their parliamentary representatives before them but being 
unable to question them about the nature of the parliamentary work. 
That most of the NUGMW’s MPs also held key national or district union posts for much 
of the period meant that only in exceptional circumstances were they absent from the 
union’s Biennial Delegate Congresses. Of the six who were MPs at the time of the 
1930 Congress, only Clynes and Bondfield were absent due to government business, 
whilst illness kept Arthur Hayday (Midlands District Secretary) away in 1936. Only 
Walter Windsor lacked an official post, but was always included in the London District’s 
Congress delegation.740 Apart from their duties in the chair (Hayday in Clynes’ 
                                                          
738 These were: Walkden as General Secretary (1936), Lathan as Chief Assistant Secretary (1936-7), 
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absence in 1930, Clynes in 1936, Marshall in 1938), MPs’ activities at BDCs was 
limited to moving or seconding one of the two or three explicitly political resolutions on 
the agenda: for example, a motion moved by Clynes on the League of Nations at the 
1936 Congress was seconded by Windsor, who also seconded a resolution moved by 
Marshall on the same theme in 1938.741 Neither Clynes in 1936 nor Marshall in 1938 
made much reference to their own parliamentary role or the work of the union’s MPs 
in their chairman’s addresses, and again, there seems to have been no attempt to 
make MPs accountable to, or at least responsible for reporting on their activity to, the 
Congress, beyond the brief details included in the General Secretary’s report.742 Any 
frustration amongst the membership about union officials holding dual roles, which 
had contributed to Thorne’s resignation as General Secretary, was unable to find an 
outlet at the union’s BDCs. 
The broadest scope for participation by sponsored MPs was afforded by the Annual 
Delegate Meetings of the NUDAW. Although no lists of ADM delegates’ names survive 
in the union’s printed records, its MPs spoke regularly at the annual meetings on a 
number of issues. Only Wilfrid Burke does not seem to have done so in the years 
1935-40, and there is no way of definitely verifying his presence or otherwise, although 
given that many of the NUDAW parliamentary panel, including its official candidates 
as well as Members, were usually in attendance, it is probable he did attend if not 
speak. Verbatim minutes of proceedings only survive for the years from 1935, so it is 
difficult to assess the period when Rhys J. Davies was the sole NUDAW MP, but from 
then on Davies, Ellen Wilkinson, W. A. Robinson and John Jagger were all active in 
ADMs. Certainly more time was allowed for political subjects, despite the ADM being 
shorter than many other delegate meetings at three days. As Political General 
Secretary, Robinson had a major role, replying in to most debates which touched on 
political issues, usually in a rather bruising and loyalist style. He was not always the 
most convincing of speakers but on occasion could be forceful and effective.743 
Robinson appears to have had problems with alcohol: Hugh Dalton noted in 1933 that 
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he was often ‘half tight’ at party NEC meetings and ‘delayed and disturbed the 
proceedings’; Dalton’s diary contains several anecdotes to this effect.744 Robinson 
certainly could be a difficult colleague. His rather relaxed approach to his work in the 
Commons, which would ultimately lead to his removal from the union’s parliamentary 
panel in 1944, had been noted by 1939 when a delegate drew attention to the scant 
information about his political activities in the Annual Report for 1938 compared with 
the rest of the NUDAW MPs. Robinson, the delegate suggested, was not pulling his 
weight. Robinson’s silence at this point in the proceedings is telling, although later he 
claimed that modesty had prevented him going into more detail.745 The issue was 
forgotten by the next ADM, but the meeting had no real means of getting a satisfactory 
explanation from the Political General Secretary.  
Jagger as General President chaired the proceedings, and often alluded to 
parliamentary developments in his opening presidential address: in 1936 he praised 
the efforts of Davies, who had ‘right worthily acquitted himself during that very difficult 
time’ from 1931-5 when ‘the whole burden of the union’s political work inside the House 
of Commons fell upon the shoulders [of Davies]’; NUDAW could now ‘congratulate 
itself on having a good solid block of representatives’ in the Commons.746 Wilkinson 
regularly intervened in debates on a variety of subjects from relations with Russian 
unions, to legal aid and the united front.747 Davies was the leading spokesman of the 
pacifist left within the union and spoke at length in debates on international affairs, 
describing himself as ‘aghast’ at the change in the PLP’s approach to the service 
estimates. His status as an MP did not protect him from criticism: he was derided from 
the platform as ‘wholly inconsistent and quite irresponsibly admits it’ on this 
occasion.748 He was often in a minority on industrial issues, remaining a firm opponent 
                                                          
744 Hugh Dalton, The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 1945-60, ed. B. Pimlott (London, 1986), 
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of the proposed amalgamation with the Shop Assistants’ Union. His stance here – he 
was the only speaker against amalgamation – earned him some fairly vitriolic criticism 
from a delegate who accused him of giving ‘a demonstration of how to be more 
conservative than anyone that ever sat on the other side of him in the House’.749 Yet 
such attacks were not linked to his performance as an MP: a Manchester delegate 
argued in 1940 that Davies formed part of ‘a jolly good political team’, noting his 
reputation as an expert on industrial legislation.750 Davies may have cut a fairly 
idiosyncratic figure within the union, but his right to do so was never challenged.751 
Martin Harrison noted of USDAW in the 1950s that ‘no union meeting has a wider 
variety of opinion’; this was ‘one of the few union conferences which is erratic enough 
to be interesting’.752 Arguably the same was true of its predecessor in the 1930s: some 
of its political breadth is exemplified in the contrast between Davies and Robinson, 
whilst this was one of the few delegate meetings where, if they were heard at all, MPs 
could not be certain of a deferential hearing. Even so, and despite occasional 
exceptions such as the complaint about Robinson in 1939, even in the case of 
NUDAW, union conferences were rarely a forum in which MPs were required to 
explain any aspect of their parliamentary activity to members, suggesting that not only 
were they given a considerable degree of freedom in this regard, but that this was 
generally accepted by their memberships.  
 
Union journals 
MPs’ presence or otherwise in union journals can also give some indication both of 
how far memberships were kept informed of parliamentary activity, and of the meaning 
of parliamentary representation in particular unions.753 Will Thorne’s parliamentary 
notes in the NUGMW’s Monthly Journal typically took the form of a simple report of 
recent and forthcoming parliamentary business, alongside some coverage of Thorne’s 
own activity and opinions. Little of the role of the union’s MPs more broadly was 
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conveyed here, even after the return of Clynes and others in 1935, arguably giving the 
impression that the column had more to do with the privileges afforded a former 
general secretary rather than a serious attempt to engage the membership in the 
union’s political activity; this seems in keeping with the points on the NUGMW made 
above. Before his defeat in 1931, Harry Charleton of the NUR had written a regular 
parliamentary column in the union’s weekly Railway Review.754 Understandably this 
lapsed during the period after 1931 when the NUR had no parliamentary 
representatives, but beyond reports of speeches outside parliament and the 
occasional attentions of the Review’s cartoonist, such an approach was not revived, 
even after 1935: for the NUR, with a relatively buoyant political fund, weekly proof of 
the utility of paying into such a fund through the medium of parliamentary coverage in 
the Railway Review was perhaps considered unnecessary.755 By contrast the TGWU’s 
Record, as suggested above, was used explicitly for this purpose. MPs contributed 
regular columns on a range of political issues,756 whilst Alfred Short – not himself a 
sponsored MP – contributed a regular parliamentary report until his death in 1938. The 
AEU again offers an interesting contrast. Its Monthly Journal’s political column, 
‘Beneath Big Ben’ was published regularly when the House was in session, authored 
by the pseudonymous ‘Tubal Cain MP’, a name presumably chosen in reference to a 
biblical metalworker, supposedly the first of his craft, but possibly also due to its 
Masonic connotations.757 It seems likely given this that Cain was in fact Herbert Tracey 
of the TUC Press Department. Pseudonyms were used commonly in the AEU Journal, 
whilst Tracey provided regular profiles of movement personalities under his own name 
for the publication. Few of Cain’s parliamentary reports make any reference to the 
AEU MPs specifically, and this is perhaps indicative of the union’s approach more 
generally to parliamentary representation at this stage. AEU Annual Reports regularly 
lamented the impoverished state of its political fund and its disproportionately small 
presence in the PLP and contribution to the politics of the wider movement,758 yet the 
choice of a column like Cain’s as the main means of parliamentary communication 
with the membership, which missed a clear opportunity to put the activities of the AEU 
MPs before the Journal’s readers every month, seems hardly likely to have been the 
                                                          
754 See Railway Review, issues until October 1931. 
755 See chapter two for political fund details. 
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most effective means of encouraging a greater proportion of that membership to 
contract in to the political fund. A series of specially commissioned articles by the MPs 
in 1939 sought to rectify this somewhat, but it is difficult to avoid the sense of an 
opportunity missed by the AEU in this regard.759 
 
Party conference delegations 
A union’s presence at party conference was a key feature of how its political identity 
was projected within the party more broadly, and as such, the role of sponsored MPs 
here also needs consideration. MPs were entitled to attend as ex officio members of 
the conference, without voting rights. In practice many DLPs appointed their MPs or 
candidates as their conference delegates: how far was this the case for the sponsoring 
unions? The presence of MPs within union delegations depended largely on the 
method by which the delegation was assembled, and unsurprisingly a variety of 
approaches were used to do so. AEU MPs were never among the union’s delegation 
in this period, which was elected on a branch vote with branches grouped into ten 
areas, to produce a delegation of ten plus the national officials and two Executive 
Council representatives. Often the well-known delegates were elected several years 
in a row, and no special provision for MPs was made, which is likely to have increased 
the sense of the Engineers as being relatively isolated within the party in political 
terms.760 The Miners’ Federation traditionally sent the largest delegation, although this 
had been affected by the 1928 party rule change which limited the number of permitted 
delegates. The MFGB elected a delegation of fifteen at its annual conference the 
previous year, so there was some flexibility given the fourteen month delay: even so, 
MPs were rarely included here. Each district also assembled its own delegation, and 
it was here prior to 1929 that most sponsored MPs were included. Given the decline 
in political membership in the districts in the late 1920s, by the time the new rule 
became effective, delegation sizes were often shrunk dramatically. From forty plus 
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delegates in some years, by 1930 the SWMF only sent eight delegates; no delegation 
in 1931 (Scarborough) and as few as seven in 1932. There was little scope for MPs to 
be included here: in 1934, the South Wales officials excluded themselves in order to 
allow a full cohort from the SWMF areas to attend.761 Where mining MPs were present, 
in was ex officio or DLP representatives. The NUGMW made no special provision for 
MPs, but there was flexibility in practice: its system of allowing district officials to 
appoint delegates did not preclude the inclusion of MPs, for example, Walter Windsor 
in the London district’s delegation in 1937. Exceptions could also be made: Fred 
Marshall attended whilst ‘shadowing’ Clynes as chairman-elect in 1937; Clynes 
himself despite otherwise being ineligible due to retirement was allowed to attend in 
1939.762 
Of those unions who elected a delegation which included MPs, the TGWU had the 
most complex system, providing for area and trade representation: its scheme, 
updated in 1931, allowed for three representatives of the Political Department, 
positions usually filled by MPs after 1935. G. H. Oliver was sometimes present as a 
fourth MP, probably due to his regular candidature for the Conference Arrangements 
Committee. Even so, these three or four delegates were only a small fraction of a full 
delegation of 40 or more, arguably enforcing that the TGWU viewed political activity 
as only part of its work – and a fairly minor one in contrast to its industrial efforts.763 
The NUR held a ballot of its branches, grouped into six areas, by single transferable 
vote to elect six delegates, as well as sending a further six or seven from head office. 
Later in the decade Henderson was usually present, probably as an ex-President. 
Dobbie appeared in this capacity in 1934-5 and 1940, although in other years as a 
DLP delegate or ex officio. Cecil Poole, a non-sponsored MP succeeded in the ballot 
in 1940. Charleton was included in 1933-4, possibly largely to give a sense of 
continuity given the absence of older experienced figures on the political side following 
the death of Cramp.764 NUDAW always included all of its MPs, alongside an elected 
delegation of nine from 1934: its MPs were very much seen as being its main political 
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representatives.765 The RCA elected a delegation of ten at its Annual Delegate 
Meeting by branch card vote: this system favoured well-known members and in 
practice it was easy for MPs to get on: only Anderson did not do so during 1936-9, 
probably only because he declined to stand. An attempt to reserve all ten places for 
rank-and-file members was defeated at the 1931 ADM; moreover, there were no rules 
barring retired officials from standing, so that both Walkden and Lathan continued to 
be elected after their retirement from their union posts, although their vote declined 
considerably.766 Here again there seems to have been a sense that the MPs were the 
most appropriate people to be delegates, as well as providing a level of stability to the 
delegations. Sponsored MPs were rarely conference speakers unless they were also 
serving officials: this suggests a desire to include them, but to allow the industrial side 
to take precedence in putting a union’s case before the party. 
Sponsored MPs, then, were used by their unions for a variety of purposes. They often 
struggled to act as a coherent group, even within their own unions. Unions were 
prepared to organise liaison, and to step in when it was felt necessary, but never to 
dominate or control their MPs – this was key to their parliamentarism, which for all of 
the variations detailed above, was on the whole characterised by democratic restraint 
and a respect for the political role of their parliamentary representatives. 
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Chapter 5 
Party strategy: two studies 
 
The aftermath of the 1931 crisis placed the Labour party in a strategic dilemma. Much 
of its politics during the preceding decade had been predicated on a gradualist 
understanding of socialist change, and its appeal to the public drew on this in order to 
establish the broadest possible basis of support. Not only did gradualism appear to 
have been fatally undermined by 1931, but the leadership which had advocated it had 
largely moved from the stage, either into the National government, as in the case of 
MacDonald, or out of Parliament altogether, as had Henderson. This created a 
vacuum, leaving the party with a much weakened political leadership short on 
confidence.  
Three main strategic options seemed to present themselves. The first was a 
continuation of the gradualist politics represented in the party’s 1929 programme 
Labour and the Nation, although jettisoned in favour of a more ‘maximalist’ socialist 
platform in the 1931 general election. Henderson was the leading advocate for this 
approach, but he cut an increasingly isolated figure, with much of his time being taken 
up by his presidency of the World Disarmament Conference from 1932. He received 
an atypically hostile reception at that year’s party conference when he urged caution 
in the debate on a motion requiring the next Labour government to commit to 
promulgating a ‘definite socialist programme’. The limited appeal of the ‘continuity 
gradualism’ approach was emphasised by the support of moderate trade union leaders 
such as C. T. Cramp of the NUR for the resolution.767 Henderson resigned the 
leadership the following week. 
The second possibility was a more radically socialist programme. The financial crisis 
and ongoing economic problems during the depression lent legitimacy to such an 
approach. Capitalism, it seemed, was in crisis; only a rapid transition to socialism 
would maintain working class living standards and even political democracy itself. The 
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main supporters of this position within the party in the early 1930s were grouped in the 
Socialist League, a body established following the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932, 
giving a new political home to those ILPers who wished to stay within Labour. The 
economic recovery which began to materialise towards the end of 1933 contributed to 
the undermining of this option, although there were other important factors in its failure, 
as will be seen below. The sense of crisis prompted many supporters of this position 
to back calls for working class unity, especially after the Communist International 
abandoned its ‘class against class’ perspective from 1933 in favour of co-operation 
with social democratic parties. The later part of the decade would find many who held 
this view favouring the adoption of united or popular fronts to combat capitalism and 
fascism; this often involved support for affiliation of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain to Labour.  
The third option involved a recognition of the shortcomings of Labour’s politics in the 
1920s in the field of policy. Whilst the party might favour nationalisation, for instance, 
it had few concrete plans as to how this would work in practice in particular industries. 
This position entailed a detailed working-out of economic policy so that a future Labour 
government would have a prepared programme on the basis of which to govern. This 
approach did not abandon gradualism entirely: it still sought to appeal to as wide a 
part of the electorate as possible. The NEC’s policy committee, established after the 
1931 defeat and including Dalton, Morrison and Lathan was to provide the policy basis 
to support this approach: this ‘moderate’ perspective came to dominate Labour’s policy 
by the mid-1930s.768 
The success of this ‘social democratic perspective’ owed much to union 
involvement.769  Foremost here was the revival of the National Joint Council, from 1934 
the National Council of Labour. This body had been established in 1921 to encourage 
greater co-ordination between the Labour NEC and the TUC General Council, 
although it had not always proved successful during the tensions of the 1920s between 
the two wings of the movement and had largely fallen into disuse during the second 
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Labour government, although 1930 did see some changes in its composition: it 
included seven representatives of the TUC GC, including a joint chairman, and three 
each from the NEC and PLP, with one of the NEC representatives as a second joint 
chairman. On the initiative of members of the General Council, the NJC was 
revitalised, with meetings held on a monthly basis. Previously Henderson had acted 
as secretary: the secretaries of the TUC, Citrine, and the PLP, Scott Lindsay, now 
became joint-secretaries alongside him. Citrine quickly established himself as the 
body’s key official.770 The NJC in the 1930s became ‘an effective co-ordinating body, 
when and as its component parts so chose to use it’: it could speak as one authoritative 
voice for the movement, although it had no powers of compulsion over its constituent 
bodies.771 It became an important voice for the movement in its dealings with 
government as well as co-ordinating joint activities; it also helped the party and the 
TUC work more closely on policy, in particular international affairs.772 The NJC/NCL 
facilitated a common approach to policy issues: in practice, this helped shore up labour 
movement support the policy developments undertaken by the party’s policy 
committee.  
Beyond policy and co-ordination around a moderate, social-democratic perspective, 
trade unions also helped shape Labour strategy in regard to both the far right, and 
those within Labour who contemplated an alliance with the far left. Henderson had 
described Labour as ‘the only effective bulwark against reaction and revolution’;773 in 
the 1930s, as will be demonstrated below, Labour, under the influence of the unions, 
played a part in marginalising both. In so doing, it not only demonstrated its own 
constitutionalism, but also made an active contribution to the maintenance of liberal 
democracy in Britain in the period.  
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Exposing British fascism 
 
The growth of fascism in the context of world economic depression in the early 1930s 
threatened democracies across Europe. Mussolini’s National Fascist Party had seized 
power in Italy in 1922; now fascist and similar authoritarian regimes of the political right 
came to prominence and power in Germany in 1933, Austria in 1934, and following 
Franco’s rebellion and the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, Spain. Although fascist regimes 
overturned democratic institutions and established single-party states, they posed a 
specific challenge to labour movements, which often found themselves among the first 
organisations to be targeted by fascists: in Germany, for example, following Hitler’s 
rise to the Chancellorship, union leaders were interned in concentration camps, and 
their functions and resources seized by the Nazi German Labour Front. Core elements 
of fascist politics included extreme nationalism, the rejection of class conflict in favour 
of corporatist solutions, as well as a ‘stress on elite or charismatic leadership, an 
emphasis on youth, a militaristic and authoritarian ethos, and a predilection for political 
violence’.774 
Britain was not immune to such developments. Small fascist organisations had been 
established in the early 1920s, including the British Fascisti and Arnold Leese’s 
Imperial Fascist League, and fascists were involved in strike-breaking activities during 
the General Strike under the aegis of the Organisation for Maintenance of Supplies.775 
However, the economic crisis of 1929-31 provided a new impetus: the most significant 
British fascist organisation of the period, the British Union of Fascists [BUF], was 
founded by Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932.  
The identity of its leader had significant implications for Labour’s response: Mosley 
had been a Labour MP and Cabinet minister. Mosley had begun his political career as 
the Conservative MP for Harrow (Middlesex) in 1918; after a period as an Independent 
he switched to Labour during 1924, although he was narrowly defeated at the General 
Election that October, having abandoned Harrow to challenge Neville Chamberlain in 
                                                          
774 Thomas Linehan, British Fascism, 1918-1939. Parties, Ideologies and Culture (Manchester, 2000), 
p. 5. 
775 Richard Charles Maguire, “The Fascists…are…to be depended upon.’ The British Government, 
Fascists and Strike-breaking during 1925 and 1926’, in Nigel Copsey and David Renton, (eds.), British 
Fascism, the Labour Movement and the State (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 6-26. 
 
248 
 
Birmingham Ladywood. Returned to the Commons at a by-election in 1926 as Labour 
MP for Smethwick, Mosley was an intriguing character in the Labour party of the late 
1920s. He used his personal wealth to give ‘extensive’ financial support to the party in 
Birmingham, and was seen in some quarters as having film star glamour: Ellen 
Wilkinson, Labour MP for Middlesbrough East, noted other MPs discussing just how 
this ‘Valentino in real life…managed that twirl to his hat brim’, whilst another observer 
suggested he had ‘the gait of a Douglas Fairbanks’.776 He was elected three times to 
the party’s national executive, although his relationship with the trade union wing of 
the movement was tenuous at best. Hugh Dalton, also from a privileged background 
but more attuned to the sensitivities of trade unionists in the party described ‘Lord 
Oswald’ as stinking ‘of money and insincerity’.777 Appointed Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster in the 1929 Labour government, Mosley was one of the ministers tasked 
with finding solutions to the problem of unemployment. Frustrated with the 
government’s inertia over the issue and the Cabinet’s failure to adopt the proposals 
he outlined in a February 1930 memorandum – a ‘mixture of Keynesian-Lloyd 
Georgian ideas, ILP Socialism, and protectionist-imperialist views’ – Mosley became 
the first minister to resign from a Labour government in May 1930.778 He maintained 
considerable support in the wider party: he was elected to the NEC at the October 
1930 party conference and a motion urging the NEC to reconsider his memorandum 
was only narrowly defeated by some 205,000 votes.779 Whilst there was support in the 
party and unions for a more assertive approach to unemployment, more open 
disloyalty was frowned upon: the ‘Mosley Manifesto’ published that December, arguing 
for a protectionist policy overseen by a small Cabinet of five, only attracted the support 
of 17 Labour MPs.780 Mosley ‘chafed at the role of Labour critic’; instead, he formed a 
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‘New Party’ in February 1931, and was promptly expelled from the Labour party by the 
NEC.781 The New Party represented a ‘political hybrid’: its members interpretations of 
its purpose differed, whilst over time it ‘transformed from the party that originated on 
the left and aimed at a consensual political centre, to one that appealed primarily to 
the right but found expression at the political extreme’.782 New Party intervention in the 
Ashton-under-Lyne by-election in April contributed to the narrow defeat of Labour’s 
NUR-sponsored candidate, J. W. Gordon by his Conservative rival, but all of the New 
Party’s candidates were defeated at the general election in October. Matthew Worley 
has suggested that the New Party, in its populist nationalism and espousal of the 
corporate state, had always been surrounded by a ‘whiff of fascism’; by October 1932 
Mosley was the leader of his own explicitly fascist organisation, the BUF.783  
The BUF enjoyed some initial success. Better resourced than earlier British fascist 
organisations, and with a charismatic leader in Mosley, its recruitment took in both 
urban and rural areas; women as well as men. A paramilitary Fascist Defence Force 
was established, its members, like other members of the BUF commonly referred to 
as Blackshirts. Early in 1934 Mosley secured the support of the press magnate Lord 
Rothermere, proprietor of the Daily Mail. The increased publicity contributed to a 
growing membership of some 40,000 later that year. Yet its public meetings were often 
marked by violence, and the BUF rapidly lost support following public outcry over the 
brutal treatment of hecklers by Blackshirt stewards at a rally at Olympia, West London 
that June. As the BUF haemorrhaged members after Olympia, increasingly its politics 
took on a strongly anti-Semitic aspect. A provocative Blackshirt march in London’s 
East End was famously halted by anti-fascist demonstrators in the ‘Battle of Cable 
Street’, in October 1936. The Public Order Act 1936, passed in December, extended 
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police powers to deal with disruption and banned the wearing of political uniforms. The 
BUF continued to campaign in the later 1930s, including a peace drive in 1939. In 
1940, however, in the context of fears about fifth columnists in a possible German 
invasion, the organisation was banned and its leaders, including Mosley, interned.784 
The BUF largely failed to have a major impact on British politics in the 1930s. 
Historians have identified a variety a factors in this failure, from the BUF’s 
misconception of the nature of crisis in the 1930s, to its attempt to import traditions 
alien to British political culture, its own internal weaknesses, and opposition from both 
the state and its political opponents.785 The Olympia controversy is often seen as a 
turning point in the BUF’s fortunes. Jon Lawrence’s work has illustrated a significant 
shift in British political culture in the years immediately following the First World War: 
in the Edwardian period, disorder had been a ‘staple feature’ of British electoral and 
public politics; in the context of wider concerns about brutalisation, whilst they 
remained ‘routine’ features of popular politics, ‘political sensibilities had hardened 
against disruption and disorder’ since 1918, something Mosley and the BUF failed to 
recognise, as demonstrated by reactions to the violence at Olympia.786 As will be seen 
below, the issues raised by the Olympia debate had an important effect on Labour and 
trade union responses to British fascism. Whilst there is a substantial and growing 
body of work on the role played by anti-fascist activity in the BUF’s failure, Labour’s 
                                                          
784 In addition to more conventional studies of the BUF, there is an expanding field investigating the role 
of gender and locality in its politics. See Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London, 1961); Robert 
Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain (London, 1972); Kenneth Lunn and Richard C. Thurlow 
(eds.), British fascism: essays on the radical right in inter-war Britain (New York, 1980); Richard 
Thurlow, Fascism in modern Britain (Stroud, 2000); Julie V. Gottlieb Feminine fascism: women in 
Britain's fascist movement, 1923-1945 (London, 2000); Thomas Linehan, British Fascism, 1918-1939. 
Parties, Ideologies and Culture (Manchester, 2000); Julie V. Gottlieb and Thomas Linehan (eds.), The 
Culture of Fascism: visions of the Far Right in Britain (London and New York, 2004); Stephen M. 
Cullen, ’The Fasces and the Saltire: The Failure of the British Union of Fascists in Scotland, 1932-
1940’, Scottish Historical Review 87:2 (2008), 306-31. Julie V. Gottlieb, ‘Body Fascism in Britain: 
Building the Blackshirt in the Inter-War Period’, Contemporary European History 20:2 (2011), 111-
136; Thomas Linehan, ‘Space Matters: Spatialising British Fascism’, Socialist History 41 (2012), 1-
21; Craig Morgan ‘Crisis, patriotism and the growth of fascism. The British Union of Fascists in the 
Midlands, 1932-1934’, Socialist History 41 (2012), 60-76. 
785 For a broad summary, see Richard Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’ in A. Thorpe (ed.), The 
Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-war Britain (Exeter, 1989), pp. 67-84. 
786 Jon Lawrence, ‘Fascist violence and the politics of public order in inter-war Britain: the Olympia 
debate revisited’, Historical Research 76:192 (2003), 238-267, and Lawrence, ‘Why Olympia 
mattered’, Historical Research 78:200 (2005), 263-272. For analysis of the shift in attitudes since 
1918, see Lawrence’s articles ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of 
Brutalization in Post–First World War Britain’ Journal of Modern History 75:3 (2003), 557-589, and 
‘The transformation of British public politics after the First World War’, Past and Present 190 (2006), 
185-216. 
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response is often characterised as weak and passive, as against the supposedly more 
robust approach of the CPGB.787 Labour historians have often focused, 
understandably given the European political context of the period, more on the 
development of Labour’s response to fascism abroad.788 A handful of writers have 
addressed Labour’s anti-fascism directly. Michael Newman has suggested that the 
party was handicapped in opposing domestic fascism by its constitutionalism which in 
his view ‘merely helped capital at the expense of the working class’. Primarily 
concerned with the left’s theoretical understanding of fascism, he suggests that any 
contribution Labour did make could not have been decisive, as potential for unrest had 
been contained within the existing political system.789 Unfortunately this limits his 
analysis of the practical side of Labour’s anti-fascist efforts, and arguably precludes 
the possibility that Labour may have, through its response, contributed to the 
maintenance of that political system. Keith Hodgson highlights Labour’s use of its MPs 
to attack fascism and press ministers into action, noting that the movement’s extra-
parliamentary efforts ‘reflected the moderate stance of the organisers’, and included 
discouraging party members from taking part in anti-fascist activity co-ordinated by 
other bodies such as the CPGB; Labour representatives in local government could 
deny the BUF access to municipal facilities for meetings, although party figures 
continued to argue that fascists should be permitted the right of free speech.790 Nigel 
Copsey analyses Labour involvement in popular anti-fascism, suggesting that the 
‘passive’ nature of the party’s official response, including calls to avoid direct anti-
                                                          
787 For the response of the political right, see Bruce Coleman, ‘The Conservative Party and the 
Frustration of the Extreme Right’, in A. Thorpe (ed.), The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War 
Britain (Exeter, 1989), pp. 49–66, and Philip Williamson, ‘The Conservative Party, Fascism and Anti-
Fascism 1918–1939’ in Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (eds.), Varieties of anti-fascism: 
Britain in the inter-war period (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 73-98. Writers sympathetic to the CPGB, 
unsurprisingly, have criticised Labour efforts. There has been a tendency on parts of the left to 
overemphasise more physical or even violent opposition to fascism: see, for example, Dave Hann, 
Physical Resistance: A Hundred Years of Anti-Fascism (London, 2013). One result of this has been 
that opposition to fascism which appears less obviously ‘heroic’ is ignored or belittled. 
788 For Labour responses to continental fascism, see Tom Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the 
British Labour Movement (Cambridge, 1991); Hywel Francis, Miners against Fascism. Wales and the 
Spanish Civil War (London, 1984); Paul Corthorn, In the Shadow of the Dictators. The British Left in 
the 1930s (London, 2006); Lewis Mates, The Spanish Civil War and the British Left: Political Activism 
and the Popular Front (London, 2007); Lewis H. Mates, ‘Practical anti-fascism? The 'Aid Spain' 
campaigns in north east England, 1936-1939’, in Nigel Copsey and David Renton (eds.), British 
Fascism, the Labour Movement and the State (Basingstoke, 2005), p. 118-40. 
789 Michael Newman, ‘Democracy versus Dictatorship: Labour’s role in the struggle against British 
Fascism, 1933-1936’, History Workshop Journal 5 (1978), 66-88. 
790 Keith Hodgson, Fighting Fascism. The British Left and the Rise of Fascism, 1919-39 (Manchester, 
2010), pp. 139-142. 
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fascist agitation, effectively failed as ‘thousands of grassroots members and 
supporters went against the Labour establishment’. However, he does note that ‘in 
rejecting left-wing extremism and in remaining committed to parliamentary 
government and moderation, Labour’s variety of anti-fascism contributed to a socio-
political order that denied domestic fascism political space’.791 
This study aims to push this analysis further, by addressing several aspects of Labour 
and trade union anti-fascism at the national level which have been underappreciated 
in existing studies. Charles Dukes, the general secretary of the NUGMW, speaking in 
a debate on fascism at the 1934 Labour party conference, argued that ‘this movement, 
and this movement alone, is the movement that will have to defend political 
democracy’. Dukes was expressing more than just the views of his union’s conference 
delegation. For many in the Labour movement, Labour was the party of democracy. 
In recognising fascism as an anti-democratic force in Britain, Labour certainly took it 
seriously, even if it was occasionally forced to respond in ways it may not otherwise 
have done. Fascism in Britain was not, in Dukes’ words ‘something which we can 
afford to ignore’.792 Labour’s practical response to the BUF took shape in three main 
arenas. The first was in Parliament, where Labour MPs brought cases of fascist 
violence to attention and voted in favour of legislation such as the Public Order Act, 
1936, which were aimed at curbing such violence. The second was through the 
gathering of detailed information of constituency level fascist activity. Thirdly, fascism 
was attacked through the legal system, most notably in a High Court slander case 
which pitted the NUR general secretary John Marchbank against Sir Oswald Mosley. 
Labour’s strategy – based upon the careful gathering of detailed empirical evidence 
on fascist activity and aimed at exposing fascists to public scrutiny, was both more 
systematic, and more effective, than often supposed; closer analysis of Labour’s 
approach to British fascism can also reveal significant broader aspects of the 
movement’s political culture in the period. 
                                                          
791 Nigel Copsey, ‘‘Every time they made a Communist, they made a Fascist’: The Labour Party and 
Popular Anti-Fascism in the 1930s’ in Nigel Copsey and Andrzej Olechnowicz (eds.), Varieties of anti-
fascism: Britain in the inter-war period (Basingstoke, 2010), 52-72. Copsey suggests that this failure 
was far from total, however: whilst Labour passivity allowed the CPGB to present itself as the ‘true’ 
anti-fascist party, there was no mass exodus from Labour members or supporters to the Communists 
in response. 
792 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1934, pp. 142-143 
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Labour chose to largely ignore the small fascist groups which developed in the 1920s, 
considering them as merely ‘little more than a vocal adjunct of conservatism’; whilst 
opposition to the New Party, particularly following the Ashton by-election, was driven 
‘first and foremost by feelings of betrayal and not anti-fascism’.793 The NUR perhaps 
had the most to complain about: Ashton had been held by an NUR MP, the late Albert 
Bellamy, and the union’s J. W. Gordon had been defeated in part thanks to the 
intervention of the New Party’s Allen Young, yet the union’s weekly was circumspect 
about Mosley, acknowledging ‘the smart he has inflicted upon us’ before dedicating 
columns in successive editions to a discussion of his political ideas; perhaps a 
reflection of the popularity of the Mosley memorandum in the movement.794 There was 
no public pronouncement on the formation of the BUF in October 1932, with Mosley 
by this point just one of a number of those, MacDonald included, who had ‘betrayed’ 
the party. By early 1933 the position began to change. The plight of socialists, 
communists and trade unionists in Germany following Hitler’s rise to the 
Chancellorship in January, combined with overtures from the Communist party in 
relation to the formation of a ‘united front’ prompted the movement into action. The 
Communist party had reached agreement with the ILP on the policy of a united front 
in March. Labour had tightened party discipline in order to exclude communists and 
others who represented parties opposed to Labour in the late 1920s, and was not 
prepared to countenance such an alliance.795 The National Joint Council issued a 
manifesto, ‘Democracy v. Dictatorship’, affirming this position on 21 March 1933. The 
document reaffirmed Labour’s belief in democracy and socialism, and suggested that 
‘reaction’ of either left or right bred ‘reaction’ in the other, in effect equating communism 
and fascism as different varieties of dictatorship. It stressed the importance of 
strengthening the unions, the co-operative movement and the party as the best way 
for ‘British workers to secure their own rights against the ambitious designs of any 
                                                          
793 Although there was some concern within the ILP as to where the British Fascisti would draw the line 
in the extent of their anti-communism. Hodgson, Fighting Fascism. The British Left and the Rise of 
Fascism, 1919-39, pp. 102-104. There were also trade union concerns about the nature of fascism in 
Italy; see references to ‘fascismo’ in TGWU Record as early as January 1923. On the New Party, 
Nigel Copsey, ‘Opposition to the New Party: an Incipient Anti-Fascism or a Defence against 
‘Mosleyitis’?’, Contemporary British History 23:4 (2009), 461-475, (quotation from p. 469); Hodgson, 
Fighting Fascism. The British Left and the Rise of Fascism, 1919-39, pp. 104-107.  
794 Tom Kirk, ‘The New Fourth Party – Sir Oswald Unfurls his Banner at Ashton – What Will he 
Achieve?’, Railway Review, 8 May 1931, and Tom Kirk, ‘Sir Oswald Mosley and the ‘Crisis’ – Has he 
got a Case?’, Railway Review, 15 May 1931. 
795 See Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party. The politics of managerial control in the 
Labour party, 1951-87 (Manchester and New York, 1988), pp. 1-15. 
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would-be dictators there may be here at home’.796 Labour’s response to fascism at this 
stage, then, was coloured by its position in relation to communism and dictatorship in 
general. Its propaganda literature broadly reflected this, although through spring and 
summer 1933 this tended to focus more on fascism: the TUC published a pamphlet 
entitled ‘Down with Fascism’ in May, whilst Labour’s monthly notes for speakers dealt 
with such issues as ‘threats to democracy’, ‘help the German workers’ and ‘fascism 
and the trade union movement’.797  
The TUC General Council submitted a substantial report on ‘Dictatorships and the 
Trade Union Movement’ to the September 1933 Congress.798 The report set the tone 
for the labour movement’s strategy regarding fascism in Britain.  
British institutions should prove more stable than those where dictatorship 
has been established. Nevertheless, where opponents of democracy praise 
dictatorial methods, and when economic conditions are so chaotic, it would 
be wise not to neglect any symptoms of such a movement. The danger 
should neither be exaggerated nor minimised. If unmeasured statements 
about the imminent possibilities of a violent outbreak are made the dangers 
of such an outbreak may be increased […] until finally such a clash becomes 
inevitable. We should avoid creating such feeling […] while at the same time 
remaining alert to detect and counteract any tendencies that seem to be 
developing in that direction.799   
                                                          
796 Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1933, p. 277. 
797See the appendix in G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London, 1948), for an 
extensive list of party and TUC pamphlet literature in the period. 
798 The report had been in preparation since late April, with Citrine instructed to prepare a statement on 
‘Dictatorship’ following a meeting with the German ambassador. Although complete by the end of 
May, discussion of the report was postponed until a special meeting of the GC in July, convened 
specifically to consider it. Discussion was exhaustive, with the 2.30pm meeting extended well into the 
evening. No verbatim report is available, but contributors included George Hicks (AUBTW), John 
Bromley (ASLEF), George Gibson (MHIWU), Arthur Hayday (NUGMW), Ernest Bevin (TGWU), 
Andrew Conley (NUTGW), Joseph Hallsworth (NUDAW), William Holmes (NUAW), Will Thorne 
(NUGMW), Alonso Swales (AEU) and John Hill (USBISS), as well as Citrine. The version eventually 
presented to Congress was amended in light of this discussion, and approved at the GC’s meeting in 
August. John Beard (TGWU), who had been absent through illness at the July meeting, attempted to 
remove Mosley’s name from the report; his proposal was defeated 11-7. Deleting Mosley’s name may 
have represented an attempt to play down the significance of his role, whilst also trying to foster 
greater objectivity in the debate which would follow at Congress. MSS.292/20/17 TUC General 
Council, Minutes, 1932-33, minutes of GC meetings of 26 April 1933, 24 May 1933, 25 July 1933 and 
31 August 1933. 
799 TUC Congress Report, 1933, Appendix C: ‘Dictatorships and the Trade Union Movement’, p. 425. 
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Much of the report’s contents concerned developments in Germany, whilst in keeping 
with earlier pronouncements, it argued that trade unionists should ‘oppose equally all 
dictatorships whether of the Right or the Left’.800 It dealt specifically with the threat 
posed by British fascists: whilst for now the strength of the BUF and similar groups 
was ‘insignificant’, it had been ‘displaying considerable activity’, including attempts to 
popularise itself among the unemployed and rural workers. It questioned how the BUF, 
a ‘foreign importation’, was financed, and urged that the ‘true character of fascism as 
an undemocratic movement […] must be ruthlessly exposed’.801 The report repeatedly 
underlined the democratic nature of trade unionism; its critique of fascism was focused 
on the threat it posed to democratic institutions. The report echoed the approach of 
much of the left-wing press at this stage, advocating a measured response to deny the 
BUF ‘free advertising’; this had to be squared against the need, recognised by the 
majority of TUC opinion, to expose fascists to public scrutiny as far as possible.802 As 
well as adopting the report, the Congress unanimously carried a motion moved by 
ASLEF’s John Bromley advocating unity of action by the trade unions, Labour party 
and Co-operative movement to ‘take all possible steps […] to combat this menace’. 
An ASLEF delegate moved a similar motion at the following month’s Labour party 
conference, urging support for an anti-fascist campaign, whilst also expressing 
concern over giving the fascists ‘too much of an advertisement’. 803  
A degree of hesitancy about anti-fascist action, shaped by concerns about giving the 
BUF publicity, was apparent in the discussions of 1933, but during the following spring 
events had prompted more urgent action. The suppression of Austrian socialists in 
February 1934, as well as the greater prominence of the BUF, now enjoying increased 
publicity through the Rothermere press, led the General Council to prepare a further 
                                                          
800 The bulk of criticism of the report during the TUC Congress was levelled at this assertion of 
equivalence between Communism and Fascism. See TUC Congress Report, 1933, pp. 325-334 for 
the contributions of T. Mycock (NUTGW), E. J. Evans (MFGB) and John Jagger (NUDAW) on these 
lines. 
801 TUC Congress Report, 1933, Appendix C: ‘Dictatorships and the Trade Union Movement’, pp. 425-
435, esp. pp. 432-435. 
802 Lawrence, ‘Fascist violence and the politics of public order in inter-war Britain: the Olympia debate 
revisited’, p. 245. The reference back of the report was lost by an ‘overwhelming majority’; for the full 
debate, TUC Congress Report, 1933, pp. 318-340. Lawrence also notes ‘ridiculing the pretensions of 
its maverick leader’ as an aspect of left-wing reaction to the BUF. This was echoed in the Congress 
discussion, with John Bromley referring to his time as a parliamentary colleague of Mosley: ‘I am not 
concerned about Mosley […] Mosley was good enough to come to him [Bromley] on many occasions 
for advice, and if he had taken it he would have been a harpist now, and not a Fascist. He was 
dangerous because he was wealthy’. TUC Congress Report, 1933, pp. 341-342.  
803 TUC Congress Report, 1933, pp. 340-345. Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1933, p. 224. 
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report, whilst plans were made for a detailed survey of fascist activity throughout the 
country. Such a proposal had been included in the motion carried at the 1933 party 
conference, and as a result the National Joint Council had determined in December 
1933 to conduct an enquiry into fascist organisation ‘in various parts of the country’; 
initially it was envisaged that this would be done by sending personal letters to 
‘selected’ Labour party agents. No action was taken for several months, until Arthur 
Pugh [ISTC] revived the idea at the General Council in May 1934: enquiries were to 
be made in the ‘most suitable constituencies’ as to fascist activity, to assess the 
possibility of developing ‘open-air Labour propaganda both in reply to fascist activity 
and to promote general Labour policy’.804 However, the violence at Olympia on 7 June 
prompted a drastic expansion in the scope of the survey: on 12 June 1934, every 
constituency Labour party was circularised with a questionnaire on local fascist 
activity.805  
No comparable national survey of local Labour parties was carried out in the period. 
This was an attempt to assess, as systematically as possible, the state of fascist 
organisation across the country. Replies were sought rapidly, by 21 June; by late July, 
when a report was prepared on the results of the survey, some 380 constituencies had 
responded, representing some 42% of the total. The results provided a snapshot of 
the extent of fascist activity across Britain during the six weeks after Olympia. The 
level of detail in responses varied considerably, but five main categories were 
identified: first, 177 constituencies reporting no local branch but the occasional 
meeting; secondly, 126 reporting the existence of a local fascist branch but no 
substantial activity; third, 28 reporting no evidence of a branch existing but meriting 
attention for other reasons; fourthly, fourteen of those with a small membership but 
with the involvement of a prominent local figure and finally sixteen meriting ‘special 
attention’.806 The questions posed reflected Labour concerns about the BUF (see 
figure 5.1). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the prime concern was over public meetings.   
                                                          
804 MSS.292/32/2 National Joint Council, Minutes, 1930-34, minutes of NJC meeting of 19 December 
1933; the NJC had also discussed reports on the development of fascism throughout the country on 
23 January 1934. MSS.292/20/18 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1933-34, minutes of GC meeting 
of 23 May 1934. 
805 LP FAS 34.1 
806 LP FAS 34.2-26 for those requiring special attention; also LP FAS 34.27-49 and 34.472-491 
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Figure 5.1 Labour Party fascism questionnaire, June 1934 
 
1. Have there been any large Public Demonstrations held under Fascist 
auspices? 
2. Is there a branch of the Fascist movement in the constituency? 
3. If so, do you have any particulars of its membership? 
4. Are there regular Local Meetings held under Fascist auspices  
a). outdoor or  
b). indoor? 
5. Is Fascist literature on sale or distributed gratis in your district? (If any local 
Fascist literature is available, please send copies). 
6. To what extent does the local Press report local Fascist activities? 
7. Is the local Fascist movement utilising the correspondence columns of the 
local Press? 
8. If so, are its contributions being answered either by  
a). members of the Local Labour Movement or  
b). persons representing other political sections or by individuals? 
9. Is there any evidence of local Fascist Movements being organised in 
connection with  
a). Women or 
b). Youth? 
10. Are you aware of any attempts by local Fascists to influence the Trade Union 
Branches in your area? (Where available, particulars would be very helpful). 
11. To what extent have prominent local politicians, or other local personalities, 
associated with the Fascists at their public meetings, or otherwise? 
 
Source: LP FAS 34.1 Labour Party fascism questionnaire.  
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Bolton DLP reported a ‘large open air meeting with the usual processions, 
searchlights. Spectacular platform arrangements, Sir Oswald himself, with Blackshirts 
imported from the surrounding districts’; the ‘Big Black Chief’ also addressed a 
meeting in Stoke, also with a large number of Blackshirts bussed in.807 Labour parties 
in Leeds, Durham, Bristol and Plymouth also reported Mosley meetings, although the 
extent of disorder varied: at Plymouth, the meeting remained ‘orderly’ despite Mosley’s 
efforts ‘during the whole of his speech to incite the audience’, whilst at Carlisle, 
although described as ‘a fiasco’, a large meeting was ‘very quiet’; by contrast, two 
‘packed’ meetings in Bristol were ‘both very rowdy’. During a meeting at Gateshead 
addressed by the fascist and former Labour MP for the division, John Beckett, ‘a very 
ugly situation’ resulted in three arrests, while at the Coventry Corn Exchange a 
Blackshirt who assaulted a by-stander was rescued from police custody by his 
comrades in an incident which caused ‘a good deal of comment in working-class 
circles’ in the city.808 A common theme emerging in regard to disruption was the activity 
of communists: the secretary of Plymouth Borough Labour Party reported ‘several 
clashes’ between the two groups, whilst in Leeds, there were regular ‘clashes and 
fisticuffs’ between fascists and communist selling rival literature in Briggate; the DLP 
secretary regretted that CPGB members were giving the BUF ‘free publicity’ in this 
way.809 In terms of fascist membership, the largest group of replies reported that no 
branch had been formed; many others gave membership estimates. These varied from 
the highly specific – 43 men and 18 women in Bolton – to the fanciful: for example, 
1,500 fascists in coastal Worthing (Sussex) alone. In six cases, membership of over 
500 was reported. Some respondents tried to give a sense of the social composition 
of the local BUF: in Portsmouth, the twenty active members were ‘very youthful and of 
the clerical class apparently’; whilst in Harrogate (North Yorkshire) most fascist recruits 
were described as being ‘the boisterous kind of young bloods’ who enjoyed golf and 
rugby.810 Several replies indicated that sport had been an effective means of attracting 
                                                          
807 LP FAS 34.7 Bolton DLP; LP FAS 34.16 Stoke Central DLP. Many of the responses discussed here 
referred to Blackshirts being brought in from the surrounding areas, rather than being natives. 
808 LP FAS 34.20 Leeds Borough LP; LP FAS 34.32 Durham DLP; LP FAS 32.5 and 32.6 Bristol 
Borough and Bristol East Labour Parties; LP FAS 34.4 Plymouth Sutton DLP; LP FAS 34.97 Carlisle 
DLP; LP FAS 34.31 Gateshead DLP; LP FAS 34.46 Coventry DLP and letter from G. Hodgkinson to 
J. S. Middleton, 14 June 1934: a knuckle-duster was found following this last incident. 
809 LP FAS 34.99 Plymouth BLP; LP FAS 34.83 Leeds North East DLP. 
810 LP FAS 34.7 Bolton DLP; LP FAS 34.19 Horsham and Worthing DLP; LP FAS 34.36 Portsmouth 
BLP; LP FAS 34.23 Harrogate and District TC. Membership of over 500 was reported from Plymouth, 
Paddington South, Worthing, Ealing, Stoke-on-Trent, and Bristol. 
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youth to the BUF, and the youthful nature of many members was often noted.811 The 
participation of women was also a recurring feature, from a group of women selling 
the Blackshirt in Bolton to a Women’s Fascist Defence Force being set up in Plymouth. 
In the latter city, three-quarters of the membership were alleged to be ‘young men and 
women of independent means (sons and daughters of the military)’.812 Where details 
of the social background of fascists were given, respondents tended to emphasise the 
middle-class or wealthy origins of BUF members, making it clear that these were not 
‘Labour people’; reports of fascists being ‘imported’ from elsewhere also indicated that 
they were outsiders, arguably reflecting the sense that fascism itself was a foreign 
import. 
In terms of the sale and distribution of fascist literature, replies indicated that this 
mostly involved sale of the Blackshirt, and the free distribution of a pamphlet, ‘Ten 
Points of Fascism’, although some more targeted publications were also in circulation, 
including ‘Fascism and Agriculture’ and an enrolment form aimed at dockers and 
seamen.813 Several DLPs complained of a lack of decent anti-fascist literature to use 
in response. Labour members in Worthing were ‘waiting for something really good 
from our Head Office to sell in opposition’, whilst the East Grinstead (Sussex) DLP 
secretary felt an opportunity was being missed: anti-fascist propaganda could easily 
be delivered at the same time as the local party’s regular circulation of ‘Victory for 
Socialism’ leaflets.814 The party does seem to have taken notice of this complaint: a 
number of new anti-fascist pamphlets were soon made available, most notably 
‘Fascism – the Enemy of the People!’, which used extensive quotations from fascist 
publications to expose the BUF’s aims and ideas.815 In inquiring as to whether fascists 
and their opponents were making use of the correspondence columns of the local 
press, the party was effectively suggesting that Labour members should be doing just 
that in order to subject fascists to scrutiny, although concerns about giving fascists too 
much publicity could surface here too: the secretary of Wakefield DLP noted a desire 
                                                          
811 For boxing, LP FAS 34.73 Newcastle West DLP; and cycling LP FAS 34.67 Caerphilly DLP. A 
League of Youth was reported as being in the process of formation at Portsmouth, LP FAS 34.36.  
812 LP FAS 34.7 Bolton DLP; LP FAS 34.4 Plymouth Sutton DLP. 
813 See LP FAS 34.1 for an overview of the fascist literature reported. 
814 LP FAS 34.19 Horsham and Worthing DLP, emphasis in original; LP FAS 34.17-18 East Grinstead 
DLP. 
815 LP FAS 33.7 ‘Fascism – the Enemy of the People!’; LP FAS 33.3 for a report to the NJC/NCL dated 
25 June 1934 compiling the quotations used in the pamphlet. Other titles included ‘The Fruits of 
Fascism’, ‘The Spotlight on the Blackshirts’, and ‘What is this Fascism?’; all of these were published 
by the NCL. 
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locally ‘not to advertise fascism’, asking ‘if correspondence does appear, is it wise to 
bother with it?’816  
Another major concern was fascist activity within the trade unions themselves. The 
BUF had established a Fascist Union of British Workers [FUBW] in an attempt to 
recruit trade unionists and the unemployed; the organisation had its own ‘leadership 
structure, membership cards and insignia’ and was intended to appropriate the 
functions of the unions in a future fascist state.817 FUBW literature portrayed union 
officials as ‘cowardly placemen, interested only in lining their own pockets […] who put 
politics and the interests of ‘foreigners’ before British workers’.818 Attacks on NUR 
leaders reported by Winchester (Hampshire) DLP were very likely along these lines, 
as was a leaflet sent by Bermondsey West DLP. At Paddington South, such criticisms 
were the ‘main points’ of most local fascist speeches.819 The FUBW sought to take 
advantage of industrial disputes for recruitment purposes; Westbury (Wiltshire) DLP 
reported activity by fascist speakers during a strike at Melksham.820 Efforts seem to 
have been particularly concentrated among transport workers. Newcastle North DLP 
reported that attempts had been made by fascists to form a rival organisation to the 
TGWU for transport workers; it was rumoured to have fifty members including ‘many 
corporation busmen’. Birmingham Sparkbrook DLP also reported a fascist busman, 
whilst the Gateshead DLP secretary had heard of fascist efforts, since stopped by 
union officials, to recruit amongst a TGWU branch in nearby Chester-Le-Street 
(Durham). At Stoke-on-Trent, the former DLP vice-president and NUR guard H. Sutton 
was apparently one of the ‘chief officers’ of the local BUF.821 The Bristol East DLP 
secretary reported being told in person by a local fascist that some 150 members of a 
                                                          
816 LP FAS 34.48-49 Wakefield DLP. 
817 For the FUBW, see Philip M. Coupland, “Left-Wing Fascism’ in Theory and Practice: the Case of the 
British Union of Fascists’, Twentieth Century British History 13:1 (2002), 38-61. See also a condensed 
version of the same article, Philip M. Coupland, “Left-Wing Fascism’ in Theory and Practice’, in 
Copsey and Renton (eds.), British Fascism, the Labour Movement and the State, pp. 95-117. 
818 Coupland, “Left-Wing Fascism’ in Theory and Practice: the Case of the British Union of Fascists’, p. 
44. This characterisation was used widely by fascists: see the discussion of the AEU legal action 
against John Beckett discussed below. 
819 LP FAS 34.58-59 Winchester DLP; LP FAS 34.62-63 Bermondsey West DLP; LP FAS 34.11-12, 
Paddington South DLP. 
820 LP FAS 34.79-80. See also Ernest Bevin, ‘The Spirit of our Membership’, TGWU Record, June 1934 
for comments on fascists seeking to provoke industrial unrest. 
821 LP FAS 34.43 Newcastle North DLP; LP FAS 34.45 Birmingham Sparkbrook DLP; LP FAS 34.31 
Gateshead DLP; LP FAS 34.16 Stoke-on-Trent Central DLP. This evidence supports Coupland’s 
account in relation to transport union organisation. Coupland, “Left-Wing Fascism’ in Theory and 
Practice: the Case of the British Union of Fascists’, pp. 47-48; Sparkbrook is one of the areas he 
discusses. 
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local printing union branch, although this was likely an exaggeration822. It could be 
difficult for trade unions to take action against fascist members: whilst the TUC’s ‘Black 
Circular’ would soon aid unions in barring communists from official posts, their own 
rules often forbade expulsions on political grounds.823 Some Coventry trade unionists 
seem to have taken matters into their own hands: when a local member of the Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Union joined the BUF in 1933, his colleagues came out on strike 
against him on the grounds that fascism ‘is anti-trade union’.824 The survey seems to 
have caught the last gasp of the FUBW’s efforts: it was wound up in June 1934, as a 
result of a shift in power within the BUF away from those keen to win over Labour and 
trade union, and support towards the organisation’s more reactionary, conservative 
wing.825 Most DLPs reported no fascist activity in local union branches. In many rural 
areas, there was often insufficient union organisation for fascists to concern 
themselves with infiltrating, although campaigning on issues such as tithes was 
noted.826 A considerable number of respondents replied with a variant of ‘not that I am 
aware of’ in response to the question about activity in trade union branches. Given 
that replies were wanted quickly, this could simply mean that they had no opportunity 
to make enquiries, although it could also be indicative of rather distant relations 
between local parties and trade union branches; again, this was most pronounced in 
rural areas: the secretary of Devizes (Wiltshire) DLP reported that local unions did not 
‘function, politically, as a rule and most of my communications to them are ignored’.827 
In such cases, the survey could produce responses that had rather depressing 
implications for the state of party-union relationships at the local level. On the whole, 
however, the exercise was a success, representing a serious and systematic attempt 
to collect a large amount of detailed evidence on fascist activity which could be used 
in campaigns and party literature. The survey was used to inform an NCL report, 
‘Fascism at Home and Abroad’, adopted by both the TUC Congress and Labour party 
                                                          
822 The fascist admitted he did not know the extent of membership, although it was growing, as not all 
fascists wore a black shirt. LP FAS 34.6 Bristol East DLP. 
823 For an example, see MSS.126/TG/1186/A/15 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive 
Council and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1937, minutes of GEC meeting of 3 
December 1937, for the union’s inability to expel an allegedly fascist member, Bro. A. Judge, on the 
grounds of his politics. 
824 LP FAS 34.46-47 Coventry DLP. 
825 Coupland, “Left-Wing Fascism’ in Theory and Practice: the Case of the British Union of Fascists’, 
pp. 51-60. 
826 See, for example, LP FAS 34.76 Eye (Suffolk) DLP. 
827 LP FAS 34.78 Devizes DLP. 
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conference in the autumn: while emphasising Labour’s efforts, it implied the reaction 
to Olympia had contributed to the movement’s strategy: for ‘the first time, the methods 
of British Fascism stood out clearly revealed to the public’.828 
Parliament remained an important arena for Labour anti-fascism. Two of the five 
Labour speakers who participated in the Olympia debate in the House of Commons 
were trade unionists.829 Will Thorne of the NUGMW struck a similar note to the 
previous year’s ‘Dictatorships and the Trade Union Movement’ report, arguing that ‘the 
Communists are out for a proletariat dictatorship and Sir Oswald Mosley is out for a 
Fascist dictatorship, and I am against both’; he highlighted the threat to democracy if 
fascism succeeded, ‘not only all our democratic institutions and local authorities, but 
every trade union in the country will be dissolved’.830 Lawrence has noted ‘a 
generational aspect to disagreements about the significance of the violence at 
Olympia’, inasmuch as Conservative MPs who were veterans of an Edwardian political 
culture where ‘rowdyism’ was prevalent tended to have greater sympathy with the 
BUF’s response to disruption, whilst there were also ‘champions of the old-style rough-
and-tumble politics’ amongst Labour MPs.831 Thorne too was a veteran of that earlier 
political culture, and had been no stranger to a more physical politics early in his 
career, yet here he expressed outrage at the violence and condemned all disruption 
at meetings, objecting in no uncertain terms to the methods adopted by Mosley and 
his supporters. Thorne, unlike some fellow pre-1910 MPs, appeared to have changed 
his views, arguably maturing into the role of an ‘elder statesman’, in doing so providing 
a more complex picture of the trade union MP than is sometimes allowed.832 Rhys J. 
Davies of NUDAW also elided the threats of communism and fascism, urging action 
to stop the BUF proceeding ‘further on militarist lines’.833 Such militarism became an 
                                                          
828 TUC, Congress Report 1934, Appendix C, NCL Statement on ‘Fascism at Home and Abroad’, pp. 
435-450 for the report. For the debate at Congress on this document, see ibid., pp. 249-266; for the 
party conference debate, Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1934, pp. 142-143. 
829 For the full debate, see HC Debs, 5th series, 14 June 1934, vol. 290 cc. 1913-2041. The other three 
who made significant speeches were Clement Attlee, Fielding West, and David Logan, as did James 
Maxton of the ILP. 
830 HC Debs, 5th series, 14 June 1934, vol. 290, cc. 1945-1951 for Thorne’s speech. 
831 Lawrence, ‘Why Olympia mattered’, p. 263. 
832 Lawrence cites Thorne in a 1908 debate on the Public Meetings Bill, ‘It was for those who organised 
the meetings to make proper provision’ for stopping disruption, although he does not explore the 
contrast with Thorne’s views in 1934. Lawrence, ‘Fascist violence and the politics of public order in 
inter-war Britain: the Olympia debate revisited’, p. 241. 
833 HC Debs, 5th series, 14 June 1934, vol. 290, cc. 1973-1980 for Davies’ speech. 
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increasingly prominent aspect of Labour’s critique of British fascism.834 In a further 
display of Labour’s constitutionalism, a deputation from the NCL pressed the Home 
Secretary, Sir John Gilmour to take action against disorder of the kind seen at Olympia. 
The deputation supplied Gilmour with ‘documents illustrating the activities and aims’ 
of the BUF; presumably these drew on the replies to the June survey.835 
Labour opposition to fascism through the courts would probably have seemed highly 
unlikely until the summer of 1934. With trade union membership substantially reduced 
by the economic slump, money was tight both in the party and in the unions 
themselves, and costly legal proceedings would have presented a considerable 
challenge. It seemed similarly unlikely that John Marchbank would be at the centre of 
this legal opposition. Marchbank had been elected as General Secretary of the NUR 
only in December 1933, although he had been acting in that capacity since the sudden 
death of his predecessor C. T. Cramp in July 1933. Marchbank had established a 
reputation within the union as an effective advocate of Railwaymen’s interests in 
negotiations with the National Wages Board in 1932. Despite having served as 
Assistant General Secretary since 1925, he was far less widely known in the 
movement than Cramp. His election to succeed Cramp appears to have been almost 
an inevitability, however. A man of ‘dynamic energy and determination’, Marchbank 
was supposedly ‘debonair and a great favourite with the ladies’; he was also a 
‘consistent supporter of the moderate element’ in the Labour party, and best known 
within the union for his meticulous use of detailed briefs.836 He does seem to have 
been particularly concerned with the growth of fascism: it was as a result of a letter of 
inquiry from Marchbank that the Labour party announced that the BUF had been 
added to its proscribed list of organisations, members of which were ineligible for 
                                                          
834 See, for instance, the report of a speech by the TUC GC chairman Andrew Conley, ‘Fascist Drill 
Must Stop – TUC Chairman Warns Home Secretary – ‘If it is Legal Two Can Play That Game’, Daily 
Herald, 22 June 1934. Notably, the reply of Leeds City Labour Party to the June survey had referred 
to the regular drilling of fifty to sixty fascists at a large hall defended by barbed wire. LP FAS 34.20 
Leeds City LP. 
835 ‘Sir J. Gilmour Warns Blackshirts – Will Not Allow Disorder – Assurance Given to Labour Party and 
TUC’, Daily Herald, 27 June 1934 for the deputation; MSS.292/20/18 TUC General Council, Minutes, 
1933-34, minutes of GC meeting of 26 June 1934. The deputation included Citrine and Andrew Conley 
for the TUC, and W. R. Smith and Joe Toole for the Labour NEC. TUC, Congress Report 1934, 
Appendix C, NCL Statement on ‘Fascism at Home and Abroad’, p. 450. Not all of the replies would 
have been collated by this point; it may be that the 21 June deadline was set so that the deputation 
would have the results at its disposal.  
836 Philip Bagwell, The Railwaymen. The History of the National Union of Railwaymen (London, 1963), 
pp. 540-541. 
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membership of the party, in June 1934.837 Marchbank was the main speaker at a TUC-
organised meeting in Newcastle on 15 July 1934, at which he was alleged to have 
said that he had evidence of ‘secret instructions issued by Sir Oswald Mosley’, that 
fascists were active among the armed forces, that certain weapons were 
recommended for use to fascists, including corrugated rubber clubs, knuckle-dusters, 
knives, potatoes containing razor blades and cardboard breastplates studded with 
drawing pins. He was also alleged to have said ‘we strongly object to any particular 
party assembling in the guise of a military machine with the object of overthrowing by 
force the constitutional government of the country.’ After a report of the speech 
appeared in the Daily Telegraph, Mosley’s solicitors informed Marchbank that he was 
being sued for slander. This was likely one aspect of Mosley’s efforts to improve the 
BUF’s reputation in the aftermath of Olympia: Lawrence has highlighted a shift in 
stewarding tactics and a renewed emphasis on electoral politics within the BUF in this 
period.838 Marchbank decided to fight the allegations, and agreed with his own 
solicitors that his defence would be based on three points: that he did not say the 
words alleged in relation to Mosley personally, that the meeting was a privileged 
occasion, and finally that the words he did say were true.839  
Through the autumn and winter Marchbank supplied his solicitors with a large number 
of pamphlets, newspaper cuttings and other evidence to support his case. At this stage 
the prospects looked rather bleak. In November Mosley was in court, suing Daily News 
Ltd for a libellous article published in the Star newspaper the previous year. Mosley, 
according to his biographer, was able to call on ‘a galaxy of legal talent’ and had 
‘sparkled’ in the witness box.840 Moreover, the defamatory words involved were very 
similar to those in Marchbank’s case in their implication that the BUF was planning to 
                                                          
837 Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 27 June 1934. 
838 Lawrence, ‘Fascist violence and the politics of public order in inter-war Britain: the Olympia debate 
revisited’, p. 257. 
839MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, 1934, memorandum ‘Mosley and 
Yourself – Grounds for Defence’. For an account of Marchbank’s speech, see Daily Telegraph, 16 
July 1934. In his documentary essay on the papers relating to the case held in the NUR’s archive, 
‘Blackshirts, Knuckle-Dusters and Lawyers: Documentary Essay on the Mosley versus Marchbanks 
Papers’, Labour History Review 65:1 (2000), 41-58, John Hope comments rightly that the papers ‘are 
an especially valuable documentary source for historians working on the labour movement and the 
way in which its responses to domestic fascism were shaped, offering ‘a rare insight that is not readily 
available elsewhere’. Unfortunately he stops short of exploring this point further, instead highlighting 
the contribution of the case papers to the debate over the British Union of Fascists’ respons ibility or 
otherwise for political violence. Hope refers to the NUR general secretary as Marchbanks; the addition 
of an ‘s’ to his surname seems to have been a common contemporary mistake. 
840 Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London and Basingstoke, 1975), p. 322. 
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overthrow the government by force, in this case by the use of machine guns. In 
summing up, the counsel for the defence, Norman Birkett argued that ‘if the question 
of damages arose in the case, the situation should be met by an award of the smallest 
coin in the realm’, but Mosley was awarded £5,000.841 Marchbank was helped in his 
collection of evidence by an ex-fascist turned Methodist preacher, Charles Dolan, who, 
as well as having supplied information about the secret instructions Marchbank 
referred to in his 15 July speech, travelled the country to collect statements on the use 
of weaponry, and the nature of Mosley’s instructions from other ex-fascists.842 
Marchbank was dealt a substantial blow in December when fifteen of the 21 particulars 
of evidence he had submitted were struck out by the master of the rolls.843 Mosley, 
fresh from another legal victory, this time being cleared of assault at Worthing, had 
engaged new solicitors, who now wrote accusing Marchbank of seeking to delay his 
submission of evidence in order to have time to gather statements, for which they 
alleged he was paying, from ex-BUF men.844 Mosley’s solicitors’ letter implied, rather 
bizarrely, that those who had given Marchbank statements were in fact fascist plants, 
being used to test Marchbank’s malice towards the plaintiff. Marchbank and his 
solicitors categorically denied this, although they had been prepared to pay out of 
pocket expenses for witnesses to get to Unity House, the NUR’s headquarters, to give 
statements.845 In February 1935 Marchbank’s appeal against the striking out of his 
evidence was dismissed. His solicitors suspected that Mosley would seek to repeat 
the success of the Star case by forcing Marchbank to justify his comments on the 
overthrow of the government by force.846 Marchbank and Dolan continued to seek 
statements, from ex-fascists as well as victims of and witnesses to Blackshirt violence 
at meetings. In June Dolan was approached by a former BUF acquaintance who 
offered him £100 to emigrate to Canada, whilst John Griffin, secretary of Eccles 
                                                          
841 See Times, 6 and 7 November 1934 for the Star libel action. 
842 For typical reports, see MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A, NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Dolan to 
Marchbank, 8 and 9 November 1934; MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5B NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, 
Dolan to Marchbank, 1 February 1935. Dolan had published a pamphlet, Mosley Exposed: the 
Blackshirt Racket (London, n.d) based on similar evidence. 
843 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material Pattinson & Brewer to Marchbank, 20 
December 1934; Marchbank to Pattinson & Brewer, 21 December 1934. 
844 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Pattinson & Brewer to Marchbank, 20 
December 1934; J. D. Langton and Passmore to Pattinson & Brewer, 19 December 1934. 
845 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Marchbank to Pattinson & Brewer, 22 
December 1934. 
846 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5B NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Pattinson & Brewer to Marchbank, 4 
February 1935. 
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Labour party, wrote to ascertain whether the letter he had received from Marchbank’s 
solicitors in relation to evidence he had given was genuine ‘in view of the fact that 
Mosley’s tactics are as freakish as his policy’.847 In November 1935, as Marchbank’s 
defence team were waiting for the date of the trial to be confirmed, Unity House 
received a telephone message explaining that a journalist had visited Dolan at his 
church in West Yorkshire hoping to publish his life story. This also caused a certain 
amount of panic, although ultimately the article did not appear in the Daily Express 
until after the trial.848  
The trial took place in the first week of February 1936, with Denis Pritt KC, the Labour 
MP for North Hammersmith leading for Marchbank, and Sir Patrick Hastings KC, 
former Labour MP and Attorney-General for Mosley.849 Mosley’s responses to cross-
examination were generally humorous and seem to have been well received, whilst 
Marchbank’s were much more guarded. He denied that he was speaking on behalf of 
the Union, but in a personal capacity. His repeated insistence that he did not know 
that Mosley was the BUF leader were unlikely to have sounded very convincing. 
Various witnesses for the defence spoke of injuries they had seen or sustained at 
fascist meetings, whilst several BUF headquarters staff denied that the organisation 
encouraged the use of any weaponry. On February 7 the jury found in Mosley’s favour, 
but, perhaps in reference to Birkett’s reference to the ‘smallest coin’ in the Mosley-Star 
case, awarded him only a farthing in damages, effectively suggesting that whilst the 
slander was accepted as having occurred, what Marchbank had said was so close to 
fair comment that the case should never have been brought to court.850  
Despite this symbolic victory, Marchbank’s costs totalled some £5,518. The NUR’s 
rules prevented any use of the union’s funds to assist him, so a testimonial fund was 
                                                          
847 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5C NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, note dated 7 June 1935, and signed 
statement by Dolan on the same date, for the offer to Dolan; MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5D NUR, Mosley v. 
Marchbank material, J. Griffin to Marchbank, 10 September 1935. 
848 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5D NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Copy of telephone message to Jones 
(Marchbank’s secretary), 13 November 1935; MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5E NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank 
material, ‘Preacher Who Lived Dangerously’, Daily Express 15 February 1936, cutting. 
849 Marchbank had tried to secure the services of Sir Stafford Cripps, but he was otherwise engaged, 
apparently on a case to do with roof problems with the Austin Sunshine. MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5B NUR, 
Mosley v. Marchbank material, Pattinson & Brewer to Marchbank, 1 February 1935. 
850 MSS.127/1990/18 Mosley v. Marchbank, bound court transcript contains the full proceedings 
verbatim. See also ‘Mosley v. Marchbank’, Times, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 February 1936. 
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established in April 1936 to appeal for donations.851 Of Marchbank, the call for 
donations stated: 
From the inception of the Fascist movement in this country he has been 
unflinching in his opposition to its pretensions and its policy. He has sought 
consistently to warn the members of his own and other organisations 
against participation in its propaganda and the dangers that will arise from 
its development. No one has been at greater pains to secure first-hand 
information regarding Fascism and its methods. It will be recalled that a 
considerable amount of verified evidence in this regard was presented in 
the recent law case.852 
The testimonial fund committee included a number of Labour heavyweights; the NUR 
president Joseph Henderson acted as chair, with Jim Middleton as secretary and 
Arthur Greenwood as treasurer; other members included Walter Citrine, Clement 
Attlee, Hugh Dalton, A. V. Alexander, George Lansbury, Ernest Bevin, J. R. Clynes 
and Herbert Morrison, a testament to the significance which was placed on the result 
of the case.853 Marchbank’s own prestige within the movement was enhanced. He 
gave the main address to the TUC’s annual pre-Congress demonstration in Plymouth 
that September; his theme was the ‘struggle to maintain and develop the institutions 
of democracy’, now in ‘its most grim and deadly phase’, with fascism ‘out to destroy 
[democracy] root and branch’.854 The testimonial appeal was very successful: 
Marchbank was able to settle his debts by April 1937, with the balance left in the fund 
to be used to form the ‘nucleus of a defence fund’ for similar cases.855 
Such cases were already taking place. In the autumn of 1936, the president and 
Executive Council of the AEU successfully sued another fascist and former Labour 
MP, John Beckett, for libel. Beckett had alleged in an article published in July 1935 
both in Fascist Quarterly and in pamphlet form as ‘Fascism and Trade Unionism’, that 
                                                          
851 Marchbank had already re-mortgaged his house to meet his solicitors’ costs. See 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5D NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Marchbank to W. Gavigan, 10 December 
1935; Pattinson & Brewer to Marchbank, 11 and 19 December 1935; Marchbank to Pattinson & 
Brewer, 20 December 1935. 
852 ‘Labour and Fascism – Mr. Marchbank’s Costs’, Manchester Guardian, 24 April 1936. 
853 ‘Testimonial for Mr. Marchbank’, Daily Herald, 24 April 1936. 
854 ‘Maintenance of Democracy – Labour Leader on Threat of Fascism’, Times, 7 September 1936. 
855 MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5E NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Marchbank to Arthur Greenwood, 8 
April 1937. 
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the not only did the seven members of the EC draw ‘salaries several times as high’ as 
working engineers, but that ‘provided they scratch each other’s’ backs, there is no 
reasonable limit to the comfort they may enjoy or the expenses they may incur’; he 
also suggested that corruption made it almost impossible to unseat an EC member by 
election, as the other members would ‘all be stumping the country and pulling strings 
in his favour […] Need I add that the wages and salaries of the [AEU’s] staff have 
increased during the past few years?’.856 This represented a ‘scandalous attack’ on 
the integrity of the AEU’s leaders, and the general secretary Fred Smith used his 
editorial in the September 1935 issue of the AEU Monthly Journal to refute Beckett’s 
allegations point-by-point; they were, he insisted, a ‘wilful and deliberate 
misrepresentation’.857 The AEU’s response would likely have stopped here, as Smith’s 
comments suggested the union ‘would not stoop to reply to this pamphlet; indeed, we 
should have taken no notice of it’ but for having received recent figures revealing the 
exploitation of workers under fascist regimes abroad.858 At this stage the AEU EC did 
not appear inclined to pursue any court action. Instead, it seems probable that the 
Marchbank case may have emboldened them to do so later in 1936, well over a year 
after the offending article had been published. The union would not have attempted to 
sue without some expectation of success; Marchbank’s experience demonstrated that 
this was possible.859 The judge found in the AEU’s favour, noting that while the right 
to criticise the ‘administration and affairs’ of an organisation such as the AEU with 
some 270,000 members was ‘essential in the public interest’, Beckett’s comments 
were not only untrue but were ‘calculated to do them [the Executive Council] serious 
harm with their members and others’; he awarded at total of £600 in damages.860 That 
the AEU president, Jack Little went on to collaborate with Marchbank on a 1937 
pamphlet Fascism: Fight it Now seems more than a coincidence.861 It is noteworthy 
that the journals of the two unions, the Railway Review and the AEU Monthly Journal, 
gave relatively little space to the outcome of either case: even in the context of success 
against fascism, trade unions remained concerned about overly publicising their 
                                                          
856 Quoted in ‘Little and Others v. Beckett and Others’, Times, 5 November 1936. 
857 ‘Fascist Attacks on Trade Unionism’, AEU Monthly Journal, September 1935. 
858 ‘The Worker under Fascism’, AEU Monthly Journal, September 1935. 
859 The success of the testimonial fund for Marchbank’s costs may have had some influence too. 
860 ‘Little and Others v. Beckett and Others’, Times, 10 November 1936. 
861 Jack Little and John Marchbank, Fascism: Fight it Now (London, 1937). The cover image depicted 
a worker in overalls, weighed down by a swastika chained between his wrists. 
 
269 
 
efforts, although the AEU did permit itself to claim success in this ‘necessary battle’ as 
‘a victory for the whole movement’.862  
There is no real consensus between historians of British fascism on the movement’s 
record in court cases. Robert Benewick sees the Star case as the BUF’s only success 
in this line, whilst Colin Cross suggests Mosley’s experience was more mixed.863 
However, arguably they overlook the implications of the chronology of these cases, 
and herein lies part of the significance of the Mosley-Marchbank case. By the end of 
1934, Mosley had won £5,000 from Daily News Ltd and charges against him at 
Worthing for assault and riotous assembly had been dropped. Beckett had won £1,000 
in slander damages from an antifascist group.864 Further legal successes followed.865 
Yet within a week of the embarrassment of the one farthing he received from 
Marchbank, Mosley had dropped another slander suit he had been bringing against 
the Daily Telegraph. Marchbank’s symbolic victory dented the BUF’s record of legal 
success, and probably Mosley’s reputation, and demonstrated that it was possible to 
challenge and expose fascism effectively in this way, as confirmed by the AEU’s 
success later in the year. Further legal defeats followed for the BUF, notably another 
libel case against Beckett, which awarded damages totalling £20,000 to Lord Camrose 
and the Daily Telegraph.866 
Initial Labour responses to fascism in Britain were influenced by the party’s position 
on communism and resulted in a critique of dictatorship in general. However, during 
1933 there was a concerted move towards a policy of exposing fascists to public 
scrutiny wherever possible, demonstrating their anti-democratic politics. This was a 
strategy based on the collection of detailed empirical evidence, of which the 1934 
                                                          
862 See ‘The Union Vindicated’ and ‘The Allegations and the Reply’, AEU Monthly Journal, December 
1936: the editorial did not take the opportunity to condemn fascism more broadly, but stressed that in 
taking the action, its EC and officers were ‘as deeply concerned for the honour of the union and the 
good name of trade unionism, as they were their own reputation and position in public life. It was not 
a vindictive action […] they might reasonably have expected to be spared the anxiety, worry and 
annoyance of such proceedings’. ‘Mosley v. Marchbank – Slander Suit’ was tucked away on the ninth 
page of the first issue of Railway Review following the judgment, Railway Review, 14 February 1936, 
although publicity might have been more difficult given that Mosley technically ‘won’. For the full AEU-
Beckett court hearings, see Times 4, 5, 6 and 10 November 1936. The affair is mentioned only briefly 
in Francis Beckett, The Rebel Who Lost His Cause. The Tragedy of John Beckett, MP (London, 1999), 
p. 133. 
863 Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain, pp. 266-272. 
864 Ibid., p. 267. The group had dissolved before he could collect the damages. 
865 See ‘Mosley v. Workers’ Press and Others’, Times 25 June 1936, 4 July 1936 for a successful 
injunction, for example. 
866 Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain, pp. 270-272. 
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fascism questionnaire is perhaps the most prominent example, both systematic in its 
approach and national in its scope. The example of the Mosley v. Marchbank case 
demonstrated that such a strategy could be effective given the right circumstances. It 
was, however, tempered by the fear of giving fascists a platform, which at points 
arguably precluded a clearer policy. The case had implications in terms of Labour 
political culture in the period more broadly. As well as emboldening the AEU, it helped 
consolidate Mosley’s status as a folk villain in Labour demonology. David Howell has 
noted the memory of Mosley being used to undermine opponents within the party in 
this way into the 1980s.867 The case was also a timely reminder of the danger of 
charismatic, wealthy newcomers to the party, as will be seen below. 
  
‘Intellectuals’, trade unions, and the Socialist League 
 
The TUC general secretary Walter Citrine recorded an encounter between himself and 
Beatrice Webb during a stay at the Webbs’ house in 1927.  
I had scarcely got downstairs before Mrs Webb tackled me. She said, ‘You 
know, Mr Citrine, you are the first intellectual who has held such a 
responsible position in the trade union movement.’ ‘I have not a very high 
opinion of the intellectuals’, I said, ‘so it is not much of a compliment to me.’ 
‘Oh, I don’t mean it in that sense’, she said.868 
This exchange reveals something of the contested language of the Labour movement, 
and specifically the problem posed by the word ‘intellectual’. From Citrine’s 
perspective, there existed a definite group who could be described as ‘the 
intellectuals’; moreover, to be called an ‘intellectual’ was effectively an insult. The 
response of Webb – by any account, an intellectual herself – indicated that, at least 
once prompted, she too was aware of this meaning of the word. There was certainly 
space in the Labour party for those from the ‘intellectual’ world – the Webbs 
themselves, along with G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski and R. H. Tawney being perhaps 
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the foremost examples in this period. Yet many writers have noted examples of 
‘intellectual’ being used as a term of abuse within the labour movement, particularly 
by trade unionists, with Ernest Bevin one of the most frequently cited: according to 
Alan Bullock, Bevin employed the word ‘in a comprehensive and idiosyncratic way. It 
had little to do with Left or Right or even with a university education’.869 The use of 
‘intellectual’ in this way seems to have a particular currency in the 1930s, when it was 
bound up closely with the fortunes of the Socialist League. It provided a powerful 
rhetorical resource which opponents of the League and its efforts to commit Labour to 
a more radical interpretation of socialism could draw upon to delegitimise the League’s 
claims. This made an important contribution to the League’s ultimate defeat, which in 
turn helped ensure the success of a more moderate social democratic politics which 
would define Labour’s approach well into the post-war period. 
Several writers have commented on the apparent anti-intellectualism of the British 
labour movement. The use of the term ‘intellectual’ as typically understood in the 
interwar years and since dates to the late nineteenth century. T. W. Heyck has argued 
that as a result of the professionalization of science and university teaching, alongside 
the development of cultural criticism, a ‘whole new vocabulary’ of ‘intellectuals’ and 
‘intellectual life’, referring to ‘a particular kind of people and their functions’, came into 
use during the 1870s and 1880s, describing a ‘separate and learned class’.870 This 
separateness contributed to the encouragement of an ‘anti-intellectualism’ in British 
society; Labour, it has been suggested, ‘has never shaken off its roots’ in such 
‘Victorian philistinism’.871 For Radhika Desai, ‘unintellectualism’ has been ‘the most 
distinctive feature of modern English society’ and a hallmark of Labour’s politics.872 
David Stack contends that Labour has ‘rarely displayed any real enthusiasm for the 
questioning, ideas and debate that characterise intellectual life’; an approach of 
‘openness […] and debate has never gained more than a fleeting acceptance’ in the 
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party.873 He illustrates this through an examination of the ILP’s political education 
efforts both before and after the First World War: by the 1920s, the wide-ranging 
Socialist Library book series, conceived to ‘increase the attractiveness of the party to 
the intellectual class and introduce intellectual discussion to ILP members’ had been 
superseded by the rather narrower and more rigid, as well as more explicitly ‘practical’, 
ILP Study Course series.874    
Intellectual pursuits with a firmly ‘practical’ element were largely acceptable in the 
movement. Jonathan Rose has suggested that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, ‘working-class culture was saturated by the spirit of mutual 
education’.875 There was a strong tradition of working-class autodidacticism, of which 
many trade unionists and Labour politicians were products. The MFGB-sponsored 
Labour frontbencher Jack Lawson claimed to have ‘read like a glutton’ from childhood; 
during his teenage years, Lawson’s fellow MFGB MP Aneurin Bevan ‘was reading 
everything I could lay my hands on’, taking in history, literature and economics. 876 
Bevan later commented that ‘the self-educating cling to what they learn with more 
tenacity than the university product […] the abstract ideas which ignite his mind are 
those to which his own experience provides a reference’; Lawson, writing of his later 
Ruskin College experience, noted that ‘most of us had plugged our way through a very 
hard, matter-of-fact world, and were so familiar with the facts of the thing that we were 
not inclined to yield easily to theories about it’.877 In both cases, the importance of 
practical experience loomed large. For Lawson and Bevan, and doubtless many 
others, early reading was facilitated by the institutions of the labour movement: in the 
former’s case, the library of the Boldon Miners’ Institute; in the latter’s, Tredegar 
Workingmen’s Library. Trade unions played an active part in the provision of working-
class education. From its early days, students at Ruskin College, Oxford, were 
supported through scholarships made possible by trade union contributions; 
prominent trade unionists including Richard Bell and David Shackleton served on the 
College’s board. The NUR and SWMF played a major role in the financing and 
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management of the Central Labour College, founded following the Ruskin students’ 
strike of 1909; they also provided scholarships to members.878 Central Labour College 
courses included Advanced Economics, taught by the future MFGB MP for Rhondda 
East W. H. Mainwaring; ‘Trade Union Law and the Law of Industrial Accidents’, taught 
by the solicitor W. H. Thompson; others included the History of Socialism, Economic 
Geography, the Co-operative Movement, Local Government and ‘Some Aspects of 
Labour Party Work’.879 The emphasis was predominantly, if not exclusively, on 
subjects of practical use to the trade unionist. One legacy of labour movement 
attitudes to education, the prioritisation of ‘practical’ intellectual work likely served to 
encourage Labour’s ‘Victorian suspicion of any form of knowledge that could not 
demonstrate its ‘usefulness’’ noted by Stack.880 
Such suspicion was cemented by cultural change within the party since the First World 
War. A substantial number of former Liberals, often from the professions, now 
transferred their political allegiance to Labour, with many joining the ILP: a shift 
facilitated by wartime membership of pacifist and other bodies such as the Union of 
Democratic Control [UDC]. Prominent amongst these new recruits were Charles 
Trevelyan, Viscount Haldane and Christopher Addison – former Liberal Cabinet 
ministers – as well as Sydney Arnold, Charles Roden Buxton, Noel Buxton, Hastings 
Lees-Smith, Arthur Ponsonby, Morgan Phillips Price and Josiah Wedgwood; they were 
joined later in the 1920s by the likes of William Wedgwood Benn, William Jowitt and 
Joseph Kenworthy, and all became Labour parliamentarians.881 As David Howell 
notes, many of these new recruits ‘found office relatively accessible’ in the Labour 
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governments of 1924 and 1929. Not only did they possess the ‘communication skills 
and self-confidence that so many Labour backbenchers seemingly lacked’, but they 
could also help demonstrate Labour’s broad appeal and counter notions that the party 
was ‘introverted, trade union-dominated, class-based’.882 The sense that such figures 
had achieved office so rapidly, without a history of service to the labour movement 
could arouse trade unionists’ resentment. The NUR MP Harry Charleton complained 
in the union’s weekly that 
The Labour party was founded by the trade unions. As we have progressed 
we have acquired intellectuals. My view is that they have not enriched us 
very much. We could have very well managed without them. Not many of 
them have won their spurs. They come into the movement and appear to 
think that they are entitled to the front seats straight away. Too many of 
them have had front seats. Few have justified their position.883 
Such resentment was often compounded by the social distance of such middle-class 
figures from the mainstream of the movement. A German observer, Egon Wertheimer, 
suggested in 1929 that middle-class intellectuals in Britain found it easier to enter the 
Labour party compared to their counterparts on the continent; joining Labour did not 
require the same social sacrifice as entering the German SPD, to the extent that 
intellectuals in the British labour movement were free to keep their usual social circles 
without having to absorb themselves in the associational life of the party.884  
The political commitment of such recruits might also be questioned. Some of the ex-
Liberals had be drawn to Labour as they considered the party a more amenable 
vehicle for their progressive ambitions after 1918; this did not necessarily entail a 
wholesale acceptance of Labour’s policies or party culture. Some new recruits did not 
stay long: Labour’s Attorney-General in 1924, Patrick Hastings, left the party and 
parliament in 1926 to concentrate on his legal career. Such incidents could give rise 
to a sense that ‘intellectuals’ were merely playing at politics, rather than the serious 
commitment the achievement of the socialist commonwealth would require. These 
concerns reached their height in 1931, initially with the exit from Labour of Mosley and 
his associates. Several of these figures, including Mosley himself, could be 
                                                          
882 Howell, MacDonald’s Party. Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922-1931, p. 317. 
883 H.C. Charleton, ‘Parliamentary – The Intellectuals’, Railway Review, 17 July 1931. 
884 Egon Wertheimer, Portrait of the Labour Party (London & New York, 1929), pp. 123-150. 
 
275 
 
characterised as wealthy interlopers promoted without first doing their service to the 
movement. Perhaps more significantly, the group who departed with MacDonald to 
form National Labour could also been viewed as ‘intellectuals’ in this regard: as Howell 
notes, only two of the eleven MPs (excluding Snowden, Thomas, and MacDonald’s 
son Malcolm) who joined MacDonald had been PLP members prior to June 1929; five 
had been Liberal MPs or candidates, two active Conservatives. Only A. G. Church had 
any connection to the unions, although ‘even for him the culture of trade unionism as 
centred around diverse experiences of industrial work remained a mystery’; without 
strong roots in the movement, for these MPs Labour was ‘an instrument for 
progressive politics and in a crisis could be relinquished’.885 MacDonald and Snowden 
could also be castigated as ‘intellectuals’: neither came from a manual background, 
whilst both were well-known as having been engaged in intellectual work in the form 
of their earlier writing. Yet more crucial to such a characterisation were their distance 
from the movement, and political unreliability as expressed in their membership of the 
National government. Such unreliability was echoed in Labour’s recent experience 
with the ILP: ILP opposition on several issues had embarrassed the Labour 
government, and disloyalty was an easy charge to level at the smaller organisation. 
Continuing the dispute over standing orders could appear indulgent in the context of 
Labour’s difficult position after the 1931 election. 
By 1932 the factors outlined had coalesced into a powerful image of the ‘intellectual’: 
wealthy, lacking roots in the movement, socially distant from most Labour members 
and trade unionists, impractical, irresponsible, and unreliable even to the point of 
disloyalty. It was in such a context that the Socialist League emerged: its short career 
was to be closely intertwined with the problem of ‘intellectuals’. That it ended in failure 
in 1937 has not precluded interest in the League from historians. Michael Bor's 
somewhat sprawling account concludes that the League's ‘cavalier approach to the 
party traditions (and official responsibilities) and public style of agitation were 
refreshing'. Paul Corthorn's more circumspect account analyses the League's 
relationship with the ILP and other organisations of the non-Communist left, 
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contending that conflicting views of the Soviet Union were at the centre of the left’s 
inability to advance a coherent political position. David Blaazer considers the League 
in the context of a progressive tradition in British politics of which campaigns in the 
1930s for united and popular fronts against fascism were a manifestation.886 Some 
older works' analyses of the Socialist League's failure remain instructive. Ben Pimlott, 
first in an article on the League, and later in his Labour and the Left in the 1930s, 
suggested that the League isolated itself from mainstream Labour opinion, whilst its 
leaders ‘showed a disastrous insensitivity to the realities of power and influence within 
the Labour movement’.887 In spite of this, Pimlott's understanding of the party as purely 
an ‘electoral machine’ is rather a narrow one, arguably precluding a full appreciation 
of the role of the industrial side of the movement in the League’s failure. Patrick Seyd’s 
account suggests that the lack of a ‘working-class, trade union leadership’ held the 
League back.888 What follows below seeks to push this analysis further through an 
examination of how concern about the role of ‘intellectuals’ influenced trade union 
responses to the League, and the ways in which exploitation of the image of the 
‘intellectual’ contributed to its downfall. 
The Socialist League was formed in October 1932, just prior to that year’s Labour party 
conference, from an amalgamation of two groups: the Society for Socialist Inquiry and 
Propaganda [SSIP] and the ILP National Affiliation Committee. The SSIP had 
developed from a series of informal conferences held during the winter of 1930-31 
before its formal launch in June 1931. A ‘purely propagandist’ body of ‘Loyal Grousers’, 
its members hoped to work towards a more constructive socialist programme whilst 
supporting the Labour government. Its leading personality was the Oxford academic 
G. D. H. Cole; it aimed to disseminate the policy work of another Cole-influenced body, 
the New Fabian Research Bureau [NFRB].889 Both SSIP – ‘its initials being intended 
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to carry a suggestion about its methods’, i.e., zip – and the NFRB were conceived of 
as ‘independent auxiliaries’, free to discuss policy without becoming embroiled in 
parliamentary or conference politics: there was ‘no question of quarrelling’ with the 
party as the ILP had done.890 Cole was perhaps the most sensitive of Labour 
intellectuals to the sensibilities of trade unionists, including concerns about 
‘intellectuals’, and endeavoured to secure union support for the venture.891 Ernest 
Bevin of the TGWU and Arthur Pugh of the ISTC were early recruits, both keen for a 
more constructive Labour policy in the context of their disillusion with the government: 
Bevin agreed to the chair the new organisation, with Pugh and Cole himself as 
deputies. Provincial branches were established, with a total membership of around 
500; a monthly bulletin went into circulation, and six policy pamphlets were published 
over the next year. The National Affiliation Committee, by contrast, was a product of 
the ILP’s decision to disaffiliate from Labour in August 1932. A substantial section of 
ILP opinion disapproved of the split, and the Committee was established in late August 
with a view to reversing disaffiliation.892 These hopes were soon dashed when leading 
pro-affiliation figures such as Patrick Dollan of Glasgow were expelled from the ILP; 
others including Frank Wise resigned. This prompted ‘loyalists’ to find a ‘new 
organisational focus’.893 Rather than engaging in rivalry and organisational duplication 
– ILP affiliationists were also spread across the country – negotiations were opened 
in September for a merger with SSIP. 
The discussions were to have significant implications for trade union support, in 
particular that of Bevin. Although an ‘uncompromisingly proletarian figure’, Bevin was 
                                                          
890 Margaret Cole, ‘The Society for Socialist Propaganda and Inquiry’ in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds.), 
Essays in Labour History. Volume 3, 1918-1939 (London, 1977), pp. 194-196; Margaret Cole, The 
Life of G. D. H. Cole (London, 1971), pp. 175-178; G. D. H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 
1914 (London, 1948), pp. 282-283. 
891 Robert Dare suggests that the very establishment of SSIP and the NFRB were symptoms ‘of the 
declining impress of […] independent intellectuals on the formation of party policy’. Robert Dare, 
‘Instinct and organization: intellectuals and British Labour after 1931’, Historical Journal 26:3 (1983), 
677-697, p. 695. 
892 The vote to disaffiliate, taken at the ILP’s Bradford conference in August 1931, was 241-142; six of 
nine divisional conferences held earlier in the year had backed continued affiliation. The largest 
division, Scotland, expressed most opposition to disaffiliation; several Scottish ILP figures were to 
play a significant role in the Affiliation Committee. Gidon Cohen, The Failure of a Dream. The 
Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II (London, 2007), pp. 15-28. Cohen 
suggests that the majority of ILP members would have preferred to stay within the Labour party. 
893 Keith Laybourn, ‘The disaffiliation crisis of 1932: the Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) and the opinion of ILP members’, in K. Laybourn and J. Shepherd (eds.), Labour and Working 
Class Lives. Essays to celebrate the life and work of Chris Wrigley (Manchester, 2017), pp. 127-130; 
Pimlott, ‘The Socialist League: Intellectuals and the Labour Left in the 1930s’, p.12. 
 
278 
 
no stranger to ‘intellectual’ work: he had made a significant contribution to the 
proceedings of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry during 1930-31, 
and was receptive to unorthodox economic ideas; he had also served on the Labour 
government’s Economic Advisory Committee.894 Restless and creative, often his 
energies were expended on more ‘practical’ problems of organisation, as noted in 
reference to the reform of the TGWU’s political department in the previous chapter, 
and indeed, in the construction of the TGWU itself.895 He had been the ‘star’ of the 
initial SSIP conference, ‘showing a grasp of economic and financial essentials which 
some of the younger intellectuals had scarcely thought to find in a trade union 
official’.896 If anything, however, his experience of SSIP had confirmed his existing 
suspicion of ‘intellectuals’. A SSIP meeting in April 1932, at which Bevin was not 
present, had discussed the party’s relations with the trade unions. Cole had raised the 
issue of giving ‘the individual as compared with the Union representatives more say in 
Party policy’, to which Hugh Dalton had responded ‘we should make the most of what 
we have got and let sleeping dogs lie’, referring to the party’s ‘unbalanced budget of 
four figures […] it cannot do without Trade Union help'.897 On receiving the minutes, 
Bevin complained to Cole: 
I must confess to being a little bit sick of this patronising air […] from Dalton’s 
observations, it would appear that we are only a useful adjunct because 
there is an unbalanced budget […] Dalton went north to fight a seat which 
had been built up by Trade Union effort, and this kind of attitude towards us 
makes one wonder […] it does give me the feeling that there is little 
difference in the attitude expressed therein and that of Herbert Samuel and 
the others.898 
Here, for Bevin, Dalton was the ‘intellectual’: a latecomer taking advantage of trade 
union hard work and sharing political opinions with Liberals. Arguably Bevin could 
tolerate such figures provided they kept to their areas of expertise and stayed out of 
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politics.899 Despite his frustrations with the attitudes displayed in SSIP, he initially 
welcomed the amalgamation talks, although, in conversation with G. D. H. and 
Margaret Cole at the TUC Congress in Newcastle, ‘his face showed plainly that he did 
not like the idea’ of the former ILPers pushing the SSIP towards a more explicitly 
political approach; Cole too had reservations on this point.900 Perhaps seeking to 
counter-balance the ILP affiliationists, Bevin attempted to draw the Social Democratic 
Federation into the talks. The SDF was an organisation in serious decline, a far cry 
from its Victorian incarnation under H. M. Hyndman, yet it retained the loyalty of a 
number of prominent trade union figures including Will Thorne and Jack Jones of the 
NUGMW and George Hicks of the AUBTW. Its secretary Tom Kennedy, a former 
Labour chief whip, was hopeful that the ‘new circumstances’ since the ILP’s exit would 
help revive its fortunes.901 Cole raised the issue in negotiations, but given that the 
affiliationists, led by Frank Wise, were determined to push through the amalgamation 
in time for the party conference at Leicester, ‘there was obviously no time to force them 
to start negotiating with the SDF before then’; the issue seems to have dropped 
thereafter.902 Wise’s group were insistent that the new organisation – the Socialist 
League – affiliate to the Labour party; they were also adamant that Bevin should not 
keep the chairmanship. Cole, outvoted, did at least manage to get his second 
preference for chairman, Arthur Pugh, to agree to serve on the new body’s 
executive.903 Angered by these developments, Bevin now refused the vice-
chairmanship of the NFRB; he effectively gave up on participation in groups apart from 
the party itself. In a letter to Kennedy in September he had emphasised the importance 
of such bodies in keeping socialist ideas before the public; by November he was 
writing, privately, that he had ‘ventured from the path of rectitude in helping to establish 
the SSIP’ in the first place.904 A crucial link between the ‘intellectuals’ of the new 
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League and the unions had been broken. Pugh soon resigned, although the TGWU’s 
Harold Clay continued to be involved for slightly longer, helping develop League policy 
on workers’ control of industry.905 Pimlott suggests that Bevin’s behaviour at this point 
was ‘hardly that of a man nurturing a deep resentment’ at losing the chairmanship; he 
helped secure the League a free column in the New Clarion almost immediately, for 
instance.906 However, it is arguable that Bevin’s experience of working with party 
‘intellectuals’ over a longer period had hardened his distrust of such figures to the point 
that he abandoned their organisations altogether; the loss of the Socialist League’s 
chairmanship was simply the culmination of a longer process. As Pimlott further 
contends, the League’s leaders ‘showed a disastrous insensitivity to the realities of 
political power and influence’ within the movement: in the alienation of trade union 
opinion as represented by Bevin, they got off to a bad start.907 
The infant Socialist League appeared to score some policy successes at the Leicester 
party conference: an amendment to the NEC’s resolution on banking and finance, 
moved by Wise, was carried on a card vote, committing Labour to the nationalisation 
of the joint stock banks; a further resolution moved by Charles Trevelyan was also 
agreed to – against the wishes of the NEC, despite Henderson’s frequently interrupted 
efforts – calling for the immediate introduction of definite socialist legislation when 
Labour next took office.908 In the spring of 1933 the League ran a successful lecture 
series, the content of which was to make up much of the policy programme it adopted 
at its own conference that May. Stafford Cripps succeeded Wise as chairman in June, 
whilst the League began building up its organisation, claiming a membership of 2,000 
by September.909 There was more apparent success at the 1933 Hastings conference 
with the NEC accepting for further consideration a proposal moved by Cripps urging 
that the ‘means to be adopted by the next Labour government for a rapid and complete 
conversion of the Capitalist into the Socialist system’ be specified; the NEC also 
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accepted resolutions from Wise and Trevelyan, in the former case on the functions of 
a National Investment Board, and in the latter, pledging the movement to consult on 
the steps to be taken to resist a possible war, including a general strike.910 The 
League’s tactics now began to shift: its commitment to research was largely neglected, 
and it focused instead on converting the labour movement to its ‘own brand of 
socialism’.911 By 1934, the policy committee of the NEC had been at work for some 
time in several areas of party policy: the result was the document For Socialism and 
Peace, presented to that year’s party conference at Southport. A long series of 
amendments moved by the League were heavily defeated.912 In response to this 
disappointment, the League began to concentrate less on policy-making and more on 
agitation, launching a major recruitment drive in 1935-36 and focusing increasingly on 
foreign policy issues and resistance to war. Following Labour's defeat in the 1935 
general election, the League took an increasingly independent line, with its national 
council coming out in favour of Communist affiliation to the Labour party in February 
1936.913 The Edinburgh party conference that October decisively rejected affiliation, 
and after League representatives, along with those of the ILP and CPGB, put their 
signatures to a Unity Manifesto in January 1937, the NEC determined that 
membership of the Socialist League was no longer compatible with membership of the 
Labour party.914 In May, the League voted to dissolve itself rather than risk the 
expulsion of its members from the party. Its influence on the party’s direction had 
proved largely insignificant, although as Seyd notes, it did ‘provide a centre of 
opposition and of political activity for a significant number of activists who might 
otherwise have stayed in the wilderness’.915 
As will be seen below, the League’s failure owed much to the fact that its ideas and 
policies were unable to gain much traction in the wider labour movement. The 
                                                          
910 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1933, pp. 158-166 for Cripps’ resolution on ‘Labour’s Goal 
– Socialism’; pp. 174-175 for Wise’s ‘Banking and Finance’ amendment; pp. 185-188 on for the debate 
on Trevelyan’s ‘War and Peace’ resolution. The League had submitted a total of twelve amendments 
to the policy document ‘Socialism and the Condition of the People’; only those moved by Wise and 
Cripps were called. Seyd, ‘Factionalism within the Labour Party: the Socialist League 1932-37’, p. 
214. 
911 Pimlott, ‘The Socialist League: Intellectuals and the Labour Left in the 1930s’, p. 26. 
912 See, for example Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1934, pp. 158-165, 175-178, and 191-
199. 
913 Seyd, ‘Factionalism within the Labour Party: the Socialist League 1932-37’, p. 219. 
914 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1936, pp. 207-211 for the debate on CPGB affiliation; 
Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting of 27 January 1937 for the League’s disaffiliation. 
915 Seyd, ‘Factionalism within the Labour Party: the Socialist League 1932-37’, p. 224. 
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language of anti-intellectualism was a contributing factor in this failure. Frequently 
employed against the League and its leading personalities, the League did not help 
itself: much of its behaviour seemed to fit all too easily with the powerful image of the 
‘intellectual’. 
The League's declared objective was to secure ‘the adoption by the working-class 
movement of an advanced programme and a socialist outlook’. Doing so implied 
converting the Labour party to the League's line, which would necessitate the adoption 
of its policies by the party conference; this in turn relied on securing a sufficient number 
of votes for a conference majority. The largest votes at conference were the block 
votes of the major trade unions. In the period of the League's existence the number of 
trade union votes, based on the number of members each union affiliated to the party, 
never fell below 1,915,000, whilst the maximum number of votes of the constituency 
parties never exceeded 432,000; by contrast, the Socialist League itself never 
affiliated more than 3,000 members to Labour. Critics sometimes suggested that this 
implies that the views of left wing constituency parties were effectively steamrollered 
by the undemocratic block vote of right wing trade unions. Such a viewpoint does tend 
to introduce something of a false distinction and obscure the fact that not all unions 
voted the same way, just as not all constituency parties voted the same way. However, 
as the figures mentioned make clear, constituency party votes alone could not secure 
victory. Success relied upon gaining the block votes of enough sufficiently large unions 
to get a majority. In 1934, for instance, during the debates on For Socialism and Peace, 
the six largest union votes, in order of decreasing size, belonged to the MFGB 
(400,000 votes), TGWU (254,000), NUGMW (242,000), NUR (219,233), UTFWA 
(171,508), and NUDAW (100,256). At least three of these unions would need to be on 
side to have a chance of carrying the conference. 
Gaining seats on the NEC provided another route to an influence on the party’s 
direction. The party's policy committees were drawn from this body, which was elected 
annually in four sections: twelve members elected by and representing the trade 
unions, one member representing the socialist societies affiliated to the party, five 
members representing the constituency parties, and five women members, in addition 
to the Secretary, Treasurer, and the leader of the Parliamentary party. Crucially, during 
the whole period of the Socialist League's existence, the socialist societies, 
constituency and women's sections were all elected by the whole party conference: 
 
283 
 
this too required sufficient support from trade union votes. Of the figures associated 
with the Socialist League, just two were successful in its lifetime: Trevelyan in 1933, 
and Cripps in 1934. Voting for the NEC was not always ideological; inertia could be a 
powerful factor in election: many unions and DLPs would simply continue to support 
the candidates they had backed in previous years.916 Even so, it is notable that both 
Trevelyan and Cripps received the lowest votes for a successful candidate in any NEC 
section.917 Although the system was altered to give greater power to the constituency 
parties in 1937, this did not necessarily improve the left's position, with only three 
ostensibly left candidates out of seven being elected in this section in 1937.918 
Trade union block votes were not simply determined on a whim, or even during the 
course of a conference debate. As Bevin commented in the debate on changes to the 
composition of the NEC in 1937, ‘there is no such thing in this Conference as a 
unanimous Trade Union opinion. In my own Union we are […] pretty evenly divided 
and our votes are not decided’.919 Each union sent a delegation to the party 
conference, almost always containing some of its national officials, as well as ordinary 
members. The size of these delegations could vary enormously: the Miners, for 
instance, typically sent around forty delegates, the Railwaymen just ten, smaller 
unions might not even send a delegate. Equally, the delegations' instructions could 
vary. Sometimes a union's own conference would have given its delegation a mandate 
if the party conference was discussing a similar issue, although given that union 
conferences tended to take place through the spring and early summer, whereas the 
party held its annual meeting in the autumn, often delegations had no specific 
mandate. In such a circumstance the usual course of action would be to try to follow 
as closely as possible the union's existing policy and vote accordingly. Alternatively, 
the delegation might meet the evening before the conference to decide how to vote: 
this seems to have been common practice in the NUR, for example. If the delegates 
                                                          
916 Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Conference. A study in the politics of intra-party democracy 
(Manchester, 1980), pp. 243-258, for a detailed discussion of the politics of NEC elections. 
917 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1933, p. 216, and Annual Conference Report 1934, p. 190. 
Trevelyan was the only successful candidate to receive less than a million votes in 1933; Cripps 
managed 1,187,000 in 1934. 
918 These were Harold Laski, Cripps, and D. N. Pritt. Whilst Cripps, who was placed fifth, received a 
larger vote than the long-serving George Dallas, Pritt scraped into the seventh spot with over 100,000 
fewer votes than his fellow KC. Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1937, pp. 180-181. 
919 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1937, pp. 145-146. 
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was split on an issue, the union's vote would be cast, with very rare exceptions, for the 
majority view.920 
The Socialist League's failure needs to be seen in this context, and so too do its 
apparent early successes. Wise’s amendment calling for the nationalisation of the joint 
stock banks at the 1932 party conference was carried narrowly, by a majority of 
157,000. This was a particularly tight margin for a conference card vote, with some 
1,141,000 votes for, and 984,000 against.921 A resolution calling for the public 
ownership of the entire  banking system had been carried at the 1931 conference, with 
support from Ernest Bevin as well as George Lathan of the RCA; Wise withdrew an 
amendment to specifically include joint stock banks as he felt sufficiently assured from 
the platform that this was included within the meaning of the resolution.922 Union 
delegations voting for Wise's amendment in 1932 might well have considered this to 
be simply a continuation of their previous policy as agreed only a year earlier. Many 
of the League’s 1934 defeats were carried on a show of hands, but in cases where 
card votes were taken, large minority votes in favour of policies backed by the League 
have more complex explanations. The largest of these votes was the 592,000 cast in 
favour of CPGB affiliation to Labour at the 1936 Edinburgh conference. 400,000 of 
these were the block vote of the MFGB, and the Federation’s position here needs to 
be understood in terms of its own internal politics, and the particular attitudes of its 
area unions to Communist involvement: the MFGB annual conference had voted in 
favour of affiliation by 283 to 238, with South Wales – where the SWMF president, 
Arthur Horner, was probably the country’s best-known Communist trade unionist – and 
Durham in the majority.923 A further 70,000 votes likely came from the AEU, another 
union with a sizeable Communist faction: the AEU National Committee had amended 
a resolution calling specifically for CPGB affiliation into a rather more ambiguous 
                                                          
920 The ASW regularly split its vote proportionally according to its delegation’s views. Lewis Minkin, The 
Blair Supremacy. A study in the politics of Labour’s party management (Manchester, 2014), pp. 16-
17. 
921 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1932, pp. 188-194. 
922 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1931, pp. 187-195; see also Annual Conference Report 
1932, pp. 216-217. 
923 Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1936, pp. 207-211. Speaking for the MFGB, Will Lawther 
argued that the union’s main problem in the coalfields had been Spencerism rather than Communism. 
For the debate in the MFGB, see D.845.15 MFGB, Proceedings and Reports, 1936, MFGB Annual 
Conference Report, pp. 58-72: assurances were given by Horner that the CPGB would accept and 
conform to the Labour party’s constitution; these were regarded as worth little by opponents of 
affiliation such as John McGurk of Lancashire. 
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commitment to unifying all ‘political bodies engaged in working-class propaganda’, 
which might still be interpreted by delegates as including the CPGB.924 
Such organisational constraints affected the Socialist League's ability to influence the 
party's direction. Its dearth of links with the industrial side of the movement was a key 
factor in this difficulty. As noted above, the loss of Bevin as chair was an ill-omen for 
the League’s future; its only other links with significant trade union figures – Pugh and 
Clay – were brief and largely insubstantial. The image of the ‘intellectual’, into which 
League leaders – in particular Cripps, its most prominent personality from 1933 – 
often, if unconsciously, played, further compounded this problem. 
Cripps came from a background of inherited wealth; he was the son of the former 
Conservative politician and later Labour peer and Cabinet minister Lord Parmoor, as 
well as being the nephew of Beatrice Webb. A barrister by profession, he had become 
Britain’s youngest KC in 1926. Cripps joined Labour in 1929; by October 1930 he was 
in the government, having been chosen to succeed Sir James Melville as Solicitor-
General. If his politics were those of a ‘tame Government lawyer’ before the crisis, the 
events of 1931 caused a rapid radicalisation of his perspective, and as one of the 
handful of former members of the government to keep his seat, Bristol East, he quickly 
became one of Labour’s leading figures in the 1931 parliament alongside Lansbury 
and Attlee. Cripps had considerable wealth as a result of his legal career, which he 
continued alongside serving as an MP; aspects of his personality – including a 
‘messianic arrogance’ – could grate with colleagues, whilst his political judgment was 
often questionable as he ‘flitted from one attractive panacea to another’. As the 
League’s leading personality from 1933 he became an ‘uncompromising rebel’.925 In 
many ways Cripps appeared to fit the image of the ‘intellectual’ perfectly, with his 
shallow roots in the movement, wealth, changeable political views and a manner which 
could be contemptuous or patronising. His public statements also caused controversy 
and embarrassment for the party, such as his insinuation that a future Labour 
government would meet with opposition from Buckingham Palace; he certainly seems 
                                                          
924 TU/ENG/3/A/4 AEU, National Conference and Committee Reports, 1934-1937, AEU National 
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to have given the Conservatives considerable ammunition.926 Cripps resigned from 
the NEC in October 1935 over the issue of sanctions on Italy over its invasion of 
Abyssinia, although he returned two years later in the now expanded constituency 
parties section. An advocate for a Popular Front after the Munich crisis, Cripps 
submitted a memorandum to the NEC arguing for a national campaign on these lines; 
from this perspective a united opposition was the only means of securing electoral 
victory over the National government. Cripps only obtained the support of two NEC 
colleagues, Pritt and Ellen Wilkinson, and his memorandum was not adopted. 
However, he now went over the heads of the NEC and circularised all DLPs with the 
memorandum; this act of blatant disloyalty led to his expulsion from the party, after he 
refused to reaffirm his allegiance to the party and withdraw his memorandum; the party 
conference in May affirmed this decision by a large majority.927 
Union figures made effective use of the image of the ‘intellectual’ to attack Cripps and 
his allies. Responsibility was something intellectuals were presented as lacking. Union 
leaders constantly emphasised the fact that they had to act responsibly. The 
comments of Bevin, John Marchbank, and Charles Dukes of the NUGMW during the 
debate on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia at the 1935 Brighton party conference are 
indicative of this. Dukes contrasted responsible trade union leadership with that of 
Cripps and William Mellor of the Socialist League: ‘I do not mind a Bevin or a 
Marchbank, or anybody else who can really say to this movement ‘l tomorrow will lead 
my men’, but I resent people who have no idea as to what these people think — people 
who have no authority, no responsibility, no influence’, the suggestion being that the 
Socialist Leaguers were speaking on behalf of no-one but themselves. Marchbank 
argued that trade union representatives ‘have to take decisions which are unpopular. 
It is one thing to be in a position of responsibility, and to have to give a decision, and 
another thing to make speeches without responsibility’. Bevin, criticising Cripps, asked 
‘who am I to let my personality protrude as compared to this great movement? Who is 
any man on that platform?’, before recounting Cripps' recent resignation from the NEC; 
not only, for Bevin, had this left the rest of the Executive with added responsibility, but 
                                                          
926 See LP/ELEC/1935/1 General election material, 1935, Conservative Central Office, General Election 
1935. Notes for Speakers and Workers (London, 1935), for numerous quotations from Cripps. 
927 For the relevant NEC decisions, Labour Party NEC papers, minutes of meetings of NEC, 13 January 
1939, 18 January 1939, 25 January 1939. Labour Party, Annual Conference Report 1939, pp. 219-
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that Cripps had effectively stabbed the rest of the Executive in the back. This offence 
against the ethos of the movement was clear: ‘l ask any trade unionist: have you ever 
found it in your own union? Have we ever treated one another like that?’928 
Being politically unreliable, potentially to the point of disloyalty, was another aspect of 
this image; Bevin's characterisation of the exit of MacDonald and his National Labour 
associates in 1931 as the ‘betrayal of the intellectuals’ reflects this. In the 1937 party 
conference debate on the Unity Campaign, the MFGB’s John McGurk expressed this 
bluntly: 
If Sir Stafford Cripps, Professor Laski and all the other fellows desire to have 
a United Front, why cannot they form a Party of their own, or else join the 
Party for which they have done so much good, namely, the Tory Party […] 
Sir Stafford Cripps is a rich man with rich friends, and they are the biggest 
danger to the Labour Party in this country. You will find those chaps where 
Mosley is before longer. I am expressing an opinion that is shared by many 
people in this Conference. Mosley did exactly the same.929 
The mention of Laski adds to the sense that ‘intellectuals’ were the problem; the 
reference to Mosley was calculated to be as damning as possible. Although McGurk 
was very much a figure on the MFGB’s right, at other times there was support within 
the union for Cripps and the positions he took: Ebby Edwards and Will Lawther shared 
a platform with him on the day of his expulsion in 1939.930 Cripps’ work for the MFGB, 
free of charge, as their legal counsel during the inquiry into the Gresford colliery 
disaster had helped build goodwill. However, the distinction between the political and 
the industrial which was part of the movement’s culture limited the extent to which 
Cripps’ industrial/professional identity was a political aid: when G. R. Strauss tried to 
defend Cripps against McGurk’s attack by referring to his work on the Gresford inquiry, 
Morrison, speaking next, dismissed this as inappropriate: ‘That sort of thing ought not 
to be exploited’.931 Other prominent League members could be accused of political 
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unreliability: J. T. Murphy, its secretary from 1934, had been a long-standing member 
of the CPGB until as recently as 1932.932 
A further way in which intellectuals could offend the party ethos related to the ordering 
of political priorities, and particularly time-wasting on issues not of immediate 
importance. Citrine claimed to have wound up a meeting with members of the League 
stating that he did not propose to waste further time discussing ‘ultimate socialist 
objectives of a theoretical character’ having come expecting ‘practical politics’.933 The 
TGWU’s George Brown's dismay that the party had wasted crucial time ‘arguing the 
toss’ over Cripps' fate in 1939 arguably represents another use of this aspect of the 
image.934 
Between 1932 and 1937, the Socialist League repeatedly challenged the policy of the 
Labour party but was unable achieve any lasting success. One dimension of its failure 
was linked to the structure of power within the Labour party’s organisation. The League 
was unable to gain the necessary support from enough major trade unions to carry its 
resolutions at the party conference, which severely limited its ability to have an 
influence on the direction of the party in the period after the crises of 1931. This failure 
was compounded by the way in which the League appeared to regularly offend against 
the prevailing ethos of the party, and trade union leaders were able to undermine the 
League through the use of image of the ‘intellectual’, representing the antithesis of 
central Labour's assumptions about responsibility, reliability, and loyalty. Such loyalty 
could matter more than the principles involved: Cripps’ notorious comments about the 
influence on Buckingham Palace in January 1934 are illustrative. Although forced to 
clarify his words publicly, he remained a member of the NEC’s policy subcommittee 
on constitutional affairs. Labour's prevailing ethos, as implied by Drucker, then, was in 
important ways an exclusive one, and it is not implausible to suggest that this was 
likely to repel more independently-minded left-wingers who might otherwise have 
become supporters.935 If Cripps and the Socialist League helped give shape to the 
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image of the ‘intellectual’ when it was at its most potent in the 1930s, it was less 
effective against the left during the next period of major readjustment in the party in 
the 1950s. Although his resignations, first from the Labour government and later from 
the shadow cabinet, could result in the charge that Aneurin Bevan was acting 
irresponsibly, the image of the 'intellectual' did not stick to the Bevanites as it had to 
the League: there was little chance of them working with the Communists, for instance. 
If anything the Labour left of the 1950s became more adept at deploying the image 
against the Gaitskellite right in the language of ‘desiccated calculating machines’, 
‘Jaywalkers’ and the ‘Hampstead Set’.936 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has argued that the trade unions played a crucial role in the recovery of 
the British Labour party in the decade after 1931. The party had been rocked by a 
series of interlinked crises. The inertia of the Labour government of 1929 in the face 
of mass unemployment and financial crisis had undermined the party’s confidence in 
an inevitable, gradual transition from capitalism to socialism and exposed the often 
flimsy basis of its policies: in R. H. Tawney’s phrase, ‘less programmes than 
miscellanies – a glittering forest of Christmas trees, with presents for everyone’.937 
Defections by leading Labour politicians – most prominently MacDonald, Snowden 
and Thomas in August 1931, but also that of Mosley earlier in the year, followed by 
the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932 – also shook the party. The catastrophic election 
result in October wiped out swathes of Labour’s parliamentary forces, including key 
leadership figures such as Henderson who were effectively removed from the political 
stage; the defeat also brutally dented the notion of Labour’s ‘forward march’. In the 
context of these calamities the unions provided vital stability, in spite of their unease 
about the direction of the Labour government, and the economic depression which 
constrained their resources, often severely. Their solidity in this dark period gave the 
party an essential base from which its recovery could be built.  
Through the political levy collected from the ‘contracting-in’ membership, unions 
provided Labour with indispensable financial support. On several occasions they came 
to the party’s aid – as in 1931 and 1939 – when bankruptcy appeared to be looming. 
Their affiliation fees gave party headquarters its more substantial regular source of 
income, allowing it to continue its routine functions. Political funds were often under 
intense pressure in the context of the depression, but unions continued to make 
generous contributions to Labour’s general election and campaign appeals. This 
allowed Labour to compete with the Conservatives and Liberals at both the national 
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and constituency level. Those unions which sponsored parliamentary candidates gave 
significant support to divisional Labour parties, providing regular annual grants as well 
as election expenses; this meant that these DLPs were more likely to be able to afford 
to pay for the services of an agent and develop their organisation; the potential for 
success of these DLPs would have been the lesser without this support. At local level, 
union affiliation to DLPs also provided regular finance, as well as members. Much of 
the voluntary effort on which the party depended came from union activists. Few 
alternative sources of funding were available: although there remained some individual 
exceptions, Labour was never able to rely on private wealth as its main political rivals 
could, and what money there was had to be pushed as far as possible.  
Whilst there were instances where resources were used inefficiently – most notably in 
the concentration of union money in ‘safe’ seats – unions also engaged closely in 
organisational reforms designed to put the party on a more sustainable basis.938 Union 
figures such as George Lathan made an important contribution to stabilising the party’s 
financial practices. Union backing made possible the establishment of superannuation 
schemes for party staff and agents, a significant step in the professionalisation of 
Labour’s organisation. Also of great importance was the development, led by 
prominent trade unionists like Bevin and Cramp, of the Hastings Agreement for the 
regulation of constituency finance. Another step towards a more professional party, 
this provided greater standardisation and reduced competition between sponsoring 
organisations. Although far from the kind of pooling arrangements envisaged by some, 
the system encouraged DLPs to take a greater share of the responsibility for their own 
funding and represented a key move towards the modernisation of constituency 
finance. 
If securing ‘labour’ representation in the House of Commons had been the motivation 
behind the original foundation of the Labour Representation Committee, trade union 
sponsorship of parliamentary candidates ensured that it continued. Whilst the early 
1930s saw the party develop a more explicitly socialist politics in both its rhetoric and 
policy agenda, through such sponsorship the unions ensured that the still significant 
goal of direct labour representation in Parliament was not lost sight of. Sponsorship 
was increasingly concentrated in the larger unions, most notably the MFGB, but small 
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and medium sized bodies such as the Bakers and the Pottery Workers continued to 
contribute too. Different selection systems, involving varying degrees of membership 
participation were used; in some unions such as the NUR these became increasingly 
professionalised, making use of examinations and interviews to ensure potential 
candidates would be of sufficient calibre to make effective Labour representatives in 
the Commons. Such systems did continue to work to the advantage of those already 
well-known within a union, and to the exclusion particularly of women, but also of 
younger candidates in general. Another area where professionalisation took place was 
in the gradual separation of political and industrial spheres. An older generation of 
trade union leaders, for example, the likes of Will Thorne and J. H. Thomas, had 
straddled both, but leading officials were increasingly excluded, with growing 
recognition that both industrial leadership and political representation were full time 
roles. This was often a slow and halting process, as in the RCA, but it was largely 
irreversible by the end of the decade. There were notable exceptions at moments of 
crisis, Bevin’s candidacy at Gateshead in October 1931 being perhaps the most 
notable, although these often relied on personal influence, in particular that of 
Henderson, to achieve. Unions’ sense of propriety over particular constituencies could 
lead to conflict, as with the TGWU at Clay Cross in 1933. If there was a tendency for 
union candidates to be concentrated in safer seats, this could obscure the interplay of 
local and national factors which influenced electoral geography. Several nationally 
important union figures such as Arthur Hayday also maintained a strong local political 
identity. The language of Labour’s appeal to the local electorate was also shaped by 
union experiences. 
Trade union MPs continued to provide an important tranche of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party’s personnel. Some union MPs lived up to the stereotype of elderly figures 
from the industrial side of the movement being effectively ‘retired’ into an ineffectual 
parliamentary career, but this generalisation masked greater complexity. Union MPs 
provided a direct, organic link to Labour’s working class supporters; they were also 
able to speak with authority on industrial issues. Figures such as Tom Williams, 
George Hall and Dai Grenfell made important contributions to the depleted PLP in the 
1931 parliament, sharing the burden of mounting an effective parliamentary opposition 
in the face of an enormous National government majority. Whilst often struggling to 
work effectively as a group, several trade union MPs played significant roles in the 
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structures of the PLP, both on its executive and as party whips. The development and 
modernisation of liaison between sponsored MPs and their unions during the 1930s 
was significant, improving the effectiveness of union and PLP efforts in the House of 
Commons. Such liaison might be informal, as in the MFGB’s use of a loose group of 
‘Mining Members’ in which Tom Cape and Gordon MacDonald played important roles; 
alternatively, it might be more structured, as in the increasingly professionalised 
TGWU political department headed from 1937 by John Price. This approach also 
involved the co-option of unsponsored MPs who were union members to increase the 
efficacy of liaison. Sponsored MPs had an important role to play in the wider labour 
movement, providing a link between the membership and parliament: this might done 
through their presence at union conferences, members of party conference 
delegations, or through union journals such as the NUR’s Railway Review or the 
TGWU Record. The effectiveness of communication varied, but unions did not seek 
to tightly control their MPs, recognising the primacy of their parliamentary work and 
their status as representatives rather than delegates. 
Unions made an important contribution to Labour strategy. On their initiative, the 
National Joint Council was revived in 1932, improving co-operation between the TUC 
and the party, helping the labour movement co-ordinate its approach and speak with 
one voice to both the government and the public. In terms of policy-making, unions 
exercised a general influence on the direction of Labour policy towards more detailed, 
constructive solutions than promulgated in the 1920s. Labour’s commitment to pluralist 
democratic politics was also shaped by the unions, notably in its rejection of political 
extremism. 
The party’s response to domestic fascism offers one example. Its strategy, developed 
through the NJC and TUC, sought to marginalise the political extremism of the far right 
through the exposure of fascists to public scrutiny. This entailed the systematic and 
detailed gathering of information, most notably in the party’s 1934 questionnaire on 
local fascist activity, to build up an accurate picture of the fascist movement and 
facilitate responses. Union MPs contributed to parliamentary criticism of the British 
Union of Fascists after the violence at Olympia in June 1934, in so doing emphasising 
Labour’s democratic credentials and its abhorrence of dictatorships of the political right 
or left. Trade unionists also contributed to the failure of British fascism through legal 
cases, most especially in John Marchbank’s slander battle with Mosley himself. 
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The success of the moderate mainstream of the party in the 1930s in fending off 
attempts to secure the adoption of more radical policies and alliances with other 
parties also owed much to the role of the unions, both in organisational and political-
cultural terms. Union suspicion of ‘intellectuals’ was a contributing factor in the failure 
of the Socialist League and its attempts to alter party policy and later pursue a ‘united 
front’ involving the Communist party. In contrast to the League’s ‘intellectuals’, 
prominent trade unionists emphasised the value of responsibility and shaped the 
party’s dominant ethos. This could cause frustration and hostility on parts of the Labour 
and broader left, but it helped Labour’s claim to be a responsible potential government 
and contributed to the development of a party culture of solidarity and 
constitutionalism. 
These developments were of considerable significance for Britain’s political culture in 
the 1930s. In these various ways, trade unions ensured Labour’s survival as a viable 
party of government, and as the major alternative to the National government: in this 
way, the unions contributed to the maintenance of liberal parliamentary democracy in 
1930s Britain. This was a significant achievement. Despite the attractions of 
corporatism, unions remained party-political, committed to democratic pluralism. They 
not only provided the Labour party with moral and material resources, but ensured the 
continuation of direct representation of the industrial working class in British politics, 
helping to safeguard investment in the democratic system. Other parties may have 
attracted working class voters, but at this stage they did not make them their 
candidates. Labour’s doing so, thanks in no small part to trade union involvement, 
helped it demonstrate its credentials of being for the ‘people’, something which was to 
contribute to its 1940s success. The party’s recovery after 1931 was not inevitable; 
indeed, it still appeared to be far from national office in 1939, when another general 
election would likely have been lost. If the unions’ work in rebuilding the party in the 
1930s did not lead inevitably to Labour’s return to government in 1940 or its electoral 
success in 1945, it did at least help to make those developments possible: it is hard to 
see how later successes could have been achieved without the unions’ contribution 
after 1931. 
These developments had longer-term implications for the party. If the greater respect 
in which unions were held during the 1940s owed much to their wartime role, then 
arguably their engagement with Labour in this earlier period also contributed. It was 
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more difficult for Conservatives to appeal to the ‘conventional wisdom’ of the 1920s, 
when they had – with a considerable degree of success – been able to portray 
unionised workers as sectional and selfish; at least until the greater industrial unrest 
of the 1960s and 1970s.939 The unions’ role in this period in the constituencies also 
had a lasting effect. In those divisions where sponsorship occurred, Labour’s electoral 
strength was consolidated to the extent that many such seats continued to regularly 
return Labour MPs until the end of the twentieth century and even beyond, often in an 
unbroken pattern. For example, the election of the RCA-sponsored Frank Anderson 
at Whitehaven (Cumberland) in 1935 began a string of Labour victories in the 
constituency (and under its later nomenclature of Copeland) which lasted until 2017.940 
Several of the organisational reforms of the 1930s also had considerable longevity. 
The Hastings Agreement, although occasionally modified to take account of the 
changing value of money, remained in place until the 1990s when unions were often 
perceived as a liability to the party, as did the practice of direct sponsorship itself. In 
response to Labour’s 1945 success, the Conservatives modernised much of their own 
finance and organisation; by the mid-1950s, the Labour reforms of the 1930s had 
become rather dated, particularly in comparison with those of their opponents. The 
Wilson Report of 1955 damned labour’s organisation as being ‘at the penny-farthing 
stage in a jet-propelled era’. This was arguably one aspect of the party’s well-
documented difficulties in an age of affluence: the electoral machine on which its 
greatest success in 1945 had been built was itself constructed in an age of poverty in 
the 1930s.941 Limited resources had arguably forced more creative solutions to 
financial difficulties, but success could breed complacency about further reform.  
The role of trade union candidates and MPs underwent considerable change in the 
post-war period. In the more corporatist post-war industrial context, unions were in 
much more direct consultation with government departments; consequently, their 
MPs’ utility was reduced in this regard. Organisation for liaison, such as the system 
                                                          
939 Ross McKibbin, ‘Class and Conventional Wisdom: the Conservative Party and the ‘Public’ in Inter-
war Britain’, in McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class. Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford, 
1991), 259-293. 
940 The seat was lost to the Conservatives at a by-election in February 2017 and held by them at the 
general election four months later. 
941 For the party in the ‘affluent’ 1950s, see Lawrence Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent 
Britain, 1951-64. Old Labour, New Britain? (Basingstoke, 2003), and Black’s Redefining British 
Politics. Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-70 (Basingstoke, 2010). 
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developed by the TGWU in the 1930s, often fell in neglect as a result; it was only 
following the difficulties in the Labour government’s relations with the unions at the 
time of In Place of Strife in 1969 that unions began to rebuild their organisation for 
liaison with their MPs all over again.942 Bevin had argued in 1931 that  
[…] just as in the last few years we have had to move away from the old 
‘election by ballot’ for Trade Union officials, and have had to make an 
examination as to ability, we must do the same with candidates for public 
office, in order to find the necessary equipment for political representation 
[…] we shall endeavour to equip our people much better and more 
scientifically.943 
Moves towards greater professionalisation took place in the 1930s; yet arguably the 
logic of such a development was recruitment from the professional classes, which 
marked a change in union candidatures after 1945. Several unions co-opted middle 
class MPs onto their parliamentary panels; Hugh Gaitskell, for instance, was an 
NUGMW MP. Correspondingly, the direct representation of working class interests in 
Parliament by working class MPs was reduced. The problem of effective labour 
representation has remained a live issue; after a similar expansion of Labour MPs from 
the professions in the 1990s and 2000s, several unions took steps to improve their 
parliamentary representation.944  
The developments discussed in this thesis indicate several areas into which future 
research might inquire: its focus has been both national, and primarily on larger 
unions. There is considerable scope to explore, for instance, the unions’ role in party 
finance further, in this period and others, through more locally-oriented studies; an 
examination of the problems faced by smaller unions engaging in politics might also 
be revealing in this regard. Political finance in Britain in general has been an under-
researched area. This study has argued for the importance of the unions’ role in the 
Labour party’s recovery after 1931; there is still opportunity and necessity to continue 
exploration of their importance in modern British political history.  
                                                          
942 See Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance. Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1991); 
Sidney Weighall, On the Rails (London, 1983). 
943 Ernest Bevin, ‘Straight on Through the Wilderness’, Labour Magazine, December 1931. 
944 Unite, successor to the TGWU, introduced a ‘future candidates programme’ to this end; see 
www.unitetheunion.org/campaigns/unitepolitics/future-candidates-programme [Accessed 12 January 
2018]. 
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a. AEU membership 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Labour Party 
 
Political membership estimated from contributions 
 
Total 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
 
 
Annual change 
 
TUC  
m'ship 
 
as % of 
total 
m'shi
p 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
Income 
(£) 
 
Pol. 
m'ship 
 
 
Annual change 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
Labour aff'n 
as % of 
pol. m'ship 
1931 183,777 -8,568 -4.5% 154,000 83.8 77,721 42.3 50.5 3,520 70,400     38.3 45.7 110.4 
1932 171,165 -12,612 -6.9% 146,263 85.5 70,022 40.9 47.9 3,273 65,460 -4,940 -7.0% 38.2 44.8 107.0 
1933 169,265 -1,900 -1.1% 130,048 76.8 70,004 41.4 53.8 3,255 65,100 -360 -0.5% 38.5 50.1 107.5 
1934 182,233 12,968 7.7% 135,482 74.3 70,006 38.4 51.7 3,303 66,060 960 1.5% 36.3 48.8 106.0 
1935 203,270 21,037 11.5% 145,951 71.8 70,009 34.4 48.0 3,325 66,500 440 0.7% 32.7 45.6 105.3 
1936 248,209 44,939 22.1% 163,061 65.7 70,021 28.2 42.9 2,435 48,700 -17,800 -26.8% 19.6 29.9 143.8 
1937 299,284 51,075 20.6% 248,209 82.9 70,021 23.4 28.2 3,244 64,880 16,180 33.2% 21.7 26.1 107.9 
1938 333,619 34,335 11.5% 299,284 89.7 72,043 21.6 24.1 3,243 64,860 -20 0.0% 19.4 21.7 111.1 
1939 376,401 42,782 12.8% 333,619 88.6 73,558 19.5 22.0 3,312 66,240 1,380 2.1% 17.6 19.9 111.0 
1940 454,126 77,725 20.6% 376,401 82.9 74,080 16.3 19.7 3,322 66,440 200 0.3% 14.6 17.7 111.5 
 
Sources: AEU Annual Financial Reports and AEU Executive Council's Reports to Annual National Committee, TUC Annual Reports, Labour 
Party Annual Reports. 
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b. AEU political fund 
 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
 Income 
(£) 
Expenditure 
Balance 
e/y (£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Labour party 
affiliation fees, 
grants etc 
Constituency 
organisation 
Grants to District 
Committees 
Elections 
exp. 
(£) 
as % of 
total 
exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total 
exp. 
exp. 
(£) 
as % of 
total 
exp. 
exp. 
(£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
1931 
     
10,522  
        
3,782  
               
6,459  
          
972  15.0 
           
595  9.2 
          
707  10.9 
     
3,224  49.9 
           
7,845  
1932 
        
7,845  
        
3,490  
               
3,029  
      
1,167  38.5 
           
305  10.1 
          
666  22.0     
           
8,307  
1933 
        
8,307  
        
3,355  
               
4,260  
      
1,805  42.4 
           
476  11.2 
          
613  14.4     
           
7,403  
1934 
        
7,403  
        
3,368  
               
4,384  
      
1,983  45.2 
           
816  18.6 
          
693  15.8 
         
228  5.2 
           
6,387  
1935 
        
6,387  
        
3,420  
               
6,219  
      
1,242  20.0 
           
800  12.9 
          
692  11.1 
     
2,514  40.4 
           
3,588  
1936 
        
3,588  
        
2,506  
               
3,942  
      
1,287  32.6 
           
440  11.2 
          
691  17.5     
           
2,152  
1937 
        
2,152  
        
3,266  
               
4,317  
      
1,942  45.0 
           
671  15.5 
          
800  18.5 
           
50  1.2 
           
1,101  
1938 
        
1,101  
        
3,260  
               
3,573  
      
1,470  41.1 
           
754  21.1 
          
738  20.7     
               
788  
1939 
           
788  
        
3,325  
               
3,149  
      
1,379  43.8 
           
600  19.1 
          
437  13.9     
               
964  
1940 
           
964  
        
3,336  
               
1,930  
          
400  20.7 
           
600  31.1 
          
540  28.0 
           
50  2.6 
           
2,370  
 
Sources: Calculated from AEU Annual Financial Reports and AEU Executive Council's Reports to Annual National Committee.   
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c. MFGB membership 
 
 
Sources: MFGB Annual Statements of Accounts in MFGB Annual Proceedings & Reports, TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports; 
Page Arnot, The Miners in Crisis and War. 
  
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Political 
 
Labour Party 
 
Total 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
 
 
Annual change 
 
 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
 
Pol. 
m'ship 
 
 
Annual change 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
as % 
of total 
m'ship 
 
as % 
of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
pol. 
m'ship 
1928 561,359     725,000 129.2 426,833     76.0           
1929 521,345 -40,014 -7.1% 600,000 115.1 359,808 -67,025 -15.7% 69.0 60.0 400,000       
1930 529,958 8,613 1.7% 600,000 113.2 356,647 -3,161 -0.9% 67.3 59.4 400,000       
1931 526,502 -3,456 -0.7% 600,000 114.0 354,631 -2,016 -0.6% 67.4 59.1 400,000 76.0 66.7 112.8 
1932 498,487 -28,015 -5.3% 600,000 120.4 348,019 -6,612 -1.9% 69.8 58.0 400,000 80.2 66.7 114.9 
1933 496,799 -1,688 -0.3% 500,000 100.6 368,236 20,217 5.8% 74.1 73.6 400,000 80.5 80.0 108.6 
1934 499,269 2,470 0.5% 500,000 100.1 383,273 15,037 4.1% 76.8 76.7 400,000 80.1 80.0 104.4 
1935 501,711 2,442 0.5% 500,000 99.7 392,456 9,183 2.4% 78.2 78.5 400,000 79.7 80.0 101.9 
1936 531,059 29,348 5.8% 500,000 94.2 419,599 27,143 6.9% 79.0 83.9 400,000 75.3 80.0 95.3 
1937 546,240 15,181 2.9% 518,423 94.9 404,860 -14,739 -3.5% 74.1 78.1 400,000 73.2 77.2 98.8 
1938 587,125 40,885 7.5% 538,468 91.7 437,636 32,776 8.1% 74.5 81.3 442,875 75.4 82.2 101.2 
1939 588,321 1,196 0.2% 584,442 99.3 424,905 -12,731 -2.9% 72.2 72.7 439,122 74.6 75.1 103.3 
1940 588,402 81 0.0% 588,888 100.1         428,079 72.8 72.7 
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d. MFGB political fund 
 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
Income Expenditure 
Balance 
e/y (£) from districts 
(£) 
retained by 
MFGB (£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Labour party affiliation 
fees, grants etc 
"Parliamentary 
salaries" 
Elections 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
1929-30 38,408 38,149 20,703 21,645 12,038 55.6 6,706 31.0   37,466 
1930-31 37,466 35,740 20,888 14,414 5,371 37.3 6,115 42.4 700 4.9 43,940 
1931 43,940 20,517 10,985 23,367 1,891 8.1 2,733 11.7 17,046 72.9 31,557 
1932 31,557 36,633 18,736 14,259 6,957 48.8 3,780 26.5   34,988 
1933 34,988 39,272 20,026 12,550 7,122 56.7 3,749 29.9 85 0.7 33,476 
1934 33,476 38,775 20,062 13,049 7,017 53.8 3,758 28.8 49 0.4 40,489 
1935 40,489 39,855 20,536 26,931 7,069 26.2 3,972 14.7 13,663 50.7 34,095 
1936 34,095 42,475 21,776 15,416 7,133 46.3 5,985 38.8   40,454 
1937 40,454 42,450 21,952 16,562 7,964 48.1 6,157 37.2   45,818 
1938 45,818 44,051 22,823 14,339 7,400 51.6 4,573 31.9 50 0.3 54,172 
1939 54,172 42,907 22,375 21,681 14,483 66.8 4,642 21.4 150 0.7 55,104 
1940 55,104 42,877 22,518 16,501 8,270 50.1 4,425 26.8   61,071 
  
Source: Calculated from MFGB Annual Statements of Accounts in MFGB Annual Proceedings & Reports  
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e. MFGB area political funds: South Wales and Durham 
 
Year 
South Wales Miners' Federation 
Durham Miners' 
Association 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
Total 
income (£) 
Expenditure (£) 
Balance 
e/y (£) 
Total exp. 
(£) 
Balance 
e/y 
Political 
Levy to 
MFGB 
To SWMF 
districts 
General 
election 
DLP affil. 
fees 
Total exp. 
1929                      17,238       21,304  
1930         1,778          4,677          1,521          2,092              3,613          2,842       12,370       23,662  
1931         2,842          7,585          3,769          1,646          2,585            9,145          1,283       16,195       28,892  
1932         1,283          3,747          2,000          1,902              3,902          1,128       11,585       32,577  
1933         1,128          3,851          3,000          1,304              4,554             425       11,387       35,712  
1934            425          6,105          2,625          1,691              4,531          1,998       12,563       38,249  
1935         1,998       10,878          3,000          2,213          3,883                617          9,713          3,164       17,086       38,919  
1936         3,164          7,166          3,500          1,855              1,381          7,144          3,186       12,646       41,514  
1937         3,186          9,159          3,500          1,976              1,521          6,997          5,348       15,162       41,912  
1938         5,348          9,072          4,625          2,356              1,783          8,764          5,655       17,958       39,292  
1939         5,655       10,485          4,500          2,248              2,101          9,168          6,972       14,142       39,811  
 
Sources: SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/1 SWMF Balance Sheets, 1918-39; Garside, The Durham Miners 1919-1960.  
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f. NUDAW membership 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Political 
 
Labour Party 
 
Total 
m'ship (e/y 
figure) 
 
Annual change 
 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
Political 
m'ship (e/y 
figure) 
 
Annual change 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
1929 111,847     108,766 97.2 85,590     76.5 78.7 70,000     
1930 116,208 4,361 3.9% 114,703 98.7 90,076 4,486 5.2% 77.5 78.5 85,590 73.7 74.6 
1931 119,623 3,415 2.9% 119,089 99.6 93,339 3,263 3.6% 78.0 78.4 90,076 75.3 75.6 
1932 123,206 3,583 3.0% 120,961 98.2 96,993 3,654 3.9% 78.7 80.2 93,339 75.8 77.2 
1933 127,611 4,405 3.6% 126,571 99.2 102,116 5,123 5.3% 80.0 80.7 100,256 78.6 79.2 
1934 134,021 6,410 5.0% 131,025 97.8 109,478 7,362 7.2% 81.7 83.6 106,937 79.8 81.6 
1935 144,675 10,654 7.9% 134,021 92.6 120,518 11,040 10.1% 83.3 89.9 116,000 80.2 86.6 
1936 158,103 13,428 9.3% 144,675 91.5 135,621 15,103 12.5% 85.8 93.7 125,000 79.1 86.4 
1937 171,789 13,686 8.7% 158,103 92.0 148,586 12,965 9.6% 86.5 94.0 137,000 79.7 86.7 
1938 182,633 10,844 6.3% 171,789 94.1 159,169 10,583 7.1% 87.2 92.7 150,000 82.1 87.3 
1939 193,906 11,273 6.2% 182,633 94.2 169,281 10,112 6.4% 87.3 92.7 160,000 82.5 87.6 
1940 223,487 29,581 15.3% 193,906 86.8 194,802 25,521 15.1% 87.2 100.5 170,000 76.1 87.7 
 
Sources: NUDAW Annual Reports, TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports 
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g.  NUDAW central political fund 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
 Income 
(£) 
Expenditure 
Balance 
end year 
(£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Labour party 
affiliation fees, grants 
etc 
Constituency 
organisation 
Local political funds Elections 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
1929 
        
7,374  
        
6,315  
        8,121  
        
1,084  
13.3% 
        
2,540  
31.3% 
           
632  
7.8% 
        
2,999  
36.9% 
        
5,568  
1930 
        
5,568  
        
8,327  
        6,381  
        
1,420  
22.3% 
        
2,134  
33.4% 
           
844  
13.2% 
           
798  
12.5% 
        
7,514  
1931 
        
5,393  
        
9,274  
        9,782  
        
2,478  
25.3% 
        
2,420  
24.7% 
        
1,455  
14.9% 
        
2,432  
24.9% 
        
7,006  
1932 
        
3,241  
        
9,580  
        6,322  
        
1,868  
29.5% 
        
1,517  
24.0% 
        
1,791  
28.3%     
     
10,265  
1933 
        
5,098  
     
10,040  
        7,482  
        
1,895  
25.3% 
        
2,410  
32.2% 
        
1,928  
25.8% 
           
175  
2.3% 
     
12,823  
1934 
        
6,238  
     
10,741  
        8,771  
        
2,490  
28.4% 
        
2,716  
31.0% 
        
2,477  
28.2%     
     
14,791  
1935 
        
7,147  
     
12,168  
     15,655  
        
2,190  
14.0% 
        
2,791  
17.8% 
        
3,942  
25.2% 
        
4,969  
31.7% 
     
11,306  
1936 
        
3,748  
     
14,211  
        9,777  
        
2,505  
25.6% 
        
1,953  
20.0% 
        
2,726  
27.9%     
     
15,740  
1937 
        
6,578  
     
15,690  
     10,743  
        
2,988  
27.8% 
        
1,683  
15.7% 
        
3,755  
35.0%     
     
20,688  
1938 
     
10,489  
     
16,982  
     11,481  
        
3,512  
30.6% 
        
1,891  
16.5% 
        
3,677  
32.0% 
           
141  
1.2% 
     
26,189  
1939 
     
14,509  
     
17,493  
     11,919  
        
4,394  
36.9% 
        
1,918  
16.1% 
        
3,065  
25.7%     
     
31,763  
1940 
     
17,841  
     
17,433  
     10,653  
        
3,581  
33.6% 
        
1,918  
18.0% 
        
2,712  
25.5%     
     
38,543  
 
Source: Calculated from NUDAW Annual Reports  
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h. NUGMW Membership 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Labour Party 
 
Political membership calculated from contributions 
 
Total 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
 
 
Annual change 
 
 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
 
Income 
(£) 
 
 
Pol. 
m'ship 
 
 
Annual change 
 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
 
as % of 
Labour 
aff'n 
 
Labour 
aff'n as 
% of pol. 
m'ship 
1928 283,906         289,393 101.9   14,448 216,720     76.3 74.9 133.5 
1929 290,877 6,971 2.5% 258,371 88.8 250,000 85.9 96.8 15,839 237,585 20,865 9.6% 81.7 95.0 105.2 
1930 282,903 -7,974 -2.7% 261,023 92.3 250,000 88.4 95.8 16,588 248,820 11,235 4.7% 88.0 99.5 100.5 
1931 267,734 -15,169 -5.4% 257,523 96.2 250,000 93.4 97.1 15,600 234,000 -14,820 -6.0% 87.4 93.6 106.8 
1932 241,998 -25,736 -9.6% 240,139 99.2 250,000 103.3 104. 13,934 209,010 -24,990 -10.7% 86.4 83.6 119.6 
1933 241,447 -551 -0.2% 220,398 91.3 242,000 100.2 10.8 12,997 194,955 -14,055 -6.7% 80.7 80.6 124.1 
1934 269,357 27,910 11.6% 229,934 85.4 242,000 89.8 05.2 13,779 206,685 11,730 6.0% 76.7 85.4 117.1 
1935 300,145 30,788 11.4% 252,422 84.1 242,000 80.6 95.9 14,966 224,490 17,805 8.6% 74.8 92.8 107.8 
1936 366,467 66,322 22.1% 260,130 71.0 242,000 66.0 93.0 16,526 247,890 23,400 10.4% 67.6 102.4 97.6 
1937 439,287 72,820 19.9% 339,821 77.4 242,000 55.1 71.2 18,463 276,945 29,055 11.7% 63.0 114.4 87.4 
1938 452,367 13,080 3.0% 405,359 89.6 242,000 53.5 59.7 18,876 283,140 6,195 2.2% 62.6 117.0 85.5 
1939 467,060 14,693 3.2% 417,131 89.3 242,000 51.8 58.0 18,855 282,825 -315 -0.1% 60.6 147.6 67.8 
1940 479,318 12,258 2.6% 430,354 89.8 242,000 50.5 56.2 19,230 288,450 5,625 2.0% 60.2 124.8 80.1 
 
Sources: NUGMW Half-Yearly Report and Balance Sheets, TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports. 
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i. NUGMW central political fund 
 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
 Income 
(£) 
Expenditure 
Balance 
end year 
(£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Labour party affiliation 
fees, grants etc 
Constituency 
organisation 
Local political funds Elections 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
1929 
        
7,374  
        
6,315  
        8,121          1,084  13.3 
        
2,540  
31.3 
           
632  
7.8 
        
2,999  
36.9 
        
5,568  
1930 
        
5,568  
        
8,327  
        6,381          1,420  22.3 
        
2,134  
33.4 
           
844  
13.2 
           
798  
12.5 
        
7,514  
1931 
        
5,393  
        
9,274  
        9,782          2,478  25.3 
        
2,420  
24.7 
        
1,455  
14.9 
        
2,432  
24.9 
        
7,006  
1932 
        
3,241  
        
9,580  
        6,322          1,868  29.5 
        
1,517  
24.0 
        
1,791  
28.3         10,265  
1933 
        
5,098  
     10,040          7,482          1,895  25.3 
        
2,410  
32.2 
        
1,928  
25.8 
           
175  
2.3      12,823  
1934 
        
6,238  
     10,741          8,771          2,490  28.4 
        
2,716  
31.0 
        
2,477  
28.2          14,791  
1935 
        
7,147  
     12,168       15,655          2,190  14.0 
        
2,791  
17.8 
        
3,942  
25.2 
        
4,969  
31.7      11,306  
1936 
        
3,748  
     14,211          9,777          2,505  25.6 
        
1,953  
20.0 
        
2,726  
27.9          15,740  
1937 
        
6,578  
     15,690       10,743          2,988  27.8 
        
1,683  
15.7 
        
3,755  
35.0          20,688  
1938      10,489       16,982       11,481          3,512  30.6 
        
1,891  
16.5 
        
3,677  
32.0 
           
141  
1.2      26,189  
1939      14,509       17,493       11,919          4,394  36.9 
        
1,918  
16.1 
        
3,065  
25.7          31,763  
1940      17,841       17,433       10,653          3,581  33.6 
        
1,918  
18.0 
        
2,712  
25.5          38,543  
 
 
Source: Calculated from NUGMW Half-Yearly Report and Balance Sheets.   
 
307 
 
j. NUR membership 
 
Year Total TUC Political Labour Party 
Total 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
Annual change TUC 
m'ship 
as % 
of 
total 
m'ship 
Political 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
Annual change as % of 
total 
m'ship 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
Labour 
Aff'n 
Annual change as % of 
total 
m'ship 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
as % of 
pol. 
m'ship 
1929 312,879     312,878 100.0           255,993           
1930 334,835 21,956 7.0% 310,330 92.7           241,170     72.0 77.7   
1931 295,268 -39,567 -11.8% 320,862 108.7 237,379     80.4 74.0 253,442 12,272 5.1% 85.8 79.0 106.8 
1932 289,925 -5,343 -1.8% 309,668 106.8 228,345 -9,034 -3.8% 78.8 73.7 234,729 -18,713 -7.4% 81.0 75.8 102.8 
1933 275,706 -14,219 -4.9% 284,842 103.3 216,493 -11,852 -5.2% 78.5 76.0 219,233 -15,496 -6.6% 79.5 77.0 101.3 
1934 290,723 15,017 5.4% 272,316 93.7 219,061 2,568 1.2% 75.4 80.4 207,465 -11,768 -5.4% 71.4 76.2 94.7 
1935 305,972 15,249 5.2% 290,723 95.0 222,347 3,286 1.5% 72.7 76.5 208,124 659 0.3% 68.0 71.6 93.6 
1936 337,848 31,876 10.4% 305,972 90.6 233,808 11,461 5.2% 69.2 76.4 216,613 8,489 4.1% 64.1 70.8 92.6 
1937 364,356 26,508 7.8% 337,848 92.7 245,183 11,375 4.9% 67.3 72.6 214,919 -1,694 -0.8% 59.0 63.6 87.7 
1938 366,659 2,303 0.6% 364,356 99.4 244,368 -815 -0.3% 66.6 67.1 224,809 9,890 4.6% 61.3 61.7 92.0 
1939 349,542 -17,117 -4.7% 366,658 104.9 229,789 -14,579 -6.0% 65.7 62.7 232,067 7,258 3.2% 66.4 63.3 101.0 
1940 361,750 12,208 3.5% 349,542 96.6 226,883 -2,906 -1.3% 62.7 64.9 220,359 -11,708 -5.0% 60.9 63.0 97.1 
 
Sources: NUR Annual Reports & Financial Statements and Annual Statements of Membership & Branch Grouping; NUR Political Sub-
committee Minute Book; TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports.  
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k. NUR central political fund 
 
 
Source: Calculated from NUR Annual Reports & Financial Statements. 
  
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
 Income 
(£) 
Expenditure 
Balance 
end year 
(£) 
Total 
expenditure (£) 
Labour party affiliation 
fees, grants etc 
Constituency 
organisation 
Elections 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
1929      76,388       13,063       20,439          3,637  17.8         4,463  21.8         9,637  47.2      72,904  
1930      72,904       13,728       12,448          5,034  40.4         4,503  36.2         77,926  
1931      77,926       12,715       24,772          5,862  23.7         3,573  14.4         8,417  34.0      69,777  
1932      69,777       11,875          9,681          4,251  43.9         1,667  17.2          75,684  
1933      75,684       11,238       12,352          4,687  37.9         3,037  24.6          78,173  
1934      78,173       11,273       10,608          3,981  37.5         2,850  26.9          82,573  
1935      82,573       11,733       26,558          7,929  29.9         2,935  11.1         9,819  37.0      71,892  
1936      71,892       11,641       10,550          5,065  48.0         1,592  15.1          74,801  
1937      74,801       12,177       17,234          9,538  55.3         1,786  10.4          71,614  
1938      71,614       12,570       12,624          4,376  34.7         1,896  15.0          73,399  
1939      73,399       11,936       16,618          5,814  35.0         2,156  13.0          70,506  
1940      70,506       11,421       10,736          4,636  43.2         2,113  19.7          72,786  
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l. NUR political fund: branches, aggregate 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
Expenditure (£) 
Balance 
e/y (£) Affil. 
fees 
Printing, 
goods 
Other Total 
1929 
     
37,413  
        
3,218  
           
509  
     
19,732  
     
23,458  
     
28,388  
1930 
     
28,388  
        
3,255  
           
365  
        
6,542  
     
10,162  
     
33,137  
1931 
     
33,137  
        
3,212  
           
448  
     
15,702  
     
19,362  
     
27,243  
1932 
     
27,543  
        
2,926  
           
550  
        
6,692  
     
10,169  
     
30,201  
1933 
     
30,201  
        
2,840  
           
467  
        
6,949  
     
10,255  
     
31,991  
1934 
     
31,991  
        
2,702  
           
527  
        
8,143  
     
11,372  
     
32,967  
1935 
     
32,966  
        
2,813  
           
405  
     
15,216  
     
18,434  
     
26,551  
1936 
     
26,541  
        
2,617  
           
579  
        
6,587  
        
9,783  
     
29,117  
1937 
     
29,116  
        
2,795  
           
485  
        
8,004  
     
11,284  
     
30,757  
1938 
     
30,756  
        
2,811  
           
511  
        
7,047  
     
10,392  
     
33,684  
1939 
     
33,684  
        
2,691  
           
498  
        
4,714  
        
7,904  
     
38,520  
1940 
     
38,520  
        
2,616  
           
526  
        
3,585  
        
6,627  
     
44,210  
 
Source: NUR Annual Reports & Financial Statements.  
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m. RCA membership 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Political 
 
Labour Party 
 
Total m'ship 
(e/y figure) 
 
Annual change 
 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
% 
m'ship 
paying 
levy 
 
Approx. 
pol. 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
as % of 
total 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % of 
pol. 
m'ship 
1929 54,347     52,500 96.6       43,500       
1930 59,473 5,126 9.4% 54,250 91.2       47,000 79.0 86.6   
1931 59,158 -315 -0.5% 58,500 98.9       48,000 81.1 82.1   
1932 58,964 -194 -0.3% 59,580 101.0 80.0 47,171 79.2 48,000 81.4 80.6 101.8 
1933 57,968 -996 -1.7% 58,972 101.7       48,000 82.8 81.4   
1934 58,677 709 1.2% 58,700 100.0       48,000 81.8 81.8   
1935 60,059 1,382 2.4% 58,677 97.7 81.94 49,212 83.9 48,000 79.9 81.8 97.5 
1936 60,931 872 1.5% 60,059 98.6 82.45 50,238 83.6 49,000 80.4 81.6 97.5 
1937 62,365 1,434 2.4% 60,931 97.7 83.05 51,794 85.0 49,000 78.6 80.4 94.6 
1938 64,106 1,741 2.8% 62,365 97.3 83.83 53,740 86.2 49,000 76.4 78.6 91.2 
1939 64,389 283 0.4% 64,106 99.6 84.68 54,525 85.1 50,000 77.7 78.0 91.7 
1940 69,877 5,488 8.5% 64,389 92.1       50,000 71.6 77.7   
 
Sources: RCA Annual Reports, TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports. 
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n. RCA central political fund 
 
Year Balance s/y (£) Total Income (£) Total Expenditure (£) Balance e/y (£) 
1928                        9,793                         7,135                                    5,288  11,641 
1929                     11,641                         7,552                                 12,743  6,449 
1930                        6,449                         8,361                                    5,792  9,018 
1931                        9,018                         8,403                                 12,091  5,330 
1932                        5,330                         7,940                                    5,615  7,654 
1933                        7,654                         7,684                                    6,465  8,874 
1934                        8,874                         7,760                                    6,152  10,481 
1935                     10,481                         8,061                                 14,660  3,883 
1936                        3,883                         8,670                                    6,773  5,779 
1937                        5,779                         9,074                                    7,773  7,081 
1938                        7,081                         9,648                                    6,874  9,855 
1939                        9,855                         9,394                                    5,339  13,911 
1940                     13,911                         9,136                                5,031  18,015 
 
Source: RCA Annual Reports.  
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o. TGWU membership 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
TUC 
 
Political 
 
Labour Party 
 
Total 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
 
Annual change 
 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % 
of 
total 
m'shi
p 
 
Political 
m'ship 
(e/y 
figure) 
 
Annual change 
 
as % 
of 
total 
m'shi
p 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
 
Labour 
Aff'n 
 
Annual change 
 
as % 
of 
total 
m'shi
p 
 
as % of 
TUC 
m'ship 
 
as % 
of 
pol. 
m'sh
ip 
1929 422,836     285,636 67.6 234,080     55.4 82.0 180,000     42.6 63.0 76.9 
1930 422,048 -788 -0.2% 388,932 92.2 255,100 21,020 9.0% 60.4 65.6 235,000 55,000 30.6% 55.7 60.4 92.1 
1931 408,734 -13,314 -3.2% 384,000 93.9 276,300 21,200 8.3% 67.6 72.0 250,000 15,000 6.4% 61.2 65.1 90.5 
1932 372,000 -36,734 -9.0% 390,000 104.8 273,800 -2,500 -0.9% 73.6 70.2 254,500 4,500 1.8% 68.4 65.3 93.0 
1933 378,869 6,869 1.8% 390,000 102.9 273,400 -400 -0.1% 72.2 70.1 171,508 -82,992 -32.6% 45.3 44.0 62.7 
1934 433,816 54,947 14.5% 368,000 84.8 308,186 34,786 12.7
% 
71.0 83.7 225,000 53,492 31.2% 51.9 61.1 73.0 
1935 493,266 59,450 13.7% 402,084 81.5 334,926 26,740 8.7% 67.9 83.3 247,715 22,715 10.1% 50.2 61.6 74.0 
1936 561,908 68,642 13.9% 459,738 81.8 338,790 3,864 1.2% 60.3 73.7 274,454 26,739 10.8% 48.8 59.7 81.0 
1937 654,510 92,602 16.5% 523,300 80.0 361,040 22,250 6.6% 55.2 69.0 301,000 26,546 9.7% 46.0 57.5 83.4 
1938 679,360 24,850 3.8% 611,000 89.9 393,559 32,519 9.0% 57.9 64.4 337,000 36,000 12.0% 49.6 55.2 85.6 
1939 694,474 15,114 2.2% 635,000 91.4 402,380 8,821 2.2% 57.9 63.4 380,000 43,000 12.8% 54.7 59.8 94.4 
1940 743,349 48,875 7.0% 648,000 87.2 428,364 25,984 6.5% 57.6 66.1 373,177 -6,823 -1.8% 50.2 57.6 87.1 
Sources: TGWU Annual Reports, TUC Annual Reports, Labour Party Annual Reports, Annual Returns to Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies. 
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p. TGWU central political fund 
Year 
Balance 
s/y (£) 
 Income 
(£) 
Expenditure 
 
Balance 
end 
year (£) 
Total 
expenditure 
(£) 
Labour party 
affiliation fees, 
grants etc 
Constituency 
organisation 
Remitted to TGWU 
Areas 
Elections 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total 
exp. 
exp. (£) 
as % of 
total 
exp. 
1930 
     
15,059  
     
12,776  
     10,192  
        
3,917  
38.4 
        
2,430  
23.8     
        
3,193  
31.3 
     
17,643  
1931 
     
17,643  
     
12,872  
     21,508  
        
4,104  
19.1 
        
2,158  
10.0 
        
6,705  
31.2 
        
3,634  
16.9 
        
9,006  
1932 
        
9,006  
     
11,623  
        9,432  
        
4,172  
44.2 
        
1,113  
11.8     
        
3,308  
35.1 
     
11,197  
1933 
     
11,197  
     
11,473  
        7,628  
        
2,187  
28.7 
        
1,218  
16.0     
        
3,219  
42.2 
     
15,042  
1934 
     
15,042  
     
12,625  
     11,895  
        
5,871  
49.4 
        
1,432  
12.0     
        
3,464  
29.1 
     
15,772  
1935 
     
15,772  
     
13,846  
     17,128  
        
4,195  
24.5 
        
1,300  
7.6 
        
6,796  
39.7 
        
3,828  
22.3 
     
12,489  
1936 
     
12,489  
     
15,308  
     11,031  
        
4,704  
42.6 
        
1,388  
12.6     
        
4,167  
37.8 
     
16,766  
1937 
     
16,766  
     
17,871  
     14,552  
        
5,784  
39.7 
        
2,125  
14.6     
        
4,763  
32.7 
     
20,086  
1938 
     
20,086  
     
20,270  
     14,588  
        
6,459  
44.3 
        
2,308  
15.8     
        
5,343  
36.6 
     
25,768  
1939 
     
25,768  
     
19,381  
     15,987  
        
7,265  
45.4 
        
2,312  
14.5     
        
5,301  
33.2 
     
29,179  
1940 
     
29,179  
     
17,988  
     14,981  
        
7,137  
47.6 
        
2,150  
14.4     
        
4,746  
31.7 
     
32,169  
 
Source: Calculated from TGWU Annual Reports 
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MSS.192/GMW/F/1/4 NUGMW, Quarterly balance sheets, 1930-31. 
 
National Union of Railwaymen 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/1 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1913. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/10 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1922. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/11 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1923. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/12 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1924. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/13 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1925. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/14 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1926. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/15 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1927. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/16 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1928. 
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MSS.127/NU/1/1/17 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1929. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/18 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1930. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/19 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1931. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/20 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1932. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/21 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1933. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/22 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1934. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/23 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1935. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/24 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1936. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/25 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1937. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/26 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1938. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/27 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1939. 
MSS.127/NU/1/1/28 NUR, Annual Proceedings and Reports, 1940. 
MSS.127/NU/1/4/1B NUR, AGM 1914, discussion on dual positions, political fund and 
political action. 
MSS.127/NU/1/4/2C NUR, AGM 1915, election of Parliamentary candidates, 
discussions. 
MSS.127/NU/1/8/1A-B NUR, Political Sub-committee minute-book & misc. 
MSS.127/NU/4/3/4 NUR, Partial Alteration of Rules, 1925. 
MSS.127/NU/4/3/5 NUR, Rules, 1935. 
MSS.127/NU/4/5/17i-ii NUR, Silver Jubilee Souvenir, 1938. 
MSS.127/NU/12/4 NUR, Photographs of NUR official Party candidates. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/2 NUR, miscellany re: J. H. Thomas. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/2 NUR, file re: resignation of J. H. Thomas. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5A NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, 1934. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5B NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Jan.-May 1935. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5C NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Jun.-Aug. 1935. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5D NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, Nov.-Dec. 1935. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/5E NUR, Mosley v. Marchbank material, 1936-38. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/24 NUR, file of biographical details of officials. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/25 NUR, file of biographical details of officials. 
MSS.127/NU/GS/3/26 NUR, Silver Jubilee material, 1938. 
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MSS.127/NU/PO/1/2 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1925-31. 
MSS.127/NU/PO/1/3 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1931-32. 
MSS.127/NU/PO/1/4 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1933-34. 
MSS.127/NU/PO/1/5 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1935-37. 
MSS.127/NU/PO/1/6 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1938-39. 
MSS.127/NU/PO/1/7 NUR, Political Department Minute Book, 1940-41. 
MSS.127/1990/18 Mosley v. Marchbank, bound court transcript. 
 
National Union of Seamen 
MSS.175/1/1/7 NUS, Minute Books, 1929-34. 
MSS.175/1/1/8 NUS, Minute Books, 1934-39. 
MSS.175/1/1/9 NUS, Minute Books, 1939-44. 
MSS.175/6/Jar/1-4 Charles Jarman Papers. 
 
Railway Clerks’ Association 
MSS.55/1/CON/56a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1931. 
MSS.55/1/CON/56b RCA, Annual Delegate Conference agendas etc, 1931. 
MSS.55/1/CON/57a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1932. 
MSS.55/1/CON/57b RCA, Annual Delegate Conference agendas etc, 1932. 
MSS.55/1/CON/58a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1933. 
MSS.55/1/CON/58b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1933, Vol. I. 
MSS.55/1/CON/59 RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1933, Vol. II. 
MSS.55/1/CON/60a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1934. 
MSS.55/1/CON/60b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1934, Vol. I. 
MSS.55/1/CON/61 RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1934, Vol. II. 
MSS.55/1/CON/62a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1935. 
MSS.55/1/CON/62b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1935, Vol. I. 
MSS.55/1/CON/63 RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1935, Vol. II. 
MSS.55/1/CON/64a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1936. 
MSS.55/1/CON/64b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1936. 
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MSS.55/1/CON/65a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1937. 
MSS.55/1/CON/65b RCA, Report of Annual Delegate Conference, 1937. 
MSS.55/1/CON/66a RCA, Minutes of Special Delegate Conference, 1938. 
MSS.55/1/CON/66b RCA, Special Delegate Conference agendas etc, 1938. 
MSS.55/1/CON/67/1 RCA, Annual Delegate Conference, shorthand notes, agendas 
etc, 1938. 
MSS.55/1/CON/68a RCA, Minutes of Annual Delegate Conference, 1939. 
MSS.55/1/CON/68b RCA, Annual Delegate Conference, agendas etc, 1939. 
MSS.55/1/CON/69/1 RCA, Annual Delegate Conference, shorthand notes, agendas 
etc, 1940. 
MSS.55/1/EC/15 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Jun. 1931-Nov. 1932. 
MSS.55/1/EC/16 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Dec. 1932-Feb. 1934. 
MSS.55/1/EC/17 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Mar. 1934-Mar. 1935. 
MSS.55/1/EC/18 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Apr. 1935-Sep. 1936. 
MSS.55/1/EC/19 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Oct. 1936-Mar. 1938. 
MSS.55/1/EC/20 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Apr. 1938-Apr. 1939. 
MSS.55/1/EC/21 RCA, Executive Committee Minutes, Apr. 1939- May 1940. 
MSS.55/4/AR/9 RCA, Annual Reports with accounts and balance sheets, 1926-30. 
MSS.55/4/AR/10 RCA, Annual Reports with accounts and balance sheets, 1931-35. 
MSS.55/4/AR/11 RCA, Annual Reports with accounts and balance sheets, 1936-40. 
MSS.55/4/HIS/1-6 RCA historical miscellany. 
MSS.55/4/POL/2-24 RCA policy statements, 1914-63. 
MSS.55/7/2/1-7 RCA, historical miscellany. 
MSS.55B/1/FI/4 RCA, Finance Committee Minutes, Apr. 1928-Nov. 1931. 
MSS.55B/1/FI/5 RCA, Finance Committee Minutes, Nov. 1931-Apr. 1935. 
MSS.55B/1/FI/6 RCA, Finance Committee Minutes, Apr. 1935-Dec. 1938. 
MSS.55B/1/FI/7 RCA, Finance Committee Minutes, Jan. 1939-Jul. 1942. 
MSS.55B/7/1 RCA, framed scrutineers’ report on Labour party affiliation, 1909. 
MSS.55B/7/2 RCA, framed political fund ballot result, 1913. 
 
Trades Union Congress 
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MSS.292/20/14 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1929-30. 
MSS.292/20/15 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1930-31. 
MSS.292/20/16 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1931-32. 
MSS.292/20/17 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1932-33. 
MSS.292/20/18 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1933-34. 
MSS.292/20/19 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1934-35. 
MSS.292/20/20 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1935-36. 
MSS.292/20/21 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1936-37. 
MSS.292/20/22 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1937-38. 
MSS.292/20/23 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1938-39. 
MSS.292/20/24 TUC General Council, Minutes, 1939-40. 
MSS.292/32/2 National Joint Council, Minutes, 1930-34. 
MSS.292/32/3 National Council of Labour, Minutes, 1934-37. 
MSS.292/32/4 National Council of Labour, Minutes, Oct. 1937-May 1939. 
MSS.292/32/5 National Council of Labour, Minutes, Jun. 1939-May 1941. 
MSS.292/32.1/1 National Council of Labour, correspondence, agendas etc. 
MSS.292/32.1/2 National Council of Labour, documents. 
MSS.292/32.3/1 National Council of Labour, Reports, Feb. 1932-Jul. 1934. 
MSS.292/32.3/2 National Council of Labour, Reports, Oct. 1934-Jul. 1937. 
MSS.292/32.3/3 National Council of Labour, Reports, Oct. 1937-Apr. 1940. 
MSS.292/32.3/4 National Council of Labour, Reports, Jun. 1940-Mar. 1943. 
MSS.292/33/2 TUC and Labour Party Joint Executives, Minutes, 1925-31. 
MSS.292/33/2 TUC and Labour Party Joint Executive Meetings, Minutes, 1938-45. 
MSS.292/43.2/1 TUC ‘Trade Union Political Fund. Contracting Out’ file, 1927-1934. 
MSS.292/560.1/1 TUC Economic Committee, Minutes, Apr. 1929-Jul. 1937. 
MSS.292/560.1/2 TUC Economic Committee, Minutes, Oct. 1937- Jul. 1939. 
MSS.292/560.1/3 TUC Economic Committee, Minutes, Nov. 1940-Sep. 1944. 
MSS.292/715.11/4 General Election 1931 file. 
MSS.292/715.11/5 General Election 1935 file. 
MSS.292/750.1/10 Labour Government 1924-29 file. 
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MSS.292/752/1 Labour Party correspondence, 1923-33. 
MSS.292/752/2 Labour Party correspondence, 1936-60. 
MSS.292/753/1 Parliamentary Labour Party correspondence etc, 1924-59. 
MSS.292/753/2 Labour Party – Parliamentary TU Group correspondence etc, 1925-
49. 
MSS.292/756.1/3 New Fabian Research Bureau, SSIP and Socialist League file. 
 
Transport and General Workers’ Union 
MSS.126/TG/754/1/1, TGWU, ‘Minutes of meetings of Members of Parliament who 
are members of and representatives of the Political and International 
Department of the Transport and General Workers’ Union’, 1922-27. 
MSS.126/TG/867/F/1 TGWU Financial Statements, 1935-37. 
MSS.126/TG/867/F/2 TGWU Financial Statements, 1938-46. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/1 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1922. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/2 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1923. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/3 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1924. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/4 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1925. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/5 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1926. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/6 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1927. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/7 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1928. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/8/1 TGWU, Report and Balance Sheet, Jan.-Aug. 1929. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/8/2 TGWU, Report and Balance Sheet, Aug.-Dec. 1929. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/9 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1930. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/10 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1931. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/11 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1932. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/12 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1933. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/13 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1934. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/14 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1935. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/15 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1936. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/16 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1937. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/17 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1938. 
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MSS.126/TG/1154/18 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1939. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/19 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1940. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/20 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1941. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/21 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1942. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/22 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1943. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/23 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1944. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/24 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1945. 
MSS.126/TG/1154/25 TGWU, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1946. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/2 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1923-24. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/3 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1925. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/4 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1926. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/5 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1927. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/6 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1928. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/7 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1929. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/8 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1930. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/9 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council and 
Finance and Emergency Committee, 1931. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/10 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and Emergency Committee, 1932. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/11 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1933. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/12 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1934. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/13 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1935. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/14 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1936. 
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MSS.126/TG/1186/A/15 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1937. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/16 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1938. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/17 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1939. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/A/18 TGWU, Minutes and reports of General Executive Council 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1940. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/R/3 TGWU, Reports of All-Ireland Delegate Conferences, 1930-
38. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/R/4 TGWU, General Executive Council, reports of sub-committees 
and Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1931-40. 
MSS.126/TG/1186/R/4 TGWU, General Executive Council, memoranda submitted to 
Council, 1931-40. 
MSS.126/TG/1232/D/1 TGWU, Reports of the Financial Secretary and Financial 
Statements, 1923-30. 
MSS.126/TG/1232/D/2 TGWU, Reports of the Financial Secretary and Financial 
Statements, 1938-45. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1925. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/2 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1927. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/3/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1929. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/3/2 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, final agenda, 1929. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/4/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1931. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/4/2 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, souvenir and 
programme, 1931. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/4/3 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, record of decisions, 
1931. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/5/ TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1933. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/6/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1935. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/6/2 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, record of decisions, 
1935. 
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MSS.126/TG/1887/7 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1937. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/8/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1939. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/4/2 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, souvenir, 1939. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/9/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1941. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/9/2-4 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, agenda, circulars 
and speeches, 1941. 
MSS.126/TG/1887/10/1 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, Minutes and record, 
1943. 
MSS.126/Z/132 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, final agenda, 1931. 
MSS.126/Z/133 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, souvenir and programme, 
1933. 
MSS.126/Z/134 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, final agenda, 1933. 
MSS.126/Z/135 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, agenda, 1935. 
MSS.126/Z/136 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, agenda, 1937. 
MSS.126/Z/137 TGWU, Biennial Delegate Conference, resolutions etc, 1937. 
 
TGWU Ernest Bevin papers 
MSS.126/EB/SS/1/1-16 Ernest Bevin papers, SSIP file. 
MSS.126/EB/X/12 Ernest Bevin papers, correspondence, 1930-36. 
MSS.126/EB/X/23 Ernest Bevin papers, notes of discussions, 1936-40. 
 
United Patternmakers’ Association 
MSS.101/P/1/10 UPA, Minute Book, 1930-31. 
MSS.101/P/1/11 UPA, Minute Book, 1932-33. 
MSS.101/P/1/12 UPA, Minute Book, 1934. 
MSS.101/P/1/13 UPA, Minute Book, 1935. 
MSS.101/P/1/14 UPA, Minute Book, 1936. 
MSS.101/P/1/15 UPA, Minute Book, 1937. 
MSS.101/P/1/16 UPA, Minute Book, 1938. 
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MSS.101/P/1/17 UPA, Minute Book, 1939. 
MSS.101/P/1/18 UPA, Minute Book, 1940. 
MSS.101/P/4/1/11 UPA, Annual Reports, 1929-34. 
MSS.101/P/4/1/12 UPA, Annual Reports, 1935-40. 
 
Workers’ Union 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/17 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1922. 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/18 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1923. 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/19 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1924. 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/20 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1925. 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/21 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1926. 
MSS.126/WU/4/1/22 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1928. 
MSS.126/WU/X/1 WU-TGWU, proposed amalgamation scheme. 
MSS.126/WU/X/2-6 WU, Rule Books, 1899-1929. 
MSS.126/WU/X/9 WU, Annual Report and statement of accounts, 1927. 
MSS.126/WU/X/10 WU, Seven months’ report and statement of accounts, 1929. 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
 
Chief Registrar for Friendly Societies 
FS 12 Annual Returns to the Chief Registrar. 
FS 32 Annual Reports of the Chief Registrar. 
 
Oldham Local Studies & Archives, Oldham 
 
United Textile Factory Workers’ Association 
TU/3/1/3 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1929-30. 
TU/3/1/4 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1930-32. 
TU/3/1/5 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1932. 
TU/3/1/6 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1933. 
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TU/3/1/7 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1934. 
TU/3/1/8 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1935. 
TU/3/1/9 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1936-37. 
TU/3/1/10 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1938. 
TU/3/1/11 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1939. 
TU/3/1/12 UTFWA, Legislative Council, Minutes 1940. 
TU/3/2/1 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1928. 
TU/3/2/2 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1932. 
TU/3/2/3 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1933. 
TU/3/2/4 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1935. 
TU/3/2/5 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1936. 
TU/3/2/6 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1937. 
TU/3/2/7 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1938. 
TU/3/2/9 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1940. 
TU/3/2/10 UTFWA, Report of Proceedings at the Annual Conference, 1941. 
TU/3/2/13 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1926. 
TU/3/2/14 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, Jun.-Dec.1928. 
TU/3/2/15 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1930. 
TU/3/2/16 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1932. 
TU/3/2/17 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1933. 
TU/3/2/18 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1934. 
TU/3/2/19 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1936. 
TU/3/2/20 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1937. 
TU/3/2/21 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1938. 
TU/3/2/22 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1939. 
TU/3/2/23 UTFWA, Report and Balance Sheet, 1940. 
TU/3/4/10 UTFWA, Political Sub-Committee, correspondence etc., 1930-35. 
TU/3/4/10 UTFWA, Financial arrangements with Constituency Labour Parties, 
correspondence etc., 1931-39. 
 
Richard Burton Archives, Swansea University 
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Miners’ Federation of Great Britain 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/1/1/29 MFGB Proceedings and Reports, 1931 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/1/1/30 MFGB Proceedings and Reports, 1932 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/10/16 MFGB ‘Report on Organisation’, 1932 
 
South Wales Miners’ Federation 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/1 SWMF Balance Sheets, 1918-39 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/2/31 SWMF Political Levy Account 1942-46 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/3/10 SWMF Correspondence, 1933-41 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/3/58 SWMF Political Correspondence 
SWCC.MNA/NUM/3/3/60 SWMF Correspondence re: international affairs 
 
Usdaw Central Office, Manchester 
 
National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers 
NUDAW and NAUSA, Documents re: Proposed Amalgamation, 1937 and 1946. 
NUDAW, Annual Reports, 1921-35. 
NUDAW, Annual Reports, 1936-46. 
NUDAW, Annual Delegate Meeting Agendas and Minutes, 1929-33. 
NUDAW, Annual Delegate Meeting Agendas and Minutes, 1934-40. 
NUDAW, Annual Delegate Meeting Printed Reports, 1935-46. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1929. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1930. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1931. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1932. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1933. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1934. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1935. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1936. 
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NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1937. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1938. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1939. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1940. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1941. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1942. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1943. 
NUDAW, Executive Council Minutes, 1944. 
NUDAW, Leaflet Collection, 1921-46. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1924. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1925. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1926. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1927. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1928. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1929. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1930. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1931. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1932. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1933. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1934. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1935. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1936. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1937. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1938. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1939. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1940. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1941. 
NUDAW, Political Secretary’s Reports to Executive Council, 1942. 
NUDAW, Rule Books, 1930-1940. 
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Working Class Movement Library, Salford 
 
Amalgamated Engineering Union 
TU/ENG/1/A/37, AEU, Bound Reports, 1933. 
TU/ENG/1/A/38, AEU, Bound Reports, 1934. 
TU/ENG/1/A/39, AEU, Bound Reports, 1935. 
TU/ENG/1/A/40, AEU, Bound Reports, 1936. 
TU/ENG/1/A/41, AEU, Bound Reports, 1937. 
TU/ENG/1/A/42, AEU, Bound Reports, 1938. 
TU/ENG/1/A/43, AEU, Bound Reports, 1939. 
TU/ENG/1/A/44, AEU, Bound Reports, 1940. 
TU/ENG/3/A/3 AEU, National Conference and Committee Reports, 1927-1933. 
TU/ENG/3/A/4 AEU, National Conference and Committee Reports, 1934-1937. 
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